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
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The 5th Army Corps






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GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

**Major-General U. S. Army,
May 14, 1861, to Nov. 8, 1864.
Died October 29, 1885.**

THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS

(ARMY OF THE POTOMAC)

A RECORD OF OPERATIONS DURING THE CIVIL
WAR IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1861-1865

BY,

WILLIAM H. POWELL

Lieut.-Col. 11th Inf., U. S. A.

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

We stormed no time-worn castle walls,
Nor camped in grand old marble halls,
But on the endless Roll of Fame,
By deeds of blood, we placed a name
That will remain till Time's no more—
The honored, brave FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK

27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET

LONDON

24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND

The Knickerbocker Press

1896



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BY
WM. H. POWELL

The Knickerbocker Press, New Rochelle, N. Y.

PREFACE.

THE history of the Fifth Army Corps is so replete with incident, so full of brilliant action, and so varied regarding the record of several of its commanders, that the historian has felt some trepidation in attempting to unravel the tangled thread of events connected with a five-years' war. Colonel Carswell McClellan commenced the task of writing this history, and though he had gathered much data for the purpose he had scarcely penetrated the veil of events when he was summoned to attend his "last roll-call." It was then left to the Society of the Fifth Army Corps to entrust the history of its services to another historian; and at the annual meeting held in Scranton, Pa., in June, 1892, the undersigned was requested to take upon himself the arduous duty.

A so-called "Chapter from the Forthcoming History of the Fifth Army Corps" on the subject of the battle of Gettysburg, published in one of the New York dailies some two years ago, led many to suppose that the history of the Fifth Corps had been completed at that time up to and beyond the period to which the publication pertained. This was not so. Neither will that chapter appear within these pages, as the discussion entered into there bears but little upon the history of the Fifth Corps. The truth is that, when

the present historian took charge of the work, an account of the Peninsula campaign had not been completed, nor had a single map been drawn for reference.

As men differ very much, not only in their ideas but in their style of writing, the undersigned concluded that it was best to commence with the first chapter and produce the work in his own way—poor and simple as that may be. He has endeavored to tell the story of the noble old Corps, with as many details as was permissible with the extent of the work, and trusts that those who solicited him to take upon himself this task will not be disappointed in what he has produced.

W. H. POWELL.

WHIPPLE BARRACKS, ARIZONA,
June 1, 1895.

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THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE BANKS OF THE POTOMAC—ORGANIZATION— MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA—SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

BULL RUN, Va., had gained place in history!

On July 27, 1861, in compliance with the urgent and unsolicited order of President Lincoln, General George B. McClellan assumed command of the Division of the Potomac, and the organization of the Army of the Potomac commenced. Early in August, 1861, General Wm. T. Sherman was transferred to duty in the West, and Brigadier-General Fitz John Porter was assigned to command Sherman's brigade, then stationed at Fort Corcoran, in the defenses of Washington. This brigade was composed of the 2d Maine, 13th and 41st New York, 9th and 14th Massachusetts, and 4th Michigan regiments of infantry, together with Hamilton's battery (E) of the 3d U. S. Artillery and Troop I, 2d U. S. Cavalry.

General Porter brought to the task laid upon him

a clear and brilliant record and a character and personality to the impress of which was due much of the fame won by those who entered the struggle for national existence under his command. Born in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1822—a son of Captain John Porter, of the U. S. Navy, and nephew of Commodore David Porter, of *Essex* renown—he worthily bore a name demanding grateful recognition from his countrymen. He graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1845, eighth in a class which numbered 123. In July, 1846, as lieutenant in the 4th U. S. Artillery, he joined the army operating against Mexico at Point Isabel, Texas, and saw active service at Saltillo; and with General Scott's army participated in the siege of Vera Cruz, the battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, and Molino del Rey, the storming of Chapultepec and the capture of the city of Mexico. At the capture of the Garita de Belen he was wounded, the other officers of his company were killed, and 27 out of 30 non-commissioned officers and privates were killed or wounded. For gallant and meritorious conduct at Molino del Rey and the city of Mexico, he was brevetted successively captain and major. In 1856, he was appointed assistant adjutant-general and was assigned to the staff of General Persifer F. Smith, and served with that officer during the Kansas troubles. In 1857 he was ordered to report to General Albert Sidney Johnston, and served with that officer during the Utah campaign.

The estimate in which Major Porter was held by those under whom he served may be gathered from the following endorsement placed upon a private letter written during the Utah campaign, as follows :

“ This is a private letter from Johnston's chief of staff, but very interesting. I wish the Secretary of War may find time to read and return it. . . . This familiar letter, written in the freedom of friendship, is full of information and encouragement. Asking the Secretary's indulgence towards the capital soldier—gallant, intelligent, and frank—the Department cannot fail to profit by its perusal, and so may the commander of the Utah reinforcements.

“ WINFIELD SCOTT.”

In November, 1860, Major Porter, being on duty at the headquarters of the army as assistant inspector-general, by order of the War Department inspected the defenses of Charleston harbor and recommended that they should be strengthened and supplied with additional force, ammunition, and provisions. As a result of this inspection, Major Robert Anderson was placed in command at that point.

The secession of the Southern States having begun, Hon. Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, being Secretary of War, Major Porter, in February, 1861, was sent to Texas with confidential orders and authority from the War Department, and by the exercise of great judgment, patience, and tact, saved to the service of the country a considerable body of regular troops, which would otherwise have been lost through the disloyalty of General Twiggs, and reinforced the garrisons of Key West and Dry Tortugas.

In April, 1861, being on duty in the Adjutant-General's office at Washington, Major Porter was selected by the Secretary of War, Hon. Simon Cameron, and by General Scott, to superintend the protection of the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg against Baltimore rioters. By his discharge of this duty he gained the entire and never-shaken confidences of Secretary Cameron and Governor Curtin,

of Pennsylvania. This confidence was strengthened by the following circumstance: Governor Curtin had received and handed to Major Porter, who was in his office, the following dispatch:

“Governor A. G. CURTIN, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:

“ST. LOUIS, MO., April 21, 1861.

“An officer of the army here has received an order to muster in Missouri regiments. General Harney refuses to let them remain in the Arsenal grounds, or permit them to be armed. I wish these facts to be communicated to the Secretary of War by special messenger and instructions sent immediately to Harney to receive the troops at the Arsenal and arm them. Our friends distrust Harney very much. He should be superseded immediately by putting another commander in the district. The object of the secessionists is to seize the Arsenal here with its 20,000 stand of arms, and he refuses the means of defending it. We have plenty of men but no arms.

“FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.”¹

A previous message had asked that Captain N. Lyon, 2d U. S. Infantry, should be assigned as mustering officer and authorized to arm and command the troops. In reply, Major Porter had informed Mr. Blair that Lieutenant J. M. Schofield, 3d U. S. Artillery, then in St. Louis, had been detailed to muster in the troops. To communicate with the Secretary of War from Harrisburg at that time required at least three days, therefore Major Porter, having received from the Secretary of War verbal authority “to use his name for any good and lawful purpose,” on reading Mr. Blair’s dispatch to Governor Curtin, was convinced that the emergency required of him the exercise of that authority, and at once sent the following dispatches:

¹ See testimony of Hons. Montgomery Blair and Frank P. Blair, *Report of Committee on Conduct of the War*, 37th Congress, 3d Session, Part 3.

TO GENERAL HARNEY, COMMANDING, ST. LOUIS.

"Captain Nathaniel Lyon, 2d Infantry, is detailed to muster in the troops at St. Louis, and to use them for the protection of the public property. You will see that they are properly armed and equipped.

"By order of Lieutenant-General Scott :

"F. J. PORTER, A. A. G.

"HARRISBURG, PA., April 21, 1861."

TO CAPTAIN SETH WILLIAMS, A. A. G., ST. LOUIS.

"HARRISBURG, PA., April 21, 1861.

"Captain N. Lyon, 2d Infantry, is detailed to muster in troops in St. Louis, and use them for the defense of public property.

"By order of Lieutenant-General Scott :

"F. J. PORTER, A. A. G."

TO HON. FRANK P. BLAIR, JR., ST. LOUIS, MO.

"HARRISBURG, PA., April 21, 1861.

"Captain N. Lyon, 2d Infantry, has been detailed to muster in the troops at St. Louis, and to use them for the protection of public property.

"By order of the Secretary of War :

"F. J. PORTER, A. A. G."

Similar telegrams were sent to the commanding officer of the Arsenal and to Captain Lyon. All were reported as received at East St. Louis in order to prevent their being known to secessionists in St. Louis. Both the Secretary of War and General Scott approved this action when reported to them on Major Porter's return to Washington at the end of April, and Mr. Blair subsequently thanked him for the prompt action "which saved Missouri to the Union."

At this time Major Porter was assigned as Chief of Staff to General Robert Patterson, then commanding the Department of Pennsylvania, and the organi-

zation of the three months' volunteers in Pennsylvania for the protection of the country north of the Potomac became also included in his duties. Until August, 1861, he remained with this army in the field, under General Patterson and his successor, General Banks.

In recognition of these services, Major Porter was appointed colonel of the 15th U. S. Infantry, to date May 14, 1861, and immediately afterward, at the request of General McClellan, was made brigadier-general of volunteers, to date May 17, 1861. For a short time he was on duty in Washington City, organizing the arriving troops into regiments and brigades, and was then assigned to the command that found him in the germ of the Fifth Army Corps. Born a patriot; ambitious, but unselfish; self-respecting and self-denying; thoroughly equipped and void of ostentation; imperturbable and unflinching; self-reliant, but never egotistic; prudent without trace of fear; reserved, yet sympathetic; quiet, but quick to see, decide, and act; courteous and careful to avoid offense, if possible, yet without "strange oaths" or other foreign aid,¹ conveying with an order given the conviction that obedience must follow, his influence was ever present and controlling.

Most of the regiments of Sherman's brigade, at the time General Porter assumed command of it, were new in service, but two (2d Maine and 13th New York) had joined the army at the outbreak of the

¹ In 1878, General S. M. Weld, on oath, declared that he did not know that he ever heard General Porter swear; that he did not think he ever heard him say "damn," but admitted that *possibly* he damned the teamsters on the road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station on the morning of August 28, 1862. If this possible exception should prove a verity, the strictest morality will, under the circumstances, either now or hereafter, scarcely count the lapse as vicious.

war, and had partaken of the experiences of the three-months' campaign, the first mentioned in Keyes' brigade, and the other in Sherman's brigade.

The 2d Maine was the first regiment to leave that State for the seat of war. At Bull Run, July 21, 1861, it so behaved as to win warm praise from both division and brigade commanders—its list of killed and wounded counting 55 out of the 87 reported as the aggregate of its brigade. Immediately after that battle, its first colonel, Charles D. Jameson, was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and was succeeded in command of the regiment by Colonel Charles W. Roberts, previously lieutenant-colonel. At Bangor, Maine, the regiment had been mustered into the United States service for three months, and afterwards, while *en route* to Washington, it was re-mustered at Willet's Point, N. Y., for two years.

The 13th New York was the first regiment raised under the act of the Legislature of the State of New York (April, 1861) authorizing the Governor to call for 30,000 volunteers to be enrolled in the State service for two years, with the understanding that they would be mustered into the service of the United States for that period, if desired. Under instructions from Washington, the regiment was mustered into the United States service for three months at Elmira, May 14, 1861, notwithstanding the protest of its commander, who desired to muster for the full term of two years. This regiment had also acquitted itself creditably at Bull Run.

In common with all, these regiments labored under the demoralization consequent upon that first unfortunate campaign, and when the three-months' regiments with which they had been associated were sent

home to be mustered out, they claimed the same privilege and demanded their discharge. The Government, however, refused to recognize their claims and mutiny was the result. Some members of the regiments had already been sentenced to confinement at the Dry Tortugas for punishment, and the regiments were held within the limits of their respective camps. With the exception of about sixty men (most of whom were eventually brought back to the regiment near White House landing, and afterwards gained the hearty commendation of their brave colonel, Roberts), the 2d Maine had accepted the situation and returned to duty ; but in the 13th New York the dissatisfaction was still openly manifested. Colonel I. F. Quimby, who had raised the regiment and led it to the front, had resigned August 5, 1861, rather than resort to the extreme measures necessary to quell a mutiny which he had anticipated (and had warned the authorities) might result from the peculiar muster insisted upon by the War Department. Many other officers had tendered their resignations, and both officers and men refused to do duty. New regiments arriving on the ground sympathized with them in their trials, believing that they had been unjustly and harshly treated, and a spirit fatal to discipline was fast growing in the command.

In this condition General Porter found the brigade. Assembling the 13th New York on parade, he called the officers to the front ; then appealing to their good sense and patriotism, he pointed out the errors they had committed and urged them to be true to the cause to which they had sworn allegiance, true to their own honor, and to the credit of their friends at home. Dismissing them from parade, he insisted that they

should teach their subordinates submission to the rules of service and maintain discipline. There was no further trouble. In a few days the 2d Maine and 13th New York, in their drills and labors in camp, were giving their companion regiments the benefit of their better experiences, and immediately there ensued a competition for excellence in all military details—a healthy rivalry that never after flagged in camp, upon the march, or on the battle-field.

New regiments being rapidly added to the command, two additional brigades were formed, and Sherman's brigade was merged into Porter's division. Himself free from political aspirations and entanglements, and anxious to aid, as far as was in his power, in placing the national forces upon a footing that would make the Government deal most speedily and adequately with those who were in arms against it, rather than with possible electoral problems in days to come, the division commander desired to deliver his subordinates from the temptations of politics, that he might better secure their assistance towards increasing the efficiency of the command. Therefore, each brigade of the division was formed, as far as possible, of troops from different States. The result sustained his judgment. Pride and emulation in military proficiency were stimulated and maintained.

March 13, 1862, by transfers from, into and in the division, it had reached its permanent organization, as follows :

First Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. J. H. MARTINDALE commanding.

2d Maine, Col. Chas. N. Roberts.

13th New York, Col. Jno. Pickell.

HISTORY OF

18th Massachusetts, Col. James Barnes.
 22d Massachusetts, Col. Jesse A. Gove.
 25th New York, Col. Chas. A. Johnson.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. GEORGE W. MORELL commanding.

14th New York, Col. James McQuade.
 9th Massachusetts, Col. Thos. Cass.
 4th Michigan, Col. D. A. Woodbury.
 62d Pennsylvania, Col. S. W. Black.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD commanding.

12th New York, Col. H. A. Weeks.
 44th New York, Col. S. W. Stryker.
 17th New York, Col. H. S. Lansing.
 83d Pennsylvania, Col. Jno. W. McLane.
 16th Michigan, Col. T. W. B. Stockton.

Artillery.

Captain CHAS. GRIFFIN commanding.

Griffin's Battery D, 5th U. S.
 Martin's Battery C, Massachusetts.
 Weeden's Battery C, Rhode Island.
 Allen's Battery E, Massachusetts.

Unattached.

1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Col. Hiram Berdan.
 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, Col. Wm. W. Averell.

Generals Morell and Martindale had been classmates at the Military Academy at West Point, the former having graduated first and the latter third in the class of 1835. Morell had been commissioned second lieutenant Corps of Engineers, and served as such until June 30, 1837, when he resigned. He had

engaged in civil engineering until 1839, but from 1842 to 1861, had practised as counsellor-at-law in New York City, being Commissioner of the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York from 1854 to 1861. General Martindale had been commissioned brevet second lieutenant 1st U. S. Dragoons, but had never served, being on leave of absence from July 1, 1835, to March 10, 1836, when he resigned. He also had engaged in civil engineering for a brief period and then became counsellor-at-law, practising as such at Batavia and Rochester, N. Y., from 1838 to 1861, being district attorney of Genesee County, N. Y., for two terms.

General Butterfield was not a graduate of West Point, but he had been colonel of the 12th New York State Militia, an organization dating from May 6, 1847. When rumor was current that effort would be made to prevent the installation of President-elect Lincoln, this regiment volunteered to accompany him to the national capital as a safeguard, submitting—but other means were subsequently adopted—to General Scott a plan and details, which he approved. On April 21, 1861, with nine companies filled to the maximum standard, it left New York for Washington, where, on May 2d, it was mustered into the service of the United States for three months, and on May 23d crossed Long Bridge—*the first Union regiment to tread Virginia soil* in the advance across the Potomac of that date. On July 9, 1861, the regiment was transferred to General Patterson's command, and remained with the army in the Shenandoah valley until its term of service expired.

General Porter's attention had been attracted by the admirable bearing of this regiment, and he had

solicited and obtained the appointment of Colonel Butterfield to be brigadier-general, and his assignment to Porter's command. General Butterfield proved, as General Porter had anticipated, a strict disciplinarian,¹ and an admirable drill officer.

Another potent factor in the development of the corps must not be overlooked in the glitter of the grouping stars. It would be no history of the Fifth Army Corps that had not running through it from cover to cover the name of FRED T. LOCKE. No matter where one found him, he was ever the courteous gentleman, the brave soldier, and the efficient officer, as all those who were brought in contact with him will readily testify. While this history was being written (1893) this gallant officer closed his labors on earth, the historian having been in cheerful conversation with him two days before he died.²

¹ This is best evidenced by the tribute lately paid him by one of his old brigade, Parkinson, of the 44th New York, in the following language :

"For a time I don't think I ever hated a man more in my life than I did General Butterfield ; he drilled us so unmercifully, as we then thought. It was 'double-quick' from morning until night, and sometimes at midnight, to see how well we could do it. If all the balls which the boys vowed would go through him in our first engagement had done so, he would have been riddled worse than any coal-sieve you ever saw, and I don't think he would be here today. But he never was afraid of balls. And when we realized his worthy purpose in thus drilling or disciplining his men, which we did not fully until the enemy had been met, and upon the field beheld amid those exciting scenes that his usual stern countenance was wreathed in smiles, as dashing up and down the line, amid the leaden hail, with waving sword, he would cry, 'Come on, boys, give them a Roland for their Oliver !' Then, amid the red-hot shot of the gory field we became acquainted with our leader, and strong hatred was turned to stronger love."

² The following is taken from the *Morning Advertiser*, of New York City, on the occasion of General Locke's death :

"Gen. Fred T. Locke, who died recently in New York City, was one of the most noticeable and at the same time one of the most industrious officers on duty during the late war. As Assistant Adjutant-General of the Fifth Corps, under Porter, Hooker, Butterfield, Meade, Sykes, Warren, and Griffin, he took rank with men most thoroughly equipped by education and experience for the

The 18th Massachusetts was recruited during July and August, 1861, at Camp Brigham, Readville, Mass., and on August 26th left that camp for the front, reaching Washington by the way of Harrisburg and Baltimore. For a short time it was in camp at Fort Corcoran, and early in October it was moved forward to Hall's Hill. The officers of this regiment were appointed, not elected. Its commander, Colonel James Barnes, was graduated from the Military Academy at West Point, fifth in the class of 1829, in which Robert E. Lee had been graduated second, and Joseph E. Johnston thirteenth. Colonel Barnes had resigned his commission as first lieutenant of the 4th

responsible position he held, and, although so strict a disciplinarian as at times to be reckoned a martinet, he was always just, often extremely lenient, and from the beginning to the end of his military career enjoyed to the utmost the respect and confidence of every soldier brought in contact with him. The General, while seldom free to absent himself from his post of duty, was a genial companion, and there were few men as much occupied with the duties of office who had a keener sense of humor or relished a joke more than he. When the Fifth Corps was in winter quarters at Stoneman's Switch, opposite Fredericksburg, in January, 1863, it was in his business tent that a Pennsylvania captain, who had just finished Wilbur's translation of Hugo's greatest work, said to him: 'Colonel, *Les Miserables* is a hefty thing to handle, ain't it?'

" 'Well, Captain,' said the Colonel, 'if all the Pennsylvania regiments stand up to the rack as well as yours does we'll not find Lee's *Miserables* quite as hefty to handle hereafter.'

"Colonel Locke was an involuntary listener to the remarkable interview between General Meade, Zach Chandler, and Ben Wade, at the same camp, when Meade replied to the objections the Senators had offered against his appointment as Brigadier-General. He was born, they said, south of Mason and Dixon's line, and they would not trust the chicken hatched from an egg laid in that region. 'Gentlemen,' said the soldier, 'had I known that in time I might find my progress impeded by statesmen so eminent as Wade, of Ohio, and Chandler, of Michigan, I should have selected other parents. As to the place of my birth, let me say I was born under the American flag, I have lived and fought under it, and shall die under it.' The Senators were not aware of the fact that George G. Meade was born in Madrid, Spain, and that the Stars and Stripes floated over the house at the time he was ushered into the world.

"General Locke took great pleasure in telling this story, and much pride, too, in giving voice to his opinion that George G. Meade was one of the grandest soldiers that ever smelled powder."

U. S. Artillery, in 1836, and became engaged in the practice of civil engineering and the construction of railways. Thoroughly capable and earnest in his service, his best description is the record of his regiment.

Immediately after the first Bull Run disaster, during a recess of Congress, Hon. Henry Wilson, Senator from Massachusetts, in fulfilment of a promise given the President to aid the enlistment of regiments in his State, in which he had held the rank of General of Militia, proposed to Governor Andrew to raise a brigade, comprising infantry, artillery, cavalry, and sharpshooters. His offer was gladly accepted, but circumstances, particularly the necessity for forwarding regiments to the front as speedily as possible, modified the original plan. On September 2, 1861, the companies that became the 22d Massachusetts, went into camp at Lynnfield, twelve miles from Boston. These companies had all been raised within thirty-five miles of that city. On September 28, 1861, by special order from the Governor of Massachusetts, the regiment was created and Colonel Henry Wilson assigned to the command. By the same order the 3d Battery of Light Artillery, Captain D. H. Follett, and the 2d Company of Sharpshooters, Captain Lewis E. Wentworth, recruited under the same auspices, were attached to Colonel Wilson's command, with which, on October 8, 1861, he left Lynnfield for the seat of war, the regimental colors having been presented, in behalf of the citizens of Boston, by Hon. Robert C. Winthrop. The regiment reached Washington, October 11th, and on the 13th moved into camp on Hall's Hill. On Sunday, October 27th, Colonel Wilson, having accomplished his

end in raising his command and placing it at the front, resigned his commission and resumed his senatorial duties. He was succeeded in command of the regiment by Jesse A. Gove, captain of the 10th U. S. Infantry, an accomplished and meritorious officer, who had served in the war with Mexico and in the Utah campaign of 1857-8 under General Albert S. Johnston. Captain Follett resigned his commission as captain of the Light Battery, November 27, 1861, and was succeeded by Captain A. P. Martin.

Colonel Pickell having been discharged March 4, 1862, Colonel Elisha G. Marshall was assigned to the command of the 13th New York. Born in New York and appointed to the U. S. Military Academy from that State, Colonel Marshall was graduated in the class of 1850. He was promoted captain of the 6th U. S. Infantry, May 14, 1861, having served continuously on frontier duty, including the Utah campaign of 1858, from graduation up to 1860, when he was ordered on recruiting duty.

The 25th New York (Union Rangers) was organized for two-years' service, in New York City, between May 11 and June 26, 1861, under command of Colonel James P. Kerrigan. The regiment had been advanced as far as Alexandria in the Bull Run campaign, and August 4, 1861, was included in Hunter's brigade. Colonel Kerrigan having been dismissed March 6, 1862, Colonel Charles A. Johnson was assigned to command April 1, 1862.

The 14th New York was organized at Albany, N. Y., May 17, 1861, Colonel James McQuade commanding. Colonel McQuade had been the editor of a newspaper in Utica, N. Y., where the regiment had been largely recruited. He was of Irish descent, "of

infinite jest," and equally ready with either pen or sword.

The 4th Michigan, recruited chiefly in the southern tier of counties in that State, was organized at Adrian, Mich., Colonel Dwight A. Woodbury commanding, and left for Washington, June 25, 1861. Assigned to Wilcox's brigade, it was stationed at Fairfax Station and Court-House by order of General McDowell, July 21, 1861, and formed part of the rear-guard covering the retreat that followed. An admirable officer and of attractive presence, Colonel Woodbury, together with his regiment, soon acquired an enviable reputation in the camps.

The 62d Pennsylvania was organized at Pittsburg, Pa., August 31, 1861, to serve for three years. Its movement to the front had commenced even before its organization was completed. Its first colonel, Samuel W. Black, was a veteran of the Mexican war, and a lawyer of distinction in Pittsburg, Pa.

The 9th Massachusetts (Irish Ninth), Colonel Thomas Cass commanding, was composed entirely of Irishmen recruited in Boston, Mass. It was the third three-years' regiment to leave the Bay State for the seat of war. On April 22, 1861, five companies had been raised in Boston, one was recruiting in Salem, another in Milford, another in Marlboro, and another in Stoughton. On the 11th of May the ten companies were in camp on Long Island, Boston harbor, where, on June 11th, they were mustered into the service of the United States for three years. Colonel Cass had served in the Massachusetts militia from private to commander of the Columbian Artillery, an organization disbanded in 1855, under pressure of the Know-Nothing sentiment then prevalent in Massachusetts.

He is described as "a tall, powerfully built, soldierly-looking man." No hint or advice was lost on him. He was ambitious to make a name for himself and determined that the reputation of the 9th Massachusetts should be second to that of no other regiment.

The 12th New York was organized at Elmira, N. Y., May 13, 1861, to serve two years. Under command of Colonel Ezra L. Walrath it was assigned to Richardson's brigade and participated in the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861. Colonel Walrath having resigned September 26, 1861, Colonel Henry A. Weeks succeeded to the command of the regiment.

The 17th New York (Westchester Chasseurs) was organized at New York City May 24, 1861, for two-years' service, Colonel H. S. Lansing commanding. Early in July it was stationed at Fort Ellsworth, near Washington, and was from there transferred to Porter's division early in October, 1861.

The 44th New York (People's Ellsworth Regiment) was organized at Albany, N. Y., between August 30 and October 29, 1861, for three-years' service, Colonel Stephen W. Stryker commanding. It left immediately for the front and was at once assigned to Porter's division. The character of the regiment may be inferred from the fact that about 150 of the original rank and file were promoted into other regiments.

The 83d Pennsylvania was organized at Erie, Pa., September 13, 1861, for three-years' service. It was commanded by Colonel John W. McLane, and early in October was encamped on Hall's Hill, Va.

The 16th Michigan (Stockton's Independent Regiment) was raised by Colonel T. W. B. Stockton, of Flint, Mich., under direct authority from the Secretary of War. To establish their legal status the offi-

cers were eventually commissioned by the governor of Michigan. The regiment organized at Camp Backus, Detroit, and left for the front September 16, 1861. Colonel Stockton was one of the fifteen members of the class graduated at the U. S. Military Academy in 1827 who survived in 1861. He was promoted to first lieutenant of the 1st Infantry, having served on frontier duty to 1831, and on other duties until November 30, 1836, when he resigned from the regular service. In the war with Mexico he served as colonel of the 1st Michigan Volunteers from December 9, 1847, and was disbanded July 9, 1848. He held the rank of major in the militia of Michigan in 1861, and had been a member of a board to organize the volunteer systems of that State.

Battery E, Massachusetts Artillery, was recruited at Lynnfield and at Camp Massasoit, Readville, Mass., Captain Max Eppendaff commanding. This officer resigned January 25, 1862, and was succeeded in command by Captain George D. Allen.

Battery C, Rhode Island Artillery, was organized in Providence, R. I., in August, 1861. It was commanded by Captain William B. Weeden, and reached Washington September 1, 1861. For about a month it was stationed at Camp Sprague, D. C., and was then ordered to Porter's division. Private Reynolds of this battery was the first man of Porter's division killed in action, having fallen at Yorktown. The battery had the distinction of firing the first shot at the fortifications of that place.

Griffin's battery replaced Carlisle's when the latter was ordered to Washington in November, 1861. Captain Charles Griffin, who thus came in command of the artillery attached to the division, was graduated

at West Point in the class of 1847, and had seen service in Mexico and on the Western frontier, and had taken part in the campaign of July, 1861, being brevetted major for gallant and meritorious service with his battery at Bull Run. Of him Colonel R. L. Auchmuty¹ writes :

“ Captain Griffin was extremely popular with both officers and men. Although prone to correct and point out the errors of others—even of those superior in rank,—he never wounded the dignity of those he criticised. His interest in the volunteers and his readiness not only to advise but to find excuses for blunders or breaches of discipline made him a welcome visitor in each of our camps and brought field and company officers to his own. Interested as he was in all that pertained to the welfare of the army, the artillery was his hobby and delight. Soldierly instinct and American versatility, however, asserted themselves, and in many trying places Captain Griffin proved himself to be (also as a general officer) one of the very best of the infantry commanders.”

Captains Weeden, Martin, and Allen were able pupils and co-workers under such a chief.

Did the records furnish data (which they do not), the limits possible to this work preclude details of the formative experiences of that first martial winter. It does not need, however. That never-ceasing third-brigade call, “ Dan ! Dan ! Dan ! Butterfield ! Butterfield ! ” has not even yet died entirely away, and with its faintest echoes there come trooping up memories of squad drill, rail drill, company drill, regimental drill, brigade drill, division review, sham fight, dress parade, camp guard, guard-house, picket duty, nervous duty, tactics, and Army Regulations, till back and head and heart again begin to ache.

General Walker, in his *History of the Second*

¹ Colonel Auchmuty, formerly captain and assistant adjutant-general of the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps.

Corps, has told the story of Sumner's division in the comprehensively brief words : " The commander was, himself, of race-horse stock ; he ran until he dropped ; and he expected no less of every man of his raw troops."

Not a regiment in the army but sympathized with Sumner's troops. They had the same end in view then ; they have the same memories now. Thousands join in the reminiscence of their comrade of the 44th New York who, concerning the journey to and arrival at the front, recalls :

"We received a hearty welcome in New York, a refreshing welcome in Philadelphia, a very little welcome in Baltimore, and no welcome at all in Washington. They let us down gradually. We started in a first-class boat from Albany and reached Washington in open cattle-cars. The boy in Baltimore who came up under our guns and told us that 'S. N. Y.' on our brasses meant 'Snub-Nosed Yankees' was the first enemy we encountered. We arrived in Washington in the night, lunched and lay down. The best lodgings seemed to have been taken, so we selected some ordinary houses and slept on the sidewalks."

It is well to join the hearty laugh that circles round the board when veterans reunite to count their thinning ranks and recall the memories of those days of crude endeavor. But the tribute of uncovered head and tears is not to be forgotten. There was toil and pain and blood expended, as well as mirth, in giving to the country the ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, than which a nobler army never trod the earth.

It is related of the Rev. Matthew Clark, who at the age of seventy came from Ireland to the pulpit rendered vacant by the death of Parson McGregor, of Londonderry, N. H., in 1729, and who as an officer in the Protestant army had been particularly active in

the defense of Derry, that, while sitting as Moderator of Presbytery, the music of a passing training band so aroused the martial ardor long repressed that he could answer the repeated calls of his brethren for attention to the clerical matters on hand with nothing but "Nae!—nae business while I hear the toot o' the drum!" The spirit animating the grand old militant divine had sounded again throughout the North the call of the Captain of the Hosts of the Lord for the gathering to battle for the right, and camped before the capital were those who could give time or thought to no other business when their country heard "the toot o' the drum." Looking backward, as Colonel Auchmuty says :

"Great indeed seemed the change from home to army life. There was the absence of much that had been looked upon as indispensable to comfort, almost to existence, and there was the surrender of personal liberty and the constant receiving of orders without a wherefore or a please. Then there was the deference to be shown to rank regardless of the age or estimate in which one might hold the bearer of a higher designation. A full measure of regard could easily be accorded one's immediate commander, but it was sometimes trying at Hall's Hill to treat four generals as if they were a superior order of beings, who were to be listened to but not argued with. . . . Those who volunteered on Lincoln's first call for men to serve for three years or the war, brought to the front an eagerness and an enthusiasm which could hardly be expected to last, or to be felt so strongly by those who came on later calls. They were citizen soldiers, intelligent enough to submit to necessary discipline, or even rules and orders, the need of which they could not understand, but reserving the right to criticise what was done, and express opinions on the conduct of the war. They were—particularly the privates—mostly young men ; probably twenty-six or twenty-seven would have been the average age of the men in Morell's four regiments. If necessary restraint seemed at times hard to staff officers, who were not usually regarded as suffering from confinement, still more hard

was it for the privates who were always under surveillance. Indeed, the self-effacement for their country's good, which was cheerfully rendered by many thousands of men heretofore accustomed to do as they pleased, seemed pathetic. . . . Our telegraph office was in charge of Mr. Thomas F. Oakes, a young man not quite nineteen years of age. He was liked by all, not only for his pleasant manners, but for his 'snap.' If communication was broken, whether by day or night, instead of calling for aid, he would follow the wire and repair the break himself. He soon established a sort of telegraphic friendship with the other army operators, and there was little that took place between Alexandria and the Chain Bridge which we did not know."

When the army moved, in March, 1862, Mr. Oakes was ordered to Warrenton Junction with instructions to examine and report upon the condition of telegraphic communication along the Manassas Gap line. He took with him one man, and alone, without tools, they strung the wires, after a fashion, and re-established communication between Warrenton Junction and Washington the very day General Sumner and his army reached that point. General Eckert, who was in active charge of telegraphic operations, sent Mr. Oakes a dispatch at the time, commending his efforts. Mr. Oakes did not then consider the work of any moment whatever, but in the period of thirty years that has elapsed, with its observation of men and methods, he has concluded it was quite a feat. Mr. Oakes is now the President of the Northern Pacific Railway Company.

The following summary of events which transpired on the banks of the Potomac during the memorable winter of 1861-2, as given by Colonel Auchmuty, cannot fail to be of interest to the most casual reader :

"One of the first orders General Morell issued at Minor's Hill —not a general or a special order, but a verbal order which was

as carefully observed—was that when any difficulty occurred among officers, or between the regiments, it was to be settled in the brigade, and that no grievances were to be carried to Hall's Hill. Whatever might happen (and four thousand men suddenly collected from different States and pursuits could hardly fail to have differences) to the rest of the division, Morell's brigade was to be a happy family. Brigade headquarters was always open to the officers and accessible to the men. There was always a plate on the mess table and a welcome for a second lieutenant as well as for a field officer, and the hospitality was freely accepted. . . .

"On the 15th of November, the great review of 60,000 men was held near Arlington, in which Porter's division participated. Proud enough we felt at the appearance of the division, and of our own brigade in particular, which we were certain looked better and marched better than any other brigade. At this review the President sat near McClellan, and many of us saw for the first time the man destined to fill so large a place in American history. Unlike other reviews, this took place on a cold, cheerless day, ending in rain. As overcoats were out of place, we were glad when the review was over to hurry away."

The pride thus confessed was certainly not ill-founded. Immediately after the review the following order was published to the army :

"GENERAL ORDERS }
"NO. 44. }

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"WASHINGTON, November 16, 1861.

"The General commanding the army desires to express to the troops his appreciation of the high soldierly qualities displayed by the division commanded by Brigadier-General F. J. Porter, during the review and evolutions on the 9th instant. The appearance of the troops would have done credit to veterans, and the regulars must look well to their laurels if General Porter's division conduct themselves on the battle-field as well as on review.

"The General commanding thanks General Porter and the officers and men of his command for their excellent military appearance on the occasion alluded to. He feels confident that

such soldiers can be implicitly relied upon when brought before the enemy, and he regards the division as a model for the army. Let others excel it if they can.

“By command of Major-General McClellan:

“S. WILLIAMS,

“Asst. Adjutant-General.”

“On Sunday, March 4, 1862, Morell was ordered to send a regiment to occupy Vienna, a village seven miles from Fall’s Church, known chiefly as the scene of an ambuscade in which a train loaded with our troops had been caught the previous July. The 4th Michigan was detailed, and I obtained permission to accompany the expedition. . . . A pleasant evening was passed at Colonel Woodbury’s headquarters, and, tired with our day’s work, all went early to bed. Shortly after midnight two cavalymen arrived from Minor’s Hill, bringing me a letter from General Morell. It read: ‘The army moves at daybreak; return immediately; tell Colonel Woodbury to stay in Vienna until relieved by the cavalry, and then return to camp and follow on to Fairfax Court-House.’ Here was news indeed! The house was quickly astir. Lieutenant Livingston decided to go back with me, and with the two cavalymen we started. . . . Three miles more we came to a walk, for we were nearing the picket line, and soon out of the darkness came the expected ‘Halt! who goes there?’ Lights shone from the windows of Barrett’s house. Infantry and cavalry officers crowded the rooms and porch. Horses were standing in the road and cavalymen were sleeping by the roadside, or were huddled around fires built of Barrett’s fence-rails, which we had carefully guarded all winter on account of the friendliness of the family. The pickets were to be withdrawn at daybreak, and the regiment of cavalry was waiting for daylight to relieve Colonel Woodbury.

“A long line of fire stretched out before us, numberless bonfires of evergreen decorations and demolished huts having been built to light up the company streets, and from the camps came the hum of many voices. Different indeed all this to the way the army was hereafter to move at an hour’s notice with hardly a sound, but six months’ quiet was not so easily broken. Over the camps and forts, black as ink, rendered darker by the line of light, so close that it seemed as if they could be touched, hung

the clouds like a vast pall. McClellan's school of instruction had finished its course, the great military picnic, as our life that first winter of the war seemed during the years which followed, was over. Death, by disease and on the battle-field, was now to take toll from those blue-coated men. One out of every four of Morell's division, for Porter was to command the Fifth Army Corps, was to be killed or wounded in the first campaign. When at the close of an awful day our lines gave way at Gaines Mill, Colonel Black was left dead on the ground. Four days later, at Malvern, where Colonel Woodbury lay dead upon the field, I said 'good-bye' to Colonel Cass, as he stood with the blood streaming from his shattered jaw."

On the 8th of March, 1862, much against the expressed wishes of General McClellan at the time, the President issued what is known as "War Order No. 2," forming corps; not but that the General believed in such an organization; he desired first to see from active service in the field what generals were best fitted for command before he became hampered with those whom it would not be easy to get rid of were they found incapable of handling such an extensive organization. He was, however, simply heard in the matter, and the following order was issued:

"PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER }
" No. 2. }

" EXECUTIVE MANSION,
" WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

" *Ordered*, 1. That the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of the said army destined to enter upon active operations (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington) into four army corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank, as follows:

" First Corps, to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by Major-General I. McDowell.

“Second Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner.

“Third Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General S. P. Heintzelman.

“Fourth Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. D. Keyes.

“2. That the divisions now commanded by the officers above assigned to the commands of army corps shall be embraced in and form part of their respective corps.

“3. The forces left for the defense of Washington will be placed in command of Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

“4. That this order be executed with such promptness and dispatch as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac.

“5. A fifth army corps, to be commanded by Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and General Shields' (late General Lander's) divisions.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

General McClellan at once proceeded to organize his army as directed, and General Porter's division, on the 13th of March, was assigned to the Third Corps.

It will be seen from the above order that a “fifth army corps” was organized under General Banks, but it never received the designation of “*the* fifth Army Corps,” and never operated as such with the Army of the Potomac.

A council, composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the Army of the Potomac upon Richmond, and therefore on the 22d of March General Porter's division, as part of the Third Corps, embarked at Alexandria for the

point named, where it arrived on the 23d, and went into camp in the vicinity of Newport News, where it remained pending the arrival of the remainder of the army and its *materiel*.

On the 4th of April the division led the advance upon Yorktown, through Big Bethel, Harwood's Bridge, and Cockletown, and on the night of April 5th bivouacked in position covering the junction of the Yorktown and Warwick Court-House roads, immediately confronting the enemy's intrenched lines.

Sykes' brigade of Regulars, after having been employed on provost duty in Washington during the winter, received orders to take the field with the Army of the Potomac, and on the 10th of March proceeded across the Long Bridge and was in the advance with the army towards Manassas. That point having been abandoned by the enemy the brigade moved to Alexandria and embarked for Fort Monroe on the 27th, arriving there the next day, and was also placed in camp near Newport News and followed Porter's division to the front of Yorktown.

Up to April 10th Porter's division remained in the position originally occupied between the York and Warwick rivers. On that day Hamilton's division arrived, and Porter was assigned to a position with his division on the plateau south of Wormley's Creek, picketing from York River to the Yorktown road, holding this line until the close of the siege.

On the 27th of April General Porter, as he expresses it in his report, "for reasons known only to the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac," was, unexpectedly to himself, appointed director of the siege. Of the services performed by his division at that time General Porter reports :

“In my own command I desire to present the names of the following regiments, which, under their respective commanders, were continually in the trenches, and most faithfully and cheerfully, under all circumstances, frequently most trying, performed their laborious and dangerous duties during the thirty days of the siege : 2d Maine, Colonel C. W. Roberts and Lieutenant-Colonel Varney ; 4th Michigan, Colonel Woodbury ; 16th Michigan, Colonel Stockton and Major Welch ; 9th Massachusetts, Colonel Cass ; 18th Massachusetts, Colonel J. Barnes, Lieutenant-Colonel Ingraham, and Major Hayes ; 22d Massachusetts, Colonel J. A. Gove, Lieutenant-Colonel Griswold, and Major Tilton ; 62d Pennsylvania, Colonel S. N. Black and Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer ; 83d Pennsylvania, Colonel McLane and Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent ; 12th New York, Colonel Weeks, Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson, and Major Barnum ; 13th New York, Colonel E. G. Marshall ; 17th New York, Colonel H. S. Lansing ; 14th New York Colonel McQuade ; 44th New York, Colonel Stryker and Lieutenant-Colonel Rice ; 25th New York, Colonel Johnson ; Berdan Sharpshooters, Colonel Berdan and Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley. The last two deserve great credit throughout the siege for pushing forward the rifle pits close to the enemy's works and keeping down the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

“I desire also to express my gratification at the gallant and efficient service of the division of artillery, under the immediate direction of Captain Charles Griffin, 5th Artillery, whose reports of service rendered and losses in respective batteries were forwarded in proper time. Often exposed to a hot fire from the enemy and meeting with some losses, these batteries were examples of superior discipline and instruction, and the conspicuous coolness, gallantry, bravery, and skill of the officers and men merited the highest commendation. These batteries were : D, 5th Artillery, Captain Charles Griffin ; C, Rhode Island Artillery, Captain Weeden ; C and E, Massachusetts Artillery, commanded respectively by Captains A. P. Martin and Allen.”

Sykes' brigade of Regulars not only occupied a position directly confronting the works on the Yorktown road, but were engaged nightly in the trenches, both as trench guards and working parties, and had

one sergeant of the 4th Infantry killed and several men wounded during the operations of the siege.

These troops had creditably passed their final examination in siege work, and the enemy, on the night before the contemplated assault, having destroyed his magazines, abandoned his fortifications, and commenced a retreat towards Richmond, Porter's division was embarked at Yorktown May 8th for West Point, Sykes' command marching by road to the same place. On May 13th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, Sykes, and Porter advanced to Cumberland, General Sykes being directed to report to General Porter, and General Smith to Franklin, on reaching that point.

"A fifth corps," created for General Banks by the President's War Order No. 2, of March 8th, was discontinued April 4, 1862, by general orders from the War Department. With the President's consent, in General Orders No. 125, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 18, 1862, "the forces commanded by Generals F. J. Porter and W. B. Franklin are designated the Fifth and Sixth Provisional Army Corps," and on the 20th of May, 1862, the Artillery Reserve was assigned to duty with the Fifth Provisional Army Corps.

Unfortunately, this action on the part of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, although sanctioned by the President, did not pass without adverse criticism, which created an unreasonable prejudice against these provisional commands, which outlasted even the weary years of warfare in which they bore a generous share of toil and sacrifice, and held their corps' existence unbroken to the end. It seems fitting, therefore to glance backward for a moment and review, as briefly as possible, the facts tending to this result.

It has been said that the only point connected with military questions in this country, about which any certainty can be entertained, is the fact that they will not be settled on their merits as such. The student finds much that sustains the statement, and thus furnishes the explanation of the wonderful resisting power of the Confederacy as contrasted with the overwhelming material advantages possessed by the Federal Government. It was not alone the army gathering around Washington in the winter of 1861-62, that had knowledge to gain of the principles upon which success in the National struggle must rest. Nine months of well directed effort had given to the country an army, but it cannot be claimed that, in comprehension of the demands of the hour, the executive and legislative intelligence of the land had kept pace with that achievement. Mr. Lincoln had brought to the chief magistracy no greater experience in National leadership than his volunteers could boast in the art of war. Only by years of fiery trial was the foremost statesman of the age developed. As President and Commander-in-chief, confronted by the overwhelming and unprecedented duties incident to the civil war, the limitations of his early life and training hampered his efforts with an ever-present consciousness that he was also the standard-bearer of a political party that had no record or policy, but was burdened by many aspirants to leadership, to whose plans and arguments he felt compelled to listen, and too often accede, even when conscious of the injustice of their interference and of the jealous coldness of the support he received in return.

Congress had, by resolution, announced to the world that the great aim and end of the war was *to*

defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and the Constitution invests the President, *and him alone,* with all the executive power of the Government. But the conferring of power, by manifest and necessary implication, carries with it the right and duty to employ ordinary means for rendering that power effective, and therefore, by the general laws of 1789, a Department of War was created, for the assistance of the President, at the head of which was a Secretary of War, who was authorized to “perform and execute such duties as shall, *from time to time, be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution.*” The formation of other departments quickly followed until, in 1849, the President was assisted by seven secretaries, to whom, collectively, custom—not law or right—has given the designation of “the Cabinet.” Except by the implication noted, these secretaries are unknown to the Constitution. They are not responsible to Congress or the people, but are appointed by the President, subject only to confirmation by the Senate, discharge their duties under his exclusive direction, and hold their offices entirely at his will. They report to him annually in writing and at such other times as he may require, consulting with him individually or otherwise as he may deem best, but hold no authority of themselves—least of all as “Constitutional advisers.”¹

¹ There is no warrant and need for recalling trite facts when an able lawyer and conscientious writer, such as Mr. John C. Ropes, states that “*the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln found itself, in the spring of 1862, in the very difficult position of having called to the chief command of the Army an officer in whom it did not place entire confidence,*” and refers to General Grant as having been “*called by Congress to take the general charge and management of all the military operations.*”

It was well known that among those called by President Lincoln to aid him as chiefs of executive departments, but little of concord was manifest except in their distrust of the untried ability of their chief and their restlessness under the limitations of their own authority. Mr. Seward's willingness to assume a certain rôle with the portfolio of the State Department, cannot be doubted. As late as September, 1862, when experience should have had some influence, Secretary Chase (Warden's *Life*, etc., p. 484) wrote to Hon. John Sherman :

"Since General Halleck has been here the conduct of the war has been *abandoned* to him by the President almost absolutely. *We*, who *are called* members of the Cabinet, but are in reality *only separate heads of departments* . . . —*we* have as little to do with it as if we were heads of factories supplying shoes or cloth. No regular and systematic reports of what is done are made, I believe, even to the President—*certainly not to the so-called Cabinet.*"

Secretary Cameron is credited with having formed the determination "to resist all interferences" if he remained at the head of the War Department, and there can be no question that his successor put such a determination right vigorously into practice, under his theory that "*everything* concerned his department, and that it was he who was carrying on the war." The memorable Cabinet meeting of September 2, 1862, when President Lincoln, having recalled General McClellan to command, was assailed by his secretaries with remonstrances so bitter, personal, and revolutionary as to extort from him the cry that *he would gladly resign his office*, indicates the intensity and direction of their zeal.

Congress furnished a corresponding element. In December, 1861, the Joint Committee on the Conduct

of the War was appointed, and an influence as powerful as it was injurious, was established. Through its chairman it announced its determination to break through the Constitutional barriers placed between the legislative and executive branches of the Government.¹ Said Mr. Wade (Rep. 37th Congress, 3d Sess.) :

“We are here armed with the whole power of both Houses of Congress. *They have made it our duty to inquire into the whole conduct of the war—with every department of it.* . . . We do want to know, and we must know if we can, what is to be done, for the country is in jeopardy. . . . ”

The breadth of the statesmanship and knowledge of military affairs inspiring the methods and procedure of their inquisitions is indicated by the same authority when, inveighing against the reticence of the general-in-chief to whom the country owed its possession of an army, he exclaims :

“. . . All this is hanging upon one man who keeps his counsels entirely to himself.”² If he was an old veteran who had

¹ “The *command* and *application* of the public force to execute law, maintain peace, and resist foreign invasion, are powers so obviously of an *executive* nature, and require the exercise of qualities so characteristic of *this department*, that they have always been *exclusively appropriated to it*, in every well-organized government upon earth. In no instance, perhaps, did the enlightened understanding of Hume discover less acquaintance with the practical science of government than when he gave the direction of the army and navy, as well as all the other executive powers, to *one hundred senators* in his plan of a perfect commonwealth.”—*James Kent*.

² General McClellan relates that, early in December, 1861, in order to aid Secretary Chase in his financial operations, he voluntarily laid before him the plans for the Urbana movement, and that the Secretary was pleased with the plan and thanked him cordially for the confidence reposed in him by tendering the information. Mr. Chase's biographer states (Warden, p. 399) that on January 11, 1862, General McDowell calling at the Department of the Treasury, “inquired about McClellan's plans, and Mr. Chase told him what he knew of them, in strict confidence.” From a military standpoint, it is evident that General McClellan might, with advantage to the service, have been even more reticent than he was when complained of by the Committee.

fought a hundred battles, or we knew him as well as Bonaparte or Wellington was known, then we could repose upon him with confidence. *But how can this nation abide the secret counsels that one man carries in his head, when we have no evidence that he is the wisest man in the world?*"

Ostensibly seeking for light, while ignoring the legitimate means carefully provided to that end, with doors ever open to the malcontent and visionary, its methods fostered discontent and insubordination, offering premium and protection for jealous complaint and captious criticism. By its very organization, impotent for good, its records bear unmistakable proof of the partisan purpose and spirit of its efforts.

And so it came about that, from the "so-called Cabinet," and Congress, and Committee, a junto-self-styled "the Administration," was evolved, composed of many incongruous elements held together by a purpose so to manipulate the resources tendered to the Government, by the unbounded liberality and patriotism of the loyal States, that the power it had usurped should be perpetuated by the overthrow of all who might seem to antagonize a newly-born Radical party.¹ Its efforts were directed by skilful and experienced politicians, and by act and word Mr. Lincoln was forced to confess himself unable to withstand the influence it wielded.

Under stress of the "military effervescence" of the opening days of war, the raw militia then constituting the national force had been led to the shameful discipline of Bull Run, and now again, while the general-

¹ Under date of July 22, 1862 (Warden, p. 440), Mr. Chase writes in his diary: "I urged upon the President the importance of an immediate change in the command of the Army of the Potomac. . . . I said that I did not regard General McClellan as loyal to the Administration, although I did not question his general loyalty to the country."

in-chief was engaged in perfecting the organization of the Army of the Potomac, and in arranging with his subordinates for the co-operation of all the national forces, the "On to Richmond" cry was raised with redoubled energy. As a consequence, on January 27, 1862, Mr. Lincoln issued his General War Order No. 1, directing a general, but indefinite, movement by the land and naval forces to be made on February 22, 1862. This was followed on January 31st by the President's Special War Order No. 1, directing that on February 22d the Army of the Potomac, "*after providing safely for the defense of Washington,*" should seize and occupy a position on the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction. Although not formally withdrawn, neither of these orders was enforced, but the special order had committed the President to the "overland" line of operations as in opposition to the Urbana line proposed by General McClellan.

The General-in-chief had purposed to organize the divisions of the army into army corps, when, having taken the field, he should be able to select such division commanders as gave evidence of fitness for the greater responsibility, and he so informed the Committee on the Conduct of the War. But here again the Committee arrayed itself in opposition, and, ignoring their own objection to the untested abilities of the commander of the armies, urged upon the President, as they report, "with all the arguments in their power," *the immediate* adoption of the corps formation *in the Army of the Potomac*, in order that the troops could "*be practised, exercised, and drilled in that formation.*" The absurdity of such a proposition for *drill* is too apparent to those acquainted with the

military profession to require remark. If Congress desired corps, they should have legislated to the extent at least of providing proper rank for those who were to command them. The highest rank in the army at that time was that of major-general, whose proper command is a division. As it was, when corps were formed under the President's order, three of the four which belonged to the Army of the Potomac were commanded by brigadier-generals, whose proper commands were brigades.

Meanwhile the President had been so pressed by the demand of the junto for the removal of McClellan from command of the army, that it had practically been decided upon, when on March 8, 1862, the council of division commanders, convened by the general-in-chief, decided by a vote of eight to four to approve of the Urbana plan of campaign, and the decision of the council was at once submitted to the President for his information and encouragement. Yielding to the overwhelming verdict, Mr. Lincoln decided to retain General McClellan in command, and sanctioned the proposed movement, but modified his consent by imposing restrictions which he formulated in his General War Order No. 3, of March 8, 1862, after having by his General War Order No. 2, of the same date, without consultation with General McClellan, organized the divisions of the Army of the Potomac into four army corps, to which he assigned the commanders—*three of them being officers who had voted in the council AGAINST THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN*—and made some purely political assignments of officers.

At that time the communication between Washington and the Confederate authorities in Richmond was

remarkably direct, and on March 9, 1862, the enemy, evidencing their appreciation of the effect of General McClellan's plan, abandoned their lines at Manassas and on the Potomac.

During the preliminary movements which followed for the purpose of shaking off the winter camps, and making sure that the enemy had withdrawn behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, on March 12th, while at Fairfax Court-House, General McClellan was informed of the President's War Order No. 3, of March 11, 1862, which relieved him from the command of the Union armies and limited his authority to the Department of the Potomac, thus depriving him of the power to secure unity of action by the various forces in the field, which, of course, was an important point in the considerations upon which his plans had been projected.

On March 13th another council, consisting of the four commanders of army corps, was convened by General McClellan, at Fairfax Court-House. This council decided that, under the changed conditions of the field, with the co-operation of the navy, the movement to be made could best be undertaken from Fort Monroe, and that "with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force *in front of the Virginia line* of 25,000 men (about 50,000 in all) would suffice" for the protection of Washington. The President sanctioned the change of plan, stipulating only that Manassas Junction should be made secure against any effort of the enemy to regain possession, and that Washington should be left secure. On March 31st the President wrote General McClellan :

“This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Frémont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would justify it, even beyond the mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.”

That the President considered this explanation to be due is his own best defense, but the most lamentable condition of the time was that he could thus claim and enforce the prerogatives of the commander-in-chief to the detriment of a subordinate held responsible for the efficiency of military operations, while confessing himself powerless to maintain those prerogatives against the illegitimate interference of secondary and antagonistic influences.

The Department of the Potomac, over which General McClellan still held command, included the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia east of the Alleghanies and north of James River, with the exception of Fort Monroe and the country surrounding it within a distance of sixty miles. Under these conditions General McClellan made his plans and instructed his subordinates, under whom he placed an aggregate of over 70,000 men for the defense of the capital, and on March 17th, *forty-six days earlier than the campaigns of either 1863 or 1864 were opened*, the embarkation of the army was commenced, and continued as rapidly as transportation was furnished by the officers of the War Department having the matter in charge. General McClellan embarked with his headquarters on April 1st, and reached Fort Monroe the day following. Here he learned that the expected co-operation of the navy in the reduction of Yorktown and James River could not be had.

On March 26th, by special direction of the President, Fort Monroe and all the forces there had been placed under his orders, with the understanding that he would detach therefrom a division to be added to the First Army Corps. On April 3d these dispositions were countermanded, General McClellan's command being restricted to the Army of the Potomac, the control of his base of operations being taken out of his hands, and his contemplated force being again reduced by 10,000 men. On the same day, with the army moving into the enemy's country, and to a certainty of heavy loss by casualty and disease, while the Confederates were straining every nerve to augment and concentrate their opposing forces, the military world was electrified by the order of the Secretary of War *discontinuing the recruiting service for volunteers in every State and rendering impossible the support of the army by reinforcement.*

On April 4th, as the movement to the front of Yorktown began, the adjutant-general telegraphed General McClellan that, by direction of the President, *the First Army Corps was detached from the Army of the Potomac* and placed at the disposal of the Secretary of War, and history must record that, by this act, if no other, the Administration assumed the responsibility for whatever of failure attended the first Peninsula campaign.

No effort was made to carry out the orders General McClellan had given for the defense of Washington; no explanation of his plans was asked or modification suggested, though the city was in no way menaced, and two corps still remained in its front waiting transportation; but on the simple report of the officer in command of the city that *he* could not muster 20,000 men for its defense, and on *the opinion* of

Generals Hitchcock and L. Thomas that the dispositions ordered in front of the Virginia line had not *fully* complied with the recommendations of the council of war, without a word of warning, he was deprived of *one third of the force the council had deemed necessary to the success of the army*,¹ which, at the very moment it was thus crippled, was in contact with the enemy. On the same day General McClellan was also informed, by the adjutant-general of the army, of the creation of the Department of the Shenandoah under General Banks, and of the Department of the Rappahannock under General McDowell, which finally reduced his own territorial command to an insignificant strip between the Potomac and James rivers, bounded on the west by the Fredericksburg & Richmond Railroad, and on the east by the line defining the sixty-mile limit from Fort Monroe.

Thus, *within four days*, the commander who had left the national capital authorized to execute a definite campaign with certain prescribed means, and vested with the control of the forces, communications, and supplies upon which he had planned for success, found himself summarily shorn of every element of necessary strength, and reduced to the hazardous military necessity of a radical alteration of plans while in contact with the enemy. The President imperatively ordered² that he should "commence his forward movements from his new base at once,"

¹ "The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that *four* [*sic*] army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understand it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River."—*General E. D. Keyes to Senator Ira Harris*.

² *Reb. Records*, vol. xi., part 3, p. 66.

making "such *incidental modifications*" as the new orders "may render *proper*."

In response to General McClellan's earnest protest against the reduction of his forces, and probably also in consequence of the protest contained in General Keyes' letter to Senator Ira Harris, Franklin's division was restored to the Army of the Potomac, arriving in York River on the 22d of April.

The *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War* shows that General McClellan's objection to the enforced formation of his divisions into army corps was not urged against the corps' formation, but against the premature assignments to the corps' commands that became necessary. On May 9th, from Williamsburg, he asked permission from the Secretary of War to reorganize the corps, stating in substance that experience had rendered him unwilling to be held responsible for the then existing arrangement, stating his reasons, and requesting authority to relieve from duty with his army any corps or division commanders who proved incompetent. Under date of May 9, 1862, he received from the Secretary of War¹ the following response :

"The President is unwilling to have the army corps organization broken up, but also unwilling that the commanding general shall be trammelled and embarrassed in actual skirmishing, collision with the enemy, and on the eve of an expected great battle. You, therefore, may temporarily suspend that organization in the army now under your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit until further orders. He also writes you privately."

On the same date the President wrote as follows :

"I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 3, p. 154.

of a dispatch to you relating to army corps, which dispatch will, of course, have reached you long ere this will.

"I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization, not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. *Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject.* I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. *It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals.* I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes.¹ The commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you, *but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them ; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter, and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are TRUE or JUST, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything ?*

"When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that

¹ And yet the severe criticism showered upon General McClellan because he entrusted the advance of his army from Yorktown to his corps commanders and had assigned the senior of these officers to the general command during the absence of the general-in-chief has not even yet entirely died away. As to the personal relations existing between the commander and his subordinates they may reasonably be inferred from General Keyes' well known letter to Senator Harris, and, among others, from the following dispatch from General Heintzelman :

" FORT LYON, March 13th.

" GENERAL MCCLELLAN—Allow me to recommend to you to have a complete survey made by the engineers of the enemy's works at Centreville and Manassas, with a memoir *to meet the false statements that will be made to your prejudice.*
S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brig.-Gen'l."

It was demonstrated very early in the war that something more than brilliant traditions and an " illustrious name " was necessary to success in active military operations.

officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

“But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough, even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

“The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.”

On May 21st the President further addressed General McClellan as follows :

“I have just been waited on by a large committee, who presented a petition signed by *twenty-three Senators and eighty-four Representatives*, asking me to restore General Hamilton to his division. *I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be understood as rebuking you.* Please answer at once.”

General Hamilton was not restored to his division in the Army of the Potomac.

If it were proper to discuss here the much-vexed question as to whether General McClellan’s “peculiar characteristics” were “suited to deal with such emergencies,” it would be impossible, for precedent fails to furnish opportunity for intelligent argument. The situation has no parallel.

It is not necessary to consider even, whether or not the peculiar treatment to which his “peculiar characteristics” were subjected, is to be regarded as arising from such a complete revolution in the judgment of the “Administration” as to have brought to them the conviction that the plan of campaign they had at first condemned without reservation was, after all, so perfect in its conception as to warrant belief in its success, even when wanting all of the elements counted upon by its projector, his “peculiar characteristics” alone excepted. But that does not so much con-

cern this history as does the fact that *it was under such circumstances* as have been stated *that the Fifth Army Corps was organized* by the general-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac.

At General McClellan's request, the order creating the Fifth and Sixth Provisional Army Corps was confirmed by General Orders No. 84, War Department, July 22, 1862, the term "Provisional" being dropped, and the corps permanently established.

Porter's division became the 1st Division of the corps, the command devolving upon General Morell, who was succeeded in his brigade command by Colonel McQuade.

The 2d Division was organized as follows :

Brigadier-General GEORGE SYKES commanding.

First Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. ROBERT C. BUCHANAN, 4th Inf., commanding.

3d U. S. Inf., Major N. B. Rossell.¹

4th U. S. Inf., Major Delozier B. Davidson.

1st Battalion 12th U. S. Inf., Major Henry B. Clitz.

1st Battalion 14th U. S. Inf., Capt. Jno. D. O'Connell.

Second Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. WM. CHAPMAN, 2d Inf., commanding.

2d U. S. Inf., Captain A. F. Bond.

6th U. S. Inf., Captain Thomas Hendrickson.

10th U. S. Inf., Major Charles S. Lovell.

1st Battalion 11th U. S. Inf., Major De Lancy Floyd-Jones.

1st Battalion 17th U. S. Inf., Major George L. Andrews.

¹ The 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, and 10th were regiments of ten companies under an old Act of Congress. The others were battalions of eight companies, organized under the Act of 1861, the regiments being formed of three battalions of eight companies each.

Third Brigade.

Colonel GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN commanding.

5th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Hiram Duryea.
1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery (serving as infantry), Col. R. O.
Tyler.

Artillery.

Captain STEPHEN H. WEED commanding.

Batteries L and M, 3d U. S., Captain John Edwards.
Battery I, 5th U. S., Lieut. M. F. Watson.

The Artillery Reserve was organized as follows :

Colonel HENRY J. HUNT commanding.

First Brigade (Horse Artillery).

Lieut.-Col. WILLIAM HAYS commanding.

Battery A, 2d U. S., Captain John C. Tidball.
Batteries B and L, 2d U. S., Captain James M. Robertson.
Battery M, 2d U. S., Captain Henry Benson.
Batteries C and G, 3d U. S., Captain H. G. Gibson.

Second Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. GEORGE W. GETTY commanding.

Battery E, 1st U. S., Lieut. Alanson M. Randol.
Battery G, 1st U. S., Lieut. Edward B. Hill.
Battery K, 1st U. S., Lieut. Samuel S. Elder.
Battery G, 4th U. S., Lieut. Charles H. Morgan.
Battery A, 5th U. S., Lieut. Adelbert Ames.
Battery K, 5th U. S., Captain Jno. R. Smead.

Third Brigade.

Major ALBERT ARNDT commanding.

Battery A, 1st New York Light, Captain Otto Diedrichs.
 Battery B, 1st New York Light, Captain Adolph Voegler.
 Battery C, 1st New York Light, Captain John Knieriem.
 Battery D, 1st New York Light, Captain Edward Grimm.

Fourth Brigade.

Major E. R. PETHERBRIDGE commanding.

Battery A, Maryland Light, Captain J. W. Wolcott.
 Battery B, Maryland Light, Captain Alonzo Snow.

Fifth Brigade.

Captain J. HOWARD CARLISLE commanding.

Battery E, 2d U. S., Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.
 Batteries F and K, 3d U. S., Capt. La Rhett L. Livingston.

Unattached.

Battery G, 1st New York Light, Captain Jno. D. Frank.
 5th Battery New York Light, Captain Elijah D. Taft.

Siege Train.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, temporarily on duty as infantry
 with 3d Brigade, 2d Division.

On June 7th the 10th New York (National Zouaves), Colonel John E. Bendix, arrived at the front from Fort Monroe, and was assigned to Warren's brigade, the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery being soon afterward returned to the Artillery Reserve. About the same time the 1st Michigan also reached the front, and was assigned to the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division.

On June 12th and 13th McCall's division arrived from the First Army Corps, and was temporarily attached as the 3d Division of the Fifth Corps. Its composition was as follows :

Brigadier-General GEORGE A. MCCALL commanding.

First Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. JOHN F. REYNOLDS commanding.

1st, Colonel R. Biddle Boberts.
2d, Lieut.-Col. Wm. McCandless.
5th, Colonel Seneca G. Simmons.
8th, Colonel George S. Hays.
13th, Major Roy Stone.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE commanding.

3d, Colonel Horatio G. Sickel,
4th, Colonel Albert L. Magilton.
7th, Colonel — Harvey.
11th, Colonel Thos. F. Gallagher.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR commanding.

6th, Colonel Henry B. McKean.
9th, Colonel C. Feger Jackson.
10th, Colonel James T. Kirk.
12th, Colonel John H. Taggart.

All three of the Brigades were Pennsylvania Reserves.

Artillery.

Battery A, 1st Pennsylvania Light, Captain H. Easton.
Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Light, Captain James H. Cooper.
Battery G, 1st Pennsylvania Light, Captain Mark Keans.
Battery C, 5th U. S., Captain Henry V. De Hart.

Cavalry.

4th Pennsylvania, Colonel James H. Childs.
8th Illinois, Colonel John F. Farnsworth.

The Regular Infantry Brigades—denominated by General McClellan the “Infantry Reserve”—had previously formed an unattached command reporting directly to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Four of the nine battalions—the 11th, 12th, 14th, and 17th—were battalion organizations, partially effected by order of the President May 4, 1861, confirmed by act of Congress July 29, 1861, and fully three fourths of the strength of the regiments consisted of recruits received since the Bull Run campaign. Introduction of the regiments in detail would be impossible in these pages, for around the standards of the old regiments were clustered all the traditions of the country's wars—a sacred trust they guarded well on every field.

“In one of the first battles of the Rebellion,” says Colonel Thomas M. Anderson, in the *Military Service Institution Journal* of July, 1890, “an old officer watched one of the new regiments as it went forward under a withering fire, with a cheer. The veteran smiled grimly, and said: ‘They act like mustangs, but they fight like men.’” The same officer touches upon the peculiarity of the contest in which the Regular Infantry was now engaging, by stating:

“The engineer officer who indicated to the 14th its line of attack at Contreras was Lieutenant Beauregard; a battery they supported for a time at Chapultepec was commanded by Lieutenant Thos. J. Jackson; the engineer officer who led the way over the San Cosmo causeway was Captain Robert E. Lee; and the officer who marched with them in command of a platoon of sappers and miners to the San Cosmo gate was Lieutenant George B. McClellan.”

Brigadier-General George Sykes was born in Delaware and graduated at the United States Military Academy in the class of 1842, along with James

Longstreet, Gustavus W. Smith, John Pope, Abner Doubleday, Seth Williams, Wm. S. Rosecrans, B. S. Alexander, and John Newton. He was appointed to the 3d Infantry, and served in the Florida war of 1842, and in the war with Mexico at Monterey, siege of Vera Cruz, at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco, and capture of the city of Mexico, and was brevetted captain for gallant and meritorious services. At the commencement of the war of the Rebellion he was major of the 14th Infantry, and was made brigadier-general of volunteers September 28, 1861, having rendered invaluable service with a battalion of regular infantry at Bull Run the previous July.

The class graduated at the United States Military Academy in 1830 numbered forty-two members. Thirty-one years later, in 1861, but eighteen of those graduates survived. Of that eighteen, six joined in the Rebellion and six remained loyal to their oath. Among the former were Wm. N. Pendleton and John B. Magruder; among the latter was Robert C. Buchanan.

Colonel Buchanan was born in Maryland, and on graduation was appointed to the 4th Infantry, with which he served in the Black Hawk war in 1832, in the Florida war of 1836, 1841-42, and in the war with Mexico at the battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and capture of the city of Mexico. He was brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for gallant and distinguished services, and as lieutenant-colonel commanded a battalion of Maryland volunteers. He became lieutenant-colonel of the 4th Infantry, September 9, 1861, after an unbroken period of over thirty-one years in the same regiment.

Colonel William Chapman was born in Maryland, and graduated from the Military Academy in 1831. He was appointed to the 5th Infantry, with which he served a long period on frontier duty, and was engaged in the war with Mexico, participating in the battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, the capture of the city of Mexico, and also of San Antonio, where he was wounded. He served after the Mexican war on frontier duty, and was in the Utah expedition of 1857-8. He was promoted major of the 2d Infantry, February 25, 1861, and lieutenant-colonel 3d Infantry, February 20, 1862. He also had been brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Mexican war.

Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren was graduated from the Military Academy in the class of 1850, standing second on its roll of forty-four members. He was appointed to the Topographical Engineers, serving nine years in that corps, his duty embracing surveys and examinations of the delta of the Mississippi, Pacific Railroad explorations, participation in the Blue Water Creek campaign against the Sioux Indians in 1855, when he was ordered to West Point as assistant professor of mathematics, at which place he remained until the outbreak of the Rebellion. On the 19th of April, 1861, Colonel Abraham Duryée, who for twenty-one years had been connected with the 7th Regiment, N. Y. S. M., commenced recruiting a regiment under the order of the governor of New York, dated April 18, 1861. Six days afterwards, enrolments enabled the sending of eight companies of about fifty select men each, into quarters at

Fort Schuyler, N. Y. The regiment was organized with full ranks, May 9, 1861, and three days later was under marching orders, and landed at Fort Monroe, Va., May 25, 1861. Colonel Duryée being placed in charge of all the forces at Old Point Comfort, the command of the 5th New York devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Warren, who on the 31st of August, 1861, was advanced to the colonelcy, Colonel Duryée having been promoted brigadier-general of volunteers. The regiment took creditable part in the battle of Big Bethel, June 10, 1861, and as soon as Colonel Warren learned of the death of his friend, Lieutenant John T. Greble, 2d Artillery (the first officer of the regular army killed in the war), he went back with a little party of men, whom he left under cover, while he, advancing alone, carried the body of his friend to an abandoned limber, which was then drawn off by the party; and there, in company with noble Chaplain Winslow of their regiment, remained with and aided the handful of men who rescued their wounded comrades from that field. During the siege of Yorktown the regiment had been associated with the 1st Connecticut Artillery, and that organization was temporarily brigaded with them in the Fifth Army Corps.

Colonel Tyler had been graduated at the U. S. Military Academy in 1853, and was appointed to the 3d Artillery. He was captain and quartermaster at the commencement of the war of the Rebellion, and became colonel of the 4th Connecticut Volunteers (1st Heavy Artillery), August 29, 1861.

The organization of a company styled "Union Volunteers," Captain Allen Rutherford, was the result of a call published in the *New York Herald*,

December 30, 1860, addressed "to the Union men of New York without distinction of party." After some vicissitudes, this company became the "National Zouaves," Walter W. McChesney, formerly a member of the "Chicago Zouaves," captain. On the 13th of April, 1861, this company tendered its services to the governor of New York, and obtained authority to increase the organization to a regiment. On May 2, 1861, the ten companies of the 10th New York Volunteers (National Zouaves), Colonel W. W. McChesney commanding, had been mustered into the service of the United States for two years, and was in camp at Sandy Hook, N. J., May 7th. On the 6th of June the regiment sailed from New York, and two days later landed at Old Point Comfort, Va. On the 20th of June Colonel McChesney resigned, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Elder until September 9th, when Colonel John E. Bendix, formerly colonel 7th New York Volunteers, assumed command, having been commissioned by the governor of New York. Lieutenant-Colonel Elder left the regiment under orders for recruiting duty. The regiment remained in quarters in Fort Monroe until April 30, 1862, took part in the occupation of Norfolk, Va., May 11th, was transferred to Yorktown, June 4th, and moved at once to the front.

The 1st Michigan was organized at Ann Arbor, Mich., under command of Colonel John C. Robinson (captain U. S. Army), and left for the front September 16, 1861. It was officered chiefly by members of the three-months' regiment, commanded by Colonel O. B. Wilcox, in the Bull Run campaign. The regiment camped at Annapolis Junction, Md., until March, 1862, when it was transferred to General Wool's com-

mand at Fort Monroe, where it became noted for its fine appearance and excellent discipline. Colonel Robinson having been promoted brigadier-general April 28, 1862, he was succeeded in command by Colonel Horace S. Roberts, an active, efficient, and popular officer. The regiment took part in the Norfolk movement, and from there was transferred to the Army of the Potomac.

Though but temporarily detached from the First Corps during the Peninsula campaign, subsequent and permanent connection identified the interests of McCall's division with those of the Fifth Corps. In response to the call of the President of the United States, April 15, 1861, for 75,000 militia from the several States, to serve for three months, Pennsylvania not only promptly furnished its quota of fourteen regiments, but increased the number to twenty-five, and so ardent was the spirit of the people that it was necessary to decline the proffered services of about thirty additional regiments. Five hundred men, commanded by W. F. Small, of Philadelphia, reached Washington on the morning of the 18th of April, being the first troops reporting in answer to the President's call. Some time in April Major-General Robert Patterson, commanding the Pennsylvania troops, requested Governor Curtin to call out twenty-five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, in addition to those mustered under the call first made. In compliance with this request Governor Curtin telegraphed a second call throughout the State, which was promptly and enthusiastically answered. The authorities at Washington, however, determined to receive no more regiments for three-months' service, and though the State swarmed with companies organized

and organizing, this second call was of necessity revoked. Nevertheless Governor Curtin, impressed with the importance of providing for probable future emergencies, in a message addressed to the Legislature of the State, convened by him in extra session, April 30th, to provide for the better establishment of the State militia, and to organize an army for State defense, urged the immediate creation and mobilization of at least fifteen regiments of infantry and cavalry, in addition to those already enlisted in the service of the United States.

On May 15, 1861, the Governor's signature was affixed to an act of the Legislature authorizing a loan of \$3,000,000; empowering the Governor to appoint a major-general and two brigadier-generals for command of the military forces of the State, and authorizing and requiring the organization of "a military corps, to be called the Reserve Volunteer Corps of the Commonwealth, and to be composed of thirteen regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of light artillery." These regiments were to be enlisted for three years or for the war, unless sooner discharged, and were liable to be mustered into the service of the United States on requisition from the President. On May 16, 1861, George A. McCall, of Chester County, Pennsylvania, was confirmed by the State Senate a major-general of Pennsylvania troops, and at once entered upon his duties as commander of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps.

It had been expected and intended that the corps should remain in camps of instruction during the autumn and winter, but the danger, in anticipation of which their organization had been provided, developed too rapidly to admit of this desired preparation. On

June 22d it became necessary to dispatch two regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery to Cumberland, Md., to support the 11th Indiana, Colonel Lew Wallace commanding, and July 22d requisition was made by the President for the immediate services of the corps. Within a few days thereafter the entire corps, 15,856 officers and men, was mustered into the service of the United States. In October they crossed the Potomac at Chain Bridge and went into winter quarters at Camp Pierpont, near the Leesburg pike. In this camp the organization of the Reserves into McCall's division of three brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Reynolds, Meade, and Ord, was perfected and the preliminary lessons of active service were mastered. In the corps organizations effected under the President's order of March 8, 1862, McCall's division was assigned as 2d Division, First Army Corps. On the 9th of June, 1862, the command, being then in front of Fredericksburg, Va., embarked for the Peninsula, and between the 11th and 14th debarked at White House, Va., and was placed in position on the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac.

George A. McCall, a native of Philadelphia, was graduated at the U. S. Military Academy, in the class of 1822, and was appointed to the 1st Infantry, but as first lieutenant joined the 4th Infantry in 1829. In 1836 he took part in the Seminole war in Florida, and in 1846-8 was engaged in the war with Mexico, for which he was brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for gallant and meritorious conduct. He became colonel and inspector-general of the army, June 10, 1850, and resigned April 29, 1853. At the close of the war with Mexico, McCall spent a year in travel

and observation in England and on the Continent, for the benefit of his health, which had become impaired during the campaign. In his retirement, he had devoted much time to scientific pursuits, and upon entering the service of his State in 1861, he brought to the duties devolving upon him a natural ability developed by wide observation and a varied experience.

John F. Reynolds was graduated from the Military Academy, in the class of 1841, and appointed to the 3d U. S. Artillery. He served during the Mexican war, and was brevetted captain and major for gallant and meritorious conduct. He was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 14th U. S. Infantry, from captain 3d Artillery, May 14, 1861, and made brigadier-general of volunteers, August 20, 1861. He was assigned to command the 1st Brigade of McCall's division, September 16, 1861. No brigade in the service could boast a commander giving brighter promise of a glorious career.

George G. Meade was graduated at the Military Academy in the class of 1835, and was appointed to the 3d U. S. Artillery, serving in the Florida war in 1836, but on October 26, 1836, he resigned. On May 19, 1842, he was recommissioned in the Topographical Engineers, serving in the war with Mexico, and brevetted first lieutenant for gallant conduct. At the outbreak of the Rebellion he was a captain of Topographical Engineers, and was appointed brigadier-general of U. S. volunteers August 31, 1861. He was assigned to command the 2d Brigade, McCall's division.

Truman Seymour, of Vermont, was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1846, and appointed to the 1st U. S. Artillery. He took part in the

Mexican war, and was brevetted captain for gallant and meritorious conduct. He was transferred to the 5th Artillery May 14, 1861, having been brevetted major for gallant and meritorious services in the defense of Fort Sumter. He was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers April 28, 1862, and succeeded General E. O. C. Ord in command of the 3d Brigade on the promotion of General Ord to be major-general, May 2, 1862.

The administrative connection of the Artillery Reserve with the Fifth Army Corps was but temporary. To that command belongs an enviable history of its own. There is small need for even a passing reference to the names shining upon its rolls. Yet, who that knew Henry J. Hunt can resist any opportunity to proffer some small tribute to the noble leader of the illustrious corps—for such in fact it was. He was graduated at the Military Academy in 1839, appointed to the 2d Artillery, and served in the Mexican war. Twice wounded at Molino del Rey, and twice brevetted for gallantry in action, his service set the name of Hunt prominently with those of his brilliant comrades of the light artillery. His rare organizing and executive ability and strategic skill, matured by practical experience and well directed study, were embellished by a truth of heart that in genial sympathy could condescend even to men of low estate when kindly, ever-ready aid was needed from one loved by those with whom he served, but—to the shame of the nation—neglected by those he served, who carelessly deemed a form of words, six times repeated, the only return called for by a lifetime of thorough devotion and brilliant service. Loyal in every fibre of his being, there was no fawning mingled with the thunders of Cerro

Gordo, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, or Petersburg, and so he came to learn the bitter lesson which he mildly phrased, "Unequal weights and balances are an abomination to the Lord, but they are very dear to the hearts of the American people."

Not the least of the honors the Fifth Army Corps may justly claim is the space upon its records held by the name of the noble man and thorough soldier—*the first artillerist of his day.*

CHAPTER II.

POSITION ON THE CHICKAHOMINY—BATTLES OF HANOVER COURT-HOUSE, MECHANICSVILLE, AND GAINES MILL.

ON the 11th of May, 1862, the James River was opened to the Union fleets by the destruction of the rebel ram *Merrimac*. At 9 A.M. of that date General McClellan congratulated the Secretary of War and urged the immediate ascent of the river by the Union ironclads and gunboats, because "this would enable me [him] to make our [his] movements more decisive." That his military instinct demanded the immediate movement of his army to the James River as a base cannot be doubted. The fact was recognized when General Wool telegraphed him, on May 12th: "Your flank will be protected on the James River. A small detachment will answer for Yorktown. I want all my troops." Nevertheless, May 21st found the army in position facing Richmond from the left bank of the Chickahominy River. On the right wing, Franklin's corps was posted three miles from New Bridge, with the Fifth Corps in rear and support. Sumner's corps across the railroad, near Turner's Mills, held the centre, and Keyes' corps on the New Kent road, near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman's corps in support, guarded the left. This disposition had been imposed by informa-

tion received May 18th, from the Secretary of War, that General McDowell, with his command of 40,000 men, had been ordered to move southwest from Fredericksburg to a connection with the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, which was ordered to be extended to the north of Richmond in co-operation with the movement.

On the 23d of May, Lieutenant Nicholas Bowen, Topographical Engineers, accompanied by Lieutenant George A. Custer, 5th U. S. Cavalry, and Messrs. Frederick Churchill and H. H. Humphreys, attachés of the Topographical Staff, had discovered a ford and crossed the Chickahominy about a mile above New Bridge. The next day a reconnaissance was successfully made by Lieutenant Bowen, accompanied by Captain James McMillan, 2d U. S. Infantry; Captain James W. Forsyth, 18th U. S. Infantry; Lieutenant Custer, and Messrs. Churchill and Humphreys, with an escort of 500 men of the 4th Michigan, under Colonel Woodbury, and a squadron of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, Captain George A. Gordon commanding. The 4th Michigan crossed the river at the newly discovered ford, and, attacking the camp of the enemy, maintained their position four hours against two regiments of Semmes's brigade, and then withdrew, carrying with them "everything but the dead of the enemy." The Union loss was one killed and seven wounded—two of the latter mortally. The Confederate loss was 10 officers and men killed, 2 officers and 21 men wounded, and 33 officers and men missing. Colonel Woodbury reports that his regiment captured "some thirty-seven prisoners, including one officer." This spirited affair is also memorable as the occasion first drawing the attention of the com-

mander of the army to that gallant soldier, George A. Custer.

On the morning of this same day, the President had informed General McClellan that General McDowell expected to commence his supporting movement on May 26th, without fail. At 5 P.M., however, under pressure of the influences surrounding him, he suspended the order for the advance, and half of McDowell's force, notwithstanding his protest, was diverted in a futile effort to capture the command with which Jackson absorbed the attention and demonstrated the timidity of the regnant authority. But, though suspended, the order for the southward movement was not revoked, and co-operation, as ordered, was still obligatory upon General McClellan. Pending developments, work was being prosecuted upon bridges across the Chickahominy with such vigor as was permitted by constant and heavy rain, when information was received, on May 26th, that the enemy had fallen back from the front of Fredericksburg and that General McDowell's advance was eight miles south of the Rappahannock River. At the same time, the presence of a considerable force of the enemy at Hanover Court-House was reported.

On the 24th of May, General McClellan directed Major Alexander S. Webb, an experienced officer of artillery, then serving at headquarters of the army on the staff of General Barry, to make a reconnoissance to Hanover Court-House. Securing from General Stoneman, chief of cavalry (who had been operating for several days on the right flank of the army), a detachment of the 8th Illinois Cavalry, and one piece of Tidball's horse artillery (about 140 men in all),

Major Webb proceeded from Mechanicsville, by the Ashland road, to a point on the Virginia Central Railroad, about twelve miles from Richmond. When scarcely five miles from camp, the advance encountered the enemy's cavalry pickets, and they were driven two or three miles from the main road northward, the detachment passing between the main body of the enemy in that vicinity and his concentrated forces at Richmond. The extreme advance of the party went to the railroad, near Mr. Leach's residence, about seven miles from the Chickahominy, tore up a portion of the track and burned the ties, so as to render those seven miles of the road practically useless.

This movement occasioned quite a commotion among the enemy's videttes, as they had dashed into their lines shouting, "The Yankees are coming!" During the half hour which the detachment occupied in their work on the railroad, the long roll was heard sounding in the enemy's camp. The good people who were going to the country church opened their eyes in amazement at seeing Union soldiers in that vicinity—this day being Sunday. After reconnoitering the country in that neighborhood, the party returned to camp on Monday.

General J. B. Anderson, in command of six regiments and two batteries, with cavalry covering his flank and rear between the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers, had confronted McDowell's corps at Fredericksburg. Stuart's cavalry covered the railroad communications from the Pamunkey southward. On May 22d, General L. O'B. Branch was ordered to move his Carolina brigade from Gordonsville to the vicinity of Hanover Court-House, in order to connect General Anderson's command with the troops at

Meadow Bridge; protect the railroad communications with Jackson's force, and be in a position to operate upon the Union flank in the event of the expected struggle before Richmond. On Sunday, May 25th, General Branch was encamped at Hanover Court-House, where he had found and assumed command of the 45th Georgia regiment. On the same day General Anderson reached Hanover Junction with his command, *en route* to Richmond, and halted to await transportation. On May 26th, General Branch moved his troops to the west of Peak's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad. These commands, numbering some 12,000 men, constituted a serious menace to McClellan's flank, as well as obstacle in the way of McDowell's advance.

As the army moved from the Pamunkey, General Porter had been charged with the duty of clearing the country of the enemy up to or beyond Hanover Court-House, and of making such dispositions as would guard the approaches to the rear of the right wing; and further, with breaking the enemy's communication with Northern Virginia by the line of the Virginia Central Railroad. A portion of this duty had been accomplished by Warren's provisional brigade, which, from its camps at Old Church, had destroyed the bridges along the Pamunkey as far as was deemed prudent, and on May 26th General Porter was directed to move at daylight next day to Hanover Court-House, to open the way for McDowell.

BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT-HOUSE.

At 4 A.M., May 27th, with the 1st division, under General Morell, preceded by an advance guard of the

5th and 6th U. S. Cavalry and Benson's battery, 2d U. S. Artillery, General W. H. Emory commanding, General Porter moved from camp near New Bridge by the most direct route to Hanover Court-House, expecting to engage the enemy at or near that point. At the same hour, Colonel Warren, with the 5th and 13th New York and 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery (serving as infantry), a detachment of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Weeden's Rhode Island battery, moved from Old Church, by a road parallel to the Pamunkey, to strike the same force of the enemy in flank and rear. At a late hour, Stoneman's cavalry command and regular infantry under General Sykes moved out so as to protect the left and rear of the advanced column.

The day opened with a heavy rainstorm, and for about fourteen miles the troops struggled through mud and water, detachments being left to watch the roads that every two or three miles intersected the route, until about noon a force of the enemy, under Colonel James H. Lane, 28th North Carolina Infantry, was discovered in position on the road from Hanover to Richmond, about one and a half miles east of Peak's Station, and about two and a half miles south of Hanover Court-House. Benson's battery at once opened fire, the cavalry being placed on the left and rear in support, and Berdan's sharpshooters, and the 25th New York, being in advance, were deployed as skirmishers to hold the enemy in check until the arrival of the main command. A force of cavalry, with a section of artillery, were at the same time sent towards Peak's Station to guard the left flank and destroy railroad and telegraph communications at that point. This force soon became engaged with

General Branch's troops on the Ashcake road, and General Martindale, arriving with the 2d Maine and 22d Massachusetts,¹ at the head of General Morell's column, was ordered by General Porter to their support. General Butterfield's brigade, arriving next, was promptly formed in two lines and moved rapidly to the front on the Hanover Court-House road, driving the enemy before it, and capturing one piece of artillery and a number of prisoners. The cavalry and horse artillery followed closely in pursuit of the enemy as they retreated towards Hanover Court-House, and Colonel Warren, who, after a severe march, hindered and delayed by the necessity of repairing bridges, joined with his command about 3 P.M., was ordered to push on in the same direction and destroy the bridges across the Chickahominy east of the railroad.

General Porter, closely following with the main body of his command, was also moving northward towards the supposed location of General Branch's camp, and the head of the column was approaching the Court-House, when the left and rear, under General Martindale, was attacked by the enemy in force. The infantry was immediately faced about, and in double time, left in front, moved back to the original battle-field, while the cavalry moved on after the enemy. The 62d Pennsylvania and 9th Massachusetts marched back a short distance in column of platoons, left in front, wheeled to the right, and, both entering the woods in line of battle, met the enemy and drove them.

¹ The 13th New York was detached with Warren's command, and the 18th Massachusetts, on picket duty when the command marched, joined late in the afternoon.

While Colonel Lane's detachment had occupied attention in the direction of Hanover Court-House, General Branch, moving under cover of the woods, had concentrated his main force on the Ashcake road, to cover his line of retreat ; and, as Martindale's regiments withdrew for the movement to the Court-House, he advanced and attacked. The 22d Massachusetts had moved too far up the railroad to be recalled in time, but the 2d Maine promptly formed on the north of the road to Richmond, west of Dr. Kinney's house ; and the 44th New York, which had been on detached duty with a section of Martin's battery, guarding the rear of the general movement, opportunely arriving, was placed in position on the left of the artillery, the artillery being posted between the regiments, under Lieutenant Dunn. The 25th New York was subsequently put in on the right of the artillery, and the 2d Maine moved to the right, extending the line to meet the developing attack of the enemy. The line thus formed was maintained until the return of the 2d and 3d brigades from the pursuit of Lane's Carolinians, though subjected to heavy assaults and a fire converging so severely on the centre that even Martin's cannoners were driven from their pieces, and the 25th New York was forced backward out of line, but heroically faced the fury. The brunt of actual contact was splendidly sustained by the 2d Maine, under their gallant Colonel Roberts, and on the left the fire of the 44th New York effectually covered the guns that were temporarily abandoned, while the bearing of the regiment gave evidence of the future in store for it with the heroic Rice.

The return movement placed McQuade's brigade

in advance. Arriving at Dr. Kinney's house, the 14th New York was pushed down the road towards Richmond, under General Morell in person, and relieved the 2d Maine, which for over an hour had held the right against heavy odds, and had almost exhausted its ammunition. At the same time the 62d Pennsylvania and 9th Massachusetts, penetrating the wood on their right, attacked the enemy on his left flank. The 4th Michigan was held in reserve, and was not brought into action, so sudden and complete was the rout of the enemy, which now ensued. Butterfield's brigade, as it arrived, was thrown in on the right of McQuade, and the enemy was driven from the field in confusion, losing heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The command pushed the pursuit until dark, and then bivouacked on the field. One of General Butterfield's aides was captured.¹

May the 28th was occupied in the pursuit of the enemy, in reconnaissance pushed into Ashland, and on the road to Richmond (which revealed the presence of Anderson's command falling back upon that place), and in the destruction of bridges over the Pamunkey and South Anna rivers, in compliance with orders from Washington (received after the fight), as McDowell's order had been revoked. Major Lawrence Williams, 6th U. S. Cavalry, operating on the South Anna, met some of General McDowell's scouts, who were then looking for the immediate advance of the First Corps.

On the 29th of May, the command returned to its

¹ This officer was returned just before the Beaver Dam fight, he having been released on pledge of secrecy of the enemy's movements. He kept his pledge, but expressed great pleasure to General Porter at the preparations for resistance, and showed much anxiety.

position on the right of the army. The casualties suffered are reported as 4 officers and 58 men killed, 12 officers and 211 men wounded, and 2 officers and 68 men captured or missing—an aggregate of 355. The official reports contain the names of Captain Michael McMahon, and Lieutenants George E. Fiske, Thomas P. Thompson, Charles Halpin, and Richard Esselstyn, all of the 25th New York, killed ; Colonel Charles A. Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry F. Savage, Adjutant O. C. Houghton, and Lieutenants Patrick Hicks and Thomas Coglean, of the 25th New York, and Major E. G. Chapin and Adjutant E. B. Knox, of the 44th New York, wounded, and Captain B. F. Harris, of the 25th New York, and Dr. G. C. Marshall, surgeon of the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, captured.

The results obtained were : increased efficiency and morale in the command thus brought into action as a body ; the defeat of Branch's brigade, with the loss of about 200 killed, 200 wounded, and 730 prisoners, and its camp and equipment ; the capture of one gun and caisson and a large number of small-arms ; the capture and destruction of two railroad trains loaded with military stores ; and the security afforded the right wing of the Union army by the complete withdrawal of Anderson's command to Richmond. The obstruction of the crossings of the Pamunkey and South Anna rivers, under the orders received, severed the communications of the enemy with Northern Virginia, but also placed impediments in the way of the otherwise unopposed advance of the First Corps to the front.

The unmilitary policy of the capitalists now constituted the only serious obstacle in the way to vic-

tory. Inconsistency and apprehension ignored the proffered opportunity until, too late, a feeble compromise was attempted in the transfer of a single division of the promised co-operative force. It is neither the province nor intention of this history to discuss the merits of General McClellan's command of the armies of the United States, or of the Army of the Potomac, but a just understanding of the situation before Richmond, and the part borne therein by the Fifth Army Corps, cannot be had without brief reference to occurrences connected with and following the departure of the Army of the Potomac from the immediate front of Washington. The general military situation is concisely stated by General E. D. Keyes, in his letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate, April 7, 1862, as follows :

“The greatest master of the art of war has said ‘that if you would invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operation and one army under one general.’ But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz : Frémont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake in the care of Dix.”

Each of these commanders was responsible to the President alone, and with him they corresponded sometimes directly, occasionally through the adjutant-general of the army, but generally through the Secretary of War. Volumes xi. and xii. of the *Rebellion Records* are rich in demonstrations of the results obtained under the arrangement. The subject is vividly sketched in a review published in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, March, 1886. With General Frémont commanding in Western Virginia, General Banks commanding in the

Shenandoah valley, and General McDowell commanding in front of Washington, 70,000 men were scattered around the nervous centre of the country. In the attempt to manipulate this force the authorities, generally through the Secretary of War, directly from Washington, or represented at one point by the Secretary of the Treasury and at another by assistant secretaries of war or other mutual friends, communicated voluminously with commanders and subordinates, even upon the most trivial subjects, and gave instructions concerning the dispositions of detachments and regiments. Brigade and division commanders telegraphed from the rear, imparting information as to what was taking place at the front, and communicated with the War Department, promising to "hold their positions to the last extremity," proffering suggestions, repeating the rumors with which the air was charged, and asking for instructions and for information as to the movements of troops. To such an extent were ordinary prudence and methods ignored during this experimental period that the intelligence of even the President so far gave way as to suggest as an addition to orders to be given to General McDowell, the charge :

"You will retain the *separate* command of the forces taken with you ; but *while co-operating* with General McClellan you will obey his orders, *except that YOU are to judge*, and are not TO ALLOW *your force to be disposed otherwise* than so as to give the greatest protection to this capital which may be possible from that distance."¹

¹ When, a month later, General McClellan telegraphed concerning the renewed proposition to send General McDowell to his support—"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results,"—the expression was seized upon and published as proof of a malignant egotism that

Responsibility and efficiency were made impossible. Subordinates knew not where to look for orders, instruction, or assistance, and army-commanders, not knowing when their orders would be countermanded by authority as arbitrary and unreliable as it was inexperienced and illegitimate, could not act intelligently.

Suddenly Washington was startled with the news that the terrible Jackson was driving Banks' army from its picket-post in the Shenandoah valley. The movement of McDowell's command southward from Fredericksburg was immediately suspended by orders from the agitated capital. Dispatches, orders, rumors, and theories added a stampede to the confusion already existing. Frémont was ordered one way and McDowell another. Everybody scouted, but nobody found the enemy. They saw him not, and yet they still had him in fearfully intangible presence. The Secretary of War, putting General McDowell upon his word as Commander of the Department of the Rappahannock, demanded to know if three hundred cavalry "was an adequate force under present circumstances for the safety of Washington," and General McDowell was obliged to reply that in his opinion the exigency demanded no greater force of that arm at that point; but, nevertheless, stumbling unexpectedly upon a Michigan regiment at Manassas, *he had the horses shod* and returned the regiment to

preferred the sacrifice of lives committed to his care, and disaster to the nation, rather than forego a little brief authority. Candidly read, in the light of events then recent, and occurring, however, it was but the judgment of a prudent commander, who preferred the risks of contest with unequal numbers to the disaster certain to result from a command divided with an irresponsible and uncertain ally under the control of authorities ignorant of the real military situation.

Washington, from *whence cavalry had but just been sent by direction of the Secretary of War.*

The inevitable end came, with Banks in collapse behind Winchester and north of the Potomac, and McDowell's troops helplessly scattered from Fredericksburg to Luray. Frémont finally obtained a view of the enemy's column in the valley and followed, until Jackson halted and beat him back. Then Jackson disappeared once more, and the Secretary of War telegraphed to McDowell at Manassas :

"You have all the knowledge possessed by the Department respecting the position of the forces under command of General Banks and General Frémont, and you also know what orders have been given *by the President* to those commanders, as well as to yourself. *I have no further orders to give.*" The truth of the situation at last became so far apparent to the President as to cause him to consolidate the hitherto vagrant corps into one army under one nominal head.

More of method was observed in and around the Confederate capital when the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia confronted each other, so nearly equal in numerical strength that interior lines, intrenchments, and constant accessions gave heavy advantages to the Confederate force. On May 20th Casey's division had secured a lodgment on the right bank of the Chickahominy and ten days later the Third and Fourth Corps had followed and taken position, strengthening their advance with intrenchments.

On the 27th of May General Johnston, being informed of the expected movement of McDowell's command to the aid of the Army of the Potomac, de-

cided to anticipate his arrival and directed General Gustavus W. Smith to attack the Union right at Mechanicsville. By night of May 28th, however, the suspension of McDowell's orders becoming known, the movement was abandoned and, instead, the battle of Fair Oaks was fought on May 31st, and Sumner's corps crossed to the right bank of the river to the support of the Union left. General Johnston being wounded, was succeeded in command by General Robert E. Lee.

On the 13th of June General J. E. B. Stuart, with 1200 cavalry and a section of artillery, effected the circuit of the Union army, ascertained the location of its right wing and the weakness of its connection with its base, and imposed a severe march of forty-two miles in thirty-eight hours upon Warren's infantry brigade, while conveying the cavalry reserve in an investigation instituted by General P. St. George Cooke into the route and methods pursued by his son-in-law, the dashing raider.

On June 19th the Sixth Corps was transferred to the south of the Chickahominy, and the lines then established from New Bridge to White Oak Swamp, preparatory to attacking the enemy's lines in the rear of Old Tavern. The Fifth Corps, reinforced by the 10th New York, the 1st Michigan, and McCall's division, as has been stated, and also by the cavalry commands of Generals Cooke and Stoneman, remained alone upon the northern bank, the order of May 18th being still in force upon General McClellan, and the coming of General McDowell with the remainder of his force "as speedily as possible" being still promised, the assurance of reinforcements being repeated on June 26th, with the added information, "McDowell's,

Banks', and Frémont's force *will be* consolidated as the Army of Virginia and *will operate* promptly in your aid by land."

The military situation may be briefly stated. Richmond could only be captured by regular approaches or by assault. Regular approaches required time and a well secured base of supplies. Assault required superior force and ample reserves. The Army of the Potomac, constantly depleting by casualty and sickness and reinforced chiefly with promises unfulfilled, was lacking in the essentials for either course, while the defenders of the city, their numbers constantly augmenting, could detach largely from behind their strong intrenchments and assume the offensive at pleasure.

BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE.

But the skilful and vigilant leader of the Army of Northern Virginia proposed to be effective when he moved. On the 22d of June he pushed his outposts along the railroads north of the Chickahominy toward Hanover Court-House, covering his operations with an impenetrable line of pickets and scouts.

On June 24th Colonel Farnesworth, from his Union outpost on the right, sent to General Porter a young man named Charles Rean, who, when captured, claimed to have served in Kenly's 1st Maryland regiment until taken prisoner at Winchester, and to have escaped at Lynchburg and gained the Union lines via Richmond. Convinced that he was not what he represented himself to be, General Porter forwarded the prisoner to the provost marshal general with the request that he be forced to tell the truth. At midnight, hearing that the story told by the youth had

been credited and that he had been released, General Porter protested and procured his re-arrest and examination by General McClellan in person. Under this pressure the prisoner finally confessed that he was a Texan belonging to General Jackson's command ; that he was charged with the duty of gaining information of the strength and location of the troops upon the Union right, and of the roads leading to them from the north and west, and that with this information he was to rejoin General Jackson, accompanied by two citizens living within the Union lines, and guide him in the completion of a movement he was then making on the right and rear of McClellan's army, in co-operation with a large force to be detached from Richmond under General Lee.

This was the first information that Jackson had baffled the efforts of the three corps commanders kept in northern Virginia to watch and check and report his movements. Telegraphing at once to the Secretary of War, General McClellan received in reply the statement, " We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force," coupled with an outline of current rumors and the assurance, " I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here." General Thomas J. Jackson in person brought definite information which was transmitted to Washington through the Army of the Potomac after the seven-days' battles.

The activity on the Confederate left had not been unnoticed and the pending emergency had been anticipated as probable by Generals McClellan and Porter. General Porter's command had been distributed as follows : Meade's brigade at Gaines' house, near a siege battery ; Reynolds' and Seymour's brigades

(3d division) were supporting and close to Meade on June 24th. On the night of the capture of the scout and his confession Reynolds and Seymour were sent to Beaver Dam Creek, where they at once entrenched their commands and kept concealed—this in conformity to plans previously discussed between Generals McClellan and Porter. They were in the timber skirting the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, covering the crossings at Ellerson's Mill and the Mechanicsville pike and controlling the roads and open ground west of the creek. Outposts from these brigades observed Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, and north to the Pamunkey cavalry pickets guarded the approaches and protected detachments sent out to place obstructions on the roads leading to the Union rear. Cooke's cavalry, near Cold Harbor, guarded the right and rear and scouted toward Hanover Court-House, while Sykes' and Morell's divisions camped on the Gaines farm, conveniently located for rapid movement to any threatened point. Buchanan's brigade of regulars was ordered to proceed in the direction of Hanover Court-House on the 24th in a reconnoissance to observe the approach of Jackson.

General Reynolds, at Beaver Dam Creek, being promptly informed of the expected attack, immediately prepared to receive it. All subordinate commanders were directed to break camp at the first sound of the battle, send their trains to the rear, and take specified positions. During the night of June 25th and 26th, the 18th Massachusetts, Colonel Barnes commanding, and the 17th New York, Colonel Lansing commanding, were detailed as an infantry support to Stoneman's cavalry, and under the orders of that officer, before noon of June 26th, took position

on the Old Church road, about a mile west of the church, retiring at night to Allen's Mill on the road to Cold Harbor.

On the 25th of June, the pickets south of the Chickahominy had been pushed forward in the movement preparatory to the intended attack at Old Tavern, and gained ground, but under such heavy opposition as to convince the commanders engaged that no appreciable detachment had been made from the forces in their front. Early the next morning, however, it became evident that the enemy purposed crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, and Buchanan reported large bodies of troops approaching from the north. The confession of the Texan scout was being rapidly confirmed.

Colonel Simmons, with the 5th Pennsylvania, and a battery occupied Mechanicsville, supporting Major Roy Stone, who, with six companies of the 6th, (Bucktail) regiment, picketed the river from Mechanicsville Bridge to and above Meadow Bridge, while Colonel Farnsworth kept cavalry patrols moving upon the road to the north and west. About 7 A.M., the cavalry pickets on the Hanover Court-House road, about six miles north of Mechanicsville, were attacked, and from that time skirmishing was continuous from the point of first attack to the Chickahominy River, the outposts at Mechanicsville being reinforced by the 2d Pennsylvania. The resistance offered to the advance of the enemy was purposely, however, only sufficient to invite as heavy an attack as possible, when all the detachments were withdrawn, with small loss, behind the main line on Beaver Dam Creek, destroying the bridge as they retired.

Captain Irving's company of Bucktails, holding their ground too long, were surrounded and fell into the hands of the enemy, after hiding four days in the swamp, where they buried their rifles before surrendering.

About 3 P.M., June 26th, the enemy, under Generals Longstreet and both the Hills, pushed rapidly across the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville, Meadow, and Crenshaw's bridges, and by 4 P.M., their columns had reached Mechanicsville and were deployed for assault.

The right of the Union line was posted in thick woods north of the Mechanicsville pike and was extended thence under cover of timber and brush along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek to the Chickahominy. The banks of the valley were steep, and the stream was waist-deep and bordered by swamps, making its passage difficult for infantry and impracticable for artillery except at the bridge crossing at Ellerson's Mill, and on the turnpike. The road from Mechanicsville to the lower crossing turns just before reaching the valley of the creek and for some distance runs parallel to it, thus exposing the flank of an approaching force.

Soon after 2 P.M., the boom of a signal gun near Mechanicsville announced the approaching crisis. General McCall, ordering Meade's brigade to move to the front, assumed command at Beaver Dam Creek and formed his line with Reynolds' brigade—the 1st, 2d, 13th, 5th, and 8th regiments in order as named—on the right, and Seymour's brigade—the 10th and 12th regiments in line with the 9th in reserve¹—on the left. Four guns of Cooper's battery

¹ The 6th was on duty with Casey's division.

on the right, and the right section of Smead's battery on the left of the turnpike, commanded the northern approach. DeHart's battery and a section of Kerns' battery near the centre swept the front. Meade's brigade (except the 11th regiment, on picket along the lower Chickahominy) was held in reserve in rear of the left centre. Van Reed's section of Smead's battery and Fullerton's section of Cooper's battery, swept the approach to Ellerson's Mill. Later, General McCall strengthened his right with the remaining four guns of Kerns' battery, the 5th regiment being ordered to their support; and, still later, sent Easton's battery, with the 7th regiment in support, to his left. Toward the close of the action, Edwards' battery was also sent to General Seymour.

During the morning, General Morell, in compliance with orders, had sent Martindale's brigade, with Martin's battery, to take positions on the extreme right of General McCall's line. This brigade was subsequently joined by Kingsbury's battery. Butterfield's brigade, with Allen's battery, was sent towards Old Church in support of Cooke's cavalry, and the 2d Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Griffin (promoted June 9, 1862, and assigned June 26th), with Weeden's battery, was held in reserve at its camp.

Early in the afternoon the attack of the enemy was developed, and General Morell was ordered to go there with the 2d Brigade and to recall the 3d, and direct it to follow him. He arrived at Beaver Creek between five and six o'clock and found McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves closely engaged on the defensive. His right, under General Reynolds, was severely pressed, and General Morell ordered General

Griffin to support him and take care of the interval between him and General Martindale. Two of Griffin's regiments, the 14th New York and 4th Michigan, became almost immediately engaged; the other two, the 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania, with Weeden's battery, were held in reserve.

Sykes' division had, in the meantime, been ordered up and formed line of battle half a mile in rear, in case of emergency. The 3d Brigade of Morell's division, returning from Cold Harbor, was placed in line of battle in rear of General Sykes' division.

Passing Mechanicsville, the attacking forces were divided. Field's brigade of A. P. Hill's division, with Pegram's battery, pushed after the withdrawing Pennsylvanians, the infantry moving toward the turnpike while the battery took position on the lower road. Anderson's brigade moved to the left of the pike, McIntosh's battery taking position on the right, and Archer's brigade was pushed in on the left of Field with his left resting on the pike, Braxton's battery coming into action on his left rear. Gregg's and Pender's brigades arriving, Pender moved down the road toward Ellerson's Mill, Anderson's battery dashing out to support Pegram. Gregg was held in reserve near Mechanicsville. Unaware, or regardless of their danger, the Confederate lines, in open view of their waiting foemen, advanced steadily and confidently until about half way down the western slope of the valley. Then the storm burst upon them. On the extreme right of the Union line the 35th Georgia gained a foothold on the east bank of the creek, but nothing further. Elsewhere the attack was repulsed with slaughter. On the Confederate left, the 44th Georgia alone suffered a loss nearly equal to the ag-

gregate casualties on the Union side, and on their right, Pender's brigade, under both direct and flank fire, suffered terribly. Ripley's brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, arriving on the ground, went forward to Pender's support, and Johnson's battery went into action on the turnpike, between Braxton and McIntosh. Again the attack was fiercely pressed, but again the deadly fire encountered repulsed the bravest efforts. Nearly every field officer in Ripley's brigade was killed or wounded. With the dusk of evening, the battle closed, to await the advent of Jackson's forces on the Union right.

The wise preparations made by General Reynolds in taking advantage of every detail of the ground affording protection, gave advantages to the Pennsylvanians that cost the enemy very dearly. The 5000 Union troops engaged suffered a loss of only 361, including about 80 killed. The 10,000 Confederates participating in the assault lost at least one-sixth of that number.

General McClellan had joined General Porter at the front early in the afternoon and remained with him until far into the night. During the day he received the information that the Army of Virginia would be formed; that King's division had reached Falmouth, and Shields' and Rickett's divisions were at Manassas; that General Pope, who knew nothing of the situation, thought if he (General McClellan) fell back "it would be much better toward York River than toward the James," and was requested, "as Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph." Such encouragement as was vouchsafed remained as usual in the indefinite future tense. The emergency confronting him was in the

present imperative. The results of the action during the day had been gratifying, but from scouts and outposts had come unvarying reports confirming the arrival of Jackson's command upon his right flank. General McClellan was compelled to an immediate decision as to which of two courses was to be followed. General Porter offered, if reinforced by a division, to hold his position at Beaver Dam Creek while the main army could be thrown against Richmond south of the Chickahominy. As an alternative, there remained but to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy and maintain his lines till dispositions could be made to move his army in the face of his vigilant foe, to the new base proposed on the James River. No middle course offered promise that could justify acceptance of the inevitably accompanying risks of the existence of the army. All available forces were being concentrated under General Pope to ensure the safety of the unthreatened capital, and the Army of the Potomac was abandoned to its own resources in the extremity to which it had been reduced by political experimenters. The logic of events in three succeeding years of war sustains the wisdom of the course finally adopted by General McClellan.

About 1 A.M., June 27th, leaving General Barnard, of the Engineers, to point out the new line of battle, in case it was decided to withdraw the Fifth Corps from Beaver Dam Creek, General McClellan returned to his headquarters, expecting to find information there which would enable him to decide upon the next step to be taken. That matters had been thoroughly discussed and a thorough understanding reached between the Army and the Fifth Corps commanders cannot be doubted any more than that each

possessed the unqualified confidence of the other. In a paper read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, May 13, 1890, Dr. Geo. H. Lyman, formerly medical director Fifth Army Corps, relates the circumstance of the separation of General McClellan and General Porter that night, as accidentally occurring in his hearing. He says :

“ Captain Mason and myself were resting on a bale of hay, under a tree, when, during the night, McClellan and Porter stopped near by in discussion upon the next day's proceedings. As they parted, McClellan said : ‘ Now, Fitz, you understand my views and the absolute necessity of holding the ground until arrangements over the river can be completed. Whichever of the two positions you take, *hold* it.’ To which Porter replied: ‘ Give yourself no uneasiness, I shall hold it to the last extremity.’ ”

About 3 A.M., Porter received the order to withdraw his command to the line selected east of Gaines' Mill.

BATTLE OF GAINES' MILL, VA.

Leaving Gaines' Mill Pond, Powhite Creek flows in a slightly curved line almost due south for two miles, to its junction with the Chickahominy 500 yards west of the location of Duane's Bridge. At the same distance east of the bridge, with Woodbury's Bridge intervening, Boatswain's Creek enters the main stream. Having its sources in the swampy ground north and west of McGehee's, this creek flows southwesterly for nearly two miles, between steep banks of equal height, bordered by rolling table-lands. Passing about 600 yards east of New Cold Harbor, and grad-

ually inclining southward, it approaches to within 500 yards of Powhite Creek when about 1000 yards north of the Chickahominy. Here the table-land falls off to the level of the bottom, and the creek bends abruptly to the east for 600 yards, and then flows in an almost straight line southeasterly to its mouth. Behind Boatswain's Creek was the position selected for the stand to be made June 27th. The line of battle was semicircular, the flanks resting on the valley of the Chickahominy and the arc including the high grounds east of the creek and sweeping north of McGehee's to Elder Swamp. Part of the front was covered by the ravine of the creek; the east bank, from the abrupt eastward turn of the creek to and across the road to New Cold Harbor, was lined with trees and underbrush, and thence to the north of McGehee's it was a series of boggy swamps covered with brush, heavily fringed with timber to the north and west. North of McGehee's and beyond the ground was more elevated and was broken by ravines. The high lands embraced were cleared ground, undulating and crossed by fences and ditches, offering some degree of cover to both infantry and artillery. The bed of the stream was nearly dry, and portions of its west bank afforded excellent protection under which to receive an advance of the enemy over the cleared ground sloping to it. The swampy grounds were open to view, and the roads from Gaines' Mill and Old Cold Harbor, the only approaches, were covered by the high grounds. The line was well selected and naturally strong, but was long, and its secure defense required both preparation and more troops than General Porter had at his command.



Immediately after pointing out the new line, General Barnard left General Porter and returned to the headquarters of the army. It was understood by General Porter that he would immediately send axes for use in the necessary defensive preparations, and that he would acquaint the commanding general with the urgency for additional force. In his official report General Barnard states his knowledge of the fact that upon the impending battle hinged the fate of the campaign, and intimates his appreciation of the inadequacy of the force he had left on the line he himself had selected, and yet confesses: "I reached headquarters about 9 or 10 A.M., and being informed that the commanding general was reposing, *I went to my tent and remained there until afternoon.*"¹ Not until 2 P.M. was General McClellan advised of General Porter's need of assistance, and though again called for, the axes were not delivered until near dark,—too late to be of any service.

During the night of June 26–7th, the heavy artillery in the works commanding New Bridge were safely moved by land to the right bank of the river, and placed in position on the flank of General W. F. Smith's division, where they were used with effect on the right of the enemy's attacking force during the afternoon. The rapid advance of the enemy, however, prevented the removal of the regimental hospital, and the attendants and sick, including tents. Wm. C. Faxon and Paul Harwood were taken prisoners. Robertson's and Tidball's mounted batteries having reported to General Porter about the

¹ After such a confession, one cannot be surprised at the fact that General Barnard was one of the most unsparing of the adverse critics of the first Peninsula campaign.

time of the receipt of his orders to take up his new position, were stationed about a mile west of Gaines' Mill to cover the retirement of McCall's division on the Mechanicsville road.

At daylight of June 27th, everything having been arranged in anticipation of orders, the Fifth Corps commenced the movement that was destined to end only with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on the James River, pausing at its old camp long enough to secure such personal belongings as had been retained after the departure of the trains loaded and sent to the rear the day before, and leaving details to destroy what little material could not be moved. General Sykes' division took up its position on the high open ground between the roads leading from Old and New Cold Harbor to Parker's Mill—Buchanan on the right, Warren on the left, and Lovell in reserve. Morell's division, following, took position south of the road to New Cold Harbor—Griffin's brigade on the right, Martindale in the centre, and Butterfield on the left.

Sharp firing recommenced along the Beaver Dam Creek lines at daybreak, but so complete had been the repulse of the day before that the enemy was cautious in again attempting an advance, although Jackson's command was then known to have arrived on his left. On the left of the Union line, the 9th Pennsylvania relieved the 12th from its rifle-pits and assumed the duties of rear-guard. Colonel Taggart, however, reports that some men of the 12th regiment, probably about 20, either did not hear the order to fall back, or would not do so, and, being left behind, were killed or captured; and also that Captain Richard Gustin's company, on duty at Ellerson's

Mill, being detached from the regiment, maintained its position for nearly an hour after the regiment had retired, and after the enemy had crossed the creek and attempted to surround it, but finally withdrew with a loss of only three men wounded. Major Roy Stone, with his Bucktails, covered the withdrawal on the Union right. The crossing of Beaver Dam Creek by the artillery and main body of the troops under Generals Longstreet and the Hills was retarded by the necessity of repairing the bridges; but such light troops as could be crossed pressed after the retiring line, and the head of Ewell's column joined by the road from Hundley's Corners to Walnut Grove church. The pursuit was, however, easily kept at a respectful distance by the Pennsylvanians, with the efficient aid of Robertson's and Tidball's well-managed guns. The retirement from under fire and in the face of such largely superior forces was effected in a manner that elicited, even from the enemy, the warmest acknowledgments of the skill evinced by Generals McCall, Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour.

The Corps' staff suffered loss by the capture of Lieutenant S. M. Weld (aide to General Porter) while on duty connected with the withdrawal of Meade's brigade. By 10 A.M., the new position was reached and the Reserves were placed in front of the Adams house and in rear of the left centre of the front line, with Reynolds' brigade on the right, Meade's on the left, and Seymour's in rear and reserve. Cooper's battery took position on the right, and on the left De Hart, Easton, and Kerns' batteries commanded the space between the woods and the Chickahominy.

Fearing that Stoneman's command would be cut off by Jackson's movement, General Porter had sent word to that officer to make his way to White House and rejoin the army from that point. This was successfully accomplished, the 17th New York and 18th Massachusetts rejoining at Harrison's Landing by way of York and James rivers, July 1st and 2d, and the cavalry retiring down the Peninsula and rejoining between the 5th and 10th.

General Franklin had been instructed to send Slocum's division of his corps to reinforce the Fifth Corps should heavy firing be heard in the direction of Mechanicsville at daybreak of June 27th. Under these orders, part of that division had crossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy early in the morning, but it was recalled before it reached General Porter.

The line assigned to General Sykes occupied high ground in an open field, and was partly covered by a fence and partly by inequalities of the ground. The commanding point was in rear of his right centre. Four hundred yards in his front, heavy timber bordered the opposite side of the ravine of Boatswain's Creek, and his left rested upon a dense wood extending to the left and front. Weed's battery, supported by the 4th U. S. Infantry, under Major Delozier Davidson and subsequently, after the disappearance of that officer, by Captain J. B. Collins, occupied the extreme right and commanded the approach from Old Cold Harbor. Extending towards the left, the 3d, 14th, and 12th U. S. (Colonel Buchanan commanding), and the 5th and 10th New York (Colonel Warren commanding), were deployed in line with sections of Edwards' battery stationed at intervals. The 2d, 10th, and 17th U. S. Infantry in line of

battle near the Cold Harbor road and in rear and support of the 3d Brigade, the 6th U. S. near the field hospital, and the 11th U. S. in support of the batteries on the left of the road to New Cold Harbor, constituted the reserve under command of Major Lovell, 10th Infantry, Colonel Chapman being disabled by sickness.

Prior to the arrival of General Morell upon the field, General Porter had the 3d Brigade go into position on the extreme left of the line. General Butterfield formed his command with the 83d Pennsylvania and 44th New York in the front line in the timber along the creek, the left of the 44th resting upon the eastward bend of the stream. The 12th New York was posted on the crest of the hill in rear of and supporting the 83d Pennsylvania, and the 16th Michigan was behind the crest in rear of and supporting the 44th New York. Allen's 5th Massachusetts's battery took position on the right and rear of the brigade. The sharpshooters of the 16th Michigan and skirmishers from the 83d Pennsylvania and 44th New York were thrown well forward on the brow of the hill in front. General Morell, arriving with the remainder of his command, placed Martindale's brigade on the right of Butterfield, and Griffin's brigade on the right of Martindale. Then followed the 25th New York, 13th New York, and 2d Maine, in order as named. The 22d Massachusetts was held in reserve. The 4th Michigan held the left of the 2d Brigade line with an interval between its right and the left of the 14th New York. The 9th Massachusetts, after holding the bridge-crossing at Gaines' Mill until the enemy had passed above the mill in force, fell back gradually into position on the right of the brigade

line. The 62d Pennsylvania was held in reserve. The whole front was covered by skirmishers, the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters being deployed in front of the 2d Brigade. Martin's battery, south of the road to New Cold Harbor, held the right of the division line. Lieutenant Buckley's section of Weeden's battery went into position on the right of the 1st Brigade, Waterman's and Clark's sections, being in rear of the 2d Brigade.

As the different commands took up their assigned positions, such defensive preparations as an hour or so permitted with the means at hand, were immediately made. With the help of tools borrowed from the artillery, some trees were felled along portions of the line and barriers were erected in places—rails, logs, knapsacks, etc., being utilized for material. At this time, also, a mail from the North arrived and was distributed, and, mingled with the sounds of the preparations for battle, newsboys were heard crying the New York and Philadelphia papers, while the regulars, whose sutler's store had to be destroyed, were coolly smoking cigars which they had been permitted to take from the burning goods.

Colonel Farnsworth, 8th Illinois Cavalry, had fallen back to Old Cold Harbor, covering the right flank of the retiring line, and remained in observation upon the right during the day—Captains Farnsworth and Kelly, with their troops, being sent to Despatch Station, where they remained until the afternoon of June 28th, when they retired by way of the ford at Bottom's Bridge, after sending to the south bank all the sick and wounded, with surgeons and nurses, from the hospital at the station, and also all teams, wagons, and ambulances, with such hospital stores as

they could transport—destroying what could not be removed.

General Philip St. George Cooke, with a detachment from the 1st Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, Colonel Rush commanding, consisting of five companies (probably 200 men) of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, and six companies (about 240 men) of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and a part of the 2d Brigade, Cavalry Reserve, Colonel Blake commanding, consisting of four companies of the 1st U. S. Cavalry (about 125 men) and the provost guard (about 40 men), was ordered to take position in the valley of the Chickahominy, to guard the left flank, intercept and hold all stragglers, and, if opportunity favored, to operate in, but *under no circumstances to leave*, the valley.¹

Before noon, Captains Robertson and Tidball, reporting to General Porter the completion of their delicate duty with the rear-guard, Robertson's battery was held in reserve near the Adams house until about 1.30 P.M., and was then moved to a position on the bottom ground in front of Boatswain's Creek, protecting the left of the corps line. Tidball's battery was directed to report to General Sykes, and under

¹ General Cooke appears to have considered the duty assigned to him to be beneath the dignity of a brigadier-general commanding cavalry, and claims that an order confining his operations to the valley of the Chickahominy would have been an insult to an officer of his rank. He admits that it was "proposed" that he should take position upon "the narrow open meadow on the extreme left," but claims that General Porter "evidently yielded" to representations offered by him (Gen. Cooke) against such a position. He appears, in fact, to have considered himself unrestricted by instructions, for he does not state any order as received by him, and confesses (*Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 41) that his ultimate action was "without orders, of course." The fact remains, however, that the cavalry division was held in position on the meadow, and the well-known character and method of General Porter preclude the supposition that any subordinate on the field was left uninstructed as to the participation expected of him in the impending battle.

his orders moved at a trot to the support of Weed's battery, then engaged with the enemy on the extreme right. General Porter at first made his headquarters at the Adams house, but soon moved to the Watts house, on more elevated ground nearer the front, whence he could more readily command all parts of the field.

Early in the engagement, the Prince de Joinville, Captain Louis Philippe (Comte de Paris), and Captain Robert d'Orleans (Duc de Chartres), with Lieutenant-Colonels Gantt and Radowitz, Majors Hammerstein and Kirkland, and Captain Wm. P. Mason, reported from the staff of the general commanding the army, as volunteer aides of General Porter, and rendered valuable assistance during the battle. Major Alexander S. Webb, of General Barry's staff, was also on the field and rendered able service as a staff officer.

Early in the morning General Porter had telegraphed General McClellan as follows :

"I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin or some other command be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement ; but, relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line."

The new line had been safely reached and occupied. By the engineer officer who had selected and indicated the line, word had been sent to the commanding general of the help that was needed to ensure its successful defense, and having made his dispositions, General Porter stood, conscious of the immense issues at stake and the formidable odds

against him, but confident of receiving the support he needed, and calmly ready, under any circumstances, to make good his promise of the night before and hold to the last extremity the position assigned him. Ere night had come, the acknowledgments of the enemy, mingled with the groans and death-cries of thousands, attested that the men upon whom he relied shared the spirit of their commander.

Leaving Ashland early on June 26th, General Jackson's command moved by way of the Ashcake road across the Virginia Central Railroad, and thence past Taliaferro's Mill and Dr. Shelton's to Hundley's Corner, where it bivouacked at dark. During the march Stuart's cavalry had covered the left flank with scouts thrown out as far as Hanover Court-House and Enon church. Following the withdrawal of the Fifth Corps from Beaver Dam Creek, Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's commands moved directly down the Chickahominy upon Gaines' Mill. Jackson's column, crossing the creek early in the morning, advanced to Walnut Grove church, and, on the arrival of A. P. Hill's column, bore to the left, moving on Old Cold Harbor; but, encountering obstructions in the road, defended by Colonel Farnsworth's cavalry rear-guard, was forced to make a detour, which finally brought it in rear of D. H. Hill's column moving to the same objective point, by way of Bethesda and Beulah churches. Stuart's cavalry still covered the left of the movement, scouting to the north as far as Old Church.

The advantage of the defensive position held by the Fifth Corps was partly counterbalanced by the woods screening the road from Gaines' Mill to Old

Cold Harbor and masking the whole front of the 2d Division, and by the valley of Powhite Creek, stretching from Gaines' Mill to the Chickahominy meadows and distant from the line of the 1st Division but about 1000 yards on the New Cold Harbor road, and only about 500 yards opposite to the Union left. Behind these screens the enemy could deploy his lines in comparative safety, and within effective striking distance.

Soon after noon, Gregg's South Carolina brigade, leading A. P. Hill's light division, reaching Gaines' Mill, found the crossing of Powhite Creek disputed by Colonel Thomas Cass, with the 9th Massachusetts. Shortly before 2 P.M., the Confederates effected the passage and advanced to the crest in front of New Cold Harbor, the Union outpost retiring upon the main line. General Gregg reports: "Among the troops driven from the ground, the 9th Massachusetts *was noticed.*" Colonel Cass intended that it should be. At 2.30 P.M., Gregg's brigade had formed north of the New Cold Harbor road with two regiments in the first line near the crest east of Powhite Creek, and the other two on low ground in rear. Crenshaw's battery took position near New Cold Harbor and opened fire. In the meantime the remainder of Hill's division had crossed the creek and Branch, J. R. Anderson, Field, and Archer's brigades, in order as named, extended Gregg's line to the right. Kemper's brigade was held in reserve. Johnson's battery took position near Crenshaw's, on the left of the road.

Learning that General Longstreet was arriving on his right, General Hill now moved forward to the attack. Gregg's South Carolinians became engaged

with the "vaunted 5th New York Zouaves and Sykes' regulars," and a moment later, Branch, Anderson, Field, and Archer joined the struggle, with Braxton's battery coming into action on the left. Branch being hard pressed, Pender's brigade was sent to his support. So warm was the reception met with, that General Hill reports: "The incessant roar of musketry and deep thunder of the artillery told that *the whole force* of the enemy was in my front." General Gregg reports that in an effort to capture a battery, "a good way on their [our] right" (probably Martin's), the 1st S. C. Rifles suffered a loss of 81 killed and 234 wounded out of 537 men taken into action; and also that all the members of the color guard of the 1st S. C. Infantry were shot down around Colonel D. H. Hamilton, who for a part of the time bore the colors himself. General Anderson reports:

"On arriving near the edge of the woods we came under a brisk fire of the enemy, which increased as we emerged from it, and crossed the narrow slip of land to the crest of the hill. . . . Here the brigade encountered a very hot fire, both of musketry and shell, which brought us to a halt from the double-quick in which I had commenced the charge. But it was only after *a third charge*, in which every effort was made by me to gain the enemy's lines beyond the ravine, that, . . . I concluded to order my men to lie down in the edge of the wood and hold *the position*."

General Field reports:

"Giving the command to charge, we rushed forward . . . until forced by an overpowering fire from greatly superior numbers to fall back for support, which was received. I again formed and moved forward to the attack, General Archer's brigade forming on my right. Both brigades gallantly responded

to the call and rushed forward, and, gaining the crest of the hill, were again stopped by an infantry fire that nothing could live under."

General Archer reports :

"The troops under my command . . . advanced at a double-quick to within twenty steps of the breastworks, when they fell back before the irresistible fire of artillery and rifles. The obvious impossibility of carrying the position without support prevented me from attempting to check the retreat. Had they not fallen back, I would myself have ordered it.

Concerning this initial struggle with the Zouaves, and regulars, General Hill concludes his report :

"From having been the attacking, I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly was the ground held. My division was thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attacks afterwards, and in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army that side of the Chickahominy."

Such thorough endorsement by an enemy is seldom earned and never was better deserved. With 26 regiments, 4 battalions, and 3 batteries, General Hill, though his "brave men had done all that any soldier could do," had failed to carry the line that was held by 9 regiments (finally increased to 11), 3 battalions, and 2 batteries.

General Gregg's attack first struck Warren's brigade—the 5th New York,—about 450 strong, and the 10th New York, about 575 strong—and then the 12th U. S., supported by a section of Edwards' battery on the right of Warren's line, and the fire of other guns on the height in rear. The fire of the 1st South Carolina was met by the fire of the 5th New York and routed by a countercharge from the latter

regiment. Major Clitz with the 12th and Captain O'Connell, on his right with the 14th, and Major Andrews with the 10th and 17th closing the intervals between Clitz and Warren, also charged and drove the enemy across the marsh and into the woods beyond. In this struggle Warren's regiment won from General Sykes the statement that "the 5th New York Volunteers were the peers of any troops on that hard-fought field." Towards the close of this initial contest the 6th U. S. went to Warren's support and was placed in position on his left. General Reynolds, with his Pennsylvania brigade, soon after relieved the Zouave regiments, which then retired to support a battery in rear of their first position.

Branch's brigade advanced along the New Cold Harbor road, but, though Pender came to its support, made no headway against Martin's guns, protected by the "Irish 9th," the 62d Pennsylvania, the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters and the right wing of the 14th New York. Leading the 62d in a countercharge to the support of the 9th Massachusetts, Colonel Black fell dead at the head of his regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shillen, of the 14th New York, was mortally wounded, but the line held firmly to the end.

Anderson, Field, and Archer struck the left wing of the 2d and the right wing of the 1st Brigade of Morell's division, engaging in a cumulative attack the 14th New York, 4th Michigan, 2d Maine, and 13th New York. Twelve regiments and two battalions united in this assault. We have already quoted from their reports of this assault and the result attained. The 2d Maine captured the colors of the 5th Alabama and the 13th New York seized those of the 1st Tennessee.

In the meantime, Longstreet's division had been for a time held in reserve behind the crest of a hill on the right of General A. P. Hill's command. As Hill's attack developed, General Lee directed General Longstreet to attempt a diversion in favor of the attacking column. Pickett's brigade, moving forward for that purpose, located the Union line and convinced General Longstreet that an energetic attack was called for rather than a feint. Accordingly, he formed his command for assault on the right of the light division — Pickett, Prior, and Wilcox's brigades, in order as named, in the front line, supported by Featherstone's brigade, Pickett's brigade being reinforced by a portion of R. H. Anderson's brigade, the remainder of which guarded the right flank of the division. Kemper's brigade was held in reserve. Thus twenty-six regiments were massed to assail the Union line to the left of the troops engaged with Hill's brigades, and which was held by seven regiments and two companies of sharpshooters.

About 1 P.M., the head of D. H. Hill's division column, passing Old Cold Harbor, and arriving north of the McGehee house, was saluted by Weed's watchful cannoneers. Bondurant's battery opened in reply, but in less than half an hour retired badly crippled. General Jackson imagined, at first, that Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill "would soon drive the Union forces toward" him, and he therefore directed General D. H. Hill to take position on the left of Old Cold Harbor road, and Stuart's cavalry was posted in readiness to charge upon a suppositious retreat towards the Pamunkey River. He soon, however, awoke to the fact that he had not now before him his adversaries of the Shenandoah valley. The sounds

from the conflict on his right deepened into an urgent call for prompt and energetic action on his part, and a general advance of his whole line was ordered. This commenced with D. H. Hill's division and extended to the Confederate right through Ewell, Jackson, and Whiting's divisions, in order as named, on the left of A. P. Hill's hard-pressed division, and Longstreet's column of attack co-operated on the right.

D. H. Hill's division formed with Garland's brigade on the extreme left—then G. B. Anderson, Roder, Colquitt, and Ripley's brigades, in order named, to the right in the timber east of the Old Cold Harbor road. Ewell's division formed with Elzey's brigade on the right of Ripley, and Trimble and Seymour's brigades in the timber west of the Old Cold Harbor road. Winder's and Lawton's brigades of Jackson's division continued the line towards the left flank of Gregg's brigade, thus forming a continuous line.

About 3 P.M., Whiting's division was ordered to press through the woods to their right and move to the sound of A. P. Hill's battle, then raging furiously. Eventually, Fulkerson's brigade of Jackson's division was sent to support Whiting's attack, and Cunningham's brigade to the support of Wilcox on the extreme Confederate right. Thus Generals R. E. Lee and Thos. J. Jackson, with their able subordinates, marshalled 65,000 troops, to crush, if possible, less than 30,000, led with a skill and animated with a spirit which created the impression that "the principal part of the Federal army" occupied the ground they held.

Thus far the advantage had been on the Union

side. As the attacks were repeated and pressed with increasing vigor from the right of Sykes' line to the left of Morell's division, McCall's Pennsylvanians were drawn upon for support and to relieve regiments forced to retire for want of ammunition. Kingsbury's battery, supported by the 12th Pennsylvania, went to the support of the right wing. Some regiments having exhausted their ammunition, withdrew from the line, reformed, replenished their cartridge-boxes, and resumed their places in line again—one regiment repeating the movement a third time.

The battle surged backward and forward, across the narrow defile, through the woods and in the swamps. Throughout its length the line undulated as advantages were lost, regained, or won. At 4 P.M., in answer to General Porter's repeated call, which this time reached the general-in-chief, Slocum's division arrived upon the ground just as the last of the reserves at hand had been exhausted. Newton's brigade moved immediately to the right of Griffin. Taylor's regiments filled up gaps in Morell's division line and Bartlett's brigade, moving first to the support of Butterfield's left, reached General Sykes' right after a flank march across the length of the battle-field, during which it suffered a loss of 15 killed and wounded by round-shot and shell. For hours the air had been burdened with the roar of guns, the crash and plunge of shot, the bursting of shell, the whir of canister, and the hissing of a fearful leaden hail, mingled with the shouts of the combatants and the cries and groans of the wounded and dying—but still the Union line held fast, and not a foot was given away.

Now the enemy gathered for a final effort. D. H. Hill pressed up and captured part of Kingsbury's bat-

tery ; but only for a moment, for Howland's 16th New York rescued it in double time. Then, at last, Stuart found available position for artillery on the Confederate left, and Pelham with a mounted section gallantly challenged the fire of Weed's and Tidball's guns, and was joined by Brockenborough, Carrington, and Courtney, who opened heavily on Sykes' right. D. H. Hill and Ewell again pushed up against the wearied line that had so long and unsupported withstood their utmost effort. A. P. Hill gathered his shattered command for a final effort. Longstreet increased his pressure upon the Union left, and on the centre, breaking from the wooded and swampy ground east of Gaines' Mill, Whiting's brigades came rapidly into line behind the roughly handled light division. The Hampton Legion, on the left, rested on the New Cold Harbor road, and on its right the line of Hood's brigade was extended by the 5th and 1st Texas regiments, through the woods to the open ground, where Law's brigade—the 11th Mississippi and 4th Alabama in the front, supported by the 2d Mississippi and 6th North Carolina—continued the formation toward the left of Longstreet's line. The 4th Texas and 18th Georgia at first formed a second line for the Texas brigade. On a ridge in their front lay the remnants of the light division, exhausted by their hours of baffled effort, but still maintaining a straggling line.

Riding through his command, General Whiting directed that no halt should be made, but that as the ridge was reached the charge should commence and be pushed without firing. Then, as Jackson on the left, and Longstreet on the right, again urged on their men, he moved forward to the assault, General

Hood passing rapidly in rear of Law's brigade, and bringing the 4th Texas and 18th Georgia into line upon the division right. Under a heavy fire the lines pressed forward. Reaching the ridge they took the swinging double-time that in the years that followed became a characteristic of "Hood's Texans," and with trailing arms and silent ranks swept down upon the line that had repelled throughout the entire conflict every effort made against it. As the Confederates, pressing up within thirty yards, answered the Union fire with defiant yells, and dashed across the ravine and up the slope beyond, the elastic limit was reached, and, borne backward by the resistless pressure, the line at last broke, and bent backward on either hand. Now, in their turn firing heavily, the enemy pressed after the retiring lines that still held such a front as caused General Whiting, in person, to solicit aid from General Longstreet, who sent R. H. Anderson's brigade—the reserve of his division—to reinforce Whiting's right.¹ Pickett, too, had fiercely assailed the left of Martindale's brigade, and at last Wilcox, after repeated failures, massed heavily enough on the Union left to bear Butterfield's brigade backward by sheer weight of numbers.

The disaster was completed by an unfortunate disregard or misunderstanding of the orders given to

¹ General Jackson, in his Report (*Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 556), says: "In this charge, in which upwards of 1000 men fell killed and wounded before the fire of the enemy, and in which 14 pieces of artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the 4th Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and seize the guns. Although swept from their defenses [their own noble bosoms were the breastworks—*Editor*] by this rapid and almost matchless display of daring and valor, the well disciplined Federals continued in retreat to fight with stubborn resistance. Apprehensive, from their superior (?) numbers and sullen obstinacy, that the enemy might again rally, General Whiting called upon General Longstreet for reinforcements."

and duly expected of General Cooke's command of cavalry, which was massed upon the meadow bottom some 200 yards (Colonel A. K. Arnold, *Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Association*, 1889) from the south and east slopes of the plateau. Had this command been moved forward to the support of Robertson's battery in front of Boatswain's Creek, that sturdy fighter could have maintained his advanced position, and the presence of an unbroken line of troopers, held well in hand, would have afforded the rallying line needed to re-establish the broken regiments of Butterfield's brigade in the hot contest they had maintained since noon. But, "emulation of the habitual devotion of our artillery" (*Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 42) overcame the dictates of prudence and the restraints of orders.

Moving up the slope of the plateau, General Cooke took position with his command immediately in rear of Kerns' and Easton's batteries. He then moved by his left flank around the slope of the bluff until he faced the prolongation of the enemy's advanced line.¹ Then almost immediately retracing his steps, and detaching the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry to support Robertson's battery, which had retired from its advanced and unsupported position, but now went into action behind Boatswain's Creek, he replaced the remainder of his command in rear of Kerns and Cooper, instructing Captain Whiting, commanding the 5th U. S. Cavalry, to charge "when the support or safety of the batteries required it," and directing Colonel Blake, commanding the 2d Cavalry Brigade, to act in reserve as the result of the charge might dictate. As Long-

¹ Undoubtedly it was this movement that misled General Porter into the supposition that the charge of the cavalry was made from the left of the line.

street's men surged up on the left, and W. H. C. Whiting's brigades forced their way forward from what had been the left centre of the Union line, the charge was ordered, and, moving forward *through the batteries* in its front, the 5th Cavalry dashed out to meet the advancing line of Law's brigade, then not far south from the Watts house. The inevitable result followed.¹ Recoiling before the fierce fire encountered in front and flank, in one brief moment the remnants of the 5th bore off to the right and then passed to the rear through the already hard-pressed line of guns. Colonel Blake reports: "The fire of the enemy was so destructive that a charge was not effected."

Of the seven officers who there led the men of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, but one escaped unhurt. Captains Whiting and Chambliss and Lieutenant Sweet were captured, the latter being mortally wounded, and Lieutenants Arnold, Watkins, and Maley were wounded. Three enlisted men were killed, 25 were wounded, and 24 reported missing; 24 horses were killed. That the dash was gallantly ridden goes without saying of the 5th; the pity was that such gallantry should have been squandered in an unauthorized effort that cannot be justified as sound tactics even by an argument *ad hominem* resting on the subsequent persecution of the commanding general of the field.

¹ The grand rules established by the best of military authorities advise that cavalry should attack infantry under the following conditions only: 1. When the infantry is demoralized or inferior in quality; 2. Or, when the infantry can be taken by surprise, the cavalry being able to approach under cover; 3. Or, when the infantry has expended its ammunition or broken by the fire action of opposing troops; 4. Or, when the infantry is in extended order and exposing unprotected flanks. And by all the rules of warfare, troops of all kinds are positively forbidden to mask the fire of batteries that they may be in support of or rendering assistance to.

In the meantime, on the Confederate left, Jackson, Ewell, and D. H. Hill massed their brigades and, at last, forced the 2d Division from the ground it had so stubbornly defended. About 6.30 P.M., or maybe a little later, French and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division, Second Corps, arriving upon the ground, moved forward to the edge of the plateau, and, as evening closed in, the corps that for nearly eight hours had held its own against an army,¹ slowly retiring, re-formed its depleted ranks on ground that previously had been occupied by its reserves.

But down in the heavy timber, where the right of Sykes' regulars rested, heavy firing was continued by the 4th U. S. long after the lines on either side had retired. This regiment had been in support of Weed's and Tidball's batteries all day long, and in consequence suffered from the heavy fire delivered against those batteries by Jackson's left. When it was first posted, it was under the command of Major Delozier Davidson, but he immediately afterwards absented himself from it and never returned. The

¹ The following is an extract from a letter written by B. J. Coll, 62d Pennsylvania: "It was on Saturday, June 28th, the Confederates advanced. Lieut. Patterson and myself were lying together, wounded, with probably 200 or 300 other wounded men of our corps lying around who had been carried there, and on account of wounds could not get away. When they advanced to where we lay, we were subjects of considerable curiosity to them. At a short distance from us we saw a group of officers. Lieutenant Patterson inquired from the Confederates standing around who they were. They told us they were Lee, Longstreet, A. P. and D. H. Hill, and General (Stonewall) Jackson. Jackson came up and asked the lieutenant 'Whose troops were engaged yesterday?' He replied 'General FitzJohn Porter's corps.' He then asked if that was all of the troops engaged. The lieutenant answered 'Yes.' The general then said if he would repeat that lie he would cut his ears off with his sword. The lieutenant answered that 'Notwithstanding the fact that I may lose my ears, I repeat that the only troops engaged yesterday were those of General Porter's corps. Slocum's division came over late in the evening, but did not become engaged.' I think he must have felt humiliated to think that General Porter's corps kept nearly the entire Confederate army at bay during the entire day of the 27th, and then retired across the Chickahominy during the night."

command then devolved upon Captain Jos. B. Collins. As the sun was setting, Weed asked Collins if he would stay by him until he could get his guns away from the field. Collins promptly replied that he would. The open field to the left and rear of Weed's position (about the McGehee house) was then occupied by the enemy. Under a heavy fire, Collins threw the 4th Infantry by a flank movement in double time to the left between the enemy and the battery, covering the Old Cold Harbor road to the Chickahominy, and, lying down by the rail-fence, delivered volley after volley, moving short distances at a time, covering the retirement of Weed, until the battery was well on its way towards Grapevine Bridge, and then night closed in on the scene. At one time so closely was Collins pressed, that a part of the right wing of the regiment had to be thrown at right angles across the road to protect the flank until the regiment became shrouded in darkness, when it retired to the Chickahominy.

Colonel Gallagher with the 11th Pennsylvania, and Colonel Simpson with the 4th New Jersey, had held their ground so stubbornly that they were unaware of the Confederate success until too late to extricate themselves. The 11th had, in the course of the afternoon, relieved the 4th New Jersey, the latter promising to support the former in case of being hard pressed. In the heat of the action, the 11th, becoming enveloped in the smoke of the battle, continued the fight after the rest of the line had retired, being closely engaged with a rebel regiment in front, and before the colonel was aware that he had been left alone on the field, he found himself under fire of two regiments on either flank, besides the one in front.

Notwithstanding the peril of his position, he gallantly kept up a galling fire as he retired in order upon the 4th New Jersey. Here, to crown his ill-fortune, he found that he, as well as Colonel Simpson, was completely surrounded, a strong force having already taken position in his immediate rear. Their situation is quaintly sketched in Colonel Simpson's words: "We were surrounded by ten times our number, and though we could have fought till every man of us was slain, yet humanity, and, as I think, wisdom, dictated that we should at last yield." These regiments were captured entire, the 11th having lost 50 and the 4th, 45 killed before surrendering.

The Confederate troops held the line that had been occupied in the morning by the Fifth Corps. But they held no more, for the corps had simply moved back to the edge of the plateau in rear of the Adams house. The corps had suffered heavily, and was outweighed; but it had not been routed. There was no effort made to attack the re-formed line where the imperturbable Porter, superior to disaster, held the remnant of his command, still ready to have "the very last extremity."

Just before the breaking of the lines, General Reynolds, accompanied by his adjutant-general, Captain Kingsbury, and an orderly, rode into the woods where the 4th New Jersey and 11th Pennsylvania still held their ground. After the surrender of the regiments, General Reynolds and his companions remained concealed in the timber during the night, but were discovered and captured the next morning by a patrol from the 4th Virginia Volunteers.

Robertson's battery, under its able commander, and his energetic lieutenant, John M. Wilson, rendered

invaluable service on the extreme left, in stemming the tide of fugitives and in checking the advance of the enemy. Supported by a portion of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, it remained in position until, having exhausted its ammunition, it retired, and, by General Porter's order, crossed to the south bank of the river, by Alexander's Bridge.

Allen's battery, Lieutenant John B. Hyde commanding, held its ground until, the 3d Brigade giving way, it withdrew, leaving one piece at the front, its horses having all been killed, and losing, from the same cause, three more pieces while retiring.

Lieutenant Buckley's section of Weeden's battery, on the right of Martindale's brigade, made excellent practice with shell, shrapnel, and canister during all the assaults, and when at last its supports were beaten back, and but three men could be mustered at each piece, and the horses at its limbers were either killed or stampeded by the terrific musketry fire, the gallant lieutenant was forced to leave his pieces and retire with his caissons. The right and centre sections, under Lieutenants Waterman (Captain Weeden, being on duty as chief of artillery, 1st Division, left Lieutenant Waterman in command) and Clark, remained in line with batteries in rear of Griffin's brigade until their left was turned by the enemy. Then occurred the unfortunate episode with the cavalry. Captain Weeden reports :

“After firing some 40 rounds, we saw the enemy turning the left of the batteries. The smoke had filled the whole field to the woods, and it was impossible to direct the fire. The batteries were limbering to the rear in good order, to retire and renew the fire from the brow of the hill, when the cavalry, repulsed, retired in disorder through and in front of the batteries. The caissons

were exchanging limbers with the pieces, and it was impossible to limber up and withdraw them. Men were ridden down and the horses stampeded by the rush of the cavalry. The whole line of artillery was thrown into confusion. Commands could be neither heard nor executed, and different batteries were mingled in disorder.¹ One piece of my battery mired in the woods. Other caissons in front and rear of the same having been abandoned by the drivers, it was impossible to rescue the piece. The remainder of the battery crossed Woodbury's bridge at dark and encamped on Trent's farm."

On the left of the artillery line Kerns' battery, after repulsing three assaults, retired before the fourth, leaving two guns on the field for lack of horses to move them. Though wounded early in the action, Captain Kerns remained with his battery, loading and firing the last shots himself, and bringing his command off the field after having fired 249 charges.

Pressed by the enemy in front and on the left flank, Easton's battery, immediately following the charge of the cavalry, was captured at the point of the bayonet, its brave captain falling among his guns, his last words being: "The enemy shall never take this battery but over my dead body." Lieutenant Wm. Stitt was at the same time dangerously wounded.

At almost the same moment, De Hart's battery suffered a similar fate. Captain De Hart received a mortal wound and three of his guns fell into the hands of the enemy,

Cooper's battery on the right of those just mentioned more fortunately maintained its position until 8 P.M. and then retired in safety after exacting heavy tribute from the elated enemy.

¹ In the *Southern Bivouac*, April, 1887, General E. M. Law states: "In the meantime, those of the cavalry who escaped retreated through the artillery they were attempting to save, and in the confusion of the retreat most of the guns were captured."

Hexamer's battery, going into action on the right of Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division, when the breaking of the line on its left exposed it to a flanking fire, retired to the line in rear, leaving one piece, the horses of which were disabled, in the hands of the enemy. It remained in action on the second line, retiring to the south bank of the Chickahominy about midnight. The battery fired 165 rounds of spherical case and shell.

Martin's battery occupied its original position throughout the entire contest. When all its supports had retired, except the 11th U. S. Infantry, upon its right, Captain Martin received the order to retire. At the same moment the enemy advanced in force upon his front. When within 150 yards, the battery opened on them with double-shotted canister, thirty-six rounds of which gave the battery an opportunity to retire in safety. Three caissons were left on the field, the teams being so disabled that it was impossible to move them, though Captain Martin returned and made a second effort after having placed his guns in safety. Lieutenant Caleb C. E. Mortimer was mortally wounded during the action. About half a mile from the field one piece ran off from a bridge, capsizing the piece and breaking the leg of one of the horses. The piece was necessarily abandoned.

Edwards' battery, separated into sections, from five to six hundred yards apart, did hard and valiant service during the day. On the left, Lieutenant Kelly's section retired, under orders, only when the line on its left had given way. Lieutenant Brownson's section, in the centre, narrowly escaped capture, eight of its sixteen horses being shot. Lieutenant Hayden's section, on the right, in front of the McGehee house,

at the final assault, fell into the hands of the enemy, its commander being disabled by a musket shot and the chiefs of pieces being killed or wounded. Lieutenants Kelly and Brownson were also wounded. Captain Edwards' service was highly commended by General Sykes.

Kingsbury's (late Griffin's) battery went into action on the right of Edwards' right section, and, notwithstanding the momentary loss of some of its pieces, maintained its position with telling effect upon the enemy until its supports were forced back. It then retired about 150 yards, and again opened fire. Remaining in this last position until after dark, it retired from the field and parked until morning near Woodbury's Bridge.

Weed's and Tidball's batteries held their original positions on the Old Cold Harbor road throughout the day. Of their service, General Sykes reports :

"The skilful handling of these guns during the battle prevented the enemy from turning my right flank, on which he made three distinct attacks, forced him to develop his own attack on the centre and left of my line, and, with the assistance of the 4th U. S. Infantry, cleared the way for themselves to retire to our new rendezvous."

Captain Weed reports having fired something over one thousand rounds of ammunition during the day, each round being fired with deliberate aim. Captain Tidball's service was identical with Weed's. The two batteries retired after sunset, recrossing the river at Woodbury's Bridge about 9 or 10 P.M. Captain Weed was slightly wounded.

Smead's battery, having been sent to the south bank of the Chickahominy to replenish its ammunition, recrossed Woodbury's Bridge to the battle-field

during the afternoon, and towards the close of the contest went into battery and fired some forty rounds of shell and shrapnel. The battery stood in park without unharnessing until 2 A.M., June 28th, and then crossed to the right bank of the river.

Among the officers lost to us General Porter reports :

“ I regret being obliged to number Brigadier-General Reynolds, Major Clitz, Captain Whiting, Lieutenant S. M. Weld, my aide, and Captain Chambliss, who were taken prisoners near the close of the contest. The country will mourn the loss of Colonels Gove, of the 22d Massachusetts ; McLane, of the 83d, and Black, of the 62d Pennsylvania, killed in action—genial men and gallant officers, who had distinguished themselves on previous occasions ; Major N. B. Rossell, 3d Infantry, and some others who have not yet been reported to me.”

Captains Wm. L. Van Derlip and Alexander McRoberts, and Lieutenants Charles B. Gaskell and C. R. Becker, of the 44th New York, were wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Rice, of the same regiment, was again conspicuous for his fervent gallantry. rescuing the left wing of the regiment from accompanying the premature departure of the colonel commanding from the field, and replacing it in line with the right wing, holding the position upon which the 83d Pennsylvania, 16th Michigan, and a portion of the 12th New York rallied and checked the advance of the enemy. On receipt of orders from General Butterfield, Colonel Rice withdrew the remnants of these regiments to the south bank of the river by Woodbury's Bridge after dark, and, at the request of General W. F. Smith, placed them in rifle-pits of the Sixth Army Corps, in anticipation of a night attack upon General Smith's lines. They rejoined the troops of the Fifth Corps the next morning.

While changing front with the 83d Pennsylvania to meet the enemy, after the line of Martindale's brigade had been forced, Colonel McLane was instantly killed and Major Naghel mortally wounded. Four other officers were wounded, and four were reported captured or missing. The regiment was at one time so nearly surrounded that the enemy sent forward a flag of truce with an unsuccessful demand for its surrender.

Of the 16th Michigan, Captain Thomas C. Carr and Lieutenant Richard Williams were killed, and Lieutenant Byron McGraw was mortally wounded. Six other officers are reported wounded. Notwithstanding the protest of his surgeon and the advice of General Butterfield, Colonel Stockton had accompanied the regiment to Beaver Dam Creek, and on the morning of June 27th had resumed the command. In the attempt to check the breaking of the lines, Colonel Stockton and another officer were captured by the enemy.

Under Major Henry A. Barnum, a portion of the left of the 12th New York, after uniting with the 83d Pennsylvania, 16th Michigan, and 44th New York in checking the advance of the enemy, retired with the brigade and crossed the Chickahominy above Woodbury's Bridge. The remainder of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert M. Richardson (Colonel Weeks being absent sick), remained upon the field in support of a battery until 1.30 A.M., June 28th, when it also retired over Woodbury's Bridge. Lieutenant Henry C. Benton and Edward M. Fisher (aide-de-camp to General Butterfield) were killed. Four officers were wounded, and two were reported captured or missing.

All reports bear witness to the care, energy, and ability of General Butterfield in the handling of his brigade, and to his personal gallantry in inspiring and leading his troops.

Of the 1st Michigan, Captain Oliver C. Comstock was killed; Colonel Roberts, Captains Wm. A. Throop, R. H. Alcott, George L. Hopper, and Ed. Pomeroy, and Lieutenant Geo. H. Eggleston were wounded; and Lieutenant Perry L. Hubbard was reported captured or missing. This regiment re-formed in front of the Watts house, and remained in position until 3 A.M., June 28th, when it withdrew under orders.

Of the 25th New York, Captain Archibald H. Ferguson was killed and Lieutenant Washington B. Fairman mortally wounded. Major Edwin L. Gilbert was wounded and taken prisoner. Captain W. W. Bates was wounded, and Lieutenant Thos. E. Bishop was reported captured or missing. A portion of the regiment crossed the Chickahominy in rear of the 22d Massachusetts.

Lieutenant A. S. Lema of the 13th New York was mortally wounded. The regiment re-formed on the crest of the hill and crossed the Chickahominy after midnight.

The 2d Maine suffered a loss of two officers wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel George Varney and Captain Levi Emerson were captured.

Holding the 22d Massachusetts to its work when the crisis came, Colonel Gove fell in front of his men, a gallant leader in the van of those who in unknown graves await the sounding of the final reveille. With him fell Captain John F. Dunning, and Lieutenants George W. Gordon and Thomas F. Salter. Major

Wm. S. Tilton, Captain John B. Wharf, and Lieutenants George A. Washburne and James P. Stearns were wounded and captured. Adjutant Thos. Sherwin was also wounded. Surgeons Prince and Milner, Captain Charles O. Conant, Lieutenant John P. Crane, and 118 enlisted men were taken prisoners.

From General Martindale's own report, that officer's energy in criticism of the line assigned him and the methods of defense attainable, must be accepted as established.

Of the 4th Michigan, Captain Richard G. Duhey and Lieutenants Jephtha N. Bears and Simon B. Preston were killed, and Lieutenant Thomas D. Jones mortally wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Childs was wounded, and one officer was captured or missing.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles H. Skillen, 14th New York, was killed in the opening assault of the day, and Captain Frederick Harrer was mortally wounded. Four other officers were wounded and one captured or missing.

Of the 62d Pennsylvania, Colonel Black was killed early in the contest, and Captain Thomas Espey was mortally wounded. In the final struggle, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob B. Sweitzer, in his turn charging at the head of the regiment, fell badly wounded and was captured. Five other officers were wounded and two reported captured or missing.

Of the 9th Massachusetts, Captains John Cary, Wm. Madigan, James E. McCafferty, and Jeremiah O'Neill, and Lieutenants Richard P. Nugent and Francis O'Dowd were killed. Five officers were wounded, and Lieutenants Michael F. O'Hara and P. W. Black were captured while the regiment was retiring from Powhite Creek to the main line of battle.

The newly risen stars that graced the battery captain of the week before shone brightly through the clouds of battle, and under its brave and skilful leader, Griffin's brigade re-formed on the last line, and there remained until 2 A.M., June 28th, when it crossed the Chickahominy.

The 5th New York lost Captain Wm. F. Partridge killed and Lieutenant Thos. W. Cartwright mortally wounded, and Captain George Duryea and Lieutenants Felix Agnus and Ralph E. Prime wounded.

Of the 10th New York, Captains James H. Briggs and Thomas Wildes, and Lieutenants James R. Smith and George F. Tait were wounded.

Of the commander of this little brigade, General Sykes reports: "Colonel Warren, with the practical experience of an accomplished engineer, his untiring industry, unceasing energy, and unsurpassed gallantry upon the field, won for himself promotion, which cannot be too soon or more worthily bestowed." Colonel Warren received a contused wound from a partly spent ball, and his horse was twice wounded, but carried him through the fight. During the battle the Rev. Gordon Winslow, Chaplain of the 5th New York, acted as aide to Colonel Warren, and subsequently rendered invaluable assistance in removing the sick and wounded; in the words of General Sykes, "uniting in himself the duties of minister, soldier, and surgeon."

Of the 2d U. S. Infantry, Captain Richard Brindley and Lieutenant Thos. D. Parker were killed, and Lieutenants S. A. McKee, James W. Long, Charles G. Freeman, and William Kidd were wounded. Lieutenant Parker was acting assistant quartermaster on the staff of General Sykes.

Early in the afternoon, while advancing the 3d U. S. Infantry on the right rear of the 12th, to meet the advancing enemy, the brave and lamented Major N. B. Rossell fell mortally wounded. The command then devolved on Captain John D. Wilkins, who carried the regiment through its trying ordeal of the day.

Captain R. N. Scott, 4th U. S. Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general to Colonel Buchanan, was severely wounded toward the close of the engagement. Captain Julius W. Adams was wounded and Major Delozier Davidson was missing and both captured. Under command of Captain Joseph B. Collins, the regiment covered Weed's and Tidball's batteries during the entire action, moved with them to the rear, bivouacked in position covering the approach to Grapevine Bridge, and, being without orders (three messengers bearing such having failed to reach the regiment), advanced again toward the McGehee house on the morning after the battle (June 28th), when, learning from wounded men who were met that it was the only Union force north of the Chickahominy, it finally retired, in view of the enemy's pickets to the south bank of the river by Alexander's Bridge.

The 6th U. S. lost Captain R. W. Foote killed and Lieutenants H. A. F. Worth and D. D. Lynn wounded. It maintained its gallant record and held its position on Warren's left with firmness.

The four companies of the 10th U. S., serving with the 1st Battalion of the 17th U. S. Infantry, Major George L. Andrews commanding, had one officer wounded. Of the 17th Infantry, Captain Albert Dodd was killed, Lieutenant Henry Inman, serving on the division staff, wounded, and Lieutenant D. L. Montgomery and one other officer captured or missing.

The 11th U. S., Major De Lancey Floyd-Jones commanding, supported the batteries in the centre of the line throughout the day and covered the withdrawal of Martin's battery at dusk. In this, its maiden fight, the battalion had two officers wounded.

Lieutenant Charles F. Van Duzer, 12th U. S., was killed. Major Henry B. Clitz, commanding, was twice wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain M. M. Blunt and three other officers were wounded.

Of the 14th U. S. Infantry, Lieutenant George W. Hoover was mortally wounded. Captain John McIntosh and Lieutenants James B. Sinclair, James F. McElhone, and W. W. Lyon were wounded.

Of the charge made by the 12th and 14th regiments, Colonel Buchanan reports that they "advanced in as handsome a line of battle as I [he] ever saw on drill."

That Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Buchanan and Major C. S. Lovell, as brigade commanders, sustained the reputations they had won on other fields, if words are needed, is attested by General Sykes' declaration that their "zealous co-operation, gallantry, fortitude, and management of their troops left me [him] nothing to direct or advise."

Of the Pennsylvania regiments the following are the casualties reported :

- 1st.—Lieutenant Joseph Stuart was killed.
- 2d.—Lieutenant H. P. Kennedy and one other officer were wounded.
- 3d.—One officer reported captured.
- 5th.—Captain Robert W. Sturrock was killed and Lieutenant D. H. McMicken mortally wounded.
- 7th.—Two officers were wounded, and one captured.

8th.—Major S. M. Bailey, Captains G. S. Gallupe, R. E. Johnson, and A. Wishart, and two other officers were wounded, and four reported captured or missing.

9th.—Adjutant L. Brent Swearingen and Lieutenants John K. Barbour, and William H. Hope were wounded.

10th.—Captains Valentine Phipps and Peter E. Shipen and Lieutenant James L. Wray were wounded.

11th.—Captain Andrew Lewis and Lieutenant Newton Rodie were killed.

12th.—One officer was wounded.

13th.—Six officers were reported captured or missing.

Of Generals Seymour, Reynolds, and Meade, it is enough to state, in General McCall's words, that they, "as usual, led their brigades with the skill and effect to be expected of officers of their distinction." Repeatedly they led their regiments into the thickest of the fight to support and relieve exhausted commands.

The gallantry with which Slocum's division, when eventually permitted, came to the aid of their hard-pressed comrades, entailed upon the three brigades a heavy loss in officers and men.

Of the 1st New Jersey, Captain E. G. Brewster was killed and Major David Hatfield mortally wounded. Captain John D. P. Mount and Lieutenants Frank B. Holt, Charles W. Mutchler, and one other officer were wounded, and Lieutenant John Parker missing or captured. Col. A. T. A. Torbert, when informed that his regiment was going into action, arose from a sick-bed and followed, in order that he might at least be present with them. In his absence the regiment was led by the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Robert McAllister.

In the four companies of the 2d New Jersey, led

by Colonel Tucker, to the relief of the 4th Michigan, the casualties aggregated 113 out of 261 men engaged. Colonel Isaac M. Tucker was killed and Captain Chas. Danforth mortally wounded. Major Henry O. Ryerson and Lieutenants Wm. E. Blewett, John W. Root, and Jacob Bogert were wounded, and Lieutenant H. H. Callan missing.

Of the 3d New Jersey, Captain Daniel P. Buckley and Lieutenant Thomas J. Howell were killed and Lieutenant Wm. N. Evans mortally wounded. Four other officers were wounded and one captured or missing.

Of the 4th New Jersey, Captain Charles Meves was killed and seven officers were wounded.

Of the 5th Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Heath was killed, Colonel N. J. Jackson, Captains Robert M. Stevens and G. E. Brown, and Lieutenants F. L. Lemont and Geo. E. Atwood were wounded and Lieutenant Samuel H. Pillsbury missing.

Of the 16th New York, Lieutenant Alanson M. Barnard was killed and Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Marsh and Lieutenant John McFadden mortally wounded. Colonel Joseph Howland, Captain Warren Gibson, Lieutenants Pliny Moon and Charles Bentley and two other officers were wounded.

Of the 27th New York, Lieutenant Joseph Webster was mortally wounded. Major C. C. Gardner and eight other officers were wounded.

Of the 96th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant E. T. Ellrich was killed, and two other officers were wounded.

Of General Newton's staff, Captain James E. Montgomery, assistant adjutant-general, was wounded, and Captain James K. Scofield was wounded and captured.

Of the 18th New York, Captains George Barry and Theodore C. Rogers were killed, and Adjutant John H. Russell mortally wounded. Captain T. J. Radcliffe and Lieutenants H. T. Goodus and James Chalmers were wounded.

Of the 95th Pennsylvania, Colonel John M. Gosline, Major Wm. B. Hubbs and Lieutenant Hamilton Donahue were killed. Captains Edward Carroll, and Henry W. Hewes, and Lieutenants H. Oscar Roberts, Charles Shugre, and Thomas D. G. Chapman were wounded.

General Slocum's own words of acknowledgment to his command fittingly present the service rendered by this division, including its gallant commander and able lieutenants :

“ Like soldiers and like men they performed their duty and met their fate, and a grateful country will long bear them and the thousand nameless heroes of this conflict who have offered up their lives at the Nation's shrine, in lasting and honored remembrance.”

When the brigades dispatched by General Sumner reached the field, the battle was ended. In Meagher's brigade, Lieutenant Thos. A. Mayo, of the 29th Massachusetts was killed and an officer of the 63d New York was reported captured or missing with five enlisted men, and one enlisted man of the same regiment was reported missing.

In French's brigade of the 57th New York, one enlisted man was reported wounded ; and in the 66th New York, two enlisted men were reported captured or missing. The casualties in the two brigades aggregated 16 ! Without any reflection upon the reinforcement from the gallant Second Army Corps, or any

disparagement of the aid they brought, justice to those who through that trying day had stood their ground as only heroes can, requires that attention should be called to the proof these casualties afford that Generals French and Meagher, arriving on the battle-field, were not called upon to make a "stand against the enemy who were already pursuing the routed columns of General Porter" (*Richardson*), "pressing hard upon the rear with artillery, cavalry, and light infantry" (*French*), as has been erroneously reported.

Of the judgment, energy, and courage with which Generals Morell, Sykes, and McCall brought their wealth of knowledge and experience to second the efforts of their indomitable leader, it is unnecessary to enlarge. So admirably were their dispositions made and so efficiently were their orders executed by their brigade commanders and their troops that the results attained leave no room for doubt that, had the reinforcements requested by General Porter, through General John G. Barnard, been received in time for their proper assignment to positions, and particularly had the axes promised (but not sent) by General Barnard been available for use in the needed defensive preparations, the line would have been maintained to the irreparable damage of the enemy. Having held at bay for six hours at least twice their own force, there is no one can doubt but that if the axes had been furnished and the timber, under which the enemy massed for attack, could have been slashed, a complete repulse of the Confederates would have followed. But, *L'homme propose, Dieu dispose!* Of all the battles fought during the American Rebellion, no battle stands out so prominently as that of Gaines'

Mill. A single army corps, with half of that a single line of troops, without breastworks, holding every inch of its own ground against twice its numerical force, while that force possessed all the advantages of cover to mask its movements, must furnish to military men a picture of self-reliance on the part of the commanders, and of discipline and endurance on the part of the Union troops scarcely, if ever, equalled.

But Porter had redeemed his promise to hold the position to the last extremity! Under orders from the general-in-chief, he withdrew his battered (but not broken) command to the right bank of the Chickahominy River during the night of June 27th.

OFFICERS SERVING AS ADJUTANTS-GENERAL IN FIFTH CORPS.

(PENINSULA CAMPAIGN).

Lieut.-Col. Fred T. Locke, A. A. G. Vols., Asst. Adj.-Gen. Fifth Army Corps.

Capt. R. T. Auchmuty, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 1st Division.

Capt. H. J. Biddle, A. A. G., 1st Division.

Capt. Chas. J. Powers, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 1st Brigade, 1st Division.

Capt. Francis W. Perkins, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 2d Brigade, 1st Division.

Capt. Thos. J. Hoyt, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 3d Brigade, 1st Division.

Lieut. Saml. J. Foster, 6th U. S. Inf., A. A. A. G., 2d Division.

Lieut. Wm. H. Powell, 4th U. S. Inf., A. A. A. G., 1st Brigade, 2d Division.

Lieut. A. W. Kroutingier, 2d U. S. Inf., A. A. A. G., 2d Brigade, 2d Division.

Lieut. A. S. Marvin, 5th N. Y., A. A. A. G., 3d Brigade, 2d Division.

Capt. Jas. C. Clark, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 3d Division.

Capt. E. C. Baird, A. A. G. Vols., A. A. G., 1st Brigade, 3d Division.

Lieut. G. H. Bemus, A. A. Gen., 3d Brigade, 3d Division.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHANGE OF BASE—GLENDALE, OR NEW MARKET CROSS-ROADS—MALVERN HILL.

By skilful manœuvering the enemy had created so serious an apprehension of attack upon the lines on the right bank of the Chickahominy as to render questionable even the possibility of reinforcing the Fifth Army Corps when General Porter's request for support at last reached the general-in-chief. And this apprehension, or misapprehension, was not confined to, or most active in, the mind of the commanding general. The replies returned by corps commanders to his inquiries during June 26th and 27th invariably indicated the opinion that detachment from the left wing of the army would endanger its ability to hold its intrenchments. After Slocum's division had been sent to the left bank of the river, as late as 5 P.M. of June 27th, General Franklin reported: "I do not think it prudent to take away any more troops from here at present," and General Sumner stated: "If the General desires to trust the defense of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments and Meagher with his brigade to the right; everything is so uncertain that I think it would be hazardous to do it."

Undoubtedly the force of the enemy defending the Richmond line was over-estimated, but history, weigh-

ing with equal balances, cannot sustain the severe criticism thereon flaunted in the after light of developed facts. Infallible military judgment and intuition are a literary vagary, while history abounds in instances of over-estimated forces. Generals R. E. Lee, Thomas J. Jackson, James Longstreet, and both the Hills sustained each other in believing and reporting that in the Fifth Corps they had encountered the main body of the Federal army on June 27, 1862. For two years the Federal Executive was so impressed and influenced by the exaggerated theories with which general apprehension threatened the national capital, that every effort of the Army of the Potomac was neutralized. At Jena, in 1806, Napoleon believed himself confronted by the entire Prussian army, and Davoust's hard-earned victory at Auerstädt was an astounding revelation.

Situated as General McClellan was, with his right wing liable at any moment to be overwhelmed and his communications severed, and with the certainty, so recently and so forcibly impressed on him, that under no circumstances could prompt and efficient aid be expected from the power dominant in Washington, to have ordered to the assault of the defenses of Richmond troops commanded by those who were apprehensive of their ability to defend their own intrenchments, was impossible.

That desperate situations require desperate measures cannot be gainsaid, but dogma cannot justify the surrender of discretion or the voluntary sacrifice of an army in the interests of a personal reputation. Held to the White House base and the occupation of the left bank of the Chickahominy by the order obliging the extension of the right wing to the north

of Richmond, which remained in force until the unopposed arrival of Jackson's corps at Hundley's Corners, the battle of Gaines' Mill was necessary to the existence of the Army of the Potomac. That battle having, from causes already indicated, finally ended in a reverse to the Union force, it was unanimously decided at a conference of corps commanders with the general-in-chief, that the result of a continued attempt to hold the north bank of the river would be disastrous, the roads leading to the White House being already held by the enemy, who had anticipated, desired, and prepared to meet a movement in that direction. The Fifth Corps was therefore withdrawn to the right bank, the bridges being destroyed soon after sunrise of June 28th.

There remained but one course to pursue. The opinion of General J. E. B. Stuart that no other course remained open to General McClellan, after the abandonment of the White House base, but to seek a new line on the James River, is certainly as well worthy of credence as the often quoted statement of General Magruder,¹ that, on June 27th, he should have attacked the defenses of Richmond. So seriously was the tenure of that base compromised after 2 P.M. of June 27th, that from that moment every argument urging the movement to the James River imperatively demanded recognition. History cannot concur with the criticism which sneers at the previous consideration of those arguments and the careful preparation consequently made in anticipation of the emergency. That the movement was in retreat in no way disproves its necessity or discredits its adoption and tactical conduct. Fortunately for the country,

¹ *Rebellion Records*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 517.

on plans wisely considered and determined in advance, the army immediately entered upon the movement which it was destined to repeat two years later with skeleton ranks and tattered standards, vindicating the judgment and attesting the faithfulness that first perceived, advocated, and occupied the line leading to the triumph of the national arms.

During June 29th uncertainty as to the movements of the Army of the Potomac ruled in the rebel camps. On the right bank of the Chickahominy they could discover no diminution of the force in their front. North of the river, the possibility of a retreat upon the Pamunkey, or down the Peninsula, absorbed their attention. New Bridge was repaired and Ewell's division was moved to Dispatch Station, the 9th Virginia Cavalry (Colonel W. H. F. Lee) forming his advance and taking position to observe the bridges below the railroad crossing of the river. By skilful handling of his small force, General Stoneman had strengthened belief in a retreat upon the Pamunkey, and attracted the main body of Stuart's cavalry in that direction. General Stuart bivouacked at Tunstall's Station on the evening of June 28th, and reaching the White House early the next morning found the place abandoned and a solitary gun-boat lying in the river.

Having acquired and forwarded indisputable evidence that the Army of the Potomac had abandoned the Pamunkey base, and having sent Colonel Fitzhugh Lee with the 1st Virginia Cavalry to observe from Bottom Bridge to Forge Bridge, the remainder of the day was spent by Stuart in resting and provisioning horses and men from abandoned stores that had escaped destruction. The next day, June 30th, leaving one squadron at White House, Stuart occupied the

left bank of the Chickahominy with his whole command, bivouacking for the night at Long and Forge bridges, after having exchanged compliments with Captain J. C. White, 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who, with his squadron, 200 infantry, and a section of light artillery, patrolled the right bank of the river.

At 3.30 A.M. July 1st, Stuart received orders to cross the river and co-operate with Jackson's command. Since Grapevine Bridge was the point suggested in the order for Stuart's crossing, General Lee seems to have had no more definite information concerning the movements and location of his cavalry than he had of the Union forces. Arriving at Bottom Bridge, and learning that the army had passed that point, General Stuart retraced his steps, and again reaching Forge Bridge, met a detachment of Mumford's 2d Virginia Cavalry, and learned of the route taken by Jackson's column. Fording the river at Forge Bridge late in the day, the Confederate cavalry bivouacked for the night on the left of General Lee's lines and within sight of the Union camp fires, where their leader dreamed that the "ponderous march" of his column, "with the rolling artillery," became prime factors in causing "a sudden collapse and stampede," which next day left Malvern in Confederate hands. This record of barren activity illustrates the value of plans retained in the sole possession of the projector until the moment for execution arrives, as compared with those subjected to discussion, revision, and consequent discovery. As General Longstreet reported, "the effort to draw the enemy out by cutting his base was entirely unsuccessful." General McClellan had not conformed his movements to the expectations and wishes of the enemy.

On the right bank of the Chickahominy, about the middle of the afternoon of June 28th, while Smith's division of the Sixth Corps was re-forming its lines on Golding's farm, a severe cannonade was opened on the position from left, front, and right, but with little effect, and the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments attacked the 33d New York and 49th Pennsylvania, but were driven back with the loss of Colonels Lamar and Towers, with 50 officers and men captured, and more than 100 killed and wounded. This was the battle of Golding's Farm.

So much confusion has prevailed with regard to the names of the roads traversing and leading to the field of operations, that explanation seems needed. Immediately south of, and almost parallel to the Richmond and York River Railroad, the Williamsburg stage road connects the Rocketts with Bottom Bridge over the Chickahominy River, passing through Seven Pines, which is about six miles east of Rocketts. The head of White Oak Swamp lies about one mile northwest of Seven Pines, the waters from which flow in a south and southeasterly course until a little to the west of south and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant from Bottom Bridge, they are crossed on a bridge by the roads from Savage Station and Bottom Bridge. For three miles below this bridge these waters flow northeasterly until they empty into the Chickahominy, about two miles below Bottom Bridge. There are farm-road crossings at fords, but no main-road crossings of the stream except on this one bridge.

About four miles below the confluence of the White Oak Swamp with the Chickahominy River, the latter stream is crossed by Long Bridge. Connecting this bridge with New Market on the river road, about five

miles N. N. W. of Haxall's, on the James River, the Long Bridge road runs in a generally southwesterly direction. Five miles west of Long Bridge it is entered by the road from the White Oak Swamp Bridge. A little more than a mile farther west it is entered by the Charles City road, which leaves the Williamsburg road four miles west of Seven Pines, and skirts the southern edge of White Oak Swamp. It is also entered by the Quaker road, which has a southerly direction from this point to the New Market river road, under Malvern Hill. Three miles farther on, from the junction of the Quaker and the Williamsburg roads, the Long Bridge road is entered by the Central road, which leaves the Williamsburg road a mile west of the Charles City road—to which its general course is parallel,—and a little more than a mile farther on it enters the New Market road, taking a westerly and then northerly course into Rocketts, west of Fulton Hill.

The line of march of the Army of the Potomac lay across White Oak Swamp, at or near the bridge, and then by way of the Quaker road to Malvern Hill. Thus it will be seen at a glance that its right flank would be seriously threatened by an active enemy. At the conference with his corps commanders, on the night of June 27th, General McClellan had informed them of his route, plan, and method of execution. The next day the headquarters of the army in the field was moved to Savage Station, and by noon General Keyes had crossed White Oak Swamp with two brigades of his corps and taken position near the junction of the Charles City, Long Bridge and Quaker roads, to cover the passage of the other troops and the trains. Before night he was joined by the re-

mainder of his corps, with the exception of Naglee's brigade, which, with two batteries remained to guard and destroy Bottom Bridge, and then rejoined the Fourth Corps at Haxall's July 1st.

Until 2 P.M. the Fifth Corps remained in bivouac upon the Trent farm, guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy, resting and refitting. Then Morell's division moved by way of Savage Station to follow the route taken by the Fourth Corps. At 6 P.M. Sykes' division followed; and at 9 P.M. McCall's division, accompanied by the artillery reserve, brought up the rear of the corps column. Captain Fred T. Locke, assistant adjutant-general, received the personal thanks of the general-in-chief, for his efficient energy, exerted throughout the night to secure the road for the passage of the troops; but the labor of rebuilding causeways and bridges over swamp and stream, the darkness of night, intensified by rain, and the condition of the narrow roads, cut up and blocked by trains and herds of cattle, all combined to retard the march.

The first division crossed at White Oak Swamp Bridge, and before sunset bivouacked on the south side, a detail of 500 men being furnished to aid General Woodbury of the Engineer Corps, in the completion of the causeway and bridge, thereby establishing communication with General Keyes. Soon after daylight of June 29th, Sykes' division crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford, a mile or more above the bridge, and occupied a position on the Charles City road, in front of its junction with the Long Bridge and Quaker roads, and in communication with Couch's division of the Fourth Corps. McCall's division did not cross the swamp until noon of June 29th.

During the night of June 28th, the corps of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin, forming the rear guard of the army, were moved to a line resting its left on the old intrenchments of the Fourth Corps and curving to the right so as to cover Savage Station—Slocum's division of the Sixth corps being in reserve at the station. Early in the morning of June 29th the headquarters of the army were moved across White Oak Swamp, followed soon afterwards by the headquarters of the Fifth Corps.

On the previous evening, Colonel Lawrence S. Baker, 1st North Carolina Cavalry, commanding the cavalry operating on the Confederate right, was directed by General Lee "to make a bold daring scout and find out where the enemy was." Accordingly, with five companies of his own regiment and 200 men of the 3d Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Thomas F. Goode, Colonel Baker, on the morning of June 29th, moved down the New Market and Charles City roads and, reaching the Quaker road, charged upon the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry outposts of Couch's division, as reported by General Keyes, "with extraordinary audacity." Averell's troopers, falling back, drew the inquisitive Confederates to within fifty yards of the division line, where the fire of two sections of artillery and a charge of the picket reserve, led by Captains Walsh and Russell, enlightened, checked, and repulsed them with an acknowledged loss of sixty-three killed, wounded, and missing, including four officers.

The 3d Pennsylvania lost one man killed and five men wounded. No further demonstrations following this cautionary incident, and others of his troops commencing to arrive upon the ground, General McClell-

lan directed General Keyes to move during the night to James River, taking up a position communicating with the Navy and holding Haxall's Landing on the left of Malvern Hill. General Porter was directed to move at the same time with his first and second divisions and the artillery reserve, by the direct road to Malvern Hill, and select and hold a position continuing the line to the right. McCall's division was detached by order of General McClellan to occupy an advanced position on the Long Bridge road during the passage of the trains, which were to be pushed forward in rear of the two corps which had preceded, and placed under protection of the gun-boats.

Early on the morning of the 29th, General Morell had received a message from General Keyes directing him to move up so as to be in position to support the Fourth Corps if necessary. As the division was getting under way, General Porter arrived, and under his direction it took position just beyond the junction of the Long Bridge, Charles City, and Quaker roads, and there remained throughout the day. The artillery reserve was parked a short distance in the rear of the forks of the roads.

At 5 P.M., McCall's division, preceded by an advance guard of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, Benson's battery of the 2d U. S. Artillery, and the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves, all under command of Colonel Wm. W. Averell, moved out to assume position at the front as ordered. By some mistake it continued down the Long Bridge road until (the advance having passed the junction with the Darbytown road) at about midnight it came in contact with Longstreet's pickets.¹

¹ Captain James Chester, 3d U. S. Artillery, at that time first sergeant of Randol's battery of the 1st U. S. Artillery, detailed from the artillery reserve

The advance guard and first and second brigades were disposed for defense as well as the darkness of the night permitted, the third brigade remaining in reserve upon the road in rear. Shortly before daybreak the command was withdrawn, left in front, and retraced its steps to a point about a mile west of the forks of the roads from which it had started, and near where a by-road crossed from the Long Bridge road into the Quaker road at Willis' church. Here the division again halted, Colonel Averell with his cavalry and Benson's battery crossing over into Quaker road, and thence to Malvern Hill, leaving, however, a squadron of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Captain Town, in position to watch the Long Bridge road towards New Market.

During the night of June 29th, in accordance with the orders received, General Porter started at the head of his column for Malvern Hill, but in the darkness the guide furnished from the headquarters of

that day for duty with McCall's division, gives the following incident of the march :

"The battery took its place in column immediately in rear of the 1st Brigade, and having crossed the White Oak Swamp, followed a road which I think was called the New Market road. The night was very dark, and the progress very slow. At last we were ordered to pull into a field on the right of the road and bivouac.

"The field seemed to be old worn-out ground, partially covered by a straggling growth of stunted pines. We had crossed a stream a few hundred yards back, and half the horses were unhitched and sent back to water. On their return the other half was sent. While the second half was absent, some of the men, prospecting around, discovered that the Confederate pickets occupied the same field, and were not fifty yards in front of the battery. The story as told me was that a soldier heard the click of a musket being cocked, and he called out 'Look out, there !—what do you mean?' This led to a conversation between the batteryman and the picket, the former telling the latter that he belonged to the battery which had just come in, but he concealed the fact that it was a Union battery.

"No doubt the true state of affairs was made known to Randol. At any rate, the horses were kept hitched during the night."

the army mistook the road, and discovered his error only after coming in contact with the enemy's pickets. Consequently, a countermarch and a new start became necessary, and it was not until 10 A.M., June 30th, that the first division reached James River, followed an hour later by the second division.

As it became known that the Army of the Potomac had abandoned the Pamunkey base, early on June 29th, Longstreet was ordered to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, with his own and A. P. Hill's division, and move by the Darbytown road to the Long Bridge road, and Jackson was ordered to cross at Grapevine Bridge and move down on the Confederate left. The evacuation of the advanced lines that had been held by the Second, Third, and Sixth Corps being discovered about sunrise, Generals Huger and Magruder had been ordered in pursuit, the former by the Charles City road and the latter by the Williamsburg road. At 9 A.M. Magruder came upon the Second and Third Corps, halted to receive him on the Allen farm between Orchard and Savage stations, and, attacking with his usual promptness and vigor, was three times repulsed with loss. Upon the cessation of these attacks, General Sumner withdrew his forces to Savage Station, uniting with Smith's division of the Sixth Corps under General Franklin; Slocum's division having been ordered across White Oak Swamp to relieve troops of the Fourth Corps. General Heintzelman, having destroyed the railway stores, ammunition, and provisions still remaining at Savage Station, put his own interpretation on the orders he had received, and with the Third Corps crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford and reached the Charles City road with the head of his column at 6.30 P.M.

At 4 P.M. Magruder's troops again attacked the line held by Sumner's command. The contest was stubborn and continued until after dark, when the enemy withdrew, having suffered heavily. By midnight Sumner's troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge (French's brigade acting as rear-guard), and at 5 A.M., June 30th, all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed.

The Union rear was now formed as follows: Richardson's division of the Second Corps and Naglee's brigade of the Fourth Corps were temporarily added to the command of General Franklin, who formed his line with Smith's division and Naglee's brigade on the right of the bridge-crossing of the swamp. Richardson's division was on the left and extended toward the right of Slocum's division, which held the right of the Charles City road, connecting there with the right of Kearny's division of the Third Corps, which in turn continued the line toward the Long Bridge road, its left flank resting somewhat in rear of the right of McCall's division. The right of Hooker's division of the Third Corps rested on the by-road entering the Quaker road a little north of Willis' church, and was some 600 yards in rear of the left of McCall's line, with which it formed an obtuse angle, extending as it did to the left on a line approximately parallel to and about a third of a mile in advance of the Quaker road. The batteries connected with this division had marched directly to Malvern Hill. On Hooker's right and in rear of McCall, Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps was posted in a cleared field in advance of the cross-roads.

There seems to have been, at first, some singular misapprehension as to the purpose for which McCall's

division was halted in front of Glendale. An impression appears to have prevailed that they were within the picket lines of the army, and would soon receive orders to follow the first and second divisions of the Fifth Corps to Malvern. No line of battle was first taken up, and, it being the last day of the month, the several regiments were actually drawn up for muster. Before noon, however, reports were received of an approaching enemy, and Generals Seymour and Meade, riding down the Long Bridge road, found Averell's squadron the only barrier between them and Longstreet's advancing troops. General McCall, realizing that he occupied an all-important point on the Union line, and that he must hold it at all hazards, ordered forward the 1st and 3d regiments to form a picket line, and at once disposed his command for action.

BATTLE OF NEW MARKET, VA.

McCall's line was formed with Meade's brigade to the right of the Long Bridge road, and Seymour's brigade continuing the line with its left somewhat advanced to a strip of woods about eight hundred yards from and almost parallel to the road. Reynolds' brigade, Colonel Simmons commanding, was held in reserve.

Randol's battery, 1st U. S. Artillery, was stationed on the right of the Long Bridge road, the left of the battery resting on the road and its right being covered by Thompson's battery, 2d U. S. Artillery, attached to Kearny's division, posted in echelon—his pieces in line with Randol's caissons. Cooper's and Kerns' (Amsden in command) batteries held the centre of the division line, and on the left Diedrich's and

Knierim's batteries of reserve artillery were posted. All batteries were in front of the infantry line. Two squadrons of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry were held in rear of the left of the line.

Accompanied by General Lee and Mr. Jefferson Davis, General Longstreet had continued his march on the Long Bridge road in the morning until the pickets of McCall's division were met and driven in upon their main line. Longstreet's division, General R. H. Anderson commanding, was disposed for assault, Branch's brigade of A. P. Hill's division being ordered forward in support on the right. The rest of Hill's division was held in reserve. About 3 P.M., artillery firing being heard in the direction of the Charles City road, where Huger was expected to attack, General Longstreet ordered his batteries to the front and opened fire. The response from McCall's lines was so immediate and so well sustained, that the assault was ordered at once, and troops pressed to the front as rapidly as possible, to support the attacking columns. The ground was broken by ravines and heavily timbered, affording opportunity for organizing the attack under excellent cover.

The first attempt was made upon the centre of the Union line soon after 3 P.M., part of Jenkins' brigade attacking under cover of a heavy artillery fire. This attack was driven back by the 7th and 12th Pennsylvania regiments. General McCall then moved the 12th, Colonel Taggart commanding, to the narrow strip of timber on the left front of his line, and General Seymour, soon after, again changed the disposition of this regiment, placing six companies in two log huts and a hastily constructed breastwork of rails

about two hundred yards in advance and to the left, and four companies to support two guns on a hill in rear of the regiment. The 12th had but just taken up this position when artillery opened upon it and Kemper's brigade advanced impetuously to attack the left of Seymour's line. The German batteries on the extreme left were incontinently driven to the rear. Colonel Taggart finding his position untenable from the concentrated artillery fire poured upon it, and being in danger of being cut off, withdrew. General McCall halted the German batteries and endeavored to place them in position, but the guns were finally abandoned by the cannoneers and some of them fell into the hands of the enemy. For nearly two hours an alternating contest was hotly maintained. Two regiments from the reserve were sent under Colonel Simmons to aid the left. Charging with the 5th and 8th to the support of the 9th and 10th, he drove the enemy with heavy loss, nearly 300 being captured; but this able and ideal soldier met his death in the splendid effort. Then the 5th and 8th, in their turn repulsed, fell back behind the 2d and 13th, which advanced to, met, and checked the pursuit by the enemy. The 3d and 10th charged and routed the supports of a battery, capturing some prisoners, but being in turn assailed by the enemy in force, fell back, bringing their prisoners with them. Captain Biddle assistant-adjutant general of the division, had in the meantime fallen, mortally wounded.

Gradually the severity of the contest worked toward the Union centre and right. Amsden's and Cooper's batteries, supported by the 1st regiment, had maintained their positions against repeated assaults until Amsden, having fired the last round in his limbers,

and being unable to find his caissons, which had been ordered to the rear by General Seymour, was ordered to retire. Quick to notice his movements, the enemy charged impetuously from the right, but were met, and, by a counter-charge of the 1st regiment, were driven toward the woods. Here a charge of fresh troops on its flank forced the 1st back, and the enemy pushing hotly after, drove Cooper's gunners from their pieces, and for a moment held the battery. But the 9th had returned from the left to its position in support, and the gallant Jackson willingly listened to the demand of his men that the guns should be recaptured. Parts of other regiments united with the 9th, and after a fierce struggle the battery was again in the hands of its own men and the enemy driven from the position. No pen will ever write the details of this strife, in which bayonet and butt were freely used.

At the opening of the attack on McCall's left, General Sumner sent the 69th Pennsylvania, Colonel Owen commanding, to extend the right of General Hooker's line, the 106th Pennsylvania being placed in reserve in rear of the 69th. Then, as the *débris* of the 12th Pennsylvania and the German batteries, together with the cavalry and details guarding prisoners captured, drifted to the rear along the road to the right of Hooker's position, General Burns was directed to post the 72d Pennsylvania, Colonel Baxter commanding, resting on the wood to the left of McCall's line, and about 5 P.M. Dana's brigade, coming upon the field, filled the space between Colonel Owen's right and Colonel Baxter's left. The advance of the enemy was checked by the fire of the 16th Massachusetts and 69th Pennsylvania, after which they fell back before a charge made by the 1st Massachusetts,

aided by the 69th Pennsylvania. This ended the active participation of Hooker's division in the engagement, the enemy from that time devoting his attention to the line held by McCall's division and the left of General Kearny's position. About 7 P.M. the left of McCall's line was relieved by the Second Corps troops of Burns' and Dana's brigades.

After the repulse of the second attempt to crush the left and centre of the Union line, the tide of battle rolled over upon the centre and right, enveloping the left of Robinson's brigade of Kearny's division. Captain Chester has kindly furnished the following graphic account of the struggle over Randol's guns :

"Randol's battery was at the salient of the line, in an open field, on the right of the road facing toward Richmond. The battery consisted of six Napoleon guns ; the right section commanded by Lieutenant Hill, the left by Lieutenant Olcott, and the centre by myself, then first sergeant of the battery. The left of the battery rested on the road.

"The attack on the batteries on our left began about 3 P.M., and Randol, with more gallantry than prudence, changed front forward on the left piece and opened an enfilading fire on the enemy's line then charging the batteries. This fire was effective, but the manœuvre had thrown the right of the battery close to the woods, then occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters, and it might have been captured by a sudden dash on its flank. Moreover, in a ravine running parallel to the original front of the battery, and about three hundred yards distant from it, the tips of several battle flags could be seen, indicating that several regiments were forming for an attack on the position. To meet this Randol changed front back again, but the movement was badly executed, and the positions in line of Olcott and myself became changed,¹ thus bringing my section nearest the road.

"As already stated, from the ravine to the battery was about three hundred yards, and as our skirmishers had come in some

¹ Captain Randol reports that he "ordered Lieutenant Olcott to limber up and come in battery with his section on my [his] right."

time before (they were not driven in), there was nothing to warn us of the coming assault but the flags referred to. The guns were double charged with canister, and the cannoneers lay down and waited, watching the tell-tale flags. Our supports, consisting of two small regiments of Pennsylvania reserves, were lying down between the limbers and caissons. We were all ready for the onset, when one of the flags began to advance, and we knew that the assault was coming. It was delivered with courage and determination, but Napoleon guns at canister-range are impregnable, if properly served, and the assault failed.

“I saw General Meade about this time. He rode into the battery shortly after this charge, if I remember rightly, and was wounded while in my section. He did not fall from his horse—only winced a little and rode slowly to the rear.

“The second assault was advertised by the movement of the flags, as was the first, and also failed, although some of the enemy actually entered the battery, but only to be taken prisoners. One major, I remember, entered my section in this way. He was decidedly drunk, and raising both hands in a half frantic manner, shouted, ‘Dixie is gone up! Dixie is gone up!’

“This assault, although successfully repulsed, proved to be our destruction. Our supports could see the enemy better than was possible to those standing up. The smoke was so thick that I could not see from my right piece to my left, but the supports could see fairly well under the smoke. They saw the repulse of the assault, and the temptation was too strong for them. Almost as one man they rose and dashed after the enemy with the bayonet. I remember Randol well—the broad brim of his brown felt hat flapping about his face as he gesticulated and shouted: ‘Keep in the rear of the guns!’ But he might as well have tried to stem Niagara. On they went, almost to the edge of the ravine. There they received a volley at short range from a line of fresh troops that seemed to rise out of the ground, and then there was a foot-race back to the battery again. The enemy were less than fifty yards in rear of our supports, and the fire of the battery was completely masked by our own men. My guns, from their position on the left, got in three or four oblique shots, but the enemy swept over Hill’s and Olcott’s sections in the wake of our supports, and the first thing I knew their line of battle was established on our caissons. Hill was mortally wounded and taken

prisoner in this charge, and some of the men were bayoneted at the guns.

“I had to remain some time inside the enemy’s lines before I got a chance to escape. It was just dusk when the charge was made, and the dust had given our blue coats the legitimate butternut color, so that a Yankee was not easily recognized. I wandered into the road without being molested, and when I got abreast of the fighting line, made a dash for liberty. But we lost our guns, and the Confederates had the use of them until the battle of Cedar Creek, when they were recaptured from a battery of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans.”

The left company of the 4th Pennsylvania, Captain Fred. A. Conrad commanding, and some men of other companies, stood their ground until, swept bodily along with the rush of the enemy, they passed through a gap in the fence and rejoined the lines in rear. Riding among his men, General McCall effected a partial rally, and Captain Randol, collecting a few companies, charged back and drove the enemy from his guns, but was unable to remove them, 38 of his horses having been killed and 8 wounded. Lieutenant Hill was recaptured and removed from the field by a captain of the Reserves, and reached his home in Albany, N. Y., before he died.

General Kearny reports¹ that the attack commenced on his line “with a determination and vigor and in such masses as I [he] had never witnessed.” Three assaults were made, the enemy pressing up to the muzzles of Thompson’s guns, where they were met and repulsed by the 63d Pennsylvania and 97th New York, adding their fire and rush to the havoc wrought by the artillery. Finally, about 7.30 P.M.—Thompson’s pieces having been withdrawn after expending all their canister,—“the enemy betokened his

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, pp. 162, 163.

efforts as past by converting his charges into an ordinary line fight of musketry, embracing the whole front of the brigade." General Kearny, then anticipating an attack on his right, "left everything progressing steadily on the left and visited the entire line to the right." In about half an hour he returned to the left to find that Colonel Hayes had been relieved by Colonel Barlow, of the 61st New York, the head of General Cadwalader's brigade, sent from Sumner's corps, and which had reported to General Robinson.

Soon after 8 P.M., General Kearny formed two regiments of General Berry's brigade on the right of the road, some 200 yards in the rear, and moved forward nearly to the original lines. With about 500 of the Reserves, who had rallied on the 13th Regiment, General McCall, about the same time, advanced on the road and halted the troops in rear of the wreck of the battery. Of staff and escort only Corporal King and one private remained with the general. Followed by them, and in company with Major Roy Stone, commanding the 13th, he rode forward in the darkness to ascertain if the men of the 4th Pennsylvania, whom he had left near that point, were still on the ground. Within less than 100 yards he suddenly encountered the troops and headquarters of Fields' brigade of A. P. Hill's division. General McCall was in advance, and in reply to his query "What command is this?" found the bridle of his horse grasped by a soldier of the 47th Virginia, and himself a prisoner. Though fired upon, his companions escaped in the darkness, Major Stone being slightly wounded.

The battle was now practically ended, and General Kearny, being still further reinforced by Taylor's

New Jersey brigade, re-established the lines in rear of the original position.

In this battle, characterized by General Kearny as "one of the most desperate of the war, the one most fatal if lost"—the Pennsylvania Reserves were called to act under great disadvantages which were not entirely removed with the closing of the strife upon the field. On June 25th the division had been actively engaged at Beaver Creek, in preparation for the contest of the next day, in which it bore itself with acknowledged credit to the Union arms. On June 27th, it held right manfully its share in the heroic struggle at Gaines' Mill, and then taking its place in the column of retreat, after nearly sixty consecutive hours passed in march, unrefreshing bivouac, and countermarch, on the morning of June 30th, with ranks depleted until it numbered barely 6000 men, it found itself posted upon the advanced line guarding the point indispensable to the safety of the army. There, unaided, it maintained itself against the assaults of Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, from 3 P.M. until nearly 8 P.M., with the exception of a portion of the left of the line, which was relieved by troops from the Second Corps about 7 P.M. It emerged from the contest counting in its casualties its division commander wounded and a prisoner, one brigade commander killed, and another sorely wounded and disabled. Unquestionably there was straggling to the rear and disorder along the line—one being the natural consequence of loss of morale from physical exhaustion incident to the labors of the preceding days, and the other the inevitable accompaniment of the charging tactics necessarily adopted; but thousands remained, faithfully upholding the honor of the Keystone State. That Randol lost his

guns is but another proof of the then obtaining folly of attempting to charge a repulsed enemy by the supports of a battery acting through or in front of the pieces. Even the loss of Knierem's guns and the timidity of Diedrich's men may not unjustly be ascribed, in part at least, to their unnecessary exposure on the extremity of a flank practically in air.

There are other points connected with the combat more deserving of notice than any disorder there may have been in the ranks that held the Confederate forces at bay that afternoon. General Hooker took position at 9 A.M., yet not until an hour later was he aware of the presence of McCall's division at the front, and though the Second Corps troops had reached their position early in the morning, the crotchet between his right and the left of the Pennsylvania line remained apparently unnoticed until Kemper's attack at 3 P.M. Through the long hours of that strife, the Pennsylvania division defeated every effort of the enemy on its front, till in the dusk of evening, by the fatal mistake of a zealous desire to punish the enemy, it was swept to the rear on the crest of the final overwhelming assault, and history may as justly credit Magruder's command with the labors of Longstreet's and Hill's men that day as to assign the laurels of Glendale to those who "were only just ready to begin fighting at dark,"¹ and who took post in the front line after the enemy had "betokened his efforts as past."

The casualties in General McCall's command are reported to have been 12 officers and 93 men killed, 43 officers and 533 men wounded, and 15 officers and 417 enlisted men captured or missing—an aggregate

¹ *History of the Second Army Corps*, p. 76.

of 1113, nearly one fifth of the strength of the command, but less than one half of the loss inflicted upon General Longstreet's division alone.

Lieutenant Kuhn, aide to General Meade, was killed during the assault on Randol's battery; Captain Biddle was mortally wounded soon after the opening of the contest on the left. Lieutenants Watmough and Beatty, and Surgeon Stocker were wounded later in the engagement.

Of the regimental staff, Surgeons E. Donnelly, 2d; J. Collins, 3d; J. De Bumeville, 11th; and N. F. Marsh, 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, voluntarily remained with the wounded on the field, and were made prisoners by the enemy.¹

¹ Extract from the report of Surgeon N. F. Marsh, 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, McCall's division, in *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 397:

“ WASHINGTON, November 25, 1862.

“ GENERAL MCCALL :

“ *General* : After the battle of the 30th June, I remained at Willis' Church with a large number of wounded. The next morning I was directed by General Jackson (Stonewall) to report to General Lee. I found General Lee in company with Generals Longstreet, Magruder, and Hill, on the New Market road. I addressed General Lee and informed him that I was a Federal surgeon and had remained to care for the wounded, and wished protection and supplies for our men. He promised supplies and directed General Longstreet to write the necessary permit.

“ At the time I approached they were discussing the battle of the previous day, being then on the ground. General Longstreet asked me if I was present. I replied I was. He asked what troops were engaged? I replied I only knew the division I was connected with (McCall's), which fought just where we then were. General Longstreet said, 'Well, McCall is safe in Richmond; but if his division had not offered the stubborn resistance it did on this road we would have captured your whole army. Never mind, we will do it yet.'

“ On Thursday, July 3d, General Roger A. Pryor came into the church (hospital), and we had a long conversation. He repeated in substance what Longstreet had said, and spoke in the highest terms of the 'pluck displayed by McCall's Pennsylvania troops.'

“ The interest I felt in the Reserve Corps made me careful to remember these acknowledgments of the rebel generals.

“ I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

“ N. F. MARSH,

“ Surgeon 4th Penna. Cavalry.”

The admirable manner in which Cooper, Amsden, and Randol served their batteries is conceded on every hand. Lieutenants Thomas Cadwalader and Henry T. Danforth died bravely at their posts with Cooper's guns. While commending the conduct of all his officers and men as "gallant and meritorious in the extreme," Lieutenant Randol speaks in the highest terms of the bearing of Lieutenants Hill (mortally wounded) and Olcott, and urges the promotion of First Sergeant James Chester.

The ability and bravery of Colonel R. B. Roberts and Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. McIntire, of the 1st Pennsylvania, were noted. Of that regiment Captain J. Finley Bailey was killed, Captain George H. Hess was mortally wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. McIntire was wounded and captured, Captains W. W. Stewart, J. H. Graham, P. J. O'Rourke, and A. J. Neff, and Lieutenants Wm. T. McPhail, Wm. B. Wolf, and John T. McCord were wounded, and Lieutenant George E. Kitzmiller was captured.

Captains George A. Woodward and Horace Neide, of the 2d, are highly praised for gallantry, both being severely wounded. In that regiment also Lieutenant James R. Nightingale was killed, Lieutenant J. B. Fletcher was mortally wounded, Captain Patrick J. Smith was wounded and captured, and Lieutenant Daniel Craig was wounded. Five officers of the 3d are reported wounded and three captured or missing.

Colonel A. L. Magilton, commanding the 4th, reports the capture of three Confederate flags and the recapture of one Union flag by the men of his command. Five officers are reported by him to have been wounded and six as captured or missing.

Of the 5th regiment, Colonel Seneca G. Simmons

was killed ; Lieutenant Mason, though wounded, returned to the field and remained with the regiment ; Lieutenant Riddle was severely wounded June 26th, but refused to leave the regiment, and was again wounded and captured June 30th. Captain James Taggart was killed, Captains Charles H. Hildebrand and John McClury, and Lieutenant J. P. Lucas and one other officer, wounded.

Captain R. M. Henderson is mentioned as having brought the colors of his regiment from the field after all of the color guard had been killed or wounded. Colonel E. B. Harvey and Captain Henderson were wounded, and one officer is reported as captured or missing.

In the 8th, Colonel George S. Hayes was wounded and one officer captured or missing.

In the 9th, Lieutenant James P. Beatty was killed, three other officers were wounded, and one captured or missing.

In the 10th, Lieutenant O. H. Gaither was killed, Captain Samuel Miller was mortally wounded, one other officer was wounded, and one is reported captured or missing.

In the 12th, Lieutenant W. W. Arnold was killed, and Captains F. Dannells and T. D. Howe were wounded.

In the 13th, Captain P. Holland was killed and Major Stone wounded.

The battered regiments of the reserves remained in position on the New Market road, not over 100 yards in rear of their original position, until 11 P.M., when General Seymour received orders to withdraw and rejoin the other divisions of the Fifth Corps. The artillery officers, before withdrawing, asked per-

mission to procure men and horses to bring in their guns, which still remained in front of the lines, but General Heintzelman, being under orders to avoid bringing on a general engagement, refused to permit the attempt to be made. Thus 14 guns were abandoned to the enemy.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

While the above events were taking place with McCall's division, the 1st and 2d Divisions of the Fifth Corps had assumed a position at Malvern Hill, nearly two miles farther to the left of Hooker's line, covering the river road and the debouches from the New Market, Charles City, and Williamsburg roads. Warren's brigade, reinforced by the 11th U. S. Infantry, under Floyd-Jones, and Martin's battery, held the river road with the left of the line. Buchanan's and Chapman's brigades continued the line northward along the west edge of the plateau upon which Edwards, Carlisle, Smead, and Voegler's batteries were posted, controlling the plain in front of the Malvern house. The right of the division line rested in a clump of pines held by the 3d and 4th U. S. The 1st Division continued this line, and curving to the right in front of the Crew house, with artillery well advanced, covered the Quaker road approach from the north, while Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries, from the Third Corps, and Ames' battery, 5th U. S., guarded the left of the division line.

As they arrived, batteries of the artillery reserve were posted on the slope of the field in rear of the lines. Soon after 4 P.M., June 30th, Couch's division of the Fourth Corps, detached by order of the general-

in-chief, reached the ground and took position east of the Quaker road, on Morell's right.

During the afternoon of June 29th, General Holmes, of the Confederate force, had crossed from the right bank of the James River with part of his division, and halted for the night on Cornelius' Creek, on the west of the New Market or river road. After a march of fourteen miles, General Longstreet bivouacked his command near the junction of the Darbytown and Long Bridge roads. Huger's column halted for the night on the Charles City road, about two miles west of the road leading to Brackett's Ford. With Jackson's command pressing upon the Union rear, General Lee hoped and expected by these dispositions to be enabled the next day to break through General McClellan's column and destroy his army.

Jackson's command, delayed by the rebuilding of the Grapevine Bridge, did not reach Savage Station until the morning of June 30th, and at noon reached White Oak Swamp Bridge to find it destroyed and the crossing guarded by Franklin's command on the south bank. Colonel Crutchfield opened a furious fire from a battery of 28 guns, which compelled Captain Ames to withdraw the batteries with which he guarded the crossing, and Mumford's Confederate cavalry gained a temporary hold on the right bank; but the contest soon dwindled to an artillery duel and continued until night, when Jackson's men rested before a position which their leader believed they could neither force nor turn. For some unexplained reason, Jackson made no attempt at crossing either at Brackett's Ford, or at the crossing below the bridge by which Mumford's cavalry, being unsupported, rejoined the main command.

Moving cautiously forward in the morning, Huger's command had encountered obstructions and skirmishers on the Charles City road in front of Kearny's and Slocum's divisions, and soon after discovered the lines holding the Brackett farm. General Mahone reports that it was then "deemed necessary to reconnoitre before pushing farther." Two guns of Moorman's battery opened an artillery duel which continued throughout the afternoon, and constituted the chief participation of this command in the operations of the day.

The Confederate General Holmes, reinforced by General Wise, had moved down the river road from the direction of Richmond, with a force of 6000 infantry, six batteries of artillery, and two regiments of cavalry. About 4 P.M. he opened fire on the Fifth Corps line from a six-gun rifled battery, pushed out to within 800 yards of Malvern Hill. General Lee reports that "he soon discovered that a number of batteries, advantageously posted, supported by an infantry force superior to his own and assisted by the fire of the gun-boats in the James River, guarded this part of the line." General Holmes reports that he "deemed it out of the question to attack the strong position of Malvern Hill from that side with his inadequate force."

Under the influence of the fire of Hunt's guns and Warren's rifles, aided by a few shells from the gun-boats, and leaving two guns and six caissons to be brought in by Warren's men, he retired so completely that General Magruder, who since early morning had been on the road from Savage Station to reinforce him, could not locate his command. Lieutenant Woods Maguire, one sergeant, and one enlisted man

of the 3d U. S. Infantry, killed by falling branches cut from the trees among which the regiment was posted, constituted the Union loss in the affair.

So it was that three of General Lee's columns, like General Kearny's battery with the enemy at the muzzles, "ceased to be a calculation" that day. Elsewhere there was hotter work going on with McCall.

At 10 P.M. June 30th, the withdrawal of Franklin's troops from White Oak Swamp commenced, followed at about midnight by that of Heintzelman's command, and at 2 A.M. of July 1st, by that of General Sumner. The last of the wagon trains had passed through the lines on Malvern Hill by 4 P.M. June 30th, and were safely parked near Haxall's. By daylight of July 1st the last of the army had arrived at Malvern, and was rapidly placed in position on the right of General Porter's command by General A. A. Humphreys, chief topographical engineer of the Army of the Potomac, under orders from the general-in-chief, General Humphreys having carefully examined the ground during the previous day.¹

On the extreme left of the Union line, as finally established, was Warren's little brigade, consisting of the 5th New York, his own, and 10th New York, Colonel Bendix commanding, supported by the 11th

¹ General McClellan had himself indicated the position to be held by the Fifth Corps and Couch's division. About 2 A.M. July 1st, he sent for General Humphreys and directed him to go to the field at daylight and post the remaining troops as massively as he could. General Humphreys was furnished with written orders as follows :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

" *General Humphreys* : General McClellan directs that you see that the proper connections in our lines be made and give directions to any commanders in this army that may be necessary to effect this object.

" R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff."

U. S., under Major Floyd-Jones, together with Martin's Massachusetts battery. This force held the river road and guarded the low ground skirting the western slope of Malvern to Crew's hill. The 10th New York was posted in the timber on the left of and at right angles to the river road, in front of the cross roads leading to Curl's Neck. The 5th New York, its left well refused, continued the line southward, and through the timber to open ground, where a section of Martin's battery commanded the plain bordering the James River. On the right of the river road, Martin's remaining three guns covered that flank of the brigade, and watched the open ground to the north. The 11th U. S., under Major Floyd-Jones, was posted in reserve to the right of the river road, and in front of the right branch of Turkey Island Creek. Lieutenant Frank W. Hess, 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, having reported with a platoon of that regiment for outpost duty, was pushed forward on the river road until the enemy's pickets were met.

Chapman's brigade under Major C. S. Lovell, consisting of the 2d U. S., Captain Poland commanding; 6th U. S., Captain L. C. Bootes commanding; 10th and 17th U. S., Major G. L. Andrews commanding, supported the batteries crowning the western edge of the Malvern plateau.

Buchanan's brigade, he being present, consisting of the 3d U. S., Captain J. D. Wilkins commanding; 4th U. S., Captain J. B. Collins, commanding; 12th U. S., Captain M. M. Blunt, commanding; and the 14th U. S., Captain J. D. O'Connell commanding, was on the right of Chapman's brigade, extending the line northward to near the Crew house.

Ten of Tyler's siege guns were posted in front of

the Malvern house, Smead's battery having been withdrawn from the extreme left of the edge of the plateau in order to give place to the heavier guns, which about 10 A.M. opened fire at long range on the woods covering the enemy's approach, and continued it throughout the day. Voegler's and Carlisle's 20-pounders remained in position as on June 30th, continuing the artillery line northward.

Just south and west of the Crew house, and facing west, the 14th New York, Colonel James McQuade commanding, with three guns of Weeden's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Richard Waterman,¹ watched the road coming from the west, and protected the left of the 1st Division line. In front of the Crew house, and just behind the crest from which the ground sloped northward to the timber occupied by the enemy, the line turned abruptly almost ninety degrees to the right, the 4th Michigan, Colonel Dwight A. Woodbury commanding; the 9th Massachusetts, Colonel Cass commanding; and the 62d Pennsylvania, Captain James C. Hall commanding, taking position in the order named on a slightly curved line, the regiments being so disposed as to co-operate with and support the more advanced artillery line. The right of the line rested on the Quaker road near the West house, connecting with the left of Couch's division of the Fourth Corps in position east of the road.

Livingston of the 3d and Ames of the 5th U. S. Artillery, both from the artillery reserve, were in

¹ Waterman's guns were so far advanced that Tyler's gunners mistook them for those of the enemy, and one of their shells striking in the battery, killed two men, wounded three others, and killed two horses. About 4 P.M. the battery was withdrawn from the left, and later on, in connection with Hyde's section of Allen's battery relieved Kingsbury's battery on General Couch's left, and rendered admirable service, having a whole company of experienced gunners to man his three guns.

advance of Griffin's infantry, their pieces just clearing the crest of the ridge. Kingsbury's battery held a similar position on the right of the Quaker road. Later in the day they were reinforced by Edwards' battery of the 3d U. S., and Waterman's and Hyde's sections. General Griffin was charged by General Porter with a general supervision of the artillery line in addition to the command of his brigade. Captain Weeden, however, retained the immediate command of the divisional artillery.

Morell's 1st and 3d brigades were at first stationed under cover of a narrow strip of woods bordering the Quaker road after it turns sharply to the east near the forks of a cross-road leading westward down the south slope of the Crew hill and thence to a junction with the river road half a mile in advance of Warren's position. About noon they were moved forward and to the west of the Quaker road, the 1st Brigade taking position in the Crew field north of the cross-road, the 3d Brigade forming in its rear and south of the road. In this position, the men lying down, it was partially sheltered by the rise of the ground in front, and was close at hand to support Griffin's line in its immediate front, Couch's line on the right and front, or the line upon the left along the edge of the plateau. Generals Martindale and Butterfield were directed by General Morell to render whatever support might become necessary without waiting for further orders.

McCall's battered division, General Truman Seymour commanding, was held in reserve to the right of the Malvern house, and Hunt's artillery reserve was posted upon the slope of the plateau, a scant half mile in rear of the battle front.

Immediately on the right of the Quaker road, General Couch placed two regiments of Palmer's brigade of his division, the 10th Massachusetts, Major Ozro Miller commanding, and the 36th New York, Major James A. Raney commanding, in a wooded ravine trending to the front for about 200 yards. To the right of Palmer's regiments was an oat field extending to the tangled marsh and wooded bank of Western Run. In this field General A. P. Howe formed his brigade, while Abercrombie's brigade lay in reserve a few hundred yards in rear of the front line.

Early in the day, Bramhall's and Osborne's batteries from the Third Corps, temporarily with the Fifth, were placed in position by General Porter's order on General Couch's right and front, and were actively engaged. They were afterwards withdrawn by request of General Heintzelman and returned to their proper command. Soon after noon, however, Snow's Maryland battery was sent from the artillery reserve by Colonel Hunt, and was posted in the oat field on General Howe's right, and at 6.30 P.M. Colonel Hunt sent Benson's battery, 2d U. S., and Frank's New York battery, to relieve Waterman and Hyde on the left, while Seeley's guns from the Third Corps went into energetic action on the right of the division.

The 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, deployed as Skirmishers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley commanding, covered the front from the low meadow land west of the hills to the swamp bordering Western Run, General Porter being charged by the general-in-chief with the command of the left of the Union lines.

Kearny's and Hooker's divisions of the Third

Corps, and Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions of the Second Corps, in order as named, continued the line to the right along the eastern border of the plateau, meeting W. F. Smith's division of the Sixth Corps near the point where the line descended abruptly to the lowlands south of the hill. The right of Smith's division rested on the mill-pond at Carter's Mill, and then united with the left of Slocum's division, which extended westward toward James River, the extreme right of the line being held by Peck's division and the artillery of the Fourth Corps. Commodore Rodgers disposed his gun-boats to cover the flanks of the army and to command the river road to Richmond.

About 8.30 A.M., General McClellan, who had remained upon the hill during the night, until assured of the coming of Franklin, Heintzelman, and Sumner, in company with Generals Porter and Couch, examined and approved the line taken up by the Fifth Corps and Couch's division, and then passed to the right, inspecting and approving the general line selected by General Humphreys.

During the preceding night the troops of the Fifth Corps had bivouacked on or near the line as finally established. The early morning of July 1st was hot and enervating, and, added to the labors of the week, undoubtedly exercised a depressing influence upon the troops, tired almost to the limit of endurance, but there was nothing of the demoralization upon the assumption of which the Confederate commander had based his plans. As the morning opened out, the bands of Morell's division, relieved from a restraining precautionary order, filled the air with stirring melody, and faces that had not blanched before the over-

whelming onsets at Gaines' Mill, brightened again with the battle-light, and hopes were uttered of speedy revenge for the gallant host that had heard the last "tattoo."

General Morell made his headquarters early in the day in the centre of his division on the road crossing his rear. He soon, however, moved to the Crew house, and there remained until the heavy contest of the afternoon, when, passing along his battle-line, he took position on its right upon the Quaker road. At the Crew house an unusual luxury was obtained. The mansion furnished pitchers and glasses and an outhouse was well stored with ice. General Kearny and many other visitors were refreshed with iced lemonade, and ice-water was freely handed around. Here, too, at about noon, a deserter from the enemy was brought to General Morell and reported that he had heard a staff-officer tell his colonel that an assault would be made on Morell's line at 4 P.M. This information was sent to General Porter at the Malvern house.

General Jackson, having at last succeeded in crossing White Oak Swamp, was ordered by General Lee "to continue the pursuit" down the Quaker road; and, about 11 A.M., found himself again confronted by a formidably posted line of battle. He at once ordered batteries into position in the Pointdexter field on the east of the road, and Whiting's division was rapidly disposed for their support. Law's brigade formed the right of Whiting's division line, its right resting on the Quaker road. On Law's left, Hood's brigade extended the line across the field, the men lying concealed by the growing grain and the roll of the ground. The extreme left was supported, and ex-

tended in echelon, by Trimble's brigade of Ewell's division, while Hampton's brigade, of Jackson's division, was held in reserve. Taylor's brigade, of Ewell's division, was posted in rear of Hampton, between his right and the Quaker Road, while Early's brigade of the same division was halted on the road half a mile in front of Willis' church.

D. H. Hill's division was ordered to deploy to the right of Whiting in and behind the timber between the forks of the Quaker road and the cross-road leading to the Long Bridge road opposite to French's Mill, upon which Huger's and Magruder's troops were approaching the field. G. B. Anderson's brigade, incautiously advancing beyond the timber, was roughly handled—the 14th North Carolina losing their colors and General Anderson being wounded and taken from the field—the command devolving upon Colonel C. C. Tew, of the 2d North Carolina. Then Gordon, commanding Rodes' brigade, formed on the right rear of Anderson's and close to the cross-road; Ripley's brigade took post on the left rear of Anderson's, with Garland and Colquit in open ground still farther in rear and opposite to the right of Law's brigade. On the right of the Quaker road, and in advance of the position held by Early, Winder, Lawton, and Jones' brigades of Jackson's division, and Ransom of Huger's division, were in reserve. Armistead's and Wright's brigades were put in line, in order named, on the right of the cross-road, and extending Gordon's line. Mahone's brigade formed in rear of Wright's.

Magruder's corps arriving, was posted with Barksdale's brigade in rear of Gordon, Toombs on Barks-

dale's left and rear, Kershaw on Toombs' right and rear—all to the left of the cross-road. On the right of the road, Semmes formed in rear and between Mahone's left and the road, G. T. Anderson on Semmes' right and rear, and Cobb on Anderson's left and rear.

Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions were held as a grand reserve.

During the day twelve Confederate batteries strove to aid the efforts of their infantry, those of Moorman, Grimes, and Pegram being the farthest advanced and the most severely punished.

Certainly General Lee had marshalled a powerful force for the assault of the lines held by troops he knew to be jaded by successive days and nights of conflict and of movement. As the event demonstrated, he could have selected no better troops for the work he had at hand, and right worthily they were led by their immediate commanders. As on the day preceding, the President of the Confederacy was present on the field to witness the confidently expected capture of the Army of the Potomac. The plan of the intended attack was concisely stated in General Lee's celebrated order :

“ Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's lines. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.”

This order issued to his subordinate commanders, General Lee appeared to think his labors ended. Unfortunately for the Confederate arms, the order was based upon intentions instead of upon facts. The batteries that were “ to rake the enemy's lines,” were never established, and there does not appear to

“

have been any concerted effort to that end.¹ As the few that made the attempt struggled one by one into position, they encountered a fire which "tore them into fragments in a few minutes after they opened."² Armistead could discover no opportunity for "charging with a yell,"³ and when finally the advance was attempted its force was weakened by lack of method and co-operation. General Longstreet states that General Lee seemed to have abandoned the intention of attacking, and had even directed him to move around to the left to turn the Union right, when in some way unknown to him, the battle was brought on. The inspiring presence of the President of the Confederacy might well have been dispensed with if in its place a controlling influence at the front had shaped into simultaneous and concerted action the desultory gallantry there expended under the most remarkable of battle orders.

Soon after 10 A.M., the enemy commenced to feel for the Union lines, keeping up a scattering fire from right to left till after noon. These tentative demonstrations were met and checked by the fire of Griffin's guns. About noon, Armistead, with his own and Wright's brigade, attempted an advance upon Morell's

¹ General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, commanding the artillery reserve of the Confederates reports :

"Tuesday morning, July 1st, was spent by me in seeking for some time the commanding general, that I might get orders, and by reason of the intricacy of routes failing in this, in examining positions near the two armies, toward ascertaining what could be done with a large artillery force, and especially whether any position could be reached whence our large guns might be used to good purpose . . . no occasion was presented for bringing up the reserve artillery—indeed, it seemed that not one-half of the division batteries were brought into action on either Monday or Tuesday. To remain near by, therefore, and await events and orders, in readiness for whatever service might be called for, was all that I could do."

² Longstreet's report.

³ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 819.

front, being aided by Grimes' battery, which was advanced to a wooded knoll on their front. They were received with a fire which checked their advance and sent the battery to the rear disabled. Three other batteries were then brought forward to the knoll, but only to meet the same disaster, Pegram fighting until reduced to a single piece, which he personally aided in serving. Soon after 3 P.M., Armistead and Wright decided that with the force at their command further demonstrations were "utterly futile and highly improper."

Upon the Confederate left, Balthis, Poague, and Carpenter's batteries, with others, were placed in position, covered by Whiting's division and its supports; but, one by one, their fire subsided under the searching influence of the Union guns. As already stated, Anderson's brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, advanced from the woods on the Quaker road. It was repulsed by artillery fire, aided by a charge of the 36th New York, of Couch's division. Then, until 5.30 P.M., the action subsided into skirmishing and artillery practice. General D. H. Hill had advised against the proposed attack even before reaching the ground. While inspecting the position, in company with his five brigade commanders, he received the "charge with a yell" order. Reporting to General Jackson the existing conditions as they appeared to him, and requesting more definite instructions, he was simply directed to comply with General Lee's order when the signal should be given.

Having brought his immediate command into position, General Magruder reached the front, where Armistead and Wright had made their unavailing effort, and at 4 P.M. assumed command of the Con-

federate right. The terms of the general battle order had been urged upon him by a message just received from General Lee, directing him to press forward his whole line "and follow up Armistead's successes," as it was reported that the Union troops were "getting off." Completing his dispositions as rapidly as possible, at 5.30 P.M. he advanced Wright's brigade, supported by Mahone, to attack the left of Morell's position, and soon after pushed out Cobb's brigade in attack upon Morell's front. Still anxiously lingering at the front with his companions, Hill heard Cobb's Georgia yell, and exclaimed, "That must be the general advance! Bring up your brigades as soon as possible and join in it," and as rapidly as their troops could be deployed, they pushed out to the assault of Couch's line, and the battle of Malvern Hill was on at last.

Through the hot summer day, the Union infantry, with patient courage, endured its trial by inaction under the fire that sought its ranks behind the partial cover where it lay. Ripley's sharpshooters in front kept General Morell advised of the dispositions of the enemy, and careful provision was made for all emergencies. Lovell was brought into closer support of Buchanan's brigade, which was placed to cover the left of McQuade's position, the 12th and 14th U. S. being deployed on the flat at the foot of and perpendicular to the slope of the hill, while the 3d and 4th U. S. were deployed on the slope, facing the Crew house. Wolcott, Diedrich and Knierem's batteries were sent from the artillery reserve to reinforce the guns of the Second Corps, and aid in persecuting Whiting's passive lines, while the other batteries of the reserve were held ready by the ever vigilant and active Hunt,

to replace their comrades at the front as ammunition chests became exhausted. About 4 P.M., General Sumner voluntarily directed Caldwell's brigade of Richardson's division, to report to General Porter in view of probable need on his line. General Porter placed this brigade temporarily under the orders of General Butterfield, for such disposition as might become necessary. General Butterfield, in his report, says :

"It soon became evident that General Couch's left would require support. I visited General Couch and consulted with him. His opinion corresponding with mine, I informed him that I would assist him in case of necessity. I also advised the general commanding the corps to that effect. On receipt of this dispatch, General Porter ordered Caldwell's brigade to report to me for such disposition as I might deem necessary. I ordered this brigade to remain in reserve on General Couch's left and rear, and report to him for orders."

About 4.30 P.M., the general-in-chief again came upon the field, and had further conversation with General Porter at Fifth Corps headquarters—Malvern house. Soon after, as General Porter started for the front of his command, he suggested to General McClellan that by looking after the centre and right of his line, he (McClellan) could give greater aid than by remaining upon the hill, and the general-in-chief returned to the right wing after having again examined portions of the line in company with General Humphreys.

The 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry was deployed in a close skirmish line in rear of the battle-field, to intercept and turn back stragglers. On the right, the line was of necessity more deployed and open to attack, the weakest point being at the junction of the Second

and Sixth Corps. Early in the afternoon, indications of a movement of the enemy to that quarter were observed, and arrangements were made to meet an anticipated attack; General Sumner, under the erroneous impression that he had been left in command of the field, going so far as to contract his own line, and send an order to General Porter directing him to fall back to the front of the Malvern house.¹

Once launched, there was no faltering in the Confederate assault. Ardor and determination sought to atone for lack of comprehensive method and cooperation. In clearly defined lines, and with standards waving, they moved forward with the swift sweeping step peculiar to the Confederates, firing as they advanced—the spirit of battle inspiring the order of a review. Fiery “Prince John” Magruder, smarting under undeserved strictures upon his weary march of the day previous, and urged by repeated orders from General Lee, hurled column after column, until nine brigades had tested the strength of Porter’s left and front. D. H. Hill, conscious of the serious task assigned him, and indignant at his lack of support, pressed six brigades upon Couch’s front and right with a persistence that for nearly two hours refused to

¹ “While the enemy’s artillery was firing upon us, General Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of Malvern Hill, to the right of the Malvern house, which descended into the valley of Western Run. Then, deeming it advisable to withdraw all our troops to that line, he ordered me to fall back to the Malvern house; but I protested that such a movement would be disastrous, and declined to obey the order until I could confer with General McClellan, who had approved of the disposition of our troops. Fortunately Sumner did not insist upon my complying with the order, and as we were soon vigorously attacked, he advanced his troops to a point where he was but little disturbed by the enemy, but from which he could quickly render aid in response to calls for help, or where need for help was apparent.”—General Porter, in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii., p. 416.

accept repulse. Only the coming of night prevented further sacrifice in the brigades of the reserve, which were pressed forward to the front too late for more than covering the reorganization of the *débris* of the field.

The first blow fell upon Morell's left, when Wright attempted to reach his rear. McQuade advanced with the 14th New York to meet the shock. At this time Buchanan's brigade, gallantly led by the division commander, Sykes, was ordered to charge through the wheat field to the right of the Crew house, and with a yell they started forward. The 12th and 14th regiments, as they swung around from the open plain in the bottom, captured a large number of prisoners from a command of the enemy that had then, by passing under the hill back of the Crew house, actually flanked the left of Morell's line. After three attempts upon this portion of the line had failed, the enemy withdrew from the attack.

In the meantime, the battle had developed from left to right. The Confederate batteries had ceased their fire, which was now masked by their advancing comrades, but the Union guns tore fearful gaps in the columns surging up almost to their muzzles, and their infantry supports, dashing out to closer quarters still, opened with volleys that checked and repulsed the most heroic efforts.

The 4th Michigan, under Colonel Woodbury, 9th Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, and 62d Pennsylvania, Captain Hull, maintained the front line until their ammunition was exhausted, the noble Woodbury falling dead while urging on his men, and the impetuous Cass being at last mortally wounded and taken from

the field.¹ The colors of the 62d Pennsylvania were brought to the ground five times, but nevertheless the regiment preserved them through all.

General Kearny had placed the 57th and 63d Pennsylvania regiments of Robinson's brigade, in support of Couch's right. Then, when under Hill's attack, his whole line, including Caldwell's brigade, became engaged, General Couch asked General Butterfield for further support, and in response the 83d Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and the 16th Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Ruele, were moved forward into position between Griffin's right and Couch's left. Almost immediately afterwards, the 44th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, was sent to the relief of the 62d Pennsylvania, and the 12th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson, advanced to the support of the 4th Michigan, which still maintained its position though its ammunition was exhausted and its colonel lay dead before it. The 44th New York and 83d Pennsylvania united in a gallant charge under the eye of the corps commander, driving the enemy and capturing a battle-flag.

From the 1st Brigade, the 13th New York, Major Schoeffel, was sent to support McQuade's left; the 1st Michigan, Colonel H. S. Roberts, moved forward, supported by the 2d Maine, Colonel C. N. Roberts, and eventually relieved the 83d Pennsylvania; the 22d Massachusetts, Captain Sampson, and the 25th New York, Captain Gleason, also moved up to the support of the front line.

About 6 P.M. General Porter, after looking over

¹ Though always prominent in battle, Colonel McQuade was the only regimental commander in Griffin's brigade who escaped death during the seven days.

Couch's line, sent a note to General Sumner requesting the aid of two more brigades. General Sumner read the note aloud, and hesitating a moment to question whether he could stand so heavy a draft, the bluff but generous Heintzelman, who was present, exclaimed, "By Jove! if Porter asks for help I know he needs it, and I will send it," and so once more that gallant old Irish brigade came to the aid of the Fifth Corps from the Second, followed immediately by Sickles' sterling brigade from Heintzelman.

Meagher's brigade arriving first, General Porter rode to meet it, his horse stumbling on the way and giving him an awkward fall. Remounting, accompanied by his staff, he advanced with the brigade in double-quick time, and finding that the enemy were retiring, pushed forward into the woods from which they had advanced. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon the advancing troops. The brigade was halted and in its turn opened with answering volleys, before which the enemy again subsided. Then, dashing back to see that Sickles had been properly disposed, and finding him waiting orders, Porter at first directed the brigade to support the batteries on the right of the Quaker road, but subsequently directed General Sickles to report to General Couch for the relief of such regiments as he should indicate.

Weed, Carlisle, and Smead had been previously ordered to the gorge of the road between the Malvern house and Crew's hill with their guns, and instructed to maintain the position even at the cost of firing upon friends, should the enemy succeed in breaking the line, as at Gaines' Mill. Soon, Colonel Hunt, who had been directed to bring up the remaining batteries of the reserve, arrived with Robertson's

and Tidball's mounted batteries, under Colonel Hays, Benson's battery of the same brigade being already engaged on Couch's line, and their guns were added to those of Weed, Carlisle, and Smead. Then at the head of Grimes' battery of 32-pounder howitzers, the Fifth Corps commander and the chief of the artillery reserve dashed out to the right of Meagher's brigade and opened a farewell fire on the retiring foe. By 9 P.M. the battle of Malvern Hill had ended in the complete repulse of the Confederate assaults.

It has been reported on both sides, and is generally accepted, that shell-fire from the gun-boats materially aided in effecting this repulse. A moment's reflection discloses the fact that such aid was impracticable. Posted as the gun-boats were, in the Turkey Island bend of James River, their aid would have been invaluable in repulsing any attack upon the extreme flank of the army; but in order to assure this, they were necessarily confined to such positions that a fire from them upon the Confederate masses, some three miles distant, in front of Willis' church, was masked by the commanding height of Malvern Hill. As a matter of fact, at the crisis of the battle—late in the afternoon—the gun-boats, hoping to be of assistance, opened fire toward the front; but all their shot struck in or near Tyler's siege-battery, killing and wounding a few of his men. An urgent order, "For God's sake, stop firing!" flagged from Fifth Corps headquarters, promptly checked the mistaken effort. Unquestionably the projectiles of which the Confederates complained so earnestly were thrown by the heavy guns of Hunt's artillery reserve.

During the day twenty-two Union batteries participated in the engagement, thirteen of the number

coming into action on the front line, at different times, as required for support or replacement. Referring to these batteries, it would be arrant platitude to attempt to couple laudatory adjectives with names that long have been familiar synonyms for every phase of martial worth. It is enough, again to borrow words from General Kearny and state the simple fact that, "with the full genius of their arm," the batteries seconded the efforts of their dauntless chief. One instance of the pervading *morale* may not, however, be amiss : So entirely disabled that he could be transported only on a gun-carriage, and was unable to stand without the aid of crutches, First-Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin, Battery E, 2d U. S. Artillery, had remained at his post throughout this week of battle. After the first engagement at Garnett's farm, June 27th, when his own battery was withdrawn, he remained on the field, and, as a volunteer, greatly aided Lieutenant Ames in serving Battery A, 5th U. S. Artillery, during the second engagement ; and Captain Carlisle reports that by his presence on Malvern Hill, directing and encouraging the men of his battery proper, he established claim to the particular attention of the general-in-chief.

When Colonel Hunt, at the close of the action, accompanied General Porter with Grimes' howitzers, he rode his third horse for that day, two having been shot from under him. Lieutenant Henry F. Brownson, 3d U. S. ; Lieutenant L. A. McClellan, 1st New York ; Lieutenant Theodore J. Vannerman, and Lieutenant John Bigelow, Maryland, all of the artillery arm, were wounded.

In addition to Colonel Thomas Cass, 9th Massachusetts, mortally wounded, Lieutenants Edward

McSweeney and John H. Rafferty of that regiment were killed, and Major P. T. Hanley and three other officers were wounded.

In company with his illustrious colonel, Captain M. A. Rose, 4th Michigan, was killed, and three officers wounded.

Of the 14th New York, Lieutenant Edward H. Lloyd was killed, and Lieutenant George W. Griffith was mortally wounded. Three other officers were wounded.

Of the 62d Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Jno. D. Elder was killed. Five officers were wounded, and one reported captured or missing.

In the 2d Maine, one officer was wounded.

In the 22d Massachusetts, Captains Samuel J. Thompson and M. W. Burt were wounded, the former mortally.

Of the 25th New York one officer was wounded.

During a greater part of the day, Major Henry A. Barnum, 12th New York, acted as a volunteer aide to General Butterfield, and at the close fell desperately wounded while leading his regiment in a charge. The loss of the 12th New York includes also Captain A. J. Root, wounded.

Of the 44th New York, Captain A. W. Shaffer and Lieutenant Charles A. Woodworth were wounded, the latter mortally.

In the 16th Michigan, one officer was wounded.

In the 83d Pennsylvania, eight officers are reported wounded.

In the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Lieutenant Cyrus E. Jones was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. G. W. Ripley and three other officers were wounded.

Referring to the fact that the losses in the Fifth Army Corps during the seven-days' battles amounted to one half of the total Union loss then suffered, the historian of the *Second Army Corps* (p. 86) remarks : " This was the only portion of the army which had been in any sense shattered." Whether this is intended to imply that it had lost its *morale*, we do not know. But, on July 8th, General Porter reported : " The corps has maintained its discipline and unity, and, with its accustomed cheerfulness and confidence, has ever been, and is now, ready for any duty required of it."

The facts connected with the battle of Malvern Hill certainly sustain the statement of General Porter. As already stated, General Magruder pressed nine brigades upon the line held by the Fifth Corps, while D. H. Hill assaulted General Couch's front with six brigades. Severe as were the tests to which it was more than once subjected, the Fifth Corps was never shattered.

General Couch justly had reason for great satisfaction with the part performed by his division and the supporting troops that came under his skilful guidance that warm summer afternoon. It is to be regretted, therefore, that it becomes necessary to note that in his report of July 5, 1862,¹ he saw fit to do himself a grave injustice by saying :

" The action now being general, I assumed command of the whole line for the time ; ordered up the reserves on the left ; placed in position regiments falling back, and halted those bravely moving forward, many of the regiments having already masked the fire of our artillery. . . . General Caldwell of Richardson's division, having been sent to my support by General Sumner, now went into action. . . .

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., Part 2, p. 204.

“General Porter came upon the ground about 6 P.M. Later, General Sickles of Hooker's division reported to me with three regiments. . . . At about 7 P.M., General Meagher, with his brigade, reported to me from General Sumner, and was posted on the left of Griffin's batteries.”

These ill-advised claims having been justly ignored by the general-in-chief, to whom the report was made, they might well be passed unnoticed now, but for the fact that General Francis A. Walker, who, on July 1, 1862, was assistant adjutant-general of Couch's division, has revived and, by condensation, intensified them in his *History of the Second Army Corps*,¹ reinforcing his version by a reference to Swinton's *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*. General Walker says :

“At half-past four, Couch, crossing the James River road to the front of Morell, and, not finding that officer, assumed control himself, and from that time until the close of the action, remained in charge of the whole infantry line.”

What “whole infantry line” is meant? the entire line of the army from right to left? He might as well assume that he had control of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops as those of Porter's, as the expression implies. Persistent assertion thus aspersing the management and discipline of the Fifth Corps cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected. That reinforcements reached General Couch through General Porter, as stated in the preceding pages, is abundantly established by the record.²

As a matter of curiosity, we would like to ask the question if, at the hour mentioned (4.30), during the

¹ Page 81.

² *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., Part 2., pp. 55, 61, 102, 103, 116, 140-2, 320.

heat of an engagement, a division-general's place is where General Morell was sought for by General Couch? General Walker says that the latter crossed the James River road "to the front of Morell." If this was done, and the attack was being made on General Couch's front, why did he leave his own troops and go to those of Morell when he had not yet absorbed the troops that General Butterfield had placed at his (Couch's) disposal in reserve?

General Keyes reports that on June 30th, General Couch had been detached from the Fourth Corps by General McClellan's order, "to strengthen our forces north of Turkey-Island Bridge." Arriving on Malvern Hill, General Couch found there only the Fifth Corps, and took position on its right. At dark, he was ordered forward to Willis' church, with Howe's and Palmer's brigades, to the temporary support of the Second Corps, leaving Abercrombie's brigade still in position on the right of the Fifth Corps. At 2 A.M. July 1st, he was ordered by General Sumner to return to his position on the hill. When the 1st Division of the Fourth Corps thus took position on the right of the Fifth Corps on June 30th, and remained therein through July 1st, by the articles of war, which neither General Porter nor General Couch had power to abrogate, it came under the authority of the commander of that corps. General Couch acknowledges this when he reports that he received and obeyed orders from General Sumner under precisely similar circumstances.

That General Porter, in the exercise of his discretion, and in acknowledgment of General Couch's ability, refrained as far as possible from interference with the battle on that officer's front, in no way in-

validated his own authority or relieved him from the responsibility attaching thereto, and that he was fully alive to the fact, is evident from the constant care exercised by him in supporting the line. That General Couch, notwithstanding the consideration extended him, declined to recognize his true position, and reported directly to the general-in-chief, concerning the participation of his division in the battle, in no way establishes his correctness in the premises. The corps, division, brigade, and regimental commanders of the Fifth Corps were all present with their troops and exercising their proper authority, and if General Couch crossed the Quaker road and, failing to see General Morell, attempted to assume control of that officer's command, his action was simply a fruitless and unwarrantable interference far less creditable than remarkable in a soldier of his ability and standing. The theory upon which the preposterous claim rests, if carried into practice, would disorganize the staunchest army ever placed in line of battle. There can be no doubt that if General Kearny, finding General Couch seeking a larger command, and absent from his own division, had asserted authority over the Fourth Corps troops, and claimed credit for their battle, a very pretty quarrel would have supplanted the hot work of that day. Undoubtedly, acting as any one competent to hold a commission could and naturally would do in time of battle, General Couch may have advised, encouraged, or directed any command he discovered needing orders in an emergency such as would be certain to arise in any action. Further than this there is no evidence that he established command, or was obeyed, outside of his own division and the supports

from time to time sent to him by General Porter. Lieutenant Kingsbury reports¹:

“During the day Brigadier-General Couch frequently urged me to fire through the woods at a rebel field battery stationed on the opposite side of Turkey Creek. I replied that it was useless to fire at objects that we could not see. As I left the field, the general's staff officer told me from the general that it was not intended that I should retire more than 100 yards, there to receive ammunition. I replied that I was directed to receive it at General Porter's headquarters. He asked if I would return immediately. I replied yes, if so ordered after receiving my ammunition. I repeated this conversation to General Porter. He bade me await his orders.”

The seven-days' battle had not impaired the discipline of the Fifth Army Corps.

About 9 P.M., July 1st, as General Porter and Colonel Hunt were returning from the front, they were joined by Colonel A. V. Colburn, of General McClellan's staff. By Colonels Colburn and Hunt General Porter then sent messages to the general-in-chief, explaining the situation as it appeared to him from his position at the front, and expressing the hope that no further retrograde movement would be made, since the position could be held. But food, clothing, ammunition, rest, and reinforcement were needed before the Army of the Potomac could hope to advance again upon the enemy, and, as Haxall's could be made a reliable base only by the occupation of the right bank of James River in larger force than was available, General McClellan, after personal consultation and examination of the river with Commodore Rodgers, had decided upon the movement to Harrison's Landing, and before General Porter's

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xi., part 2, p. 288.

messages could have reached him, that officer received the following order :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
9 P.M., July 1st, 1862.

“ Brig.-General F. J. PORTER, com'g Fifth Provisional Corps :

“ *General*.—The General commanding desires you to move your command at once, the Artillery Reserve moving first, to Harrison's Bar. In case you should find it impossible to move your heavy artillery, you are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages. Couch's command will move under your orders. Communicate these instructions to him at once. The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner will move next. Please communicate to General Heintzelman the time of your moving. Additional gun-boats, supplies, and reinforcements will be met at Harrison's Bar. Stimulate your men by informing them that reinforcements, etc., have arrived at our new base.

“ By command of Major-Gen. McClellan :

“ JAMES A. HARDIE,
“ Lieut.-Col., A.D.C., A.A.A.G.”

General Porter then sent an order to Colonel Buchanan, commanding the 1st Brigade of Regulars, directing him to so dispose his command as to hold the battle-field—the brigade being at that time on the line of battle to the right and left of the Crew house—until after daylight the next morning; that all the army would be withdrawn during the night; that Colonel Averell, with the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, would co-operate with him in retiring from the field.¹

Before daybreak of July 2d, the army, preceded by its trains, was well on its way to Harrison's Landing. Daylight came, and with it a heavy, murky atmosphere and beclouded sky. The enemy's pickets en-

¹ During the night Lieutenant Wm. H. Penrose, 3d U. S. Infantry, with a detachment from his company, advanced to a house in front of the lines and captured an officer and 23 men.

gaged Buchanan's in desultory firing. An hour passed and Colonel Averell had not been seen. Buchanan then gave the order, in a drenching rain, to retire from the field, and for his skirmishers, in retiring, to contest every foot of the way, marching his brigade in line of battle, in order to face to the rear promptly in case the enemy endeavored to press him too closely. But they apparently had no intention of doing so, simply occupying the field as Buchanan gave way. In this manner the brigade was withdrawn to the plain midway between the Crew and Malvern houses, where Colonel Buchanan found Colonel Averell. The latter directed the continuation of the movement, and it passed down the rear of Malvern Hill and over Turkey Creek on some bridge-stringers that had been left when the bridge was destroyed. Colonel Averell, with the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, remained on the battle-field and skilfully performed the duty of covering the retiring infantry. A number of surgeons were left at the Malvern house, which had been converted into a hospital, and where many of the wounded had been removed to from the battle-field the night before, who, of course, fell into the hands of the enemy when Colonel Averell retired from the field, which he accomplished about 10 o'clock A.M.

Turkey-Island Bridge had been destroyed under orders from General Keyes, commanding the Fourth Corps. To General Keyes had been assigned the duty of protecting the rear from the high ground overlooking Haxall's. For this purpose he had the 2d Division and artillery of his corps and the 8th Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois regiments of cavalry. Under the immediate command of Colonel John J. Peck, Wessell's brigade, supported by batteries, were

placed in position early on the night of July 1st, covering the approaches from the north, and which were patrolled by the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Half a mile below Wessell's position, the 8th Illinois Cavalry covered the road in line of battle, and a mile still farther on Naglee's brigade, with batteries under Major Robert M. West, was in position on commanding ground. Through these lines the army, with its trains, passed safely, Buchanan and Averell being the last, and by evening of July 3d was encamped at Harrison's Landing, slight tentative advances by Stuart's cavalry being readily disposed of. General Keyes states positively: "I do not think more vehicles or more public property was abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him."

General R. E. Lee's strategy, seconded by General Jackson's able tactics in the Shenandoah valley, and aided by supposed political necessities in Washington, had secured the relief of Richmond for the time. General McClellan's careful provision and skill, aided by the nerve and endurance of his command, had rescued the Army of the Potomac from the false position into which it had been forced, and had placed it in safety at the point to which, thwarted on every other line, it returned two years later as the only base from which successful effort could be made.

At Harrison's Landing, the 18th Massachusetts, 17th New York, and 6th Pennsylvania Reserves rejoined their proper commands, and the 1st Battalion 92d Massachusetts (six companies), Lieutenant-Colonel Francis J. Parker commanding, arriving from

the defenses of Washington, was assigned to Griffin's brigade. On July 5th, the 2d Battalion (eight companies) 14th U. S. arrived and was assigned to Buchanan's brigade. On July 11th, General Martindale left the army on sick leave, and never resumed his command in the Fifth Corps.

On July 3d, with his cavalry supporting Pelham's howitzers, Stuart took position for a time on Evelington Heights, and opened a harmless fire upon Harrison's farm. He was promptly displaced as the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Corps went into positions assigned them, and the lines from Harrison's Point, past Rawling's mill-pond, to Herring Creek, below Westover, were speedily intrenched, the flanks being thoroughly covered by the guns of the navy.

At noon of July 4th, the national salute was fired at each corps headquarters, and the troops were reviewed by the general-in-chief. The next day, in anticipation of an attack in force by General Lee, the army was placed in readiness to meet the attack and follow up the repulse it was believed would inevitably result.

On July 8th, President Lincoln visited the camps, reviewed the army by moonlight, and returned to Fort Monroe the next morning.

On July 25th, the Fifth Corps was reviewed by General McClellan, and in the afternoon General Halleck, general-in-chief of the U. S. armies, arrived at Harrison's Landing.

On the morning of July 30th, General W. N. Pendleton, Confederate chief of artillery, with a force of artillery, supported by two brigades of infantry, under Brigadier-General L. G. French, left Petersburg and bivouacked for the night near Parkin-

son's saw-mill. After carefully examining the locality during July 31st, forty-one of Pendleton's guns were placed in position upon the river bank, after dark, and at 12.30 A.M., August 1st, opened fire upon the Union camps and shipping. The surprise was perfect, the noise was tremendous, and the execution was ridiculous in proportion. The Union artillery and the gun-boats met the challenge with a prompt reply, and in thirty minutes the storm was over and Generals Pendleton and French were on their return to Petersburg. The Confederates suffered an acknowledged loss of one man killed and seven wounded, and about 1000 shots expended, inflicting upon the Union forces a loss of ten killed and fifteen wounded, with a trifling damage to the shipping.

The following afternoon, the 4th U. S. Infantry, under Captain J. B. Collins, from Buchanan's brigade of the Fifth Corps, was sent over to occupy the position from which this dastardly midnight cannonade was made, and the Cole house and surroundings were burned and the timber about it cut down as a warning of what would be the consequences thereafter to property occupied for such purposes. After the performance of the duty the 4th returned to its camp.

To guard against a renewal of such annoyances, field works were constructed on the south side of the James River, which were occupied by the Pennsylvania Reserves and cavalry detachments, under the command of General John F. Reynolds. In anticipation, at an early day, of a renewal of active operations on both sides of the river, reconnaissances were made from that point to ascertain the character of the

country and the location of the enemy—all with the design of an attack upon Petersburg and the destruction of the bridges over the river, and to cut off railroad communication with the South.

ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS AND RETURN OF CASUALTIES
IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS, DURING THE OPERATIONS
BEFORE RICHMOND, VA., FROM JUNE 25 TO JULY 2, 1862.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Brigadier-General FITZ JOHN PORTER, Commanding Corps.							
Staff					1		1
Brigadier-General GEORGE W. MORELL, Commanding 1st Division.							
FIRST BRIGADE:							
Brigadier-General JOHN H. MARTINDALE.							
Staff					1		1
2d Maine		4	3	52	5	45	109
18th Massachusetts (detached with Stoneman)							
22d Massachusetts	3	66	6	147	5	119	346
1st Michigan	1	32	5	128	1	47	214
13th New York		2	1	54	2	67	126
25th New York	2	4	2	39	2	35	84
2d Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters				6			6
Total First Brigade	6	108	17	426	16	313	886
SECOND BRIGADE:							
Brigadier - General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
9th Massachusetts	8	61	10	271	2	41	393
4th Michigan	5	51	5	136	1	54	252
14th New York	3	30	9	167	1	15	225
62d Pennsylvania	2	22	10	164	4	81	283
Total Second Brigade	18	164	34	738	8	191	1153

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.							
Staff					1		1
12th New York	2	19	5	116	3	56	201
17th New York (detached with Stoneman)							
44th New York		16	6	99		34	155
16th Michigan	2	47	8	140	2	54	253
Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's Company		1		6		2	9
83d Pennsylvania	2	77	12	154	4	113	362
Total Third Brigade	6	160	31	515	10	259	981
ARTILLERY :							
Captain WILLIAM B. WEEDEN.							
Massachusetts, Light, 3d Battery (C)			1	3			4
Massachusetts, Light, 5th Battery (E)		3		5		2	10
Rhode Island, 1st Light, Battery C		5		21		5	31
5th U. S., Battery D		1		8	1	1	11
Total Artillery		9	1	37	1	8	56
SHARPSHOOTERS :							
Colonel HIRAM BERDAN.							
1st U. S.	1	7	4	31		13	56
Total First Division	31	448	87	1747	35	784	3132
Brigadier-General GEORGE SYKES, Commanding Second Division.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Lieutenant-Colonel ROBERT C. BUCHANAN.							
3d U. S. Infantry	2	9		30		22	63
4th U. S. Infantry		4	2	16	1	9	32
12th U. S. Infantry	1	54	5	101		56	217
14th U. S. Infantry		19	5	138		93	255
Total First Brigade	3	86	12	285	1	180	567
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Major CHARLES S. LOVELL.							
2d U. S. Infantry	2	14	4	103		16	139
6th U. S. Infantry	1	4	1	69		46	121
10th U. S. Infantry		4	1	13		4	22
11th U. S. Infantry		7	2	26		8	43
17th U. S. Infantry	1	5	1	8	2	17	34
Total Second Brigade	4	34	9	219	2	91	359

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel G. K. WARREN.							
5th New York.....	1	37	4	106	1	14	163
10th New York.....	9	4	40	1	69	123
Total Third Brigade.....	1	46	8	146	2	83	286
ARTILLERY :							
Captain STEPHEN H. WEED.							
3d U. S., Batteries L. and M.....	1	3	15	2	21
5th U. S., Battery I.....	3	1	5	2	11
Total Artillery.....	4	4	20	4	32
Total Second Division.....	8	170	33	670	5	358	1244
(1) Brigadier-General GEORGE A. McCALL, Commanding Third Division (captured).							
(2) Brigadier - General TRUMAN SEYMOUR, Commanding (subsequently).							
Staff.....	1	1	2
FIRST BRIGADE :							
(1) Brigadier-General JOHN F. REYNOLDS (captured).							
(2) Colonel SENECA G. SIMMONS (killed).							
(3) Colonel R. BIDDLE ROBERTS.							
Staff.....	2	2
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	26	7	1	122	47	205
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	15	7	74	21	118
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	23	9	114	58	207
8th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	32	7	100	5	80	230
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles), Cos. A, B, D, E, F, and K.....	1	6	3	48	9	180	247
Total First Brigade.....	7	102	33	464	17	386	1009
SECOND BRIGADE :							
(1) Brigadier-General GEORGE G. MEADE (wounded).							
(2) Colonel ALBERT L. MAGILTON.							
Staff.....	1	3	4
3d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	14	4	76	4	89	187
4th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	11	5	41	6	136	199
7th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	27	5	132	2	128	294
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	53	(*)	*18	25	619	716
Total Second Brigade.....	2	105	17	267	37	972	1400

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
(1) Brigadier - General TRUMAN SEYMOUR.							
(2) Colonel C. FEGER JACKSON.							
6th Pennsylvania Reserves (detached with Casey).....
9th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	24	5	129	1	48	208
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	39	6	137	1	55	239
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	12	3	59	37	112
Total Third Brigade.....	3	75	14	325	2	140	559
ARTILLERY :							
1st Pennsylvania, Light, Battery A.	1	2	1	8	4	16
1st Pennsylvania, Light, Battery B.	2	2	15	19
1st Pennsylvania, Light, Battery G.	7	1	12	20
5th U. S., Battery C.....	7	1	4	7	19
Total Artillery.....	3	18	3	39	11	74
CAVALRY :							
Colonel JAMES H. CHILDS.							
4th Pennsylvania.....	2	2	11	1	6	22
Total Third Division.....	16	302	70	1106	58	1515	3067
CAVALRY :							
Colonel JNO. F. FARNSWORTH.							
8th Illinois.....	1	2	9	3	15
ARTILLERY RESERVE :							
Colonel HENRY J. HUNT, Commanding.							
FIRST BRIGADE—HORSE ARTILLERY:							
Lieutenant - Colonel WILLIAM HAYS.							
2d U. S., Battery A.....	6	1	7
2d U. S., Batteries B and L.....	1	1
2d U. S., Battery M.....
3d U. S., Batteries C and G.....
Total First Brigade.....	6	2	8
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Lieutenant-Colonel GEORGE W. GETTY.							
1st U. S., Battery E.....	2	4	6
1st U. S., Battery G.....	1	3	4
1st U. S., Battery K.....	2	2
4th U. S., Battery A.....	3	20	4	27
5th U. S., Battery K.....	1	1	1	3
Total Second Brigade.....	7	1	28	6	42

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Major ALBERT ARNDT.							
1st Battalion New York Light, Battery A.....		1		1		2	4
1st Battalion New York Light, Battery B.....		3		6			9
1st Battalion New York Light, Battery C.....				4		2	6
1st Battalion New York Light, Battery D.....							
Total Third Brigade.....		4		11		4	19
FOURTH BRIGADE :							
Major E. R. PETHERBRIDGE.							
Staff			1				1
Maryland Light, Battery A.....				3		1	4
Maryland Light, Battery B.....		2	1	17			20
Total Fourth Brigade.....		2	2	20		1	25
FIFTH BRIGADE :							
Captain J. HOWARD CARLISLE.							
2d U. S., Battery E.....		2		2			4
3d U. S., Batteries F and K.....				2			2
Total Fifth Brigade.....		2		4			6
UNATTACHED :							
1st N. Y. Light, Battery G (temporarily assigned from Second Corps).....			1	5			6
N. Y. Light, 5th Battery (not mounted).....				1			1
Total Unattached.....			1	6			7
Total Artillery Reserve.....		15	4	75		13	107
SIEGE TRAIN :							
Colonel ROBERT O. TYLER.							
1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery.....		2		4	2	27	35
Total Fifth Army Corps....	56	939	194	3611	101	2700	7601

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE JAMES TO THE POTOMAC—THE CAMPAIGN IN
NORTHERN VIRGINIA—SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

A WEEK or ten days in camp at Harrison's Landing on the James had served to recuperate and restore the energies of the Fifth Army Corps, and the officers and men were in daily expectation of moving on Richmond, feeling sure that if the losses of the seven-days' battles were made good, they would be able not only to cope with, but conquer, the army they had but lately engaged.

General McClellan had, in the meantime, published the following order to the army :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
" CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VA., July 4, 1862.

" Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac :

"Your achievements of the last ten days have illustrated the valor and endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by vastly superior forces, and without hope of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of military expedients. You have saved all your material, all your trains, and all your guns, except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy. Upon your march you have been assailed day after day with desperate fury by men of the same race and nation skilfully massed and led ; and under every disadvantage of numbers and necessarily of position also, you

have in every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaughter.

“Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated armies of history. No one will now question that each of you may always say with pride, ‘I belonged to the Army of the Potomac!’

“You have reached this new base complete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at any moment attack you. We are prepared to receive them. I have personally established your lines. Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a final defeat. Your government is strengthening you with the resources of a great people.

“On this our Nation’s birthday we declare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of their so-called Confederacy; that our National Constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can alone insure internal peace and external security to each State, must and shall be preserved, cost what it may in time, treasure, and blood.

“GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
“Major-General, Commanding.”

It is needless to say that the officers and men of the Fifth Corps took this largely to themselves, for had they not fought the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill almost single-handed? Had they not borne a large share in the battle of Newmarket (White Oak Swamp)? And had they not hurled back the rebel masses at Malvern Hill? The brave fellows the corps was compelled to leave on those sanguinary fields attests fully the part they bore. The losses of the army in the battles of the seven days amounted to about 15,000 men, the Fifth Corps losses being 7560—over one half the loss of the entire army. This alone is sufficient comment.

Just prior to the “seven-days’ battles” events of importance were taking place at Washington, which must be here noticed. These events plainly indicate that the authorities at the capital were as much, if

not more deeply interested in the success of operations about to commence in Northern Virginia than in those which the Army of the Potomac desired and were about to renew.

On the 26th of June, the day General Lee commenced his attack on the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, the President ordered that the forces under Generals Frémont, Banks, and McDowell, including troops under General Sturgis at Washington, should be consolidated into one army, to be called the Army of Virginia. This army was placed under the command of General John Pope, and was composed of three existing corps, which, with the exception of the troops at Washington, were respectively under the command of Generals Sigel (who succeeded Frémont), Banks, and McDowell. Its duty was not only "to protect Northern Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, but also at the same time to so operate as to attack and overcome, in the speediest manner, the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond."

To these corps had been assigned the duty of watching and holding in Northern Virginia the forces under Jackson and Ewell; but without the knowledge of their commanders, the rebel forces disappeared, and on the 26th of June united with General Lee for the purpose of raising the siege of Richmond, and of destroying the Army of the Potomac. The immediate effect of that junction was the seven-days' battles, in which the part taken by the Fifth Corps has been narrated.

On the 14th of July, General Halleck, who had

been ordered to Washington, assumed command of the army as general-in-chief. A series of orders, submitted to the Cabinet and approved by the Administration, was promulgated by General Pope, proclaiming the principles upon which the campaign was to be managed, and the policy to be pursued towards the inhabitants of the country in which his army was to operate. The policy to be carried out roused the animosity of the Confederate authorities and alarmed the rebel citizens, while the principles, if practised as announced, showed a weakness which, by available forces, could be taken advantage of to annihilate General Pope and his army, transfer the alarm from the enemy at Richmond to our authorities at Washington for the safety of our capital as well as the control of Northern Virginia and Maryland. The Confederate authorities were not slow to prepare for the emergency, and watched the movements of Pope with interest.

General McClellan applied for reinforcements and set vigorously to work to supply any deficiencies existing from losses sustained by the army in its change of base. The President visited him, and soon afterwards General Halleck. Each assured him of reinforcements, with which General McClellan promised to renew active operations. But the assignment of Burnside to Fredericksburg, followed by the withdrawal of cavalry and artillery to his support, in connection with the pushing of Pope to and beyond the Rappahannock along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, in the direction of Gordonsville, soon discouraged all hope of reinforcements from the only troops available, and those troops south of Washington.

On the 3d of August, 1862, just thirty days after the Army of the Potomac had secured its position on the James River, General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan that he must abandon the Peninsula and proceed to Acquia Creek. The telegram was received on the 4th, at noon, and none, except those who were there, can conceive the sorrow and bitter disappointment it gave. It destroyed all hope of an early capture of Richmond, and consequently of the end of the war, which was dependent upon that event. So great was the dissatisfaction that some of the best commanders of corps and divisions urged McClellan to disobey the order and march on to Richmond, and thus, at least, hold the enemy from detaching any large force against the army under General Pope, thereby maintaining confidence in the safety of the capital. General McClellan immediately wrote and dispatched a letter¹ begging to be permitted to continue his operations from where his army then was. To this clear, patriotic, and manly letter a deaf ear was turned, and the order was reiterated.

General McClellan, as he advised in his letter, at once commenced preparations for his withdrawal by sending off all sick and wounded men. Transportation, however, was scarce, General Burnside having retained the steamers which had conveyed him to Acquia Creek from Fort Monroe; and the Department at Washington furnishing but four steamers—too large to go to Harrison's Landing,—it became necessary to march the army to Newport News. The hospital and small transports were pushed to their utmost capacity in removing those who were

¹ See *Records of Rebellion*, Series I., vol. xi., p. 81.

sick, wounded, and unable to march, together with the stores and material. Every dispatch, however, was used, and a pontoon bridge, 1200 feet long, was constructed near the mouth of the Chickahominy River, for the passage of the troops and trains.

These preliminaries occupied ten days, and on the 14th of August, 1862, the order was issued putting the army in motion. At 5 o'clock P.M., of that day, General Porter received orders to move his corps as soon as possible and to push on to Williamsburg, there to await the arrival of the next corps. The Fifth Corps was, therefore, placed en route before 8 P.M. of that day, marching all night, resting on the 15th at the Chickahominy, to protect the pontoon bridge, reaching Williamsburg on the 16th. Reynolds' division of Pennsylvania Reserves, at a late hour on the 14th, was withdrawn from the south side of the James and shipped on barges to Acquia Creek.

On the 16th, General Porter became possessed of information that the enemy was pushing north with the main body of their army to crush General Pope's army before it could be strengthened by the Army of the Potomac, and he immediately reported to General McClellan that, unless otherwise ordered, he would leave Williamsburg at 4 A.M. August 17th, without waiting for the arrival of the next corps, push on to Newport News, embark as rapidly as possible, and hasten to the relief of General Pope.

Porter moved his corps as he had stated, arriving at Newport News on the evening of the 18th, and within forty-eight hours had embarked his men and material, and sailed for Acquia Creek.¹

¹ When McClellan's army was about to evacuate the position taken near Richmond on the James River, a terrible cannonade was opened at night by the

As General McClellan had surmised, just so soon as General Lee found, by the shipping of the sick and stores, that the army was to withdraw from the Peninsula, the latter, having already sent Jackson and Ewell to check Pope's advance, at once hastened preparations for a campaign against Washington, hoping to crush Pope before McClellan could join him.

After the Fifth Corps had embarked for Acquia Creek, it was feared that the march from Fredericksburg would consume too much time in forming a junction with General Pope, and therefore the destination of the other portion of the Army of the Potomac was changed to Alexandria, Va., in order to forward them by rail to Pope's assistance.¹

As fast as the transports arrived at Acquia Creek, the men were disembarked and forwarded by rail the same day to Fredericksburg, and, inside of twenty-four hours (August 23d), General Porter had started his command up the north bank of the Rappahannock River, continuing the march day after day, flanking the fords and feeling for the enemy in his front.

Early on the 26th, Porter pushed ahead of his enemy from the south side of the river. General Dan Butterfield's command was ordered to cross the James River and begin an attack on Richmond, drive back the enemy's artillery, and cover the withdrawal of McClellan's army. It was supported by Admiral Rodgers with the *Galena* and another gun-boat. A private of the command, at a camp fire in New York, told of General Butterfield being on his horse and writing an order for his orderly to carry when shot and shell were flying in every direction. One of the shells struck the dirt near by and bespattered the General, covering his face and his memorandum pad with mud. Butterfield simply took his handkerchief out of his pocket, wiped his face, took the dirty leaf from the pad, finished his order, and handed it to the orderly as calmly as if on dress parade. This was entirely new to the General. He did not know that a private was watching him upon that occasion.

¹ Considering this fact, together with the fact that Alexandria was but *six hours* farther by steamer than Acquia Creek, and that the Fifth Corps had a *six-days' march* to accomplish, it seems somewhat singular that the Fifth was depended upon to furnish the assistance to General Pope, and the brunt of the fighting of the 30th of August should have been left to that corps.

command to Bealeton Station, where he found General Kearny with a portion of his division, and learned that the enemy were abandoning the Rappahannock and pushing north beyond Pope's right. As there was no enemy in his vicinity he deemed it his duty, though without instructions, to report to General Pope, then at Warrenton Junction, and did so by letter in the hands of General Kearny, and rejoined his command, then six miles east of Bealeton. At 11 o'clock that night he was ordered to move the next morning to the vicinity of Warrenton, there to be ready to join in a "general engagement," which General Pope said "I do not see how it can be postponed more than a day or two." Pope located the enemy as extending from "Sulphur Springs to a few miles north of the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville," and was unaware that Jackson, with Ewell, A. P. Hill, Taliaferro, and Stuart, 23,000 strong, had parted from Lee and gone north to his right. At 9 A.M. on the 27th, on arriving at Bealeton, Porter received orders, dated 4 A.M., "to march direct to Warrenton Junction as rapidly as possible"; "the enemy's cavalry have intercepted our railway communication near Manassas, and he seems to be advancing with a heavy force along the Manassas Gap Railroad. We will probably move to attack him tomorrow in the neighborhood of Gainesville, which *may bring our line farther back towards Washington.*" Turning the head of the column towards Warrenton Junction, Porter hastened forward and reported to General Pope in person at 10 o'clock.

For the last two days of this march from Fredericksburg the men had been on half rations. They had had no rest at Newport News, were in camp only

one night at Fredericksburg, and therefore had been thirteen days and two entire nights on their continuous journey. The last day was intensely hot, and the march was over a country destitute of water; many officers and men sank down upon the road, unable to march another step, and it was near daylight the next morning before all had joined; then it was to find their commands again on the move; for at nine on that night, less than three hours after the arrival of the main body, while the men were cooking their meat and coffee—the first that they had had for forty-eight hours,—orders were received from General Pope to march at 1 o'clock A.M.

“To meet the heavy force advancing along the Manassas Gap Railroad,” Pope decided early on the 27th to interpose his command between the enemy and Manassas and form a line east of Thoroughfare Gap, so as to be readily reinforced from Washington, and to fall upon the enemy’s flank or to retire behind Bull Run, if necessary. McDowell, with Reynolds and Sigel, was ordered to Gainesville that night; Reno and Kearny to Greenwich, where Porter was to follow on the 28th, when relieved by Banks, who was to guard the wagon-trains accumulating east of Warrenton Junction. At 3 P.M. Pope withdrew along the railroad, following Hooker, who had been sent towards Manassas to re-open communication and repair the railroad. Hooker, near Bristoe Station, encountered Ewell, who, after a short engagement, retired behind Broad Run and joined Jackson at Manassas. Pope joined Hooker at sunset, and then learned for the first time that Jackson and Stuart were between him and Washington. Pope at once resolved to destroy Jackson or “to bag

the whole crowd" before Lee could rescue him, and ordered Porter to march at 1 o'clock and join him at daylight of the 28th; Reno and Kearny to join at dawn, and McDowell, with Sigel, to march to Manassas, with his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad and left extending north. Pope stated in his order to Porter: "*The enemy has been driven back, and is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is.*"

Generals Morell, Butterfield, Sykes, and Warren were present at 9.40 P.M., when the order to march at 1 o'clock was received. Each stated the worn-out condition of their men, and knew that thousands of the wagons of the whole army blocked the single narrow road which passed through woods, was crossed by streams without bridges, and by the railroad on which cars were running, and also that the night was so dark that only by groping could one move about with safety. Each urged that the march should be delayed till day-break, as the men would, thereby, get their needed rest, reach General Pope as a body after a ten-mile march as early as by marching at 1 o'clock, and be in better condition for what would be required beyond Bristoe. Captain Drake De Kay, who delivered the order, confirmed the reports of the blocked condition of the road and the darkness of the night. He had been over three hours travelling, part by daylight, about nine miles. Under these circumstances, General Porter directed the march to begin at 3 o'clock, soon after which daylight would aid the movement.

After midnight it was intensely dark and a slight rain fell. When the column was put in motion, the road was discoverable only by candles carried by the men,

while close to the camp it was found blocked by two batteries from Banks' command, sent for by Pope. Darkness and obstructions soon caused inextricable confusion and prevented real progress till daylight. Even then some time was required to extricate and unite the commands so as to allow them to move. Though greatly obstructed on the march, the head of the column reached Bristoe about 8 o'clock, and at 10 took position on the north side of Broad Run. General Pope acknowledged to General Porter that an earlier arrival of the corps was unnecessary, and, not anticipating any use of it, ordered it to remain where it was. Twice that day, when artillery firing was heard respectively near Thoroughfare Gap between Ricketts and Longstreet, and near Groveton between King and Ewell, Porter's aides, kept near Pope for emergencies, applied to Pope at Bull Run for orders, and were directed to tell Porter "to remain where he was : when wanted he would be sent for."

Soon after 11 A.M. General Pope, preceded some hours by Heintzelman and Reno, moved to Manassas. Under the belief that Jackson had gone to Centreville with his whole force, Pope sent forward beyond Bull Run Heintzelman's corps (Kearny and Hooker), followed by Reno, and at sundown camped with Reno on the west side of that stream. Pope was misled. Jackson, instead of going to Centreville, sent Hill, A. P., and Stuart ; he, with Ewell, under cover of darkness, crossing Bull Run and going up the east bank to Stone Bridge, and thence to the north side of Warrenton pike, near Groveton, where, via Sudley road, he had sent Taliaferro. Hill and Stuart followed early on the 29th, escaping the vigilance of Kearny.

It is probable that the operations of the army on the 29th and 30th of August, 1862, have given rise to more discussion, misstatement, and bad feeling than any campaign of modern times. In order to understand the movements of the Fifth Corps at this time, it is well that the position of the Union and Confederate armies on the morning of the 29th should be stated. They were as follows :

“Stonewall” Jackson, commanding Hill, Ewell, and Taliaferro’s divisions of infantry (about 20,000 men), and about 2000 cavalry under Stuart, had left Lee on the farther side of the Rappahannock, marched around Pope’s right flank, gained his rear, captured large supplies at Manassas, cut his railroad communications with Washington, and had taken position on the old battle-field of Bull Run, to await the arrival of Lee, with the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia. He was posted in a fine defensive position behind the embankments of an unfinished railroad, with his left at Sudley Springs and his right near the Warrenton turnpike. Hill held the extreme left, while the old “Stonewall” division, under Stark, held the right. Taliaferro had been wounded the day before.

Two divisions of Longstreet had passed through Thoroughfare Gap on the evening of the 28th and encamped at the foot of the mountains on the eastern side that night. The remainder of the corps was passing through the gap at the time the first two divisions were moving toward Gainesville on the morning of the 29th.

On the Union side, Sigel’s corps, with Reynolds’ division of McDowell’s corps and Milroy’s independent brigade, passed the night of the 28th just south of the

Warrenton pike, Reynolds being on the left, near Newmarket, while Sigel's two divisions, with Milroy's brigade, were near the junction of the Sudley Springs road. Kearny, with three brigades, was at Centreville, while Heintzelman, commanding the corps, was with Hooker, at or near Bull Run; Porter with the Fifth Corps (Morell's and Sykes' divisions only) was at Bristoe, where he had remained under and awaiting orders since the morning of the 28th.

King's and Ricketts' divisions of McDowell's corps had, during the 28th, been acting independently. Buford and Ricketts had been sent from Gainesville by McDowell to contest with Longstreet the latter's passage through Thoroughfare Gap, while King had been ordered from Gainesville to Centreville, and on his way had become engaged with Ewell and Taliaferro, near Groveton. After dark of the 28th, Ricketts was at Gainesville, having retired from Thoroughfare Gap on the approach of Longstreet's column. Hearing that King was retiring to Manassas, Ricketts, followed by Buford, who was watching Longstreet, on the morning of the 29th marched to Bristoe, via Greenwich. Banks, with his corps, was guarding the army trains near Bristoe. The story of Thoroughfare Gap is told by General E. M. Law as follows:

“Bare allusions were made in some of the official reports to the fact that Hood's division was sent over the mountain by a trail north of the pass, and I have seen it stated that Hood was guided by a wood-chopper who was familiar with the mountain. The facts are these: My brigade was leading the division when it reached the mountain. There I met General Hood coming from the direction of the gap. He informed me that it was held on the other side in strong force by the enemy, and that Jones' division was unable to force it. He was accompanied by a man liv-

ing in the vicinity, who, he said, would guide me by a trail across the mountain, a short distance above the gap. His own brigade was to follow mine. The head of my column was at once turned to the left, and, striking a slight trail, commenced the ascent. I had not gone half way up the side of the mountain when my guide either missed the trail or it ran out. At any rate, he seemed to know as little as I did, and told me he could guide me no further. Letting him go, I moved on through the tangled woods and huge rocks until the crest was reached. Here we were confronted by a natural wall of rock, which seemed impassable. Men were sent out on both sides to search for some opening through which we might pass, and a crevice was soon found some feet above our level, where the men could get through, one at a time, the first one being lifted up by those behind, and each man as he got up lending a helping hand to the next. As I stood on the crest and heard the fighting in the gap below and the distant thundering of Jackson's battle at Manassas, I felt that the sound of each gun was a call for help, and the progress of the men, one by one, across the rocky barrier seemed painfully slow. In fact, they got through in an almost incredibly short time. As soon as the leading regiment was over, a skirmish line was pushed down the mountain, which on this side sloped gently, and presented few obstacles except a small ravine and stream which issued from the gap itself. The Federal batteries at the mouth of the gap soon came in sight. They were firing steadily but leisurely, and seemed as if they were there to stay. My whole brigade was soon over, the skirmishers in the meantime pressing forward upon the flank of the batteries, which were less than half a mile off. As they emerged into the open ground at the foot of the mountain and engaged the Federal skirmishers on the ravine already mentioned, there was a commotion among the batteries, which limbered up and rapidly moved off. It was now nearly dark. My skirmishers were pressing steadily forward, followed by the main line, when I received an order from a staff officer of General Hood directing me to return at once to the gap by the way I had come,—that the enemy was retiring. This was plain enough, but of what had caused him to retire, Hood was at that time entirely ignorant. I remonstrated against the order, but was told that it was peremptory. I therefore had no choice but to move back and march two miles and a half in the night to reach a point less than half a mile from where I had started. We

passed through the gap and camped that night on the ground that Ricketts' troops had held in the afternoon. The second battle of Bull Run was practically decided at Thoroughfare Gap. Had McDowell's whole corps been assigned the duty of keeping Longstreet on the west side of the Bull Run mountains, it could, properly handled, have kept him there long enough to enable General Pope to crush Jackson with the other forces at his disposal."

On the night of the 28th, General Pope supposed that Jackson was retreating from Centreville, and gave orders, about 9 o'clock P.M., to Kearny, to move at 1 A.M., and at early dawn attack him vigorously. He had heard, from his position at Bull Run, the guns of King's engagement, and felt sure that Jackson was making for Thoroughfare Gap. At 10 P.M., orders similar to Kearny's were sent to Heintzelman, to send Hooker to act as a reserve to Kearny.

During the night of the 28th verbal orders had been sent to Reno to move with his two divisions to the support of Heintzelman in the direction of Centreville.

On the morning of the 29th, at 6 o'clock, General Porter received the following order from General Pope :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
" NEAR BULL RUN, August 29, 1862, 3 A.M.

"General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major General Pope directs you to move on *Centreville* at the first dawn of day, with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be *here* at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place and your presence is necessary.

" GEORGE D. RUGGLES,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

"To Major-General PORTER."

In obedience to this order Porter moved immediately toward Centreville. He had passed Manassas Junction with Sykes' division, when one of General Pope's aides, carrying a dispatch to General McDowell, stopped to inquire the whereabouts of McDowell (Porter had just left McDowell with King at the Weir house north of Manassas). The aide gave Porter the purport of the order and a verbal message for himself, that "he should take King's division and march from Manassas toward Gainesville." The order in full was subsequently handed General Porter by General Gibbon, who commanded a brigade of King's division. This order was issued by General Pope in consequence of his hearing of King's retreat to Manassas.

General Porter immediately faced about, took up King's division at Manassas about 9.30 o'clock A.M. and moved as directed, the road to Gainesville running nearly parallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad, and at a right angle to the road Porter had been pursuing towards Centreville.

At about 11.30 A.M., with column well closed up the advance under Morell struck Dawkins' Branch, nine miles from Thoroughfare Gap, and here encountered the cavalry pickets of the Confederates, at the same time capturing some of Longstreet's scouts. Large clouds of dust in front, and extending back to Thoroughfare Gap gave evidence that the enemy were arriving in force and that some were forming in line. His position was along the course of this small stream—Dawkins' Branch—on the east side of an open valley, and commanded, within ordinary range of field artillery, the opposite slope. The valley, except to the left, was surrounded by thick

brushwood and heavy timber, affording facilities for opposing forces to conceal their respective strength, exact position, and movements. Morell's skirmishers were in the timber on the opposite slope south of the stream and were engaged with those of the enemy.

Before leaving Bristoe, Porter had learned of the advance through the gap of Longstreet's forces ; at Manassas he had talked with McDowell regarding that advance ; from Pope's orders he knew that Jackson was being taken care of ; and from scouts captured he knew that Longstreet was in his front. Notwithstanding all this, he at once directed Butterfield with his brigade to occupy a prominent ridge beyond the stream, before the enemy in force could seize it and thus cover the deployment of the command preparatory to making or resisting an attack. Scarcely had this movement commenced, when General McDowell arrived, and showing the following order, a copy of which Porter had just received and read, assumed command, and exclaimed : " Porter ! this is no place to fight a battle ; we are too far out." Under his direction and in his presence further deployments ceased and Butterfield's order was revoked.

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
" CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

" GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 5. }

" *Generals McDowell and Porter* :—You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must be now not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies.

"I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I had not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning.

"General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts and instruct him to rejoin the other division of the corps as soon as practicable.

"If any considerable advantage is to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view—that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day.

"My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.

"JOHN POPE,
"Major-Gen'l, Commanding."

At the same time McDowell showed Porter the following dispatch from General John Buford, commanding the Union cavalry, who had been sent to observe Thoroughfare Gap. This dispatch had been sent through General Ricketts :

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE, 9.30 A.M.

"Seventeen regiments, one battery, and 500 cavalry passed through Gainesville three quarters of an hour ago,¹ on the Centreville road. I think this division should join our forces, now engaged, at once. Please forward this.

"JOHN BUFORD, Brig.-Genl."

So Porter and McDowell both knew from Ricketts and Buford that Longstreet was through the gap, marching to reinforce Jackson. From Buford they

¹ Before Porter had received the order to turn back and take up King's division at Manassas Junction.

learned that Longstreet was three miles from their present position before 9 o'clock that morning, with about 14,000 men. McDowell claimed that King's division, from its constant day and night marching and its fight within the last thirty-six hours, was in no condition to go into action, and that Ricketts', ten miles distant, was in the same condition, and too far distant to be relied upon for support, and showed Porter the following dispatch :

" Col. E. SCHRIVER, Chief of Staff :

" I forward the enclosed from Gen. Buford. My division halted to close up ; men are much exhausted and straggle a great deal. Will do my best to push on.

" Very respectfully,

" JAMES B. RICKETTS,

" Brig.-Gen., Comd. Division."

General McDowell having assumed command under the joint order, he and General Porter rode off into the thick woods to the right and north, for the purpose, if possible, of putting King in line and forming connection with Reynolds, then south of Groveton, on the Warrenton pike ; but they found the woods and underbrush so heavy that they could not pass, besides which heavy ravines cut through the woods. After ascertaining that it was impossible to move in that direction, McDowell decided that, as the head of King's division was then near the point where the Sudley Springs road left the road on which the Fifth Corps then was, he would move with it up the former road, and come in on Reynolds' left. Accordingly, McDowell galloped down the railroad to put King in march, exclaiming to Porter as he left, " Put your corps in there."

While returning to his command Porter saw the

enemy's infantry coming to the railroad, and artillery moving to a slight elevation north of it. Believing that then, if ever, before the enemy was formed in force, was the time to strike with united forces, he directed Morell to continue his deployment, and sent Colonel Locke to instruct King not to go away. Sykes was coming up as rapidly as Morell's deployment permitted.

Colonel Locke soon returned and delivered the following message from McDowell, whom he had found with King's division: "Give my compliments to General Porter, and say I am going to the right and shall take King with me. He had better remain where he is, but if necessary to fall back, he can do so on my left." Porter at once decided that the circumstances compelled him to act on the defensive, to invite attack or to threaten it, and thereby to keep in his front the forces which otherwise would be available to go against Pope's scattered army. Morell was at once recalled, and advantageously posted, concealed largely by the brush and timber with which the ground abounded. Sykes was thrown back on the road and held immediately in rear of Morell, prepared to support him, meet any attempt to turn his flank, at the same time advantageously located to move promptly if called to Groveton, or as indicated by the joint order, as likely "to reach Bull Run by night or by morning."

Sturgis, with Pratt's brigade, was directed to fall back to Manassas to protect the rear and the army trains gathering there. But soon hearing that some of Banks' command had reached that station, Sturgis was recalled and held, in rear of Sykes, near Bethlehem Church.

While Morell was taking position, artillery opened upon him. The fire was soon silenced by Hazlett's battery, though it was subsequently opened farther to the right, and was again silenced. From that time the enemy gradually increased in force, and formed to resist attack occasionally threatened by Porter.

The position of the opposing forces was such that neither dared attack by crossing the open valley between them—each commander knowing that the attacking party would be badly defeated, if not virtually annihilated, and render no service to his cause. Of this situation General Longstreet says :

“The important difference between our plans and purposes was that you were working to win while I was working to have you lose. I had no thought of going, or attempting to go, across the uninviting ground between us to get at you, and reported to General Lee, after a reconnoissance, that you did not have men enough to bear you over to me.

“I have tried to illustrate the effect of your attack on me, had you made it, by Burnside's fight at Sharpsburg—the circumstances and the forces being in favor of Burnside, while they were not in your favor.”

Notwithstanding this belief, he sent for Wilcox's division in the afternoon, and posted it to aid in resisting an attack expected from Porter.

McDowell has claimed by his expression “Put your corps in there,” that he intended Porter should advance, while Porter claimed that it was understood that he should wait until McDowell had gone round to where Reynolds' line was established, to continue the line of the army from Reynolds' left, and at the time when he judged, or was able to ascertain that King was in position to be communicated with, and then be governed by orders or circumstances at the time. Porter, at least, carried out by his action what he under-

stood to be the movement, when he sent scouts continually through and behind the woods towards the left of Reynolds, to find and report to McDowell.

Now, the question naturally arises, Did McDowell intend Porter to fight there? We find him first saying to Porter, "You are too far out; this is no place to fight a battle"; in the next place he takes King's division of 7000 men with him, leaving Porter with only 9000 men (without support) to fight Longstreet's forces, which he at that time knew, from Buford, were in front with at least 14,000 men; and then, as he had assumed command, if he expected Porter to fight, why did he go away from the scene of action? These are facts which have never yet been explained, and which must necessarily support Porter in his belief and actions regarding an engagement.¹

It is well to note here the position of the troops on the right of the Union line, whom it was intended, under the joint order, that Porter should "act in concert with." The following order was issued shortly after the joint order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

"August 29, 1862.

"*To Generals Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel* :—If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy, you will not push matters further.

"Fitz-John Porter and King's division of McDowell's corps are moving on Gainesville from Manassas Junction, and will come in on your left. They have about 20,000 men.

"The command must return to this place (that is, Centreville) to-night or by morning on account of subsistence and forage.

"JOHN POPE,

"Major-General, Commanding."

¹ See Chapter XXIV., pp. 513 to 535, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, for report of the Board which reinstated General Porter, on this matter.

The fact is, that at the time the joint order was issued it incorrectly stated the position of Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, who, to the knowledge of General Porter and General McDowell, had not even reached Groveton, where Jackson subsequently held them in check.

It will be seen from these two orders that Pope did not want a fight with the combined forces of the enemy, because the army must not be so involved that they could not fall back that night behind Bull Run. It was known both by McDowell and Porter that the forces of the enemy had combined.

In order that there should be nothing left undone on his part, Porter, after McDowell's departure pushed Griffin to the north through the woods to the railroad ; but on learning that McDowell had taken King with him, he withdrew Griffin and placed his troops in a defensive position. During the afternoon he sent scouts through the woods to reach Reynolds, but they were all captured or driven back. He also sent dispatches to McDowell and Pope regarding the situation of affairs on his part of the line, and asked for orders and information. He also kept up a bold front with his troops before the enemy, and put his corps in position to resist attack, and sometimes threatened to attack in order to keep Longstreet from sending assistance to Jackson. He kept up constant communication with his skirmish line, receiving from the officer in command frequent dispatches regarding the enemy, who was reported in large force in his front.¹

¹ This display of troops and activity so deceived Longstreet that at 4 o'clock P.M. he ordered Wilcox, with his three brigades, from the support of Jackson's left (our extreme right) to the support of Jones, who was in front of Porter,

At about 4.30 P.M. hearing the heavy artillery fire occasioned by Grover's charge on the right, Porter ordered Morell to push north to the aid of Sigel, but finding the enemy massing in his front¹ suspended the movement.

At 5 P. M., while waiting in a state of uncertainty, and nothing having occurred to suggest any change in the plan indicated in the joint order to retire behind Bull Run instead of giving battle that day, and the attack having been begun by Kearny on Jackson's left at that hour, the sound of artillery near Sudley, so much apparently to the rear of Groveton, suggested to Porter, who was then at Bethlehem Church, that Sigel was retiring, or perhaps driven back, and that his artillery was then in a new position near the Sudley Springs road. If it was true that Sigel was being driven back, the military situation was perilous, and therefore the following order was sent to General Morell :

"General MORELL :

"Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass ; but see if you cannot give help to Sigel. If you find him retiring, move back toward Manassas, and should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return.

"F. J. PORTER, Major-General.

"Look to the points of the compass for Manassas.

"F. J. PORTER."

The zeal displayed by this order might have occasioned great disaster, as it left Porter alone with

and they were placed across the Manassas Gap Railroad in rear of Jones. (See Longstreet's report on Manassas in *Records of Rebellion*.)

¹ Wilcox's reinforcement of Longstreet.

Sykes' division, in front of Longstreet's 20,000 men, to hold the Manassas road and cover the retreat of Ricketts' worn-out troops, who at that hour were stretched along the road for four or five miles both towards Sudley and back towards Manassas Junction.

Before Morell had time to commence his movement, a report was received from him that the enemy was coming down in force to attack both his front and flank. Porter then dispatched to Morell :

"General MORELL :

"Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing ?

"F. J. PORTER."

Immediately afterwards he sent the following :

"General MORELL :

"Tell me what is passing quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to him and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him.

"F. J. PORTER,

"Major-General."

Again, in reply to Morell's advice that they had better retire, Porter sent the following message :

"We cannot retire while McDowell holds on."

He then sent the following :

"Generals McDOWELL and KING :

"I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in great force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now

going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back?

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General.”

Again.

“ Generals McDOWELL or KING :

“ I have been wandering over the woods and failed to get a communication to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have to retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the battle? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left.

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General Vols.”

Again.

“ General McDOWELL : The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance, and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate please do so. I have sent many messengers to you and General Sigel, and get nothing.

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General.

“ An artillery duel is going on now ; been skirmishing a long time.

“ F. J. P.”

And then this :

“ General McDOWELL : Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about the woods for a time, I withdrew him, and while doing so, artillery opened on us. My scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us and I believe some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get battery, but have not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left and from reports of scouts, think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs, whether you retire or not.

I cannot get water and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men from infantry firing.

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General Vols.”

“ August 29—6 P.M.”

Up to 4 P.M., General Porter's dispatches to General McDowell had furnished full information of the former's doings and of the enemy's presence. Receiving no instructions or intimations to the contrary, General Porter concluded his course was satisfactory and its policy should be maintained till night, when he supposed orders would probably direct him “to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville.” Porter's troops were without food at this time, and so continued throughout the next day, except a small supply of hard-tack, which they received that night. But, to make sure that he was doing right, he sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Stephen M. Weld, to General Pope, with a note, informing him that Morell would soon be engaged, and asking for information and orders.

About 6 o'clock favorable reports from the right wing, stating “that the enemy was retiring up the pike,” induced General Porter to direct General Morell to attack, which he did, by the following order :

“ General MORELL :

“ I wish you to push up two regiments, supported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the party with the section of artillery opposed to you. The battle looks well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling when our troops advance.

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General.”

We will give Judge Advocate-General Holt the credit of having mistaken, in his review, this order directing a reconnaissance in force for the later and verbal order borne by Colonel Locke, commanding an attack by General Morell with his whole division, in pursuance of the 4.30 order of General Pope.

General Morell, believing this attack by two regiments would bring on a disastrous repulse, followed by a strong pursuit, commenced putting all his command in his front line, and urged General Porter, in consequence of the apparent great strength of the enemy, not to make it. During the time occupied by this preparation, Porter became satisfied that Morell was right, and that by holding the enemy in front of him he was producing all the good effects of a battle and would get none of its evils. Hence, as the day was nearly ended,—then sunset,—he suspended the attack by an order, which put the troops in position for any service that might be required after the return of Lieutenant Weld.

Between sundown and dark, Lieutenant Weld returned, but without orders, and with but little information. He had delivered General Porter's note to General Pope in rear of Groveton, near the crossing of the Warrenton pike by the Sudley Springs road. *After Lieutenant Weld's return*, General Porter received the following order :

“ HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

“ August 29th, 4.30 P.M. ¹

“ Major-General PORTER : Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action

¹ There has been much dispute as to the time of the receipt of this order—Pope claiming it was delivered at 5 o'clock, in ample time for Porter to execute it ; Porter, on the contrary, claiming that it was not received till after 6.30

at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds.

"The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

" JOHN POPE,

" Major-Gen., Commanding."

Up to the hour of the receipt of the 4.30 order General Porter's corps had remained substantially in the positions it held when General McDowell left; that is, with General Morell in line of battle, with supports from his own command, and General Sykes immediately in rear, extending along the road to Porter's headquarters at Bethlehem Church. The different movements made by Morell in his position have been erroneously connected with the dispatch sent by Porter to Generals McDowell and King, and were thus made the ground of charging Porter with having retreated. No action was taken in accord-

P.M.—too late to execute and impracticable (as stated in his letter acknowledging its receipt), as designed to attack Jackson's left and ignoring the presence between Jackson and Porter of Longstreet's 23,000 men.

Pope also alleged that Porter fell back to Manassas before the advancing enemy. As additional evidence of the late hour at which the order was received, as well as of that there existed not even an intention to withdraw, but of arrangements made to remain, if necessary, two or more days, the following dispatch is presented. Though it was before Porter's court-martial, it was not printed with the record, but held secret with its files *for over sixteen years*. It also shows that at the time Ricketts' rear had passed (after 6.30 P.M.), Porter did not know that Pope had left Centreville.

"Gen. MORELL: Send down some good energetic men to Gen. Pope at Centreville. Get hold of Col. Beckwith and get some rations. Bring beef up to kill; we have nothing else; and get enough to last two or three days.

" F. J. PORTER,

" Major-General.

" Ricketts has gone up, also King."

ance with that dispatch, as Porter soon found his information was incorrect.

At no time was there any retreat, or order by Porter or any of his officers for retreat, or any movement leading to a retreat. The denunciation which enemies have resorted to had no better foundation than the movements above mentioned, which necessarily arose from placing the command in proper position for defense and to induce attack, and in proper support. General Porter held, all the afternoon of the 29th, and until 4 A.M. of the 30th, the same line in front as he occupied when General McDowell left him. The enemy in the meantime had been increasing in strength, occasionally driving in the Fifth Corps skirmishers, as if intending to attack, or desiring to prevent an understanding of their movements. The officers on the corps skirmish line were, however, vigilant, and early ascertained the existence of a large force in their front. They were prompt to report its presence to Colonel Marshall, commanding the skirmishers, who, for verification, reconnoitred in person and ascertained the facts, and reported them to General Morell. The details of the information concerning this force Morell reported to Porter at various times throughout the afternoon.

The 4.30 order was delivered to General Porter *after* 6.30 P.M. The sun set about 6.31, Warrenton time. The order was delivered to General Porter by Captain Pope, one of General Pope's aides. Porter was then quite near Bethlehem Church, at the junction of the Sudley Springs road with the Manassas-Gainesville road. This order asserted that "your line of march brings you in on the enemy's flank," and

directed Porter to attack *Jackson's right flank*, the flank of the forces "massed in front of us," and "to keep close communication with General Reynolds." It showed the entire ignorance on the part of General Pope of Longstreet's separate force then confronting and outflanking Porter and also of the impracticability of any speedy movement across the country between him (some two miles) and the "right wing," which Porter was "to keep close communication with." Its execution involved an attack upon Longstreet—an attack which, in a smaller degree, Porter had been attempting, and which, in so large a degree, he had regarded as leading to no good result.

General Porter, however, immediately on receiving the 4.30 order, dispatched Colonel Locke with orders to Morell to attack with his whole division, saying that he (Porter) would join him immediately. Having thus dispatched Locke, Porter then acknowledged the receipt of the order by General Pope's returning aide. This reply was in writing. He said that, though he believed the order had arrived too late to be executed, he would do all that was possible to carry it into effect, and added that he could promise no good effect, and believed that disaster would attend any attack without the aid of the divisions taken away by General McDowell.

General Pope, in his testimony on Porter's trial, acknowledged having received from Porter a message somewhat of this character, but he said the message made no impression on him, and he did not give the precise language used in the note. This note, or envelope, which contained his order to Porter, and which was returned to him (Pope), con-

tained a statement of the hour that the 4.30 order was received, but neither that envelope (or note) nor any one of the other important dispatches sent by Porter to Pope during this period was produced during the Porter trial, although the defendant requested, during the examination of General Pope as a witness before the court-martial, to produce them.

Now, if these dispatches prove anything, they prove :

First.—That the 4.30 order was not in Porter's possession at 6 P.M.

Second.—That Porter made every effort to keep General McDowell, and through him General Pope, fully informed of the state of affairs in his front that day, and was anxiously seeking information and instructions to guide his actions.

Third.—That they show co-operation on his part in the carrying out of some plan or understanding with General McDowell, by which both were to act or were acting together, and that understanding was *not*—after he had taken King and Ricketts away—that Porter should attack or move over the open ground to his right front without some further information from General McDowell or General Pope.

To return to the narrative. The order to attack with his whole force hastened Morell's movements to get his troops in position.¹ A few minutes thereafter Porter joined him. But it was then so dark that it

¹ It seems that the order to post his troops for the night did not reach Morell until after Locke gave the order to attack with the whole division, though sent prior to the one by Locke. When he received the order to pass the night, he construed it as countermanding the order to attack, and as a reply to his protest against an attack with two regiments. He knew nothing of the 4.30 order, and considered the message by Locke as merely urging him on.

was impossible to make aggressive movements. Even if Morell could have begun the attack before dark, Sykes could not have been gotten into line after the order was received. Porter deemed that to push Morell against the enemy in the dark would have been in no sense obedience to the order, even if he had not considered that the order was based upon conditions manifestly erroneous. He therefore placed his troops in position to pass the night on the ground they occupied, picketing in all directions, for Porter had only some 12 or 15 mounted men, loaned him by General McDowell, for messengers, while it was known that the enemy had quite a force of cavalry on his flank.

And so it was that the grand old corps, without food or water, held its ground to the extreme front, and, weary and exhausted, men and animals sought a much-needed rest.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

At 3.30 o'clock A.M. of the 30th of August, 1862, General Porter received the following :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
“ IN THE FIELD NEAR BULL RUN, August 29, 1862.—8.50 P.M.

“ Major-General F. J. PORTER :

“ *General* : Immediately upon the receipt of this order, the precise hour of which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.

“ JOHN POPE,

“ Major-General, Commanding.”

This order, although dated at 8.50 P.M of the 29th, was not received (as officially acknowledged) until

3.30 A.M. of August 30th. It was but a short time afterwards when daylight came, and, notwithstanding the fact that in order to comply with his instructions he must make a flank movement with his entire force, in the immediate presence of an enemy in line and prepared to give battle, Porter sent orders to his commanders to withdraw, and lose not a moment in doing so. Morell immediately issued orders to his brigade and battery commanders to get ready to retire, and to get their troops and batteries in motion as soon as possible.

General Sykes aroused his division and placed it en route. Generals Butterfield's and Barnes' brigades moved up on the road and followed Sykes. General Morell, fearing an attack, withdrew Griffin's brigade so cautiously and slowly from the immediate front of the enemy as to cause him to lose sight of the rest of his division, he having waited until Griffin called in his skirmishers. He kept the direct road to Centreville, at the head of Griffin's brigade, believing he was following Sykes, as he was instructed, instead of turning at Bethlehem Church towards Groveton. Pratt, who had returned from detached duty at Warrenton Junction, without Porter's knowledge, followed Griffin. Orders to Morell, on the Gainesville road, to hasten up, did not reach him. Martin's battery followed Griffin's brigade.

General Porter, knowing nothing at the time of the cause of Morell's and Griffin's absence, reported as he was directed, and placed his corps on the Warrenton pike, near the Dogan house.

The Union army, facing westward, was posted in the form of an angle, with unequal sides, thus \wedge . The short side, just south of the Warrenton pike,

was occupied by Reynolds' division. The long side, north of the pike, stretching off towards Sudley Springs, was held in the order named—Porter, Sigel, Reno, and Heintzelman—Ricketts and King being in reserve. Elevated ground immediately in front and to the left of Reynolds was covered with dense timber, interspersed with patches of scrub oak and pine. A narrow but dense forest was on Porter's right front. Between the forests, one half mile apart, and skirting the Warrenton pike on the north and in Porter's front, was cleared ground, a natural glacis rising rapidly to an elevated ridge held by the enemy and crowned by numerous batteries of artillery. This artillery commanded the pike and the cleared ground, and concentrated a flank and direct fire upon any attacking column.

The enemy's skirmishers held the open ground and the forests. His forces and movements were concealed, whilst the least of the movements of the Union troops as far back as Centreville were open to his view. Unsuccessful efforts to gain these forests on the 29th had caused much loss to General Pope, revealed the presence of large forces south of the pike, and the fact that Jackson had acquired great strength north of it by standing behind a railroad embankment.

General Porter learned, upon reporting at General Pope's headquarters, that those efforts of the 29th had been mainly a series of skirmishes, artillery contests at long range, and a few attacks (after strong protests and delay) by brigades and separate divisions, resulting in repulses and heavy losses, and that about dark, King's division, the only part of McDowell's command which at that hour had reached General Pope at Grove-

ton, was sent into action, lost heavily, and did no good.

Early in the day General Pope suggested plans of attack, the favorite one being with the corps on the right along the Haymarket road. All were based on the erroneous impression that the enemy had been some hours retreating. General Reynolds (since early on the 29th engaged with the newly arrived body of the enemy) coincided with General Porter in the opinion that the enemy had been strengthened in that region, and was in great force in front of the Union army, and especially on the left. No such impression, however, could be made on the mind of General Pope.

Seeing great danger in the enemy holding in their immediate front the forests which masked his strength and movements, and as no plan was decided upon, and each commander was left to act on his own judgment, Generals Reynolds and Porter arranged to clear their respective fronts, and ascertain if possible the strength and position of the enemy. They succeeded, the Union skirmishers not meeting with strong resistance. Porter soon found the enemy well posted behind the railroad embankments, and his front and flanks well protected by numerous artillery. General Reynolds, from his newly acquired elevated position, at once informed Porter of a numerous enemy in his front, and of his intention to at once report that his left was being turned by a heavy force. He did in person so report. He told General Pope that in order to get to him (Pope) he had to pass through the enemy's skirmishers who were getting to his rear, but General Pope placed no confidence in what he said and sent General Buford to ascertain the truth of the statement.

General McDowell, returning from a reconnoissance on the extreme right, reported to General Pope the enemy as having withdrawn. The contraction of their line was mistaken for a retreat. About the same time a Union soldier—recaptured by Porter's skirmishers and sent to General Pope—reported that he had "heard the rebel officers say their army was retiring to unite with Longstreet." So positively did their knowledge of Longstreet and the indications before them contradict the statement of this soldier that, on sending him to General Pope, General Porter said: "In duty bound I send him, but I regard him as either a fool or designedly released to give a wrong impression, and no faith should be put in what he says." Unfortunately, General McDowell's report was considered as confirmed by his story, and Porter received this message:

"General Pope believes that soldier, and directs you to attack; King will support."

The 2d Division, under Brigadier-General George Sykes, occupied a corn-field in front of the Dogan house, facing west, on both sides of the Warrenton pike. The left of the 1st Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert C. Buchanan, consisting of the 3d U. S., Captain John Wilkins commanding; 4th U. S., Captain Jos. B. Collins commanding; 12th U. S., Captain M. M. Blunt commanding; 1st Battalion 14th U. S., Captain Jno. D. O'Connell commanding; and the 2d Battalion 14th U. S., Captain David B. McKibbin commanding, rested on the pike.

The 2d Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Chapman, composed of the 2d U. S., and Co. G, 1st

U. S., Colonel Chapman commanding ; 6th U. S., Captain Levi C. Bootes commanding ; 10th U. S., Major Charles S. Lovell commanding ; 11th U. S., Major DeLancey Floyd-Jones commanding ; and the 17th U. S., Major George L. Andrews commanding, was formed in column of divisions as a reserve in rear of the 1st Brigade.

The 3d Brigade, under Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren, consisting of the 5th New York, Captain Cleveland Winslow commanding ; and the 10th New York, Colonel John E. Bendix commanding, occupied the extension of Buchanan's line on the left of the Warrenton pike. These positions were all taken up before 11 A.M.

Morell's division, under Brigadier-General Daniel Butterfield was placed on the right of Sykes. The 3d Brigade (Butterfield's) under Colonel H. S. Lansing, consisting of the 12th New York, Captain Wm. Huston commanding ; 17th New York, Major Wm. C. Grower commanding ; 44th New York, Major Freeman Conner commanding ; 83d Pennsylvania, Major Lamont commanding ; and 16th Michigan, Captain Robert T. Elliott commanding, was massed in some fields to the right of Sykes.

The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Charles W. Roberts, composed of the 2d Maine, Major Sargent commanding ; 18th Massachusetts, Captain Stephen Thomas commanding ; 13th New York, Colonel E. G. Marshal commanding ; 25th New York, Colonel Charles A. Johnson commanding ; and the 1st Michigan, Colonel Roberts commanding, moved up between Sykes' right and the left of the 3d Brigade.

All these troops were under a heavy shell-fire of the enemy from 11 A.M. until about 3 P.M.

Between 12 and 1 P.M. General Porter received the following orders :

"SPECIAL ORDERS, } " HEADQUARTERS NEAR GROVETON,
No. } " August 30, 1862, 12. M.

" The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit.

" Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike.

" By command of Major-General POPE :

" GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff."

From General McDowell he received the following :

" HEADQUARTERS, THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
" August 30, 1862.

" Major-General PORTER, Commanding, etc.:

" Major-General McDowell, being charged with the advanced forces to pursue the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds. Heintzelman with his corps, preceded by Reynolds' division will move on your right on the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable that you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of Reynolds' Division, on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report to you; push it well to the left as you advance.

" Very respectfully your obedient servant.

" ED. SCHRIVER,
" Colonel and Chief of Staff."

Anticipating strong resistance from the enemy, well posted and waiting attack, Porter had asked that Sigel should be held ready to assist him. Confident that he was to attack a well posted and well prepared enemy, General Porter arranged to make a strong attack, and deferred "pushing forward in pursuit of the enemy" until he put his forces in position for this strong attack. On the receipt of General Pope's verbal order, Butterfield (commanding Morell's two small brigades) was sent to develop the strength of the enemy beyond the forest on Porter's right.

Butterfield directed Roberts to move the 1st Brigade to the extreme front, this position being nearly the same as that occupied by General King's command during the action of the previous day. Roberts posted his brigade as follows: the 25th New York was deployed as skirmishers, covering the front of the brigade, and connecting with the skirmishers of the 3d Brigade, and also those of the 3d U. S., which Buchanan threw forward; the 18th Massachusetts was deployed in line of battle, directly in rear of the reserve of the 25th New York; the 13th New York was in line of battle in rear of the 18th Massachusetts, and the 1st Michigan was in double column and in rear by echelon of the other regiments respectively, ready to promptly relieve them.

The 3d Brigade was established by Lansing with the 17th New York in the first line, supported by the remainder of the brigade in double column.

Sykes was prompt in his dispositions. Buchanan had deployed the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 14th U. S. to support Butterfield's attacks, and had advanced his skirmishers through the woods in his front. Warren extended Buchanan's line to the left

and threw forward six companies of the 10th New York as skirmishers.

General Hatch, in command of King's division (King being sick), was directed to report with the division to General Porter, and upon so reporting he was ordered to take position on the right of Butterfield, and directed to make an attack simultaneously with that officer. Hatch established his division in seven lines—the first and second being composed of Hatch's own brigade; the third and fourth, Patrick's brigade; the fifth and sixth, Gibbons' brigade; and the seventh, Doubleday's brigade. The 2d U. S. Sharpshooters were advanced as skirmishers in the woods.

While General Butterfield was making his dispositions to assault the enemy, General Reynolds' division and a rifled battery, then occupying the left of the line, were all withdrawn from the south side of the Warrenton pike and placed on the north side, leaving Warren's left flank entirely exposed. Warren immediately assumed the responsibility of occupying the place which Reynolds had vacated south of the pike, and made all the show of force he could with his two regiments. For this purpose he deployed three fifths of the 10th New York to hold the edge of the woods towards the enemy on his left, keeping the 5th New York in reserve out of view of the enemy's battery, and at once reported his action to General Porter, who directed him to hold on, and sent mounted orderlies to Warren to keep him, Porter, informed.

About 1 P.M., Porter ordered Butterfield to make the attack. The latter directed Roberts to advance his skirmishers through the skirt of woods to his front, and, following with his command to attack the enemy,

take possession of a railroad excavation located just through the woods to his right, to then sweep around to the left, and advance upon the batteries of the enemy posted on a hill some distance to Roberts' left, at the same time assuring Roberts that he should receive from the forces under Hatch a vigorous support on the right. Roberts at once commenced executing the order, his skirmishers advancing through the woods, with the command following them closely. He had passed nearly through the belt of timber to his front, when, upon the opposite edge beyond the wood, his skirmishers, receiving an exceedingly hot musketry fire from a railroad cut, were compelled to halt. Colonels Johnson and Berdan, in charge of the skirmishers, notified Roberts that unless they could have better support from the skirmishers on their right, it would be impossible for them to advance farther. Fearing that his skirmishers did not possibly connect with Hatch's on the right, Roberts deployed two companies of the 18th Massachusetts to correct the error if possible, which they succeeded in doing satisfactorily. Roberts then sent Captain Powers to General Porter, reporting his true position, and requested a more decided support on his right, else, on account of an enfilading fire from the enemy, it would be futile to commence the attack. By an orderly he sent a similar message to Butterfield. Porter replied: "I will at once send infantry to your right. Wait until they arrive, then push vigorously forward." From General Butterfield, through his aide, Lieutenant Perkins, Roberts was directed to be sure and make the connection with General Hatch, allowing no mishap to occur in so doing.

Roberts then directed Captain Powers to confer

with the officer in command of Hatch's advanced regiment, which at that time was directly in rear of Roberts' line, requesting him to speedily move on. This order was faithfully delivered, Captain Powers at the same time showing said officer just the spot where Roberts' right rested. Notwithstanding all this, General Hatch's command moved forward very slowly and in a confused manner,¹ and, with much labor, Roberts was compelled to move his entire command slightly to the left in order more speedily to get the advancing brigade into position. General Butterfield was then notified that the desired connection was at last accomplished.

While this was being done, Buchanan's skirmishers (3d U. S.) had advanced by degrees, driving the enemy's sharpshooters from the house at the toll-gate, and had taken possession thereof; the two battalions of the 14th U. S. had advanced with Butterfield's line, while the 4th and 12th U. S. were deployed in line, one behind the other, at the edge of the wood as support. Chapman's brigade was in reserve, and Warren was holding the position from which Reynolds had been withdrawn.

About 3 P.M., Butterfield commenced the attack with the two brigades of Morell's division, the second brigade (Griffin) being absent. As soon as Butterfield's troops advanced up the hill there was great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarmed with men before unseen. The enemy fell back to the line of the railroad, and took shelter in the railroad cut and behind the embankment, and lined the edges of

¹ This occurred in consequence of having to move by the right flank under the enemy's fire, in order to uncover Roberts' line.

the wood beyond. Butterfield was ably supported by Sykes on his left.

With three deafening cheers Butterfield's men charged across the open field nearly to the timber beyond, hoping, under the cover of the woods, to be able to sweep around to the left and take the guns of the enemy ; but the musketry fire, both to the right and front, was so galling that the troops were obliged to halt to resist it, an incessant artillery cross-fire at the same time being poured into them.

In this position the troops remained for some thirty minutes holding their ground, during which time Colonel Roberts of the 1st Michigan had been instantly killed. At last, finding that they had no support whatever on the right, the regiments there having retired, Butterfield's troops were obliged to retreat for cover, which, under the circumstances, was performed in good order. The enemy hotly pressed them at first, but were soon checked by Buchanan's men, assisted by Hazlett's battery, which did good execution, and forced one column that had advanced beyond the point of the woods to fall back into it.

Unwilling to retire from his position, which involved the withdrawal of this efficient battery, Warren held his ground, hoping that fresh troops would be thrown forward to meet the enemy now advancing in the open field in his front, well knowing that his position was one from which he could not retreat in the face of a superior force. The enemy advanced with rapidity upon Warren, with the evident intention of capturing Hazlett's battery. The 10th New York was compelled to fall back, arriving at the position held by the 5th New York in such manner as to almost completely prevent the 5th from firing upon

the enemy. While Warren was endeavoring to clear them from his front, the enemy opened fire in force from the woods to the rear and left of the 5th with fearful effect. Warren then gave the order to face about and march down the hill, so as to bring the enemy all on his front ; but in the roar of musketry his voice could only be heard a short distance. Captain Boyd, near him, repeated the command, but his men only partially obeyed it. They appeared unwilling to make a backward movement. He was wounded while trying to execute it. Adjutant Sovereign carried the order along the line to Captain Winslow, commanding the regiment, and to the other captains, but was killed in the act ; and before the colors and the remnant of the regiment could be extricated, 298 men of the 5th and 133 of the 10th were killed or wounded.

During the time the above described battle was going on, General McDowell, still not appreciating the real state of affairs, replied to Porter's request to have " Sigel pushed up," as follows :

" HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

" August 30, 1862.

" *General*: Major General McDowell directs that you push on the movement, suggested in your note to him, to the left, and General Heintzelman, now here, will attend to the front and right. You have at your disposal to reinforce you, King's division and Reynolds'.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" ED. SCHRIVER,

" Colonel and Chief of Staff."

As if the presence of an *aggressive* enemy was then only becoming apparent to him, the following post-script was added to the above :

"The enemy having shown indication of advancing by the right, Reynolds has been withdrawn from your column and put over on your left. It is still thought you will be strong enough, to effect your purpose, with King; if not, General Pope will send you Sigel."

And again, as if he had expected Porter's 6000 men (Griffin being absent) to overcome Jackson, that which General Pope's right wing had failed to do on the previous day,¹ he directed thus :

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
" August 30, 1862.

"Major-General McDowell is now busy attending to our left; he directs me to inform you that you must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's division in connection with the service you are to perform.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"ED. SCHRIVER,

"Colonel and Chief of Staff.

"Major-General PORTER, Commanding, etc."

At the time of Butterfield's repulse, General Porter urged again the employment of Sigel, as follows :

"General McDOWELL :

"I fear for the result unless you push up Sigel. Our right is also attacked.

"F. J. PORTER, Major-General."

Replies came too late to get Sigel up to join in the attack. From his elevated, crescent-shaped position, the enemy swept with numerous artillery every foot of ground over which the Fifth Corps had to pass. He opposed the movement also by a terrible musketry

¹ General Pope's report of Sep. 3, 1862 (*Proceedings of Schofield Board*, p. 1039, vol. iii.), gives the Fifth Corps as 8500 strong. From this, Griffin's brigade of 2000 were absent at Centreville.

fire from behind the railroad embankment, where he was driven and stood almost unharmed. Butterfield, aided by Sykes, with Hatch on his right, emerging from the sheltering timber, rapidly advanced, gallantly attacked and desperately contended for victory. The resistance could not be overcome. The enfilading artillery, combined with the direct infantry fire, created havoc with line after line, as each was about to crown the embankment. Many of the enemy, hard pressed, had not time to reload and received the charging troops with stones, severely wounding many. Four successive, unceasing, vigorously desperate attacks were repulsed. General Hatch, apparently badly wounded, on asking to leave the field, reported the condition desperate and that Porter's presence with his division (Hatch's) was necessary to induce renewed attack. Colonel Sullivan, commanding one of Hatch's brigades, reported affairs deplorable. Porter had started with him to use his personal influence with the troops, when he met the evidence of disastrous repulse in numerous wounded and stragglers, and in remnants of regiments declaring themselves out of ammunition. As if to add to the discomfiture, came the shouts of Longstreet's forces pushing down upon Warren and the almost defenseless artillery on the left, to gain the rear and cut the Union troops off from the turnpike. Renewed attack on Jackson was madness. The two brigades of regulars under Sykes were left alone on the original line of battle, and Porter, after assigning to the serviceable part of King's division the protection of that part of the field held by it, gave orders to Sykes to retire to the plateau in rear of the Henry and Robinson houses, which the first brigade did in column of regi-

ments in line of battle, under a severe artillery fire. Captain Collins, commanding the 4th U. S., being wounded during this movement, the command devolved on Captain Dryer.

At the time the movement was commenced, Colonel Buchanan sent Lieutenant Powell, his adjutant-general, to the front, through the woods, to withdraw the skirmish line of the 3d U. S., but instead of finding that regiment he ran into the enemy's skirmish line, and only escaped capture by retiring under a volley of musketry. The commander of the 3d had, at the time Warren was so hotly pressed, withdrawn the right skirmishers and retired by the Warrenton pike; but those on the left of the pike, under Lieutenant Andrew Sheridan, assembled on Warren's brigade and were with it in its fierce engagement.

When Reynolds was relieved from Warren's left, Meade's brigade was moved from the position it occupied, and marched entirely across the battle-field to the right of the Warrenton pike, which position it had no sooner reached than it was ordered to march back to the plateau of the Henry house. During its absence the enemy had encompassed Warren's left, and when the severe attack was received by Warren, the brigade, in conjunction with the division to which it belonged, was deployed in line of battle and charged down the slope of the Henry house ridge towards the Sudley Springs road, driving before it such of the enemy as had advanced across the road, thus enabling Warren to extricate the remnant of his brigade from its perilous position.

Porter's attack was the only one made. He struck the right of Jackson, and instead of finding "a retreating enemy," as he had been informed from Gen-

eral Pope's headquarters, found Jackson as steadfast as his old "Stonewall," and Longstreet with nothing in front of him. So fierce and sanguinary was Porter's attack, however, that he nearly broke Jackson's line, and would have done so had he been properly supported. Indeed, he was so near doing it, that Jackson sent to Lee, begging for reinforcements. But Longstreet, who was directed to furnish them, insisted that "the guns will do their work," and the terrible fire they poured into Porter at short range did their work.

Longstreet, on finding that Porter had retired on the morning of the 30th from Dawkins' Branch, swung his corps around as on a pivot, using Hood, who rested on the Warrenton pike, as the pivot. He occupied the position just south of the pike and parallel to it, facing north, and by his infantry and batteries Warren was nearly decimated. He was struggling for the pike, the Bald Hills, and the Henry house, which last position commanded the stone bridge over Bull Run,—the only bridge for the retiring army to cross that stream.

Upon the retirement of the first division to the plateau near the Henry house, on the right of the pike, General Morell joined, having ridden from Centreville, and took command of his division, which was not again brought into action that day.

Battery C, Rhode Island Light Artillery, Captain Waterman commanding, took position on the heights near the Warrenton pike, commanding the enemy's batteries and the woods through which Butterfield was to advance to the attack. The battery was subsequently advanced to within canister-range of the woods, but was afterwards returned to its former

position and reopened fire on the enemy's batteries that were shelling our infantry. It also fired with shrapnel at shorter range at the enemy's infantry, who were endeavoring to form under cover of the woods. Having exhausted the ammunition of his limbers, Captain Waterman, in accordance with a previous command of General Butterfield, withdrew to the top of Bull Run Hill, and by order of General McDowell took position on the left, covering the charge of the left of the Union line. After remaining in this position for nearly an hour without firing, at 7.30 P.M. he, by order of General Porter, moved to Centreville.

Battery D, 5th U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett commanding, was placed on a hill to the left of the Warrenton pike, in order to shell the woods in front of that position until the infantry advanced, and then to turn the guns on the enemy's batteries. When this order was given, General Reynolds' division occupied the woods on the left and front of the designated position, but as Hazlett was proceeding to it, the division withdrew. Hazlett rode forward and found that all the troops had been withdrawn, not even leaving pickets. As this was a dangerous position in which to place a battery without a strong support, Hazlett asked Warren if he would give him support. He did so, and in consequence saved the battery from capture. The firing from the battery in this position was extremely effective. It was not long afterwards when Colonel Warren informed Lieutenant Hazlett that the enemy was approaching through the woods on his left, and almost immediately they were upon Warren with an overwhelming force. The troops were between the enemy and the battery, so

that no assistance could be afforded by its fire. In order to save his battery, Hazlett limbered up and left that portion of the field at a walk. He then took position on a hill farther to the rear and again opened fire on the enemy with good effect. He remained in this position until ordered to retire to Centreville.

Battery I, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain Stephen H. Weed commanding (also chief of divisional artillery), occupied three positions during the day. The right section was detached and posted in a corn-field to the front, about 1200 yards from some batteries of the enemy. It remained there doing effective service until forced to retire by a general advance of the enemy and the retirement of the Union forces. About 5.30 P.M. the battery took up a second position behind the house it had been in front of, and remained there engaged until nearly all the ammunition with the pieces was exhausted. The caissons had been sent to the rear after the first position was abandoned. The battery left its second position about 6.30 P.M. While moving off, and under heavy fire, two pieces broke down by the axles snapping apart. Both these pieces were taken entirely from the field, but they were so disabled that afterwards they were abandoned on the road to Centreville.

Battery E, 1st U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant A. M. Randol commanding, remained in column of pieces on the Warrenton pike near the Dogan house, somewhat sheltered from view of the enemy, but under continuous and heavy fire directed at other batteries, but no opportunity was afforded for placing it in position for firing. It remained in that place until the infantry had fallen back, when it took position on the right of Hazlett's battery, and did effective work

until the close of the battle, when it proceeded to Centreville under orders.

Battery K, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain Smead commanding, took position on the hill to the left of the Dogan house, where it remained until the infantry fell back, when the battery was withdrawn. While on the road Captain Smead was killed by a shot striking him on the head. The command of the battery then devolved on Lieutenant Van Reed, who moved it from the field and under orders proceeded to Centreville.

Major Andrews, commanding the 17th U. S. was leading Chapman's brigade while moving to the rear, and when nearly to the summit of Bull Run Hill he was ordered to halt, and asked by a major-general, whom he afterwards understood was General Pope : "What troops are these, and where are you going?" Upon giving the information that he had been ordered to retire to Bull Run Hill, he was soundly berated by General Pope, and was ordered to remain where he was. Soon afterwards he received orders through a staff officer to advance into the timber on his right. This officer was referred to a brigade commander, but prior to his return Andrews received peremptory orders from a general officer, who proved to be McDowell. This position was towards the left of that occupied by the Union forces. Colonel Chapman who had been absent for a few moments, returned at this time, and under the orders received, led his brigade to the point indicated, and occupied the edge of the wood through which a heavy force of the enemy was advancing. The arrival of the brigade was most opportune. Chapman formed line with the 6th U. S., advanced a little way into

the woods. Here, coolly and calmly the brigade awaited the enemy, and for three-quarters of an hour it held its position, giving and receiving volleys of musketry fire ; but, being outflanked and outnumbered, was forced to retire towards the Henry house, and while doing so, met Buchanan's brigade moving towards the enemy.

Upon reaching the hill in rear of the Henry house, Buchanan had deployed his brigade, awaiting orders. While in this position, an officer on horseback, without a hat, his hair streaming in the wind he created, rode furiously up to where Generals McDowell, Porter, Sykes, Buchanan, and others were sitting on their horses, and in a very frantic manner called for reinforcements. The individual proved to be General Milroy. He was asked for what purpose he wanted reinforcements, and he replied that if he had them he could whip the enemy, or something of that nature. Some one then remarked that he could not have much need of reinforcements if those were his troops, referring to some bodies of men that were hurriedly retiring from the left. Milroy then said : " Meade wants them." General McDowell or General Porter then remarked : " Well, Meade's a good fellow and knows what he's about," and Porter, turning to Sykes, ordered him to send assistance over to the left and front.

Buchanan was ordered by Sykes to take the battalions of the 12th and 14th U. S., and move over to the Sudley Springs road to the edge of a wood, and while placing these regiments in position, he observed that the 3d and 4th U. S. had also been ordered up. Buchanan found the enemy in very strong force in the woods. His entire brigade was

deployed in line of battle, and, during the heat of a very severe engagement, discovered that he was being flanked by large masses of troops. He immediately commenced to gain ground to his left, so as to meet the enemy's movements, and thus held him in check for nearly an hour. At length he found the contest too unequal—his command was being cut to pieces, and the ammunition of his men was nearly expended. At this time he sent Lieutenant Powell to report the facts to General Sykes and ask for orders. He was directed to fall back slowly, which was done in most excellent order. At one time the 3d and 4th were within thirty yards of one of the enemy's brigades, which made a flank movement to turn their left, when the regiments fired by battalions and poured three most destructive volleys into it before the fire could be returned. In retiring, Dryer marched his regiment about thirty yards to the rear, faced about and delivered another volley into the enemy. The enemy's fire becoming very severe upon the retiring column, Dryer, after marching another sixty yards, halted and faced about, and such was the discipline maintained, that he fired two volleys by wing, his left flank being covered by one of the regiments moving to the rear in echelon.

The sun had gone down during the action of Buchanan on the left, the shades of night were being illumined by the flashes from the volleys of musketry, the stone bridge had been saved, and the second battle of Bull Run had been fought.

RÉSUMÉ.

In this chapter the historian has endeavored to record events exactly as they occurred during the

trying days of the memorable August of 1862—not only as they came to his personal knowledge, but as verified by the official reports of the commanders of the various organizations taking part in the campaign herein described. In another chapter, farther on in the chronological order of events, he will refer to the case of the capable, brave, and noble commander of the noble Fifth Corps.

It has been said and believed by many that the Fifth Corps did not fight at the second battle of Bull Run. It is not necessary here to dispute this. The official records show that with only two divisions, numbering less than 6500 men, there were 30 officers killed, 68 wounded, and 8 captured; 301 men killed, 1294 wounded, and 450 captured, making an aggregate loss of 2151—as many as Pope's entire army (consisting of 33,650 engaged) lost at the battle of Cedar Mountain, and more than either of the other corps lost in the Bull Run affair.

While charging the enemy at the railroad cut, the 1st Michigan had the misfortune to lose its gallant colonel (Roberts), who, while bravely leading his command, was shot through the intestines, the missile going directly through his body.

The 16th Michigan had Captain Ransom and Lieutenants Ruby and Chittick killed, and Captain Berry and Lieutenant Swan wounded.

The 12th New York had Captains Root and Fowler wounded.

The 17th New York had Captain Wilson mortally, and Major Grower and Captain Martin dangerously wounded, while Captains Demarest and Blauvelt were shot dead as they were nobly cheering on their men; Captain Burleigh was also wounded. Colonel

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LIST OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS AT SECOND
BULL RUN, AUGUST 29-30, 1862.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General FITZ JOHN PORTER Commanding.							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Major-General GEORGE W. MORELL.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES W. ROBERTS.							
2d Maine.....	1	5	3	70	16		95
18th Massachusetts.....	3	31	5	101	29		169
22d Massachusetts.....							
13th New York.....	3	27	4	71	10		115
25th New York.....				6	13		19
1st Michigan.....	3	26	6	108	2	29	178
Total 1st Brigade.....	14	89	18	356	2	97	576
SECOND BRIGADE :¹							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
9th Massachusetts.....							
32d Massachusetts.....							
14th New York.....							
62d Pennsylvania.....							
4th Michigan.....							
THIRD BRIGADE :							
1. Brigadier-General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD. ²							
2. Colonel HENRY S. LANSING (sick).							
3. Colonel HENRY A. WEEKS (wounded).							
4. Colonel JAMES C. RICE.							
12th New York.....		15	6	57	1	64	143
17th New York.....	3	17	9	101		53	183
44th New York.....		5	6	42		18	71
83d Pennsylvania.....	2	12	2	70	1	10	97
16th Michigan.....	3	13	3	61		16	96
Total 3d Brigade.....	8	62	26	331	2	161	590
SHARPSHOOTERS :							
1st United States.....		5	3	38	1	14	61

¹ Not in action.² Commanded 1st and 3d Brigades in action.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARTILLERY :							
Massachusetts, Light, 3d Battery (no loss reported).....							
1st Rhode Island, Light, Battery C.....				3		1	4
5th United States, Battery D.....				2			2
Total Artillery.....				5		1	6
Total 1st Division.....	22	156	47	730	5	273	1233
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General GEORGE SYKES.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Lieutenant-Col. ROBERT C. BUCHANAN.							
3d United States.....		5	2	15		25	47
4th United States.....		3	1	13		1	18
12th United States, 1st Battalion.....	1	4		32		5	42
14th United States, 1st Battalion.....		14	1	91		23	129
14th United States, 2d Battalion.....	1	3	4	30		11	49
Total 1st Brigade.....	2	29	6	181		65	285
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Lieutenant-Colonel WM. CHAPMAN.							
1st United States, Co. G.....		1		6		4	11
2d United States.....	1	1	1	63	1	7	74
6th United States.....		6	3	26		6	41
10th United States.....		1		11			12
11th United States.....		4		15		13	32
17th United States.....		5		34		9	48
Total 2d Brigade.....	1	18	4	155	1	39	218
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel G. K. WARREN.							
5th New York.....	3	76	7	163		48	297
10th New York.....	1	22	2	63	2	25	115
Total 3d Brigade.....	4	98	9	226	2	73	412
ARTILLERY :							
Captain STEPHEN H. WEED.							
1st United States, Batteries E and G (no loss reported).....							
5th United States, Battery I.....				2			2
5th United States, Battery K.....	1						1
Total Artillery.....	1			2			3
Total 2d Division.....	8	145	21	564	3	177	918
Total Fifth Corps.....	30	301	68	1294	8	450	2151

CHAPTER V.

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN—BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN—ANTHETAM—SHEPHERDSTOWN FORD.

As night, with its mystic shadows settled over the battle-field of Bull Run, the army was directed to retire to Centreville. The march is described by the historian in an article written for *The Century Magazine* and published in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, as follows :

“The last volley had been fired, and as night fell upon us, the division of regulars of Porter's corps was ordered to retire to Centreville. It had fought hard on the extreme left to preserve the line of retreat by the turnpike and the stone bridge. We were gloomy and despondent, and about ‘tired out’ ; we had not had a change of clothing from the 14th to the 31st of August, and had been living, in the words of the men, on ‘salt-horse,’ ‘hardtack,’ and ‘chickory-juice.’ As we filed from the battle-field into the turnpike leading over the stone bridge, we came upon a group of mounted officers, one of whom wore a peculiar style of hat which had been seen on the field that day, and which had been the occasion of a good deal of comment in the ranks. As we passed these officers, the one with the peculiar hat called out in a loud voice :

“ ‘What troops are these?’

“ ‘The regulars,’ answered somebody.

“ ‘Second Division, Fifth Corps,’ replied another.

“ ‘God bless them ! they saved the army,’ added the officer, solemnly. We learned that he was General Irwin McDowell.

"As we neared the bridge, we came upon confusion. Men, singly and in detachments, were mingled with sutlers' wagons, artillery, caissons, supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving to get ahead of the other. Vehicles rushed through organized bodies, and broke the columns into fragments. Little detachments gathered by the roadside, after crossing the bridge, crying out the numbers of their regiments as a guide to scattered comrades.

"And what a night it was! Dark, gloomy, and beclouded by the volumes of smoke which had risen from the battle-field. To our disgust with the situation was added the discomfort of a steady rain setting in after nightfall. With many threats to reckless drivers, and through the untiring efforts of our officers—not knowing how, when, or where we should meet the enemy again,—we managed to preserve our organization intact, keeping out of the road as much as possible, in order to avoid mingling with others. In this way we arrived at Centreville some time before midnight, and on the morning of the 31st of August we were placed in the old Confederate earthworks surrounding that village, to await developments.

"It was Sunday! The morning was cold and rainy; everything bore a look of sadness in unison with our feelings. All about were the *disjecta membra* of a shattered army. Here were stragglers plodding through the mud inquiring for their regiments; little squads, just issuing from their shelterless bivouac on the wet ground; wagons wrecked and forlorn; half-formed regiments, part of the men with guns and part without; wanderers driven in by the patrols; while every one you met had an unwashed, sleepy, downcast aspect, and looked as if he would like to hide his head somewhere from all the world.

"During the afternoon a council of war was held in the bivouac of the regular division, at which I noticed all the prominent generals of the army. It was a long one, and apparently not over-pleasant, if one might judge of it by the expression on the faces of the officers when they separated. The information it developed, however, was that the enemy was between the Army of the Potomac and Washington; that Kearny was then engaged with him at Chantilly, and that we must fall back towards the defenses of the city. Dejection disappeared, activity took the place of immobility, and we were ready again to renew the contest. But who was to be our leader? and where were we to fight? These were the questions that sprang to our lips."

General McClellan, upon his arrival at Alexandria from the Peninsula, was directed to remain at that point and forward his troops to General Pope as fast as they arrived, and, fully complying with these orders from Washington, found himself stripped of everything but a small camp guard of less than 100 men; and this was the extent of his command at the closing scene of the second battle of Bull Run.

About 5 P.M. of the 30th, Captain Martin's battery, which had followed General Griffin's brigade to Centreville, was ordered by General Griffin to proceed from that place to the battle-field; but it did not arrive in season to be of any service, and was therefore directed to return to Centreville, where, the next morning, it was placed in battery by General Morell, and remained until the morning of September 2d, leaving its position at 1.30 A.M., and then moved towards Washington, arriving near Chain Bridge the evening of the same day. On September 3d it marched to Hall's hill and remained until the 7th, when it was ordered to Alexandria to refit. The following day it joined General Griffin's brigade at Upton's hill.

Captain Waterman's battery moved by order of General Morell from Centreville on the morning of August 31st towards Alexandria, to procure forage for the horses, they being in a very exhausted state, not having had any grain for five days. It moved as far as Fairfax Court-House, and encamped, three of the horses having dropped dead from exhaustion as the battery moved into camp. Not being able to procure either rations or forage, on the 1st of September it moved to within five miles of Alexandria, where part of one day's rations of grain was secured,

and the next day it proceeded to Alexandria. On the 3d of September, it marched to Miner's hill and rejoined the division. All other divisional batteries remained with the commands.

On the night of August 31st, the 16th Michigan was on picket duty in front of the command at Centreville.

General Pope, in his report of the battles of August 29th and 30th states that the wagon-trains in his charge had all been brought in safely. This is verified by Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. H. Smith, A.-D.-C., in a note dated from New York, January 27, 1863, saying :

"A dispatch was received from Major-General Banks on the 2d of September, stating that the wagon-trains in his charge had all been brought in safely—nothing lost."

Notwithstanding such report, there were 500 wagons, 147 cars, 7 locomotives, and 300,000 rations burned by order. This is attested by the following letter :

" OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE,
" FIFTH ARMY CORPS, April 1, 1864.

" COL. FRED. T. LOCKE,

" *Adj.-Genl. and Chief of Staff Fifth Army Corps :*

" SIR : In compliance with your request, I have the honor to send you a true copy of the order to destroy public stores, etc., at Bristoe Station, on the morning of September 1, 1862, by direction of General Pope, after the retreat of the army from the battle-field of Bull Run on to Centreville.

" ' Captain PIPER : Destroy all public property by fire and withdraw the troops at once.

" ' By command of Major-General POPE :

(Signed)

" ' N. P. BANKS, M. G. C. '

" The order is in General Banks' handwriting. Captain Piper was an officer of General Pope's staff, on special duty for the time

with General Banks. General Banks, with about 3000 men, was in charge of the trains and other public property in the vicinity of Bristoe Station, Va. The number of railroad cars burned was 147 ; the number of locomotives, 7 ; the number of rations—commissary property—was over 300,000 rations of all kinds except meat, of which I had about 30,000. The number of empty wagons near the trains, and which had been there for several days idle, was not less than 500.

“ These trains of stores were collected at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, and run down to Bristoe, which was as far as they could be taken, on account of the bridge at that place having been destroyed by the rebels. In addition to subsistence stores, they contained all the quartermaster’s and medical supplies for the Army of Virginia, which were even more valuable than the subsistence. There was sufficient wagon transportation available, if it had been brought into requisition, and ample time, to have saved all these stores.

“ During the action, I reported to General Pope personally (having with me at the time present Lieutenant J. J. Devoe, of the regular service, and Captain Meredith, of Subsistence Department) that, with the transportation available, I could deliver within the camps of the troops before sunset of that day, from 30,000 to 50,000 rations, if the troops requested them, and I asked permission to do so, stating at the time my apprehension that a change of the position of the army might endanger the safety of the stores. The reply I received was : ‘ Return to your post ; General Banks will take care of your stores.’ This was before the action commenced on the second day of the fight—say about 2 o’clock P.M., and the day before the stores were destroyed. There was no necessity for any troops being without rations, as I had even ample supplies for the entire army there, as fully three-days’ rations for the whole army were burned, and all that was required was the necessary orders to supply them to the troops.

“ I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

“ D. L. SMITH,

“ Capt. and Com. Subs., U. S. Vols.,

“ Late Depot Commissary Army of Virginia.”

Notwithstanding the fact that the men of the Fifth Corps were in front of the enemy from noon of

August 29th until after dark on the 30th, and that General Porter had urged the necessity of supplying food to his command, it will be seen by the above that, for some reason, rations were withheld and subsequently destroyed.

The officers and men of the Army of the Potomac, and of the Fifth Corps in particular, after all they had done, ought to feel very kindly (?) towards the individual who could make such a report of them as is contained in the following dispatch, sent from Centreville on the 1st of September, to wit :

“ CENTREVILLE, Sept. 1—8.50 A.M.

“ MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK : All was quiet yesterday and so far this morning. My men are resting. They need it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. The consequence is, that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure ; and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can—the next day certainly. I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the peninsula. Every word, and act, and intention is discouraging and calculated to break down the spirits of the men and produce disaster. One commander of a corps, who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all, and worse still, fell back to Manassas¹ without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three-miles' distance of a furious [?] battle, which raged all day.² It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me the next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville, in plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse, these are

¹ See p. 207 ; also Report of Schofield Board, *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xii., part 2.

² For truth of this see *Reb. Rec.*, vols. xi., xii., xiii.

both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is that the Army of the Potomac will not fight; that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the peninsula, etc. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad amongst those in subordinate stations.

"You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can and *I will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away.*

"JOHN POPE, Major-General."

This dispatch was a clean "stab in the back" for the Fifth Corps, as it was sent to Washington without being shown to any of those concerned, and without even asking for an explanation of the conduct of those who it asserts disobeyed orders. It was on the receipt of this dispatch, as subsequently proved, that President Lincoln requested General McClellan to ask of his officers and men a hearty co-operation. This General McClellan did in the following:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"September 1, 1862—5.30 P.M.

"Major-General PORTER:

"*Centreville, Commanding Sixth [Fifth] Corps:*

"I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and of the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The distresses [destinies] of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my friends in the

Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. I am in charge of the defenses of Washington. I am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.”

To this dispatch General Porter replied as follows :

“ FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE,
“ September 2, 1862—10 A.M.

“ General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Washington* :

“ You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty.

“ F. J. PORTER,
“ Major-General, Commanding.”

These two communications were passed without either of the officers knowing what had been said by General Pope concerning the disloyalty of the Army of the Potomac. We will let this subject drop for the present, but will refer to it in the succeeding chapter, asking our readers to bear the above correspondence in mind.

Near 3 P.M., September 1st, General Pope went to General Porter (notwithstanding the base charges made in the letter above quoted), and, candidly stating his enforced position, asked Porter's opinions and for suggestions. Porter, deeming that we then held a worse than useless position—the enemy not daring to strike us, and we in no condition to go after him,—urged immediate withdrawal from Centreville to the protection of Washington and Maryland, towards which, for two days, in plain sight, had been

hastening the exulting enemy. Porter said he believed it wrong to have held to Centreville so long; every necessity required it to be abandoned, and our troops were dispirited and without food. He said that General Pope would be held responsible for the safety of the capital and proper use of the army; that our condition could not be understood at Washington, and no orders from distant authority should compel him to submit to and maintain a manifest wrong in every point of view. Porter told Pope that he had had no talk with others, but suggested that Pope should confer with those general officers present to whose opinion he had a right, and whose judgment he should respect. At Porter's solicitation they then sought General Franklin, at whose tent were called Generals W. F. Smith, Newton, Hancock, Slocum, Bartlett, and others, all of whom gave about the same advice as Porter, and General Pope issued verbal orders withdrawing his troops to Fairfax Court House.

Just as the decision was given, General Kelton, aide to General Halleck, entered the tent, and was informed of the orders and the reasons for them. Kelton expressed surprise at receiving an unfavorable report of the situation, and said from official reports (Pope's) received in Washington he expected to find General Pope with a very large force in good condition, and cheerful after great successes, though rumors had been sometime in circulation stating the contrary (Porter's letters to McClellan), and as he now found true. He had come prepared, if the latter reports were correct, to direct as General Pope had just ordered.

While this conference was being held, the enemy,

in large force and unbeknown to the army at large, had struck our right and rear. This movement on the part of the Confederates was meant to turn the right of the Union army, and interpose their forces between the capital and the forces of General Pope.

General McDowell received orders to march his whole command back to Fairfax. Generals Sumner and Heintzelman also received orders to march at daylight the next morning across the Little River turnpike in the direction of Chantilly. General Heintzelman had scarcely returned to his headquarters after getting this order, when he received notice that the enemy was about to attack him. The enemy had already struck Reno, and at 4 P.M. General Kearny's troops were in motion, followed by General Grover, then in command of Hooker's division. At 5.50 firing commenced by Reno. The enemy was within half a mile of the Warrenton pike when they attacked him. General Stevens being killed, a portion of his troops gave way, but Birney's brigade of Kearny's division gallantly supported them. At this juncture General Kearny reached the field with Randolph's battery (K, 1st U. S. Art.), and, placing it in position, aided Birney by a well directed fire. Birney pointed out to Kearny a gap on his right, caused by the retiring of Stevens' division, and asked for Berry's brigade to fill it. General Kearny then rode to the point to examine the ground, and dashing past Birney's lines, ran into the enemy, falling a victim to his gallant daring.

General Birney then sent forward the 38th New York and 57th Pennsylvania, to complete the work he had begun, and they advanced gallantly, driving the enemy and assuring victory to the Union arms.

Then night closed in, leaving Birney's brigade in full possession of that part of the field, and "Chantilly" was added to the list of battles fought. This repulse caused the enemy to cease his efforts at this point, and with only light skirmishing the movement of the Union forces was continued to Fairfax Court-House.

As soon as General Pope heard of the success of Reno and Kearny at Chantilly, he issued the following instructions :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
" FAIRFAX, C. H., Sept. 2, 1862.

" CIRCULAR }
}

" The following movement of troops will be made at once, in accordance with instructions from the War Department, viz. :

" 1. Banks' corps will march by the Braddock road and Annandale, and take post at or near Fort Worth.

" 2. The corps of Franklin and Hooker will pursue the Little River pike towards Alexandria.

" 3. Heintzelman's corps the Braddock road to Fort Lyon.

" McDowell's corps the road by Falls Church, Little River, and Columbia pikes towards Forts Craig and Tillinghast. The corps of Porter, Sumner, and Sigel, via Vienna towards the Chain bridge. These three latter corps will keep well closed up and within easy supporting distance of each other. . . .

" By command of Major-General Pope :

" GEO. D. RUGGLES,

" Colonel and Chief of Staff."

It will thus be seen that General Pope was as good as his word in the dispatch he sent to Washington. He put the Fifth Corps where it had "to fight or run away"; it was in advance on the flank of the enemy, with whom it skirmished several miles on leaving Fairfax Court-House. But in his anxiety to "make them fight," General Pope failed to note that he gave the corps the post of honor.

For a description of the march of these three corps we again quote from the article written for *The Century Magazine* by the historian of this work, as follows :

“We had been ordered to keep our camp-fires burning brightly until ‘tattoo’; and then, after the rolls had been called, we stole away—out into a gloomy night, made more desolate by the glare of dying embers. Nothing occurred to disturb our march; we arrived at Fairfax Court-House early on the morning of the 2d of September. At this point we turned off on the road to Washington, and went into bivouac. Here all sorts of rumors reached us; but, tired out from the weary night march, our blankets were soon spread on the ground and we enjoyed an afternoon and night of comparative repose.

“About 4 o’clock on the next afternoon we descried in the distance the dome of the Capitol. Would we be there at least in time to defend it? Darkness came upon us and still we marched. As the night wore on, we found at each halt that it was more and more difficult to rouse the men from the sleep into which they would fall apparently as soon as they touched the ground. During one of these halts, while Colonel Buchanan, the brigade commander, was resting a little off the road, some distance in advance of the head of the column, it being starlight, two horsemen came down the road toward us. I thought I observed a familiar form, and, turning to Colonel Buchanan, said :

“ ‘Colonel, if I did not know that General McClellan had been relieved of all command, I should say that he was one of that party,’ adding immediately ‘I do really believe that it is he!’

“ ‘Nonsense,’ said the Colonel; ‘what would General McClellan be doing in this lonely place, at this time of night, without an escort?’

“The two horsemen passed on to where the men of the column were lying, standing, or sitting, and were soon lost in the shadowy gloom. But a few moments had elapsed, however, when Captain John D. Wilkins, of the 3d Infantry (now Colonel of the 5th), came running towards Colonel Buchanan, crying out :

“ ‘Colonel! Colonel! General McClellan is here!’

“The enlisted men caught the sound. Whoever was awake aroused his neighbor. Eyes were rubbed, and those tired fellows,

as the news passed down the column, jumped to their feet and sent up such a hurrah as the Army of the Potomac had never heard before. Shout upon shout went out into the stillness of the night; and as it was taken up along the road and repeated by regiment, brigade, division, and corps, we could hear the roar dying away in the distance. The effect of this man's presence upon the Army of the Potomac—in sunshine or rain, in darkness or in daylight, in victory or defeat—was electrical, and too wonderful to make it worth while attempting to give a reason for it."

While these movements had been progressing, General McClellan, unknown to his army, had (September 1st) been called from Alexandria to Washington and placed in command of the defenses of the city only, but the next day he was directed to assume command of all troops operating with General Pope; and as each corps established itself within the zone of those defenses, it found itself under his command. He did not sit in Washington, and give directions regarding them, but, as mentioned above, went forth with one aide (Monteith) and three orderlies to greet his old command once more and designate personally the positions they were to occupy.

Porter's corps was placed on Hall's hill; McDowell's on Upton's hill; Franklin's and Heintzelman's were sent to the works in front of Alexandria; the Second and Twelfth Corps were sent to Tenallytown, and the Ninth to a point on the Seventh Street road. These last three corps were moved to these positions September 3d—the enemy having disappeared from the front of Washington.

Sykes' division at this time was detached from the Fifth Corps, and was held as an independent division.

Notwithstanding the demoralizing influences of the late campaign, General McClellan, upon ascertaining

that the enemy was moving northward, at once took the initiative in a new campaign. It has been stated and firmly believed by many that General McClellan undertook the Maryland campaign on his own responsibility and without orders. We do not know how such an impression has been created, for, on the 3d of September, "General McClellan was directed¹ to pursue him [the enemy] with all the troops which were not required for the defense of Washington," and General McClellan says, in his own report²: "Being honored with the charge of this campaign, I entered at once upon the additional duties imposed on me with cheerfulness and trust." Therefore, having made the necessary arrangements for the defense of Washington, he pushed forward the First and Ninth Corps, under Generals Reno and Hooker, forming the right wing under General Burnside, to Leesborough on the 5th of September; thence the First Corps to Frederick, and the Ninth Corps by Damascus to the same point. The Second and Twelfth Corps, under Generals Sumner and Williams, on the 6th, were moved by Urbana or Frederick, the Twelfth Corps moving by a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining communication between the centre and right wing, as well as covering the direct route from Frederick to Washington. Sykes' division was the same evening ordered, and that night proceeded, to Rockville. The Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, was moved to Darnestown on the 6th of September, thence on Buckeystown, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in position to connect with and support the

¹ General Halleck's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xix., part 1, p. 4.

² *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xix., p. 25.

centre should it have been necessary, as it was supposed, to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division was thrown forward to Offutt's Cross-Roads and Poolesville by the river road, thus covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the Sixth Corps.

About this time the Fifth Corps had some valuable accessions to its numbers. Among the regiments joining was the 20th Maine and the 118th Pennsylvania (Corn Exchange of Philadelphia). The 20th Maine was made up of choice companies from widely different portions of the State. It was organized at Portland, Me., under the superintendence and command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, a gentleman of high social standing and scholarly attainments, and who subsequently proved as gallant a soldier as he was an accomplished gentleman. Colonel Chamberlain was Professor of Modern European Languages, and had leave of absence for two years to visit Europe. But he immediately offered his services to the Governor, and was sent at once to organize this regiment. His college would not accept his resignation, but extended his leave from year to year. His commission was dated August 8, 1862. Near the end of the month, the colonel, Adelbert Ames, joined and took command. He was a first lieutenant of the 5th U. S. Artillery, having graduated at the U. S. Military Academy, May 6, 1861, and had served with distinction with his battery in the Army of the Potomac, during the Peninsula campaign. Charles D. Gilmore, of Bangor, was major, and had been sheriff of Penobscot County. The regiment left Portland, September 2, 1862, arrived at Alexandria, September 6th, where it was armed with spurious

Enfield rifles, and on the 8th moved to Arlington Heights (Fort Craig). It was assigned to the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps, which it joined on the morning of September 12th, near the Aqueduct bridge, and commenced the hard march with Morell's division to Antietam.

The 118th Pennsylvania was known throughout the war as the "Corn Exchange Regiment of Philadelphia." This regiment was raised by the money and efforts of the members of the Corn Exchange of Philadelphia, in resolutions adopted July 24, 1862, and on the afternoon of September 1st the regiment arrived at Washington, D.C. It was composed of a fine body of men, and commanded by gallant officers. The colonel, Charles M. Prevost, was of Revolutionary ancestry, and had served as assistant adjutant-general of volunteers during the Peninsula campaign. The lieutenant-colonel, James Gwyn, had seen service as a captain in the 23d Pennsylvania on the Peninsula, and subsequently became colonel of the regiment. Charles P. Herring was the major. He had been a lieutenant of the Gray Reserves, and, although not having seen service with the army, had participated with his company in quelling the Schuylkill County riots in May, 1862. The regiment was assigned to the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps, and joined September 12, 1862.

Both these regiments received their baptism of blood at Shepherdstown Ford, Va., and the States to which they belonged have ever felt a just pride in their valor and achievements.

About midnight on the 11th of September, General Porter received orders to report with his corps to General McClellan at Brookville, Md. The only

portion of his corps then under his command was Morell's division. One brigade was at Upton's Hill, one at Hunter's Chapel, and the other at Fort Corcoran. At 6 A.M. of the 12th, the division, about 6000 strong, was in motion, via Leesborough, to join the active army.

Tyler's and Allabach's brigades, constituting Whipple's (subsequently Humphrey's) division were voluntarily assigned to the Fifth Corps on the morning of the 12th by the general-in-chief (Halleck), and, on the morning of the 14th (having been delayed by exchanging arms and obtaining transportation and provisions), about 6000 strong, marched to join near Middletown, Md. The two brigades were composed entirely of Pennsylvania troops. The first consisted of the 91st, Colonel E. M. Gregory; the 126th, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. Rowe; the 129th, Colonel J. G. Frick; and the 134th, Lieutenant-Colonel E. O'Brien; and was commanded by Brigadier-General E. B. Tyler. The second brigade consisted of the 123d, Colonel John B. Clark; 131st, Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. B. Shaut; 133d, Colonel F. B. Speakman; and the 155th, Colonel E. J. Allen; and was commanded by Colonel P. H. Allabach. On the afternoon of the 13th, however, General Humphreys received a note from General Halleck, stating that if he did not immediately join his division in the field he would be arrested. This caused General Humphreys (after the campaign was over) to apply for a court of inquiry, in which request he states:

"On Friday, the 12th of September, about noon, I was ordered, without any previous intimation, to take command of a division of new troops, about 7000 strong, which would pass through the city that day about 3 o'clock P.M., and march on the road to

Rockville ; to see that it was well supplied with rations, forage, and ammunition ; that all baggage that could be dispensed with should be stored, and that the command should be kept fresh on the march ; that I was not informed of the position of our army, or that of the enemy, or of the probability that a battle would soon take place ; that I had no staff officers, and could get none at the Departments ; that the troops did not begin to reach the city until 7 o'clock P.M., and did not reach their bivouac near Columbia College until from midnight to morning ; that one brigade (3600 strong) had no rations whatever, and an insufficient supply of forage ; that all its arms were unserviceable ; that it had no wagons for ammunition and no supply train, and that its regimental wagons, five per regiment, did not arrive until near midday Saturday [13th] ; that it had no ambulances, or but one per regiment ; that it had no shelter tents, but full regular allowance of common tents, which it could not transport, and that its officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage ; that the other brigade (3600 strong) had an insufficient supply of rations and forage, and but eight wagons for supply train, and one ambulance per regiment ; that the arms of one of the regiments were unserviceable ; that the brigade had no shelter tents, but the allowance of common tents ; that officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage ; that I made every effort possible to supply the deficiencies and march on Saturday, but found it impracticable ; but that on Saturday night [13th], all deficiencies were supplied through my personal efforts, and that my command marched at daylight Sunday, 14th September ; that by orders received at Monocacy station Tuesday evening [16th], my command halted near Frederick during Wednesday to protect that city, marching again, under new orders received at 3.30 P.M. of that day, and that by additional orders continued that march during the night, and was in position at Antietam at an early hour the next morning, Thursday, 18th September, having marched more than 23 miles."

With the disadvantages above enumerated, taken in connection with the formation of a new division, it is somewhat surprising that General Humphreys made the time he did in arriving on the battle-field of

Antietam. No more could have been expected of an old organization.

General Porter reported in person to General McClellan on the morning of the 14th, and, by the latter's order, resumed command of Sykes' division and that portion of the Reserve Artillery not distributed to corps, Morell's division continuing the march by the way of Frederick and Boonsboro'. The troops of the Fifth Corps present were held in readiness to take part in the battle of South Mountain, bivouacking in rear of Reno's left, partly up the mountain side, on the evening of the 14th.

While these movements of the Union army had been going on, the Confederate cavalry, under General Fitz Lee, had made a demonstration toward Alexandria on the morning of September 3d, Hampton's brigade moving by way of Hunter's Mill to the Leesburg pike, towards Dranesville. In the meantime, the main Confederate army had taken up its line of march towards Leesburg, keeping up demonstrations towards Georgetown and the Chain bridge, Robertson's brigade moving in the direction of Falls Church. The cavalry followed the rear of the army to Leesburg. Longstreet's command crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, and moved to Frederick City, Md., arriving there on the 7th.

Jackson's corps had crossed the Potomac on the 5th, proceeded to Frederick City, which it left on the 10th, and passing rapidly through Middletown, Boonsboro', and Williamsport, recrossed the Potomac on the 11th, at Light's Ford, and on the 13th appeared before Harper's Ferry.

At the same moment that Jackson made his appearance in front of Harper's Ferry, Franklin, with

the Sixth Corps, was at a point three miles east of Jefferson, and Longstreet, who on the 11th had sent six brigades under General Anderson to attack Maryland Heights, made a forced march to Boonsboro' Gap in the Blue Ridge, to assist D. H. Hill's division in holding the Union forces in check.

On the morning of the 14th, Franklin advanced towards the Blue Ridge, and, finding Crampton's Pass (which he was ordered to occupy) held by the enemy (Cobb's, Semmes', and Mahone's brigades), made immediate preparations to attack, which he did, and after a gallant charge up the mountain and over the crest, the position was carried, the enemy being driven in confusion. At this moment, however, the white flag had been displayed by Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry. Had he held on for twenty-four hours, he would have been relieved of Jackson's presence in front of him, Jackson being needed very badly by General Lee; this, in consequence of McClellan having pushed his command and attacked the enemy in the strong position Lee was occupying at South Mountain, holding Turner's Pass on the main pike to Sharpsburg. After a gallant flank attack by General Reno, in which he was killed, about 7 P.M. of the 14th, the Confederates were driven from the mountain, and retired towards Sharpsburg. Thus, at sundown on the 14th, McClellan had forced Lee to such an extent that Jackson would have been ordered that very night to abandon his demonstrations at Harper's Ferry and return to the main command. An order of General Lee's, giving the movements of the Confederate forces, having fallen into McClellan's hands, furnished the latter this information, and caused him to make his attacks immediately, believing by such

attacks Jackson would the sooner be recalled, and Harper's Ferry thus relieved.

On the night of the 14th, General McClellan gave orders to his corps commanders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy had abandoned his position, and an immediate pursuit was ordered—the cavalry, under General Pleasanton, and the three corps of Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield (the latter of whom had arrived that morning and assumed command of the Twelfth Corps) by the National turnpike and Boonsboro'; General Franklin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry (McClellan not having heard of the surrender at that time). General Burnside, whose troops were on the crest of the mountains, and General Porter with only his division of regulars, which was nearly at the base on the eastern slope, were ordered in pursuit by the old Sharpsburg road, and upon reaching the road from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville, were to reinforce Franklin or move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Instead of General Burnside moving, as was expected, Sykes' division of Porter's corps passed up the mountain, through Burnside's command, and confronted the enemy at Antietam. General Burnside reached the neighborhood of Antietam about sundown.

Franklin moved towards Brownsville, and found there a force of the enemy, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. The cavalry overtook the Confederate cavalry at Boonsboro', and made a daring charge,

killing and wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners and two guns.

The Fifth Corps had not as yet participated in any mountain campaigns, and when it started down the western slope of the Blue Ridge, the Antietam valley lay basking in peacefulness, with its immense fields of grain and ripening orchards in full view, while white hamlets dotted the surface here and there, forming a panorama of wondrous beauty. The wind rustled softly among trembling leaves. Ever and anon birds jumped about in a frightened and dazed manner at the unusual invasion of their mountain homes, uttering as it were notes of danger; that and the steady tramp of hurrying feet out from the dark woods into the sunlit valley was like the low moaning which precedes a storm at sea.

Sharpsburg was quite shut out from sight. Dense clumps of trees furnished a dark contrast to the yellow fields of ripening grain—trees that were now clothed in the rich and lovely leafage of autumn. In the distance a little stream, that seemed to run under a toy-like bridge, met the eye—apparently a little span of shallow water that could offer no impediment to an army. The drowsy hush of the minute before the storm seemed to have cast its spell over everything—the upturned glassy eyes of the corpses of yesterday's harvest of battle adding to the solemnity of the moment. The grim, hard-featured faces of the warriors had lost something of their grimness, for Death has a marvellous way of smoothing out the lines and creases of the human visage, and bestowing upon it that serenity and quiet content which give a kind of beauty to even the homeliest or the most forlorn. Had there been no civil war in our country, this little

stream would have been only of local note ; but its waters have been crimsoned with the blood of heroes, and history has enrolled the name of "Antietam" among those of the most sanguinary conflicts of modern times.

General Richardson's division of the Second Corps, pressing the rear-guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonesboro' and Keedysville, and came upon the main body of the enemy, occupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond the latter place. It had been hoped by General McClellan to engage the enemy during the 15th. Accordingly, orders were given to the various corps commanders that if the enemy was overtaken on the march, he was to be attacked at once ; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be placed in position for attack and await further orders. General Sykes had pressed on and established his division, and when General McClellan arrived at the front there were but two divisions (Richardson's and Sykes') in position, the former on the right and the latter on the left of the main pike leading over the central bridge to Sharpsburg. The other troops had been halted in the road some distance in rear.

The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights to the west of Antietam Creek, and numerous batteries of artillery opening on the Union columns as they appeared in sight on the roads, crowned the crest. This fire was at once returned by Tidball's battery of the 2d U. S. and Petit's battery of the 1st New York Artillery.

Antietam Creek in this vicinity is crossed by four stone bridges : the upper one on the Keedysville and Williamsport road ; the second one on the Keedys-

ville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two and one-half miles below ; the third about one mile below the second, on the Rohrsville and Sharpsburg road ; and the fourth near the mouth of Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles below the third. The stream is sluggish, with but few and difficult fords.

General Lee having learned during the evening of the 14th that Crampton's Pass had been forced by Franklin, and believing from a report from General Jackson that Harper's Ferry would be surrendered the next morning, determined to take up a new position in the vicinity of Antietam Creek, where the Confederate army could be united. During the night of the 14th, therefore, he moved to Sharpsburg, and at daylight of the 15th was in place in front of that town.

Jackson's report of the surrender of Harper's Ferry was received by General Lee prior to the arrival of the advance of the Union forces on the 15th. This information inspired the Confederates and lent zeal for the coming struggle.

While General Lee had taken up an exceedingly strong position—probably the strongest in that section of the country, yet it was one where defeat might be followed by dire disaster, for he was backed up against the Potomac River, which was broad at this point, with but a single ford by which he could cross his army, and that at a point farthest from the centre of his line of battle ; or in other words, he occupied an irregular triangular strip of land, formed by a bend of the river, across the widest part of which was stretched his line of battle. During the night of the 16th he changed the position of his batteries, but

kept his troops well concealed. The left and centre were upon and in front of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike (consisting only of the troops of Longstreet and D. H. Hill), hidden by woods and irregularities of the ground, the extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence, near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm, terminating upon the Potomac. The line extended south, the right resting upon the hills to the south of Sharpsburg, near Snavelly's farm. The bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by Confederate riflemen, protected by rifle-pits and stone fences, and enfiladed by artillery. On all favorable points, the Confederate artillery was posted. By holding bridge No. 3, General Lee not only held the way open for A. P. Hill to join him with five brigades of infantry and six batteries of artillery from Harper's Ferry ; but as long as he was able to hold it he afforded himself an additional line of retreat other than by Shepherdstown Ford in case of defeat. Could he have induced General McClellan to throw his whole army across Antietam Creek against the Confederate centre and left flank, Lee's chance of success would have been very great.

General McClellan having surveyed the position occupied by the Confederates on the afternoon of the 15th, concluded that by the time he got his troops in position it would be night, and therefore too late to make an attack ; but he went to work at once to establish his lines. The left, opposite to and some distance from bridge No. 3, was occupied by Burnside's corps. Sykes' division of Porter's corps was on the left of the turnpike, extending towards Burnside's right. Buchanan's brigade, consisting of the 3d U. S.,

Captain John Wilkins; the 4th U. S., Captain Hiram Dwyer; the 1st Battalion of the 12th U. S., Captain M. M. Blunt; the 2d Battalion of the 12th U. S., Captain Thos. M. Anderson; the 1st Battalion of the 14th U. S., Captain W. H. Brown; and the 2d Battalion of the 14th U. S., under Captain David B. McKibbin, was deployed in two lines, the 3d and the two Battalions of the 12th in the front line and the two Battalions of the 14th in the rear line, close to the first, on the height near to and overlooking the central bridge (No. 2). Lovell's brigade, consisting of the 1st and 6th U. S., Captain Levi S. Bootes; the 2d and 10th U. S., Captain John S. Poland; the 11th U. S., Major DeLancey Floyd-Jones; and the 17th U. S., Major George L. Andrews, was formed on the left of Buchanan. Warren's brigade, consisting of the 5th New York, Captain Cleveland Winslow, and the 10th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Jno. W. Marshall, was held in reserve.

The 3d Infantry was thrown forward as skirmishers, to cover the bridge.

Richardson's division was deployed on the right of the pike, his left connecting with Buchanan's right. On the extreme right, near Keedysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike, were Sumner's and Hooker's corps.

General Burnside's orders were to advance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of bridge No. 3, and to reconnoitre the approaches thereto carefully. In front of Generals Hooker and Sumner, and the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between the turnpike and Pry's house were placed Taffe's, Langner's, Von Kleiser's, and Lieutenant Wever's batteries of 20-pounder Parrott guns;

on the crest of the hill, in rear and right of bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's 3-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder batteries were placed.

Franklin's corps and Couch's division were holding a position in Pleasant Valley, in front of Brownsville, while Morell's division of Porter's corps was en route from Boonesboro' and Humphrey's division was en route, at Frederick.

About 7 A.M. of the 16th the 4th U. S. was ordered to take possession of and hold bridge No. 2. On arriving within 200 yards of it, Dryer detached Lieutenant Buell, with Company G, with orders to advance rapidly on the bridge, which was accomplished without opposition. Dryer marched the remainder of the regiment down and threw four companies across the bridge, posting them under cover of a large barn on the left of the pike and under the bank on the right, where they remained quiet for several hours, when it was discovered that the enemy was advancing on their position, with his skirmishers on both sides of the turnpike. Companies G and K were then thrown out as skirmishers, one to the right and the other to the left of the pike, and engaged the enemy. It was about this time that the Confederate batteries began a vigorous shelling of Dryer's skirmishers, as well as the batteries on the heights in rear.

General Morell, with his division of Porter's corps, had left camp on the south bank of the Potomac about 6 A.M. of the 12th, and marching through Frederick City and Boonesboro', arrived on the battle-field about noon of the 16th. On the morning of the 17th he relieved Richardson's division on the right of Sykes, covering the army trains and Reserve Artillery, and supporting

the batteries which crowned the high ridge to the right of bridge No. 2. This consisted of the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Jas. Barnes, comprising the 2d Maine, Colonel C. W. Roberts; 18th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Jos. Hays; 22d Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. S. Tilton; 1st Michigan, Captain E. W. Belton; 13th New York, Colonel E. G. Marshall; 25th New York, Colonel C. A. Johnson; 118th Pennsylvania, Colonel C. M. Prevost; and 2d Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Captain L. E. Wentworth. The 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Chas. Griffin, comprised the 2d District of Columbia, Colonel C. M. Alexander; 9th Massachusetts, Colonel P. R. Guiney; 32d Massachusetts, Colonel F. J. Parker; 4th Michigan, Colonel J. W. Childs; 14th New York, Colonel James McQuade; and 62d Pennsylvania, Colonel J. B. Sweitzer. The 3d Brigade, under Colonel T. B. W. Stockton, comprised the 17th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel N. B. Bartram; 20th Maine, Colonel Adelbert Ames; 16th Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel N. E. Welch; 14th New York, Captain Wm. Huson; 44th New York, Major Freeman Connor; 83d Pennsylvania, Captain O. S. Woodward; and Brady's company of Michigan Sharpshooters, Lieutenant J. H. Titus.

Between 1 and 2 P.M. of the 16th, General Hooker was ordered with his corps, consisting of Rickett's, Meade's, and Doubleday's divisions, to cross the Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1—a short distance above—to attack, and if possible to turn the enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered to send Mansfield's corps across during the night, and hold his own, the Second Corps, ready to cross early the

next morning. General Hooker accordingly crossed and took a direction nearly perpendicular to the creek, his object being to gain high ground, or the divide between the Potomac River and Antietam Creek, and then incline to the left, following the elevation toward the left of the enemy. Two regiments of Meade's division were thrown forward as skirmishers, followed by a squadron of Owen's cavalry—all supported by Meade's division. These had not proceeded over one half or three fourths of a mile, before the skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's advanced posts, and the firing was continued until dark, the First Corps advancing slowly, and the enemy retiring accordingly. The cleared space between the forests necessitated a change by General Hooker in his front from a division to a brigade, and Seymour's command held the advance when night overtook the movement.

This attack was met by General Hood, whose troops occupied the extreme left of the Confederate line. Hood claims to have driven Hooker back, but not without severe loss.

General Mansfield crossed the creek during the night of the 16th and encamped his command about one mile in rear of Hooker's, the latter's advance being some three miles from where it had crossed the bridge.

At daylight on the 17th, General Hooker was fully prepared to renew his forward movement, which lay through orchards, cornfields, and over plowed ground, skirted on either side by forests, the cleared space between which averaged some 400 or 500 yards in width. Doubleday's division was posted on the right, Rickett's on the left, and Meade's in reserve. At daylight Gibbon's and Hartsuff's brigades were

thrown forward, supported by the brigades of their respective divisions, while Meade followed them up in the centre, instructed to spring to the assistance of either, as circumstances might require. Seymour continued to hold the advance with the utmost firmness and resolution until the other troops passed him.

General Hooker's object was to gain the high ground nearly three quarters of a mile in advance of his present position, and which completely commanded the position taken up by the enemy. His troops had not proceeded far, however, before he discovered a heavy force of the enemy in a cornfield in his immediate front, the fact being disclosed by the sun's rays falling on their bayonets, they standing in line, evidently at "support arms." All of Hooker's batteries near at hand (five or six) were ordered to spring into battery at once and to open with canister on this field.¹ Smoke-clouds leaped in sudden fury from these batteries, and from the ridges crowned with artillery; the volleyed thunder bespoke destruction. Those of the enemy who escaped fled in the opposite direction, and were followed closely by the Union troops. The surprise was a terrible one for the enemy. As Hooker advanced, the opposition of the Confederates became more determined, they being driven from the open field in front of the first line of woods into a second line of woods which ran to the

¹ After the battle was over, every stalk of corn in the northern part of this field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in ranks. These were a part of Jackson's troops from Harper's Ferry, and were waiting for some stragglers to arrive (which had been left during the night march), in anticipation of delivering an attack on Hooker's command. They having arrived at 2.30 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, were placed in this position temporarily to give a surprise to General Hooker.

eastward of, and nearly parallel to, the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike.

General Hood was not strong enough to resist this pressure, and several of D. H. Hill's brigades were sent to his assistance, observing which, Hooker ordered up Mansfield's corps, which moved into position on Hooker's left; Williams' division was deployed on approaching the enemy, Crawford's division on the right, his right resting on the Hagerstown pike; on the left was Gordon's brigade. The 2d Division (Greene's), joining the left of Gordon's, extended as far as a burned building to the northeast of the Dunker church. During the deployment that gallant old soldier, General Mansfield, fell mortally wounded, and the command of the corps devolved on General Williams.

The battle at this point raged for about two hours. It was now about 9 o'clock, and already the ebb-tide which flows from every battle-field had fairly set in, bearing out some stragglers, but chiefly those of the wounded. The ghastly procession tottered along, some unsupported, some leaning upon comrades, some borne upon stretchers, while others were lying upon the grassy banks of the meandering stream, too seriously wounded to move of their own accord.

It was not until 7.20 A.M., of the 17th, that General Sumner received orders to march. He then moved Sedgwick's division in three columns, followed by French's division in the same order. Richardson was ordered to move in the same direction by the commanding general an hour later. Hooker had sustained a repulse; then Mansfield joined on his left and another repulse was the result. Now it was that Sedgwick went into the battle in three lines, sup-

ported by French. Some time after the first line had opened fire, the enemy made a most determined rush to turn the left, through the cleared fields, and so far succeeded as to break through the line between Mansfield and Sumner, until they began to appear in the rear. In order to repel this attack from the rear, Howard's brigade (third line) was faced about, but the fire at that moment became so severe from the left flank that this line moved off in a body to the right. The first and second lines after some time followed this movement, but the whole division was promptly rallied. About 10 o'clock Richardson's division came upon the field and formed line of battle by brigades in a ravine near the Roulette house, and soon became engaged with the enemy, and Meagher pressed forward nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking the Piper house, which Caldwell finally gained possession of. In this and subsequent movements some magnificent work was done by the brigades of Meagher, Hancock, and Caldwell. A more advantageous line, however, was found on a crest, a short distance from the Piper house, to which General Richardson withdrew his line.

Up to this time the division was without artillery, but now a section of Robertson's horse artillery arrived on the ground, and under Lieut. Vincent, 2d Artillery, did excellent service. Shortly afterwards. Captain William M. Graham, with battery K, 1st U. S. Artillery, of Porter's corps, was ordered to report to General Richardson, and by the latter's direction, took position in the plowed ground occupied by General Meagher's brigade in the morning. Here he engaged one of the enemy's brass batteries at seven hundred yards, silenced and drove it away in about

ten minutes. At this time two heavy columns of the enemy's infantry moved upon the battery, getting within a few hundred yards of Graham's guns before being discovered, by approaching through a dense cornfield. A heavy fire of spherical case and shell was opened on them immediately, which in a short time drove them from the field with great slaughter. A very sharp fire of shot, spherical case, and shell was now opened upon Graham by two of the enemy's batteries of rifled guns. This fire was returned as rapidly as possible, but after firing some twenty minutes, Graham found that they were beyond his range, and having called General Richardson's attention to the fact, was told by that officer that he wished to save the battery as much as possible in order that it might advance with his division, which was expected at any moment. While communicating this information, General Richardson was mortally wounded by a ball of a spherical case shot from the battery enfilading Graham. After this, Graham continued his fire some five minutes and then retired over the crest of the hill to a point some two hundred yards in rear of his first position. Lieutenant Maynadier, with First Sergeant Cooney, returned under a heavy artillery fire and brought off two caissons, which had been left at first on account of all the horses having been killed. Lieutenant Michalowski for a long time served one of his pieces with but one cannoneer, alternating with this man in loading and firing. The battery lost 17 horses killed and 6 severely wounded.

About this time, General Hooker, fainting from the wound he had received, was compelled to leave the field, and the right wing, which had driven the Confederates through the fields into a thick grove farther

up the Hagerstown road, at least a mile, with great slaughter, was forced back by the outnumbering mass which the Confederates, whose right was left comparatively unattacked by Burnside during the morning hours, were able to concentrate against it. The bravest fighting could not withstand such odds, especially as their old opponent, Jackson, had sheltered his reserves behind rocky ledges waist high and wonderfully adapted for defense.¹

During the time occupied by the Union troops as above described, Burnside had been dilly-dallying about carrying bridge No. 3, although he had received orders at 8 o'clock A.M. to attack in concert with the troops on the right. The result was that three hours had been consumed in accomplishing nothing, and General McClellan was forced into sending him an imperative order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet.

General Burnside had established General Crook's brigade and General Sturgis' division immediately

¹ The following extract is taken from the *History of the 118th Pennsylvania*, by J. L. Smith, then a member of the regiment, which formed part of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps :

"At noon the combat raged in all its fierceness. It was near this hour when General McClellan, with his large and imposing staff, rode upon the ground occupied by our division. The deep and abiding enthusiasm that habitually followed him, promptly greeted him. Shouts, yells, and cheers of appreciation rent the air. This unusual noise, so loud that it was borne above the din of battle, to the enemy's line, brought on a vigorous and persistent shelling. Regardless of the flying, bursting missiles, there he sat astride his splendid charger, glass in hand, calmly reviewing the mighty hosts, whose discomfiture with his trusted legions he was bent upon that day accomplishing. Intent, no doubt, on securing some permanent advantage at this particular point, he turned suddenly to Colonel Webb, of his staff, who subsequently won imperishable fame in command of the Philadelphia brigade at Gettysburg, and after a few moments of hurried instructions, dispatched him on his mission down into the valley—down into the very jaws of death. The smoke of the conflict soon enveloped him, and he was lost to view entirely. * * *"

in front of bridge No. 3 and the ford, a short distance above, their front covered by the 11th Connecticut as skirmishers; General Rodman's division, with Scammon's brigade in support, opposite the ford, some three quarters of a mile below the bridge; General Wilcox's division in the woods at the left of Benjamin's battery, in rear of the other lines. General Burnside claims that he received the order to attack at 10 o'clock. General J. D. Cox, who had been placed in command of the Ninth Corps by Burnside, states in his report that he received the order to cross the stream at 9 o'clock, he having previously received orders at 7 o'clock from General Burnside to move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the Antietam, which he did, to be in readiness to carry the bridge and the heights above it by assault.

The task of defending this bridge was entrusted to General D. R. Jones, and his report shows that at the commencement of the action on the morning of the 17th he had under his command only Toombs' two regiments, and Kemper, Drayton, and Walker's brigades (2430 men), Garnett's brigade having been detached for duty in front of the centre. Notwithstanding the discrepancy as to time, three hours at least were spent in futile attempts to do what was subsequently accomplished in from ten to fifteen minutes.¹

¹ "Ordered the night before to be ready to attack early, that the enemy might be kept from concentrating against our right,—ordered at 8 o'clock to carry the bridge with a dash, and to storm the bluff beyond it,—aide after aide sent to find why it was n't done, and with the same orders, more urgent,—at 9 o'clock Colonel Sackett sent with same orders positive, that it must be done, and a strong move made towards Sharpsburg, and Colonel Sackett to stay there and help do it,—*three hours later* Colonel Key, senior aide, sent with same orders *imperative*, not to stop at any sacrifice of life, for the day depended on it,—and at last, at 1 o'clock, the bridge and bluff were carried, and then, *another*

General Crook was ordered to storm the bridge with his brigade. In moving forward it was brought under so lively an infantry as well as artillery fire that it was forced to halt and open fire in return, and Sturgis' division, passing by the rear, came first to the bridge, and was ordered to cross under protection of the artillery fire from the Union batteries.

General Rodman was ordered by General Burnside to cross his troops at the ford below the bridge. Sturgis was then ordered to make a detail from his division to accomplish the object. The importance of carrying out, without delay, these orders was impressed on him by General Burnside, and he (Sturgis) went in person to the vicinity of the bridge and ordered the 2d Maryland, Colonel Duryea, and the 6th New Hampshire, Colonel Griffin, to move over in double time, with bayonets fixed. They made a handsome effort to execute this order, but the fire was so heavy on them before they could reach the bridge, that they were forced to give way and fall back. He then selected the 51st New York, Colonel R. B. Porter, and the 51st Pennsylvania, Col. Jno. F. Hartranft, from the 2d Brigade, and directed them to charge with the bayonet. They started on their mission of death, full of enthusiasm, and taking a route less exposed than the previously detached regiments,

stop; and meanwhile a heavy concentration was made against our right, its splendidly successful attack checked with great carnage, and the very thing Burnside was intended and ordered to *prevent* was permitted by his astounding incapacity. Oh, for two hours of Reno, or Kearny, or Reynolds, or Hancock, or old Sumner, instead of a whole day of this man, who could neither see the great need nor his own glorious opportunity, nor even do as he was told, until finally Colonel Key was sent again with peremptory orders to drive on hard towards Sharpsburg, and *this time Colonel Key carried an order in McClellan's handwriting relieving Burnside on the spot and placing General Morell in command, to be used if Burnside did not instantly advance and fight.*"—Wm. F. Biddle, in *United Service Magazine*, May, 1894.

rushed over the slope leading to the bridge, and over the bridge itself with an impetuosity which the enemy could not resist, and the National flag was planted on the opposite bank at 1 o'clock P.M., amid enthusiastic cheering from every part of the field where it could be seen.

Sturgis' division followed the storming party, as well as the brigade of Crook, in support. At this juncture the Confederates withdrew to still higher ground, from which position they poured a hot fire into the storming party. Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford, after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery and joined on the left of Sturgis.

General A. P. Hill, with the brigades of Branch, Gregg, Field, Pender and Archer, and six batteries of artillery, left Harper's Ferry at 7.30 A.M. of the 17th, and moved with remarkable rapidity, reaching the battle-field at 2.30 P.M. the same day, having marched seventeen miles, coming in on the right of the Confederate line, passing within a mile of Burnside's left, after the latter had succeeded in crossing the creek. His troops were immediately thrown into position, and not a moment too soon, for at 3 o'clock, General Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, having brought General Wilcox's division to the front line and putting Sturgis' division in reserve at the head of the bridge, moved forward with Wilcox and Rodman in line, the former supported by Crook and the latter by Scammon. The troops moved in perfect order and with much enthusiasm. The right of the line broke through Jones' division and drove it back nearly to the village. Hill's batteries, however, were arriving and taking position. Branch and

Gregg were holding Rodman in check, and this opened a gap between him and Wilcox. The enemy still massing on Rodman's left caused that officer to attempt a change of front of a portion of his command, and while doing so fell desperately wounded. This caused some confusion. Sturgis was then ordered forward, but the change of front made necessary by Hill's attack was causing a greater separation of the wings, and Archer's Confederate brigade being thrown in at a critical moment, together with the terrible cross-fire of artillery which had been made possible by the arrival of Hill's batteries, forced the Union line from the exposed ground in front to the cover of the curved hill above the bridge.

It becomes necessary now that we should notice what had taken place at the centre of the line of battle. As has been stated, Morell's division replaced Richardson's in support of the batteries on the heights to the right of the turnpike. About 4 P.M. the 2d Brigade under General Griffin and the 3d Brigade under Colonel Stockton received an order to move to the support of General Sumner. The brigades moved about half a mile to the right, where they were halted by General McClellan, with directions to remain there until further orders. Just before sunset they returned to the position occupied in the morning by orders from the commanding general, and remained during the night. Although under severe shell-fire during the 17th, the division was not otherwise engaged.

During the day some light batteries and cavalry under General Alfred Pleasanton were thrown across bridge No. 2. Their position being one of great exposure, and General Pleasanton desir-

ing some infantry to protect his guns, the 2d and 10th U. S. Infantry, under Captain J. S. Poland, were sent to his support. Subsequently, the ammunition of Pleasanton's batteries having been exhausted, Sykes was ordered to relieve them by his own artillery. He therefore, against his own judgment, sent Randol's and Van Reed's batteries and with them the 4th U. S. under Captain Hiram Dryer; 1st Battalion 12th U. S., Captain M. M. Blunt; 1st Battalion 14th U. S., Captain W. H. Brown, and the 2d Battalion 14th U. S., Captain D. B. McKibbin, all under command of Dryer. The last-named officer was also ordered to take command of all the regular infantry of his division on that side of the creek, to support the batteries, and dislodge the enemy from certain haystacks in a field on the left of the pike. Dryer, finding Poland's command deployed as skirmishers on the left of the pike, ordered him to advance to the left and front and take possession of the haystacks about 150 yards to the front and 400 yards to the left of the pike. He at the same time directed Captain Carlton, 4th Infantry, to deploy the three leading companies of the 4th (G, I, and K), to the right of the pike and to advance to the crest of a hill about 250 yards to the front, using the remaining companies as a support. Captain Brown was ordered to march his battalion in line of battle under cover of a hill, in echelon to the right of the 4th Infantry, and Lieutenant Poland to push forward his skirmishers to a fence near a lane on the left, running at right angles to the pike.

In the meantime Randol had taken the place of Tidball and Robertson with his guns, but finding that his battery could not effect anything withdrew it, and

Van Reed's battery was advanced to the right of the pike.

Poland advanced his whole line to the position indicated, and while advancing, the skirmishers were obliged to pass over a ridge completely commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters and by a battery posted to the left of the cornfield in front of the right of his line. When they appeared above its crest, the enemy opened with a heavy fire of case-shot and canister, but the line did not waver; it moved rapidly to the fence. The right advanced beyond, however, before the order to halt at the fence could be conveyed to them. By a well-directed fire they compelled the enemy's cannoneers to leave their guns. Carlton had advanced his skirmishers to connect with Poland's right, also driving the enemy's cannoneers from some of their guns, and Dryer was just about to give orders to charge the batteries, which it would have been impossible for him to take with his force, when he met Lieutenant Powell, A. A. G., who had been sent with orders from General Sykes to withdraw from the dangerous position he had assumed. This Dryer did to a place of cover, where he remained until near sundown and then recrossed bridge No. 2, his command resuming their former positions.

Warren's brigade, early in the day, had been dispatched to Burnside's support, but did not become engaged. It was subsequently placed in position on the road to Harper's Ferry, covering the right and rear of Burnside's command.

The Fifth Corps, while not taking an important part in attacking the enemy, had a grave responsibility thrown upon it. Morell with one brigade (two having been sent to Sumner's support), and Sykes with

two brigades (six battalions of that a mile away from him), not only were expected to hold the centre, but to cover the Reserve Artillery and the wagon trains of the entire army.

During the afternoon, when Dryer had advanced his command so far to the front, General Pleasanton sent to General Porter for a division to press the success obtained by Dryer, accompanied by the statement that Burnside and Sumner were driving the enemy. Between the dispatching and receiving of that call the tide of battle had changed. The troops on the left under Burnside had been driven from the heights which they had so gallantly crowned, while those on the immediate right under Sumner were held in check. The army was at a stand. Moreover, Porter had not the force asked for, and he could not, under his orders, risk the safety of the artillery and centre of the line, and perhaps imperil the success of the day by further diminishing his small command, not then 4000 strong. Had it been possible to have had Humphrey's division present at the time Dryer commenced his advance, and thrown it across the river, supported by Sykes' remaining force, there is but little doubt, as was the impression at the time, that Lee's centre could have been broken, Burnside's position advanced, and the Confederates driven to the river. But Humphreys did not (nor could he) arrive until the morning of the 18th.

About 5 P.M., as sudden as a stroke of lightning out of a clear sky, there swept over the Union troops a tornado of rebel wrath, and shot and shell struck and burst in all directions. Thirty guns, which had been massed in Hooker's corps, and which had been impatiently waiting this opportunity, together with the

artillery of other corps, swept woods and cornfields with a deluge of missiles, while the roar of the guns of both armies, from every available position, made the very earth tremble. As this was the ordinary prelude to an infantry attack, the Union forces gathered themselves, and stood like tigers at bay, waiting for the coming onset. But the attack never came. It had been the intention of the Confederates to attack with infantry—it being General Jackson's favorite time for flinging himself upon the Union forces—but, as General Jackson says in his report, "I found his numerous artillery so judiciously established in their front and extending so near to the Potomac, which here makes a remarkable bend, . . . as to render it inexpedient to hazard the attempt."

With this cannonading the fighting ended for the day. Men obtained bundles of straw from the neighboring farmyards, and proceeded to lie down in line of battle; tired gunners made themselves comfortable beside their guns; pickets stood with eyes and ears open, close to the Confederate lines, ready to give instant warning should a night attack be attempted. No one even removed his sword or equipments; horses stood saddled and ready for immediate use. Within a space of four square miles lay about 150,000 men—some stiff and stark, staring with visionless eyes into the depths of eternity; some tossing on the beds of the field hospitals, or lying maimed and bleeding in the open fields; some hugging in their sleep the deadly weapon with which they expected on the morrow to renew the work of death.

But sunrise came! hour after hour slipped by, with no orders to advance, no attack by the Confederates, and gradually a feeling of disappointment began to

show itself in the Union troops. No matter what had been said of the condition of the line of the Union army, the men expected to advance and renew the battle on the morning of the 18th. Having fought the battles of South Mountain on the 14th, marched some twelve or fifteen miles on the 15th, under fire and taking position on the 16th, and fighting all day the 17th, it is not surprising that McClellan believed his men were tired out. But what might be said of Lee's army? Had not the troops of Longstreet and Hill done the same thing? and had not Jackson marched to Frederick, thence up to Williamsport, forded the Potomac, marched down to Harper's Ferry, received the surrender of that place, and marched back again to the battle-field? These were the same men we had fought at Bull Run, and they had been "on the go" ever since. Was the Army of the Potomac—that gallant and fighting army—any the less capable of moving forward than Lee's army was to pick up its traps and march across the Potomac River, or give battle? The hazardous position and the bad condition of the Confederate army, to say nothing of the possibility of the exhausted state of its ammunition, ought to have been considered by General McClellan, and he never should have lost the opportunity of attacking on the 18th. He had the whole of Maryland to fall back upon, with its mountain barriers for defensive positions, and his lines of supplies assured, while Lee had nothing but an interminable wagon-road, almost from Richmond, to furnish him.

There are three important points in the history of the battle of Antietam which military students should carefully note: 1st. Had Mansfield been on Hooker's

left with Sumner in support on the morning of the 17th, success would have attended the Union arms early in the day, for Hooker had actually turned the enemy's left, as all the Confederate reports acknowledge ; but as he pressed forward, the enemy in the cleared ground overlapped Hooker's left, and he was forced to retire. If Mansfield had been there this could not have happened. 2d. Had General Burnside carried the bridge at any time between 9 and 12 o'clock, and pushed his troops forward, he would have effectually cut off A. P. Hill's entire division from making any connection with the Confederate right. 3d. Had Humphreys not been detained a day at Frederick City by orders from Washington, he would have been up in time to have supported Sykes' regulars in a bold charge on the centre of the Confederate line. The result of any one of these three movements, from a careful study of the action, can easily be determined.

As statesmen derive, from the study of history, the knowledge of nations and their government, so ought men to consider the study of the campaigns of great commanders as a fruitful source of information both in theory and practice ; because their faults being brought to the test, and rectified by established principles, the attentive reader cannot but increase his stock of knowledge. Such is, in fact, the course which ought to be pursued in times of peace for the purpose of bringing to perfection the science of war—a science the most extensive, the most complicated, the most important, and the most noble, since it protects the liberty, the religion, the property, the commerce, and the glory of nations. Early in the war, a lesson as to the possible condition of an opposing force was learned

by General Grant, which should be indelibly impressed upon the minds of military students. In his *Memoirs* he gives an experience on approaching the little town of Florida, where a regiment of the enemy under Colonel Harris was encamped. He says :

“ Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and possibly ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do ; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below us was in full view, I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was still there, and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible ; but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before ; *but it was one I never forgot afterwards.* From that event to the close of the war I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. *I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his.* The lesson was valuable.”

During the continuance of the war, it was a matter of some consideration by the writer of these lines as to the reason why so many of the commanders of armies on both sides, as a rule, selected the latter part of the afternoon to commence their main attacks. And even those commenced in the morning seemed to lack the vital principle for which an early attack was desirable. He was youthful in war in those days, but it always appeared to him as if each was afraid of the result, and desired night to cover them—in other words, that each was looking for disaster. Never, to

the writer's knowledge, at any time was an army put in position for immediate pursuit, pending the result of a battle, contemplating a success—that is, orders given beforehand to certain corps to pursue at once in the event of a favorable result. Had the First Consul been satisfied with simply repulsing his pursuers, France could have claimed no glorious victory at Marengo.

General Burnside, although ordered to move forward early on the 15th, followed General Lee from South Mountain tardily, and the latter had the whole of the 15th and 16th to recuperate and establish himself—just the time he wanted to enable Jackson to join him. Lee could, had he so desired, have removed his entire force across the Potomac River on the night of the 15th as well as he did on that of the 18th, but he preferred to give battle as soon as he discovered that he would not be attacked on the 15th, being certain that Jackson would rejoin him on the 16th. He felt sure of being able to turn the Union right and force McClellan to cover Washington by way of Harper's Ferry, leaving the whole of the North open to him. This was what was intended when the furious cannonade commenced at 5 P.M. on the 17th, which movement had to be given up because Jackson found McClellan too well prepared for him to hazard the attempt.

We shall refer to other similar cases in this history, when other commanders guided the destinies of the Army of the Potomac.

The day and night of the 18th was therefore consumed in caring for the wounded, and, as far as possible, the burying of the dead.

Battery I, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain Stephen H.

Weed, had furnished one section, under Lieutenant M. F. Watson, on the evening of the 15th, to dislodge the advance skirmishers of the enemy from the cornfield and wood in front of the height occupied by Sykes' division. On the 16th, the battery was planted on a prominent height near the centre of the line, where it remained until the morning of the 19th.

Four 20-pounder Parrott guns, commanded by Lieutenant Wever, were also placed under Captain Weed's orders by the chief of artillery, and remained until after Captain Weed's battery left its position. On the 16th and during the battle of the 17th, these batteries improved several opportunities of opening with effect upon the artillery and infantry of the enemy at ranges varying from 1200 to 2500 yards.

During the engagement of the 17th, Lieutenant A. M. Randol was ordered with battery E., 1st U. S. Artillery, to report to General Pleasanton, and relieved Robertson's battery of the 2d U. S. Artillery, which was in position in advance of Antietam Creek, and on the left of the Sharpsburg pike. He opened fire as soon as possible with spherical case on the flank of one of the enemy's batteries, which, after a few rounds, retired to a position beyond the range of Randol's guns. He subsequently returned to his first position with Warren's brigade, where he remained until the close of the engagement.

Battery K, 5th Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Van Reed, went into position on the Sharpsburg side of the Antietam, about 2 P.M. of the 17th, and fired about four hundred rounds of ammunition with effectiveness, withdrawing about dusk.

Soon after the placing of Langner's, Von Kleiser's, and Wever's batteries on the 16th, Major Arndt, com-

manding the 1st Battalion New York Artillery, was mortally wounded by the enemy's fire (died on the 18th) while personally assisting at one of the guns.

SHEPHERDSTOWN FORD.

On the evening of the 18th Colonel Roberts advanced the 2d Maine across bridge No. 2, and remained on picket that night. At daybreak on the 19th, having heard during the night quite a commotion in the direction of the enemy, as if in retreat, Roberts gradually advanced his command, until he arrived at the Potomac, when he discovered that the enemy had crossed to the other side of the river with all his train. He then returned to the bridge, reporting the fact, and the Fifth Corps, with others, was directed to take up a position in line beyond the town ; but General Porter was subsequently ordered to pursue the enemy and give aid to the cavalry brigade, then in advance. The enemy's rear-guard, pressed by General Pleasanton, had crossed the Potomac, and was holding the right bank, defending the ford with well posted artillery. General Porter determined to clear the fords and if possible to secure some of the enemy's guns. With this end in view, he caused the banks of the river and those of the canal (which was parallel with and near to the river) to be lined with the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Captain J. B. Isler, supported by portions of Generals Morell's and Sykes' divisions, while a portion of the divisional artillery was posted to control the opposite bank.

While these were engaged in driving from their guns the cannoneers and horses and silencing the fire of the enemy's infantry, about 5.30 P.M., Captain Isler

was ordered to find a ford to cross the river. This order was conveyed by Colonel Barnes. Owing to the extent of Isler's line of skirmishers, only part of his command received the notice, and so, with only about sixty men, Isler advanced. When in the canal the 4th Michigan, under Colonel J. W. Childs, which had been ordered forward, marched down and acted as a support for Isler's men while they forded the river. The bluff was quite high on the Virginia side, and the river being unknown, the ford was with some difficulty found, under the sharp fire of the enemy's musketry ; but they lost only four men while crossing, the 4th Michigan having rendered very efficient service by firing volleys over the heads of the fording party.

After the sharpshooters had crossed, the 4th Michigan followed, and when on the other side the two commands jointly advanced up the bluffs in front. Through some misunderstanding an order to General Sykes to move over a part of his command did not reach him, but his skirmishers, under the direction of Colonel Warren, were busy keeping down the fire of the enemy's infantry, and with the artillery of Weed created such a sharp fire as to cause the enemy to abandon his guns, which the 4th Michigan was ordered to take. This was handsomely done in conjunction with Isler's sharpshooters, the regiment advancing and delivering its fire with such effect and determination as to cause the enemy (Lawton's brigade and Pendleton's artillery) to fall back in confusion.

It was at this time getting quite dark, and the regiment succeeded in finding only two pieces of artillery and several caissons, or parts of caissons. After establishing picket lines with the sharpshooters, and

remaining there some two or three hours, the command was recalled to the Maryland side of the river.

Captain Weed's battery had been placed in position near the ford, and during the action had engaged and silenced four guns of the enemy opposed to it, two of which had been found by the 4th Michigan and brought across the river. One gun of Randol's battery was engaged for a short time.

Lieutenant Van Reed's battery was not engaged in this action, but in moving forward towards the river, had one man killed and the legs of two horses broken by a shot from the enemy.

General Porter received orders to make a reconnaissance in force on the morning of the 20th, and therefore he ordered Generals Morell and Sykes to cross their divisions about 7 A.M., preceding their main columns by advance guards thrown well forward on the roads to Shepherdstown and Charlestown. Some cavalry had been directed to cross the river and co-operate with the infantry. At the hour named, General Sykes put his 2d Brigade, Major C. S. Lovell commanding, in motion, and accompanying it himself passed over to the Virginia side, caused skirmishers to be deployed, and the brigade, consisting of the 2d and 10th U. S., Captain J. S. Poland; 1st and 6th U. S., Captain L. C. Bootes; 11th U. S., Major Floyd-Jones; and the 17th, Major George L. Andrews (in all about 800 men), to advance on the Charlestown road. The cavalry that was to have accompanied the expedition did not reach the Virginia shore until Lovell's pickets were in close proximity to an advancing force of the enemy.

Major Lovell occupied some woods a mile from the river, and had scarcely done so when the enemy,

about 3000 strong, with artillery, was seen to be rapidly approaching. Sykes at once directed Lovell to fall back slowly to the crest of the river bank and hold it, and ordered the 2d and 6th U. S. to occupy a belt of woods in front, sending at the same time for Warren's brigade to cross.

In the meantime, Colonel Barnes had been ordered by General Morell to cross the river, push his brigade to Shepherdstown and vicinity, and report what was to be found there. In obedience to this order, about 9 A.M. of the 20th, the brigade, consisting of the 18th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hayes; 22d Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Tilton; 13th New York, Colonel E. G. Marshall; 25th New York, Colonel C. A. Johnson; 118th Pennsylvania, Colonel C. M. Prevost; 1st Michigan, Captain E. W. Bilton; and the 2d Maine, Colonel C. W. Roberts, numbering about 1711 men, crossed at the ford. As soon as the 18th Massachusetts had crossed, it was drawn up on the road running below the bluffs towards Shepherdstown. At this moment, and before other regiments had crossed, General Sykes informed Colonel Barnes of the approaching enemy, and requested the latter to remain where he was until an aide (whom he had sent to find out about the enemy's advance) returned, in order to give him support. This Colonel Barnes declined to do unless General Sykes gave him an order to that effect, saying that his orders required him to go to Shepherdstown. Sykes at once gave the order, and desired that Colonel Hayes should take position with the 18th Massachusetts near to, but below, the top of the ridge. This was accordingly done. The 25th New York and the 13th New York having crossed,

took position on the right of Colonel Hayes, but to reach the position it was necessary to pass beyond the ravine by which the 18th Massachusetts had ascended to another ravine a few rods distant, the interval forming a rocky bluff nearly perpendicular, up which it was impracticable to advance.

By this time Colonel Prevost had crossed the 118th Pennsylvania and formed in the road. This regiment was directed to follow the 13th and 25th New York, and to take a similar position below the top of the ridge and to their left. It accordingly followed those regiments and occupied the place designated. The remaining regiments of the brigade—namely, the 1st Michigan, 22d Massachusetts, and the 2d Maine—were directed to ascend the ravine by which the 18th Massachusetts had ascended, and to form in a similar manner, the first two on the right and the latter on the left of it. The brigade being thus in position and suitably protected by the ground in front, skirmishers were advanced and immediately commenced firing upon those of the enemy who by this time had appeared within musket range, and were deployed along their whole front in large numbers and at reduced intervals.

In the meantime Colonel Warren had crossed his brigade, consisting of the 5th New York, Captain C. Winslow, and 10th New York, and took post on the left of Major Lovell, covering his front with light troops.

Weed's, Randol's, and Van Reed's batteries moved into position on the heights on the Maryland side, and opened a destructive fire on the enemy, which impeded the advance of his masses and turned his skirmishers above the ford in the direction of Shepherdstown.

Feeling that the Virginia side was no place for a small body of troops until a proper reconnoissance had been made, and several reports from citizens inducing the belief that a large force of the enemy was moving upon him, General Sykes expressed the thought to General Porter, who, agreeing with him, directed the immediate recrossing of the troops. Lovell and Warren effected the retirement in excellent order and without loss. Colonel Warren, on regaining the Maryland side, threw his brigade behind the canal embankment and occupied it until relieved the following day.

The information respecting the advance of the enemy as at first received by Colonel Barnes was to the effect that they were advancing from the left of the position occupied by his brigade. It was, however, soon perceived that the Confederates were not only approaching with a greatly superior force from that direction, but that they were also in equal numbers advancing on the front and right, springing as it were from the bushes and cornfields, which had previously concealed them. Making their first appearance within short musket range, a rapid and vigorous firing commenced at once, and notwithstanding the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, every man stood his ground firmly and the Union line exhibited an undaunted front.

Had the enemy not been mistaken with regard to the movements of the Union army, in all probability the entire Army of the Potomac could have crossed the ford during the 20th, for General Jackson in his report¹ says :

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xix., part I, p. 957.

"In the evening [19th] the Federals commenced crossing under the protection of their guns, driving off Lawton's brigade and General Pendleton's artillery. By morning a considerable force had crossed the river. Orders were dispatched to Generals Early and Hill, who had advanced some four miles on the Martinsburg road, to return and drive back the enemy. General Hill, who was in the advance, as he approached the town, formed his line of battle in two lines; the first composed the brigades of Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, under command of General Gregg, and the second of Lane's, Archer's, and Brockenbrough's brigades, under command of General Archer. Early, with the brigades of Early, Trimble, and Hays, took position in the wood on the right and left of the road leading to the ford. The Federal infantry lined the high banks of the Virginia shore, while their artillery, formidable in numbers and weight of metal, crowned the opposite heights of the Potomac. General Hill's division advanced with great gallantry against the Federal infantry in the face of a continued discharge of shot and shell from their batteries. The Federals, massing in front of Pender, poured a heavy fire into his ranks, and then extended, with a view to turn his left. Archer promptly formed on Pender's left, when a simultaneous charge was made."

It will thus be seen that while Sykes fully estimated the danger his little brigade of regulars was in, and retired to where he could receive the support of Barnes, the Confederate chieftain, from the manner in which the two brigades of the Fifth Corps received him,¹ thought he was in front of a large force of the Union army. One regiment and about sixty sharpshooters, with the assistance of Weed's battery, had, the evening before, driven away Lawton's brigade and Pendleton's artillery, and on the 20th Porter's two brigades, with the assistance of Warren's two regiments, later on, had met the attack of Jackson, with *nine brigades* of infantry. It is somewhat singular,

¹ He and the other Confederate generals thought the whole Army of the Potomac received them at Gaines' Mill.

but the troops of the Fifth Corps had invariably fought the Confederate army with the odds of two or three to one at Hanover Court House at Mechanicsville, at Gaines' Mill, at New Market Cross-Roads, at Malvern Hill, and at Bull Run.

During the action of the 20th the 118th Pennsylvania had only been able to get seven companies into line when the firing was heard on the right flank, and in moving in line to the crest of the hill, discovered the enemy advancing in heavy force in front and on the left. Colonel Prevost posted in person the three left companies, to meet a flank movement of the enemy, on a knoll to the left of the regiment, and they became immediately engaged; about the same time the right was fired on from the front. Owing to the worthlessness of their arms (condemned Enfield), not more than fifty per cent. of which could be discharged, the line began to waver, when Colonel Prevost advanced with the colors to the front, and was almost immediately severely wounded. The command of the regiment then devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel James Gwyn, who rallied his men, and charged over the slope of the hill in front, receiving a heavy fire on his left flank, which caused him to drop back behind the bluff. The command was re-formed, with the intention of repeating the charge, when, at that moment, a regiment of the enemy, with colors displayed, crowned the hill on Gwyn's left, and poured a hot fire into his regiment.

A few moments after this, Gwyn received orders from Barnes to withdraw his regiment and retire in good order. The only way to retreat was over the bluff, and it was very precipitous. The line fell back, however, and when it reached the road, received a

decimating fire from the enemy on the summit, which was continued upon it as it crossed the dam opposite the Shepherdstown ferry.

Colonel Barnes withdrew his brigade, under orders from General Sykes, and the several regiments recrossed the river in good order and with but little loss in crossing. In his report he says :

“Finding themselves suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by a force so vastly superior, there was no sign of intimidation on the part of any one, and when the order to retire was given, it was received with evident disappointment.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Chamberlain had his horse shot under him while he was steadying the men through a deep place in the river, where several of the 5th New York were drowned in his presence.

Major Lovell recrossed his brigade in admirable order, and with but little loss.

During the morning of the 20th, as soon as it was light enough to see, the 4th Michigan and 62d Pennsylvania, of General Griffin's brigade, crossed the river with some horses of Hazlett's battery, and brought back three guns, several caissons, and one battle-flag picked up on the field of action of the 19th, and returned to camp about 8 A.M. Two of these guns had been taken from General Griffin by the enemy at the first battle of Bull Run.

On the 21st, 23d, and 24th, two more guns, several caissons, and two forges were brought into camp by Griffin's men from the other side of the river, the enemy having been compelled to leave them here and there through the woods, in the fields, and along the roads, together with some 200 stand of small-arms.

On the 27th, four regiments of General Griffin's

brigade, about 2000 strong, crossed the river as guard to three mule teams, for the purpose of securing hay, but nothing of importance occurred, and they returned in safety.

This was the last of the movements of the Fifth Corps while engaged in the Maryland campaign, and it was placed regularly in camp in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and the Potomac River, where it entered upon its regular camp duties.

The battle-field of Antietam was the first that had remained in possession of the Union troops where an opportunity to visit it after the mighty giants of death had ended their labors, and it was with some curiosity that the historian of this work rode over it, and particularly that part where Generals Hooker and Sumner fought. He passed where now blighted stalks only indicated the field of waving corn when the battle commenced, and saw the dead lying all through its aisles ; then out into the barren field beyond where bodies attired mainly in Confederate uniforms were lying in ranks so regular that they must have been mowed down in swaths. Burying parties were already busily engaged, and had put away to rest many Union men. Still, here, as everywhere, they were scattered over the fields. The ground was strewn with muskets, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, and articles of clothing, with the carcasses of horses, and with thousands of shot and shell. Glancing at each corpse, he passed on to the road by the Dunkard church. Could it be that those were the faces of his late antagonists? They were so absolutely black that they looked almost as if they might be negroes. Their eyes in many instances were protruding from their sockets ; their heads, hands, and limbs were swollen to twice their

natural size. Their marred and bloated remains, emptied of all that made them manlike—human—were simply repulsive.

And thus it was, with an almost sickening sensation he rode over this graveyard of unburied dead. No matter in what direction he turned, it was all the same shocking picture, awakening awe rather than pity, benumbing the senses rather than touching the heart, glazing the eye with horror rather than filling it with tears. And this was war in all its hideousness!

The Fifth Army Corps, as Organized for the Maryland Campaign from September 11 to 30, 1862.

Major-General FITZ-JOHN PORTER, commander.

Escort.—1st Maine Cavalry (detachment), Captain George J. Summat.

First Division.

Major-General GEORGE W. MORELL.

First Brigade.

Colonel JAMES BARNES.

2d Maine, Col. Chas. W. Roberts.
 18th Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Jos. Hayes.
 22d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Wm. S. Tilton.
 1st Michigan, Capt. E. W. Belton.
 13th New York, Col. E. G. Marshall.
 25th New York, Col. C. A. Johnson.
 118th Pennsylvania, Col. C. M. Prevost.
 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Capt. L. E. Wentworth.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General CHAS. GRIFFIN.

2d Dist. of Columbia, Col. C. M. Alexander.
 9th Massachusetts, Col. P. R. Guiney.
 32d Massachusetts, Col. Francis J. Parker.
 4th Michigan, Col. J. W. Childs.
 14th New York, Col. James McQuade.
 62d Pennsylvania, Col. J. B. Sweitzer.

*HISTORY OF**Third Brigade.*

Colonel T. B. W. STOCKTON.

20th Maine, Col. Adelbert Ames.
 16th Michigan, Lt.-Col. N. E. Welch.
 12th New York, Capt. Wm. Huson.
 17th New York, Lt.-Col. N. B. Bartram.
 44th New York, Maj. Freeman Conner.
 83d Pennsylvania, Capt. O. S. Woodward.
 Brady's Co. Mich. Sharpshooters, Lieut. J. H. Titus, Jr.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, Battery C, Capt. Augustus P. Martin.
 1st Rhode Island, Light, Battery C, Capt. Richard Waterman.
 5th U. S., Battery D, Lieut. Chas. E. Hazlett.
Sharpshooters.—1st U. S, Capt. John B. Isler.

Second Division.

Brigadier-General GEORGE SYKES.

First Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel ROBT. C. BUCHANAN.

3d U. S., Capt. John D. Wilkins.
 4th U. S., Capt. Hiram Dryer.
 12th U. S., 1st Battery, Capt. M. M. Blunt.
 12th U. S., 2d Battery, Capt. T. M. Anderson.
 14th U. S., 1st Battery, Capt. W. H. Brown.
 14th U. S., 2d Battery, Capt. D. B. McKibbin.

Second Brigade.

Major CHAS. S. LOVELL.

1st and 6th U. S., Capt. Levi C. Bootes.
 2d and 10th U. S., Capt. Jno. S. Poland.
 11th U. S., Major DeL. Floyd-Jones.
 17th U. S., Major Geo. L. Andrews.

Third Brigade.

Colonel GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

5th New York, Capt. C. Winslow.

10th New York, Lt.-Col. J. W. Marshall.

Artillery.

1st U. S., Batteries E and G, Lieut. Alanson M. Randol.

5th U. S., Battery I, Capt. Stephen H. Weed.

5th U. S., Battery K, Lieut. Wm. E. Van Reed.

Third Division.

Brigadier-General ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General E. B. TYLER.

91st Pennsylvania, Col. E. M. Gregory.

126th Pennsylvania, Col. James G. Elder.

129th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob G. Frick.

134th Pennsylvania, Col. M. S. Quay.

Second Brigade.

Colonel PETER H. ALLABACH.

123d Pennsylvania, Col. John B. Clark.

131st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Wm. B. Shaut.

133d Pennsylvania, Col. F. B. Speakman.

155th Pennsylvania, Col. E. J. Allen.

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Almond Barnes.

1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Capt. L. N. Robinson.

Artillery Reserve.

1st Batt. New York Light, Battery A, Lieut. Bernhard Wever.

1st Batt. New York Light, Battery B, Lieut. Alfred von Kleiser.

1st Batt. New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Robert Langner.

1st Batt. New York Light, Battery D, Capt. Charles Kusserow.

5th Batt. New York Light, Capt. Elijah D. Taft.

1st U. S., Battery K, Capt. Wm. M. Graham.

4th U. S., Battery G, Lieut. Marcus P. Miller.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS DURING THE
MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

ANTIETAM.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
4th U. S. Infantry.....	3	1	28	32
12th U. S., 1st Battalion, Infantry.....	1	3	4
14th U. S., 1st Battalion, Infantry.....	2	2
14th U. S., 2d Battalion, Infantry.....	1	1
2d and 10th U. S. Infantry.....	8	1	45	1	55
11th U. S. Infantry.....	1	1
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery I.....	3	3
ARTILLERY RESERVE.							
Batteries A, B, C, and D, 1st Battalion New York Artillery.....	1 ¹	1	2
1st U. S. Artillery, Battery K.....	4	5	9
Total.....	1	16	2	88	2	109
SHEPHERDSTOWN FORD.							
2d District of Columbia Infantry.....	2	2
2d Maine Infantry.....	2	2
20th Maine Infantry.....	3	3
18th Massachusetts Infantry.....	2	10	2	14
22d Massachusetts Infantry.....	2	2
32d Massachusetts Infantry.....	2	2
1st Michigan Infantry.....	1	1	2	4
4th Michigan Infantry.....	1	1	5	7
5th New York Infantry.....	1	1
12th New York Infantry.....	1	1
13th New York Infantry.....	1	5	12	18
25th New York Infantry.....	3	9	12
44th New York Infantry.....	2	2
83d Pennsylvania Infantry.....	1	1
118th Pennsylvania Infantry.....	3 ²	60	4	97	3	102
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Bat- tery C.....	1	1
2d U. S. Artillery, Battery M.....	1	1
3d U. S. Artillery, Batteries C and G...	1	1
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery I.....	1	1	2
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery K.....	1	1
1st and 6th U. S. Infantry.....	2	2
2d and 10th U. S. Infantry.....	1	2	3
11th U. S. Infantry.....	3	3
17th U. S. Infantry.....	1	1
1st U. S. Sharpshooters.....	2	5	7
Total.....	3	68	6	155	3	128	363
Grand Total.....	4	84	8	243	3	130	472

¹ Major Arndt.² Captains Jos. W. Ricketts and Courtland Saunders and Lieutenant Jos. M. Moss.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MARCH FROM ANTIETAM TO WARRENTON—GENERAL McCLELLAN RELIEVED FROM COMMAND—GENERAL PORTER'S TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL.

As has been stated in the previous chapter, General McClellan received his army during the night of September 2d and 3d, and placed it in a defensive position for an attack from General Lee, but the latter having withdrawn from any direct demonstration upon Washington, General McClellan gathered the defeated and despondent army together as the overland stage-driver gathers the lines of his six-in-hand for the perilous descent of the mountain, and started to feel for and meet his wily antagonist in positions of the latter's own selection. He marched some seventy miles, fought three battles and two actions with the enemy inside of two weeks, driving him across the Potomac back into Virginia ; and then, when he found that following the enemy at that particular point was impracticable, he prepared to refit his troops, and while doing so let his men and animals take a much-needed rest, as they had been on the move since the 14th of August. He directed his corps commanders to make requisitions for supplies. Many of his men were without shoes or stockings and other clothing was sadly needed. When the en-

emy recrossed the Potomac, the means of transportation at McClellan's disposal were "inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance."¹

Under these circumstances, he did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army, over a very deep and difficult ford, in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, thereby placing that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between his army and its base of supply.

Whatever may have been the consensus of opinion at Washington, as to the advisability of General McClellan following the enemy across the Potomac, we have always contended that his reasons for not doing so were eminently correct, and that no great military chieftain, with the hazard he had at stake, would ever have advised such action on McClellan's part. General Lee only hoped that McClellan would attempt to cross over; he would have turned on him with the ferocity of a tiger.

On the 22d of September, General McClellan telegraphed to the general-in-chief additional good and substantial reasons for not having followed the enemy, viz. :

"As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer."

On the 30th of September General Halleck sent a

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xix., Part I., p. 69.

dispatch to General McClellan thanking him and his army for hard-fought battles, saying that "for the well-earned and decided victories in Maryland, a grateful country, while mourning the lamented dead, will not be unmindful of the living."

This gratitude (?) was expressed decidedly on the 6th of November following.

On the 1st of October President Lincoln visited the army and remained several days, during which time he passed through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam, expressing himself as highly pleased and gratified at what had been done ; and to General McClellan's explanatory reasons for not moving, declared himself satisfied that the reasons were good, and promised that supplies should be sent immediately. He returned to Washington on the 4th.

On the 5th of October, instead of receiving reinforcements, General Cox's division, about 5000 men, was detached from General McClellan's command and sent to West Virginia.

To his surprise, on the 7th of October, General McClellan received the following communication :

“ WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.

“ Major-General McCLELLAN :

“ I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. . . .

“ H. W. HALLECK,

“ General-in-Chief.”

At this moment the cavalry force was absent on general reconnoitring duty. General Averell, with

the greater part of the efficient cavalry, was at Cumberland, and the same day it was reported that a large force of the enemy was advancing on Colonel Campbell at Sir John's Run. Averell was ordered to proceed with his force to the support of Campbell.

Three days later, General Stuart, with 2000 Confederate cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry, and started on a raid through Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all the cavalry force against him. Averell, Pleasanton, and Stoneman were started from different points to follow or intercept as the case might be. Pleasanton arrived at Mechanicstown to find the enemy only one hour ahead of him, and pushed on, overtaking Stuart at the mouth of the Monocacy, having marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours. He at once attacked, but could not prevent Stuart recrossing the Potomac into Virginia.

At the time the order above referred to was received from General Halleck, not only was the army wholly deficient in cavalry, and many of the troops in need of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, but Stuart's raid had caused many horses to be broken down, and a new supply of animals had to be furnished, or the mounted establishment of the army would be of little use in an aggressive movement.

Day after day passed without receiving supplies. General McClellan wrote, telegraphed, urged, and got into a snarl with the quartermaster's department, the officers of which insisted that the stores had been shipped. That appears to have been what was considered the end of their duty at that time. Technically, they had been shipped, but, upon investigation,

train loads of supplies for the army were found on the tracks at Washington, where some of the cars had been for weeks.

This delay continued until the 26th of October, and although not yet supplied with articles for which requisition had been made, owing to the demands at Washington, General McClellan commenced, on the 27th, to cross his army into Virginia.

The Twelfth Corps was left at Harper's Ferry, and General Morell was detached from the command of the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps and assigned to the command of all the Union forces remaining on the Upper Potomac from Antietam Creek to Cumberland, Md. General Chas. Griffin succeeded to the command of the division.

On the 30th of October the Fifth Corps commenced its march from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry, where it arrived on the 31st, one division (Sykes') crossing the Shenandoah River. Here the remainder of the supplies for the corps were received. [General Franklin did not receive the remainder of his supplies until his corps had crossed the Potomac and was moving into Virginia.]

General McClellan had determined on his plan of campaign, believing that by moving south along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge Mountains, and occupying the various gaps in the same, he could not only place his army between General Lee and Richmond (as the trend of the mountains was towards the northwest), but could force that general to fight the Army of the Potomac on ground of its own selection ; or in the event of Lee separating his command for any strategic purpose, he would be in position to assail the Confederate army in detail.

The plan of the campaign was most successfully carried out to a certain point. On the 26th of October two divisions of the Ninth Corps and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry crossed at Berlin (below Harper's Ferry). The First, Sixth, and remainder of the Ninth Corps, the cavalry and the Reserve Artillery crossed at the same place between the 26th of October and the 2d of November. The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of October and the 1st of November. It was expected that the Eleventh Corps and Sickles' Division would be united with the army near Thoroughfare Gap. The army, therefore, pursued the various routes mapped out for each corps.

On the morning of the 2d of November, the 140th New York Infantry, under Colonel P. H. O'Rorke, was assigned to and joined Warren's brigade. This regiment was raised in Monroe County, N. Y., in the latter part of the summer of 1862. The first company (A) was composed almost exclusively of farmers and farmers' sons; Company B was composed almost exclusively of Germans, while the ranks of companies C and K were filled up with Irishmen. The other companies were mixed in character. The regiment was consolidated at Rochester, and on the 19th of September it left that city for Washington, where it was placed in the defenses on the south side of the Potomac. On the 30th of September it was moved by rail to Frederick, Md., and from there, on the 5th of October, to Sandy Hook, Md. On the 8th of October Colonel O'Rorke joined the regiment and assumed command. From the very first he commended himself to his officers and men, and they always evinced an admiration for his soldierly quali-

ties and his genial character. Up to this time the regiment had been under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Ernst, who, from the earliest date of its organization, had devoted himself untiringly to furthering its interests and providing, as best he could, in those days. Colonel O'Rorke graduated from the United States Military Academy June 24, 1861, and was assigned as lieutenant of engineers June 24, 1861. During his one year's service in the army he had participated in the Port Royal expedition. The regiment had served at different points about Harper's Ferry until it was assigned to the 3d Brigade, 2d Division Fifth Corps.

ACTION AT SNICKER'S FERRY.

The Fifth Corps arrived at the town of Snickersville on the evening of the 2d of November, and the same night ¹ General Sykes was ordered, with the 2d Division to occupy the gap and make a reconnaissance or demonstration from that point to the ferry of the

¹ The following description of the movement is given by Porter Farley, of the 140th New York, it being the termination of the first long march the regiment had made: "At about sundown, after travelling, as near as could be estimated, some twenty miles, we halted, stacked arms, and bivouacked at the foot of the Blue Ridge, opposite the notch known as Snicker's Gap. We supposed our labors, for that day at least, were over, but not so; for in about half an hour, during which time we had succeeded in boiling coffee and eating a hurried meal, we were ordered up the road leading through the gap, and after a long wearisome march up hill and through the darkness, we rested at last at about 9 o'clock, on the crest of the ridge. Who that was there can ever forget that first night spent in Snicker's Gap? Our position and circumstances were extremely uncomfortable. We were perspiring freely from our exertions during the steep ascent, the night had become bitter cold, and the wind on that mountain top blew cuttingly. For some unaccountable reason we were not allowed to build any camp fires. Those of the rebels could be plainly seen on the opposite side of the Shenandoah, and they certainly knew that we were in possession of the gap, for their pickets had retired from it upon the arrival of the first of our troops. We had no shelter except our blankets, and to avoid freezing very many of us had to keep moving about on our feet all night."

Shenandoah. The next day General Sykes detailed Lieutenant-Colonel Horace B. Sargent, 1st Massachusetts Cavalry (commanding Escort Fifth Army Corps), with 46 mounted men of his command; the two battalions of the 14th U. S. Infantry, under Captain J. D. O'Connell, numbering 178 men in the 1st and 121 in the 2d; and the 6th U. S., under Captain L. C. Bootes, to make the reconnaissance ordered. Captain Bootes deployed a line of skirmishers on the left of the road leading to the ferry, and proceeded down the mountain side. Colonel Sargent sent a lieutenant and 12 men to feel the wood to the right of the road, while he, with the remainder of the cavalry, attempted to thread the wood on the left, but, seeing the infantry skirmishers in advance of him, moved by file. After moving about a mile Sargent debouched upon the road and met a force of Confederate cavalry, somewhere between 50 and 100 men, who commenced firing on Bootes' skirmishers in the woods.

After a few shots, Sargent moved his cavalry upon the enemy at a trot, exchanging fire, until he saw a horseman enter the Shenandoah, when he sent a dozen men to the right to act as dismounted skirmishers, and charged with his remaining force until the enemy entered the river, when he poured an effective fire upon them. Suddenly, a fire of small-arms was opened upon Sargent's command from every window of a house on the opposite bank and from the shore, which killed a captain and wounded three cavalrymen. A severe shelling from some guns posted on the bank, covering the ferry, compelled Colonel Sargent to withdraw the cavalry under cover. Some time elapsed after the shelling commenced be-

fore the infantry skirmishers were able to come up to the support of the cavalry.

In the meantime, O'Connell had formed line of battle with the 14th, and was directed by Captain Bootes, the senior officer of infantry, to march so that his right would be near the road and hidden from the enemy. The line passed over fields and through groves of timber until, arriving near the crest of the hill overlooking the river, the enemy's batteries opened on it, but the troops were protected in a great measure by the woods. Having arrived on the crest of the hill, O'Connell ordered a halt, believing the main body had then the proper position to make the required reconnaissance. Seeing some officers on the road, whom O'Connell thought were officers of the division staff, he asked for orders, and was answered "Move forward." O'Connell then moved his men forward to the river under a heavy fire of artillery and some musketry, the greater part of the latter from hidden positions. He expected to meet a force of the enemy on his own side of the river, covered by the bank. The 14th made a splendidly gallant but disastrous charge, in line of battle to the river bank, and only halted because there was no enemy except on the other side of the river. The enemy, apparently thinking the charge was an attempt to force the river, instantly opened the fire of eight guns on O'Connell and deployed one or two regiments of Confederate infantry on the opposite bank. O'Connell ordered the men to lie down, but, finding that the left of his line had not emerged from the woods, retired to the point from which he made the charge. Lieutenant Frank Perry and 26 men of the 14th were wounded, 5 of whom subsequently died.

Captain M. C. Pratt, of the cavalry was killed and 3 enlisted men were wounded.

Having accomplished the purpose of the reconnaissance, the command returned to its position, and on November 6th, the entire corps proceeded to White Plains, and thence, by way of New Baltimore, to Warrenton, arriving there on the 9th. The position of the Army of the Potomac was then as follows :

The First, Second, and Fifth Corps, Reserve Artillery, and general headquarters were at Warrenton ; the Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo ; the Sixth Corps at New Baltimore ; the Eleventh Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap ; Sickles' division of the Third Corps on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas to Warrenton Junction ; Pleasanton across the Rappahannock, at Amissville, Jefferson, etc., with his pickets at Hazel River, facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpeper Court-House ; Bayard near Rappahannock Station.

At this time the best information that could be had developed the fact that Longstreet was immediately in front of the Union forces, near Culpeper ; Jackson, with one or both of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their force west of the Blue Ridge.

Upon arriving at Warrenton, officers and men were in glorious spirits, and General McClellan says in his final report : "I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle."

But, like a thunderbolt from an unclouded sky came the intelligence that Generals McClellan and Porter

had both been relieved of their commands! Why? was the question on every lip. Some believed but many doubted the report. No reply could be vouchsafed the query. The following orders, however, had been issued:

“ EXECUTIVE MANSION,

“ WASHINGTON, November 5, 1862.

“ By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army. Also, that Major-General Hunter take command of the corps in said army which is now commanded by General Burnside.¹ That Major-General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from the command of the corps he now commands in said army, and that Major-General Hooker take command of said corps.

“ The General-in-chief is authorized, in [his] discretion, to issue an order substantially as above, forthwith, or so soon as he may deem proper.

A. LINCOLN.”

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ WASHINGTON, November 5, 1862.

“ Major-General McCLELLAN, Comm’g, etc.

“ *General*: On receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, N. J., reporting, on your arrival at that place, by telegraph, for further orders.

“ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ H. W. HALLECK, General-in-chief.”

[*Inclosure.*]

“ GENERAL ORDERS, }
“ NO. 182. }

“ WAR DEPARTMENT ADJ’T GENERAL’S OFFICE,

“ WASHINGTON, November 5, 1862.

“ By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.

“ By order of the Secretary of War:

“ E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass’t Adjutant-General.”

¹ It may be well to note here that General Hunter never appeared in the field to take command, although the order was never revoked.

It will be observed that in the instructions of the President he left the *time* of relief of General McClellan entirely discretionary with General Halleck. That officer hardly permitted the ink to dry on the President's paper before he issued the orders for removal. This order was received by General McClellan on the night of the 7th, and he immediately turned over the command to General Burnside, but in consequence of having planned several movements he remained to see that they were fully carried out.

Was the fact of General Porter being relieved at the same time as General McClellan significant of anything? Was McClellan relieved for incompetency? If so, for what was Porter relieved? Could they not trust the latter under any other general but McClellan? Let us see if we can learn anything from the pages of history that will throw light on the subject of McClellan's removal.

Secretary Chase in his diary, September 7, 1862, says :

"In the night a large part of the army moved northward following the force already sent forward to meet the rebels invading Maryland. Generals Burnside, Hooker, Sumner and Reno in command (Burnside chief) as reported.¹

Why did he think that Burnside was in command of the Army of the Potomac at the time mentioned? Had the promise been made to Mr. Chase that Burnside should have the command? It certainly has that appearance, when we consider that the moment McClellan had relieved Washington of its danger, had forced the rebel army back to the Rappahannock, and then having his own in the best possible

¹ Worden's *Life of Salmon P. Chase*, p. 464.

condition and position to fight, he was suddenly relieved and Burnside assigned to the command. What was the motive which induced Mr. Chase to wish Burnside in command of the army? Did Mr. Sprague of Rhode Island have any connection with the matter? Can it be possible that these diminutive wheels within wheels worked the machinery of the Army of the Potomac? These may be daring surmises; but until light is thrown upon the subject we are left to speculate for ourselves. Facts, however, are stubborn things.

Now the question arises, Why did the authorities not give the command of the Maryland campaign to Burnside, when he was on duty with the army, and McClellan was without command? The answer is, because, even though it may have been promised, they dared not take the risk at that critical period. There was only one man in whom they had the confidence to meet the emergency. That man was George B. McClellan, and they sought him—he did not ask for or seek a command, although he was without one.

And why was Fitz-John Porter relieved by the same order? The reasons given will appear hereafter; but the true reason is that Porter was known to be a soldier—he was the right-hand of McClellan as Jackson was the right-hand of Lee, and, next to McClellan himself, he was the most prominent among the younger fighting generals of the army. Had he not managed the battles of Hanover, Court-House, Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam, Gaines' Mill, and Malvern Hill, and had he and his corps not comported themselves to the satisfaction of the army commander when that commander was present to give instructions according to circumstances?

But the fiat had gone forth!

On the 10th of November that portion of the army at Warrenton was paraded by the side of the road for a last view, by McClellan, of his beloved soldiers, before which the following was read to each command:

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
“ CAMP NEAR RECTORTOWN, VA., November 7, 1862.

“ *Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac:*

“ An order from the President devolves upon Major-General Burnside the command of this army.

“ In parting from you, I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear to you. As an army, you have grown up under my care. In you, I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles you have fought under my command will proudly live in our Nation's history. The glory you have achieved, our mutual peril and fatigues, the graves of our comrades, fallen in battle and by disease, the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness have disabled—the strongest associations which can exist among men—unite us still by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in supporting the Constitution of our country and the nationality of its people.

“ GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
“ Major-General, U. S. A.”

Then came the parting scene, and as General McClellan passed down the line, which was stretched along the Alexandria and Warrenton pike, cheer after cheer was spontaneously given him by the different organizations until he came to the little band of regulars. They stood at present arms as silent as the grave. Who could have believed that these men, who had viewed the battle-fields of the Peninsula, of Bull Run, and of Antietam with callous expressions of countenance,—these men with their bronzed visages, their battle-scarred bodies, and their proud

soldierly bearing, could weep? Yet some of them did.

“Something adown the soldier’s cheek
Washed off the stains of powder!”

They were being bereft of a man who was to them the embodiment of loyalty—one who possessed all the traits which rendered him lovable by his officers as well as by the enlisted men of the army. His nobility of character as a man; his kindness and solicitude for the welfare of his men as a father; his unflinching courage as a soldier, in the face of his enemies, whether political or military, could not help endearing him to the army which he undoubtedly created. What, we ask, would have been the result, with such an army at his back, had he chosen to have rebelled against the powers at Washington? The American people should feel proud of the loyal heart that, without a murmur, accepted degradation at such a moment, for the love of his country. Noble and brave man! you have gone to join the army of millions on the other shore, and if there is a better place than this, yours be the portion. In that glorious some day, when we lay down the burden of this life, our hope is that we may find an humble position in that sphere which your merits on earth must have awarded you a high one. No desolate widow, no fatherless child, no despairing sister can point to the grave of a needless sacrifice you caused, or with justice raise a pitying appeal to Heaven for vengeance that it alone can repay.

A few days elapsed after the departure of General McClellan when the Fifth Corps was called upon to bid adieu to its own gallant chief—who had not only

created the corps, but had shared in all its trials and triumphs on every march and battle-field up to that time. But the officers and men consoled themselves with the idea that in a little while he would return and lead them over victorious fields.

On the 12th of November General Porter received his orders relieving him from command ; at 12 o'clock noon of the same day, General Hooker assumed command of the corps. General Porter took leave of the corps at 4 P.M., when the troops gave proof of their grief in many ways at the loss of their honored and beloved commander, who had, by his heroic bravery in battle, and by his kindness of heart in camp, endeared himself to them. The same evening he left for Washington.

On the 17th of November General Porter was placed in arrest and confined to the limits of his hotel. This order was subsequently revoked, and his limits were extended to the city of Washington.

We must now return to the 2d of September, when the Fifth Corps arrived at Fairfax Court-House, from the Bull Run battle-field. At that time General Porter heard some rumors to the effect that General Pope was displeased with his actions during the campaign. Like a man, and as straightforward as a soldier, he went to Pope direct and asked him the question. General Pope informed him that he had no cause to complain of him during the period he (Porter) had been under his command. And yet, at 8.50 P.M., the night before, he had sent to Washington the dispatch which is given at length on page 251. Can any one believe a soldier guilty of such duplicity?

While at the Arlington House, in the defenses of

Washington, General Porter again heard of General Pope's allegations, and therefore, on September 10th, he addressed a letter to the War Department, asking for an investigation of the charges against him and his command, to which he received no reply. On the following day he again addressed the War Department (same reference), stating that he had seen General Pope's report in the New York papers and urged that an investigation be made. No reply was vouchsafed this communication; but, instead, Porter was ordered to the field with his corps, and an additional division of new troops (Humphrey's) was sent to report to him; this, notwithstanding an order had been issued on September 5th, convening a Court of Inquiry, to examine into the conduct of General Porter and others. This order was unknown to Porter, and was so carefully suppressed that it never came to light until January 7, 1879. And thus Porter entered upon his Maryland campaign, little dreaming of the clouds that were gathering in the horizon of his military career.

On the 17th of November, 1862, a military commission was ordered to investigate the charges preferred against General Porter by General Pope; but this commission having no power to enter upon a legal trial, the order appointing it was revoked and a general court-martial ordered. When this court met, General Porter offered no objections to being tried by any member named in the order, so confident was he of being able to establish his innocence. He then submitted the following paper.¹

“ WASHINGTON, D. C., December 3, 1862.

“ There is a question of form, possibly involving important matter of law, to which I now, upon my own reflections and the

¹ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. xii., part II., supplement, p. 828.

advice of my counsel, deem it proper respectfully to ask the consideration of the court.

“The charges and specifications furnished to me are signed by B. S. Roberts, brigadier-general of volunteers and inspector-general of Pope’s army. The order convening a military commission in my case recited that the subject-matter of its investigation was charges preferred against me by Major-General John Pope.

“I desire to be informed whether, under these circumstances, the charges before this court, signed, as above stated, by an officer of General Pope’s staff, whose official character as such appears as part of his signature, be or be not, in the judgment of the court, in contemplation of law, charges preferred by Major-General Pope, or by his order, so as to make the presentation of them his act.

“Should the court hold this to be the legal fact, then, as the court is aware, the order convening this court is not legal, in view of the provision of the statute of 1830, which requires the court, in such a case, to be convened by the President of the United States, and not, as this court is, convened by order of the General-in-chief.

“The determination of this question now may prevent embarrassment and delay hereafter, and in that view solely I now present it, and not with the slightest purpose of taking any exception to any member of the court.

“F. J. PORTER, Major-General.

The court determined that it was properly organized and called upon the accused to plead to the charges and specifications. After pleading “Not Guilty” to the charges on which he was arraigned, General Porter was brought face to face with his accuser, General Pope, who was the first witness called in the case, which was then proceeded with to a termination, the proceedings of which are to be found in the *Records of the Rebellion*, vol. xii., part 2, supplement.

On the 22d of January, 1863, the order publishing the findings and sentence of the court was issued, as follows :

“ WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
 “ WASHINGTON, January 22, 1863.

“ GENERAL ORDERS }
 “ No. 18.

“ I. Before a General Court-Martial, which convened in the city of Washington, D. C., November 27, 1862, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 362, dated Headquarters of the Army, November 25, 1862, and of which Major-General D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers, is president, was arraigned and tried—

“ Major-General FITZ-JOHN PORTER, U. S. Volunteers :

“ CHARGE 1ST.—Violation of the 9th Article of War.

“ *Specification 1st.*—In this, that the said Major General Fitz-John Porter, of the Volunteers of the United States, having received a lawful order, on or about the 27th of August, 1862, while at or near Warrenton Junction, in Virginia, from Major General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, in the following figures and letters, to wit :

“ ‘ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

“ ‘ BRISTOE STATION, August 27, 1862—6.30 P. M.

“ ‘ Major-Gen. FITZ-JOHN PORTER, Warrenton Junction :

“ ‘ *General* : The major-general commanding directs that you start at 1 o’clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you send word to him to push forward immediately ; also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed, to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks also, that he had best run back the railroad train to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you write him to that effect.

“ ‘ By command of Major-General Pope.

“ ‘ GEO. D. RUGGLES,

“ ‘ Colonel and Chief of Staff.’

“ P. S.—If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery, as a guard, till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately. If Banks is not at the junction, instruct Col. Cleary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it.

“ By command of Major-General Pope :

“ GEO. D. RUGGLES,

“ Colonel and Chief of Staff.’

Did then and there disobey the said order, being at the time in the face of the enemy. This at or near Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August, 1862.

“ *Specification 2d.*—In this, that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being in front of the enemy, at Manassas, Va., on or about the morning of August 29, 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to-wit :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

“ CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

“ Generals McDOWELL and PORTER :

“ You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to join the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be

strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view : that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own headquarters will be, for the present, with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.

“ ‘ JOHN POPE,
“ ‘ Major-General, Commanding.’

Which order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August, 1862.

“ *Specification 3d.*—In this that he, the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, having been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1862, did on that day receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to-wit :

“ ‘ HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
“ ‘ August 29, 1862.—4:30 P.M.

“ ‘ Major-General PORTER :

“ ‘ Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

“ ‘ JOHN POPE,
“ ‘ Major-General, Commanding.’

Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey, and did fail to push forward his forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, and in all other respects did fail to obey said order. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862.

“ *Specification 4th.*—In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Junction, on the night of the

29th of August, 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in figures and words as follows, to-wit :

“ ‘ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
“ ‘ IN THE FIELD, NEAR BULL RUN, August 29, 1862.—8:50 P. M.

“ ‘ Major-General FITZ-JOHN PORTER :

“ ‘ *General* : Immediately upon the receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.

“ ‘ JOHN POPE,
“ ‘ Major-General, Commanding.’

And the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter did then and thereby disobey the said order, and did permit one of the brigades of his command to march to Centreville—out of the way of the field of battle—and there to remain during the entire day of Saturday, the 30th of August. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th and 30th days of August, 1862.

“ *Specification 5th.*—In this, that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the night of the 29th of August, 1862, and having received from his superior commanding officer, Major-General John Pope, the lawful order set forth in specification fourth to this charge, did then and there disobey the same, and did permit one other brigade attached to his command—being the brigade commanded by Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt—to march to Centreville, and did thereby greatly delay the arrival of the said General Piatt’s brigade on the field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th of August, 1862. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th day of August, 1862.

“ CHARGE 2D.—Violation of the 52d Article of War.

“ *Specification 1st.*—In this, that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1863, and while within sight of the field and in full

hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy, in the following figures and letters, to wit :

[This is a repetition of the 4.30 P.M. order.]

Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy, without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army, a result which must have followed from said flank attack had it been made by the said General Porter in compliance with the said order, which he so shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862.

Specification 2d.—In this, that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1862, between Manassas Station and the field of a battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence was being fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on to the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces from which he shamefully retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862.

Specification 3d.—In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps, near the field of battle of Manassas, on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe action was being fought by the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and being in the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and general, and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army ; and did fail by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th day of August, 1862.

Specification 4th.—In this, that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, on the field of battle of Manassas, the 30th of August, 1862, having received a lawful order from his superior officer and commanding general, Major-General John Pope, to engage the enemy's lines, and to carry a position near their centre, and to take an annoying battery there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and by delays give the enemy opportunities to watch and know his movements, and to prepare to meet his attack; and did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy's lines¹ as to make little or no impression on the

¹ General Bradley T. Johnson, of the Confederate Service, in writing to Colonel L. N. Tucker, of Boston, regarding a ring which was supposed to belong to Colonel Fletcher Webster, says:

“Major L. N. TUCKER, Boston:

“*My Dear Sir*—Yours received. I will be glad to give the ring to Colonel Webster's family. But I must do so with an explanation of how it came into my possession, so that it may be understood how vague and uncertain is the connection between it and Colonel Webster.

“At Second Manassas, August 28, 29, and 30, 1862, I commanded the 2d Brigade of Jackson's old division, and was posted about 100 yards in the rear of the railroad cut, which subsequently was the scene of such a Titanic struggle.

“On the 29th the line to my left was driven back and broken, and as the advancing Federal force was deploying to my right, after it had got through the gap its bayonets had made in Ewell's line, I had the good fortune to charge it in flank while it was in columns of fours and break it up, capturing the colors of a New York regiment of the Excelsior Brigade.

“We also captured four guns about 500 yards in front of our line, and were then recalled and posted in our original position.

“On the left front of the railroad cut was a tongue of woods, running out at right angles to our line of battle, and for hours before noon of the 30th this skirt of woods concealed some curious movements of the Union troops. It was 400 yards from the railroad cut, and I was 100 yards behind it, but by going beyond the woods in which my brigade was lying down and getting into the open I could hear the words of command and indistinctly see the movements of troops.

“General Jackson came along and I showed him the position and told him I could not make out what they were doing. It looked like they were making breastworks of dead timber. [It turned out afterwards that what I thought were breastworks was a line of battle lying down, and their white knapsack tents marked the line.]

“‘Very well,’ said old Jack, ‘get some artillery and put some grape and canister into them. That will make them show.’

“He rode off and never sent me the artillery, so their interesting proceedings kept going on as actively as ever.

“Later in the afternoon Major W. W. Goldsborough, temporarily in com-

same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily and without making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or to keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his position and the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of the day.

mand of the 44th Virginia, which I had posted in a tongue of woods in front of the right of the railroad cut, came to report to me that some movement was taking place in the strip of woods on the left of my line, and directly in front of Goldsborough's position. We were standing at the edge of the woods, my back to the open, and his face to it, when all at once he exclaimed, 'My God, Colonel, look there.' I turned round and saw as handsome a sight as is ever seen in war.

"A line of battle in blue had just emerged from the woods, with a front of probably 1000 men. An officer, on a superb sorrel horse, rode out in front of his colors, drew his sabre and whirled it round his head, turned in his saddle, his voice ringing out clear and thrilling :

"Forward! Double quick! Charge!"

"Then, fronting us, he settled himself down in his saddle, brought his sabre to a carry, put spurs to his horse and led his line. At a trot, after him, came line after line of blue soldiers, and the gallant fellow on the sorrel horse headed straight for my left.

"I had jerked my people up and charged straight for the railroad cut. We had 100 yards, the blue line had 400 yards to go. We piled into the cut in ten seconds, whence we poured a devouring and irresistible fire on the lines close following each other coming up the hill.

"The sorrel horse and rider had lived through it all. The rider put his horse straight at the railroad embankment, and jumped him clear on top of it. The feat was seen by our whole line; was such a gallant thing and done so cleanly and well that a distinct yell went up from the men in the cut and from behind the embankment, 'Don't kill him! Don't kill him!'

"The chivalry of brave men, which makes them all akin, revolted at slaying so peerless a knight, but the air was almost a solid sheet of lead, and before one could think, horse and rider fell one limp mass on top of the embankment.

"The brave gentleman who fell was seized and pulled into shelter at once.

"While this was taking place, and I was carrying my people across the exposed open place from the woods to the railroad cut, Goldsborough was shot down by my side, and, I supposed, killed, for he bounced as he struck the ground.

"At night, however, I heard from my surgeon that, though terribly wounded, there was a chance for him. A ball had gone clean through him, through breast and back, within two inches of his heart.

"When we reached Frederick, about a week afterwards, one of my cousins (I had 29 of them in my command, Goldsborough and the surgeon were both my cousins) came up with a message from Goldsborough and a ring, which he sent word had been given him by Colonel Fletcher Webster, who died in the

" Finding.

" The Court, having maturely considered the evidence adduced, finds the accused, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of United States Volunteers, as follows :

" Charge First.

- " Of the 1st specification, ' Guilty.'
- " Of the 2d specification, ' Guilty.'
- " Of the 3d specification, ' Guilty.'
- " Of the 4th specification, ' Not Guilty.'
- " Of the 5th specification, ' Not Guilty.'
- " Of the 1st charge, ' Guilty.'

" Charge Second.

" Of the 1st specification, ' Guilty, except so much of the specification as implies that he, the accused, ' did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy ' after the receipt of the order set forth in said specification.'

field hospital in which he and Goldsborough were lying. I have kept the ring ever since, and have always associated it with the gallant charge made by the knightly soldier on a sorrel horse, who led that charge into a fire compared with which Balaklava was a holiday parade.

" I do not know his name, nor his regiment, but after the lapse of 29 years I can see that picture, that circling flash of his sabre, and hear his resonant thrilling voice, as he led that desperate charge and faced certain death, with an elan, a dash, a chivalry unsurpassed and unsurpassable, as clearly as I saw them and heard them that August afternoon, as the sun sent his slanting shadows across the Virginia field.

" Honored forever and forever be such deeds ! They will bind all Americans for the far future in their common recollection and common pride, heroism, the devotion and the fidelity of the American soldier.

" Future generations will recall with emotion and proud sentiment that their ancestors faced each other in that railroad cut and fought and died as brave men and heroes. With these feelings I will send the ring which I pray you to give to the representatives of Colonel Fletcher Webster, with this explanation, for I want it understood that I have no proof at all that he was connected with it, but only the circumstances I have detailed.

" You may be able to identify the officer who led the charge. As well as I can make out from the Union reports it was Fitz-John Porter's corps, I think, Grover's brigade. All that I know is that it was led by a soldier on a sorrel horse, as gallantly, as bravely, and as beautifully as any charge was ever led from Agincourt to Tel-el-Keber. I am your obedient servant,

" BRADLEY T. JOHNSON."

“ Of the 2d specification, ‘ Guilty.’

“ Of the 3d specification, ‘ Guilty,’ except the words ‘ to Manassas Junction.’

“ Of the 2d charge, ‘ Guilty.’

“ *Sentence.*

“ And the Court does therefore sentence him, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the United States Volunteers, ‘ *To be cashiered, and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of profit or trust under the Government of the United States.*’

“ II. In compliance with the sixty-fifth of the Rules and Articles of War, the whole proceedings of the General Court-Martial in the foregoing case have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, and by him laid before the President of the United States.

“ The following are the orders of the President :

“ ‘ The foregoing proceedings, findings, and sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and confirmed ; and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and he hereby is, cashiered and dismissed from the service of the United States as a major-general of volunteers and as colonel and brevet brigadier general in the regular service of the United States, and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.

“ ‘ ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“ ‘ January 21, 1863.’

“ III. The general court-martial, of which Major-General Hunter is President, is hereby dissolved.

“ By order of the Secretary of War :

“ L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.”

The publication of this order was not only a crushing blow to the accused, but had to be accepted as a slur upon the corps which sustained almost alone the assaults of the entire force of Lee’s army at Gaines’ Mill, and hurled back the Confederate masses at Malvern Hill. Like its brave commander, it had the courage to endure.

The progress of the trial had been closely watched, and when the court adjourned, the press of the country, almost without exception, declared that an honorable acquittal must result, a few ultra-radical papers closely connected with the prosecution remaining silent until the sentence was announced. It was to meet this condition (*Board Record*, vol. ii., p. 367), that the fraudulent "Proceedings of a General Court-Martial," and "Review," of the Judge Advocate General were prepared, forestalling the record and promulgating the theory which was to furnish the astonished public with "a safe and reliable light," where evidence failed. Thus it was brought about that so many of his countrymen—ignorant of his acts, forgetting his record of service in their behalf, and careless of the blood of his comrades crying from the plains of Groveton for justice to their leader—have been led to condemn General Porter on belief of what they have imagined that he thought.

All, however, were not led astray by the blandishments of psychic theories and the guile of sophistry. The Hon. Edward Everett, *convinced by the record of the court* that the findings were not in accord with the evidence, personally called the attention of President Lincoln to the errors and the *great injustice* committed, and urged a reconsideration of his action confirming the sentence. So favorable was the disposition shown by the President that Mr. Everett prepared the written appeal of August, 1863, in which Messrs. Robert C. Winthrop, Amos A. Lawrence, and Gardner Howland Shaw united with him in urging the matter upon Mr. Lincoln's attention—the appeal supported by the written opinion of some of the ablest legal minds of the country, being early placed

in his hands, although General Porter, deeming the time inopportune, protested.

In 1864, ex-Governor Wm. A. Newell, at the suggestion of Governor Randolph, of New Jersey and others, called upon the President and urged the reopening of the case—new evidence having come to hand. President Lincoln stated to Governor Newell (*Board Record*, vol. ii., p. 320) “that if any new evidence exculpatory of General Porter could be introduced, he would be very glad to give him an opportunity to have it presented; that he had had a high regard for General Porter personally and as a soldier, and that he hoped he would be able to vindicate himself in that way.”

General Porter himself, though assured of a friendly reception by the President, did not present the documents prepared by Mr. Everett and others until September, 1867, when he tendered them, accompanied by cordial endorsements from ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, Senators Wilson, Sherman, Harris, and Foster, Governor Curtin, General Banks, Mr. Horace Greeley, and others of like character and standing, and also by hundreds of ex-soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. President Johnson was disposed to grant the requests, and made the usual preliminary reference of the documents to the War Department. They were never returned to the President; on the contrary, they disappeared from the department without a trace of their ever having existed being left. It was under date of September 16, 1867, that General Pope wrote his letter of protest to General Grant (*Board Record*, vol. i., p. 476), commencing:

“ As I am one of the principal parties concerned in the case of Fitz-John Porter, and as I learn that he is in Washington City seeking a re-opening of his case . . . I consider it my duty as well as my right, respectfully to submit to your attention, or that of any commission that may be ordered, the following remarks for such consideration as they merit.”

In June, 1869, General Porter again appealed to the President through General Sherman, submitting with this appeal letters from Generals McClellan, Franklin, Longstreet, and Wilcox, and Colonel Marshall; also an exhaustive review of the case by Dr. Guernsey, a copy of the original appeal with its accompanying documents, and the protest of General Pope, with an answer to the same.

In 1874, he again appealed to President Grant, his application being indorsed by resolutions of the Legislatures of New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and by written opinions from eminent lawyers—Charles O'Connor, Daniel Lord, Judge Wm. D. Shipman, Sidney Bartlett, Judges Benjamin P. Curtis, and J. G. Abbott, Montgomery Blair, and others. In addition, many private appeals were made by General Porter's friends, who looked for the dawn of a brighter day. This came at last, when the honor of the corps was vindicated, and justice meted out to him who for years had lived under the stigma of that bitter, cruel sentence. On the 12th of April, 1878, thirteen years after hostilities had ceased, the following order was issued :

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, April 12, 1878. } ”

“ SPECIAL ORDERS }
No. 78. } ”

“ The following order has been received from the War Department :

“ An appeal has been made to the President, as follows :

“ ‘ NEW YORK, March 9, 1878.

“ ‘ To his Excellency RUTHERFORD B. HAYES,

“ ‘ President of the United States :

“ ‘ SIR : I most respectfully, but most urgently, renew my oft-repeated appeal to have you review my case. I ask it as a matter of long-delayed justice to myself. I renew it upon the ground heretofore stated, that public justice cannot be satisfied so long as my appeal remains unheard. My sentence is a continuing sentence, and made to follow my daily life. For this reason, if for no other, my case is ever within the reach of executive as well as legislative interference.

“ ‘ I beg to present copies of papers heretofore presented, bearing upon my case, and trust that you will deem it a proper one for your prompt and favorable consideration.

“ ‘ If I do not make it plain that I have been wronged, I alone am the sufferer. If I do not make it plain that great injustice has been done me, then I am sure that you, and all others who love truth and justice, will be glad that the opportunity for my vindication has not been denied.

“ ‘ Very respectfully yours,

“ ‘ FITZ-JOHN PORTER.’

“ In order that the President may be fully informed of the facts of the case of Fitz-John Porter, late major-general of volunteers, and be enabled to act advisedly upon his application for relief in said case, a board is hereby convened, by order of the President, to examine, in connection with the record of the trial by court-martial of Major-General Porter, such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file in the War Department, together with such other evidence as may be presented to said board, and to report, with the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their opinion justice requires should be taken on such application by the President.

“ *Detail for the Board.*

“ Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD,

“ Brigadier-General A. H. TERRY,

“ Col. G. W. GETTY, Third Artillery,

“ Major ASA B. GARDNER, Judge Advocate, Recorder.

“The board will convene at West Point, N. Y., on the 20th day of June, 1878, and is authorized to adjourn from time to time, and to sit in such place as may be deemed expedient.

“By command of General Sherman :

“E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant General.”

The full report of the Board, is given as follows :

“Report of the Board of Army Officers in the Case of Fitz-John Porter.

“NEW YORK CITY, March 19, 1879.

“TO THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

“Washington, D. C.

“*Sir* : We, the Board of Officers appointed by order of the President to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late major-general of volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for our conclusions, what action (if any), in our opinion, justice requires should be taken by the President on the application for relief in that case, have the honor to make the following report. The recorder has been directed to forward to the Adjutant-General of the Army the printed record of our proceeding, including all the evidence examined and the arguments of counsel on either side.

“We have made a very thorough examination of all the evidence presented and bearing in any manner upon the merits of the case. The recorder has, under instructions from the board, sought with great diligence for evidence in addition to that presented by the petitioner, especially such as might appear to have a bearing adverse to the claims urged by him.

“Due care has been exercised not to inquire into the military operations of the Army of Virginia, or the conduct of officers thereof, any further than has seemed necessary to a full and fair elucidation of the subject submitted to us for investigation. On the other hand, we have not hesitated to examine fully into all the facts, accurate knowledge of which seemed to us to be necessary to the formation of a correct judgment upon the merits of the case, and to the determination of the action which justice requires should be taken by the President on the petitioner's application for relief.

“We have had the benefit of the testimony of a large number

of officers of the late Confederate army, a kind of testimony which was not available at the time of General Porter's trial by court-martial. We have also availed ourselves of the testimony of many officers and soldiers of the Union forces who were present on the battle-field, and of much documentary evidence, to throw additional light upon points not made perfectly clear in the record of evidence taken before the court-martial; and we have had the use of accurate maps of the battle-field of Manassas, constructed from recent actual surveys made, under direction of the Chief of Engineers, by a distinguished officer of that corps, who was himself a participant in that battle.

"Without such a map neither the testimony upon which General Porter was convicted nor the additional testimony submitted to this board could have been correctly understood.

"The evidence which we have thus been able to examine, in addition to that which was before the court-martial, has placed beyond question many important facts which were before the subjects of dispute, and in respect to some of which radically erroneous opinions were entertained by General Porter's accusers, and doubtless by the court-martial that pronounced him guilty.

"The result has been, as we believe, to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the facts essential to the formation of a correct judgment upon the merits of the case of Fitz-John Porter. We are thus enabled to report, with entire unanimity, and without doubt in our own minds, with the reasons for our conclusions, what action, in our opinion, justice required should be taken by the President on the petitioner's application for relief.

"The evidence presents itself under several distinct heads, viz.:

"*First.* The imperfect, and in some respects erroneous, statements of facts, due to the partial and incorrect knowledge in possession of witnesses at the time of the court-martial, and the extremely inaccurate maps and erroneous locations of troops thereon, by which erroneous statements were made to convey still more erroneous impressions.


"*Second.* The opinions and inferences of prominent officers based upon this imperfect knowledge.

"*Third.* The far more complete and accurate statements of facts now made by a large number of eye-witnesses from both the contending forces.

"*Fourth.* The accurate maps of the field of operations and the exact positions of troops thereon at different periods of time, by

which statements otherwise contradictory or irreconcilable are shown to be harmonious, and opposing opinions are shown to have been based upon different views of the same military situation ; and,

2ND MANASSAS: AUG. 29. 1862.




MAP OF CORRECT POSITION.

“*Finally.* The conflicting testimony relative to plans of operations, interpretations of orders, motives of action and relative degrees of responsibility for unfortunate results.

“A careful consideration of all the material facts now fully established, in combination with the conflicting or inconclusive testimony last above referred to, gives rise to several diverse theories respecting the whole subject with which General Porter's case is inseparably connected. These diverse views of the subject

necessarily involve, in a greater or less degree, the acts, motives, and responsibilities of others as well as those of the petitioner. We have considered, with great care and labor, and with our best ability, each and all of these phases in which the subject can be and has been presented, and we find that all these possible views



of the subject, when examined in the light of the facts, which are fully established by undisputed testimony, lead inevitably to one and the same conclusion in respect to the guilt or innocence of Fitz-John Porter of the specific charges upon which he was tried and pronounced guilty by the court-martial.

“Therefore, while exposing General Porter's conduct to the

test of the highest degree of responsibility which recognized military principles attached to the command he held under the circumstances in which he was placed, and the orders which he had received, we are able to take that view of the whole subject which seems to involve in the least possible degree any question as to the acts, motives, or responsibility of others.

[Here follows a concise narrative of the events which gave rise to the charges against General Porter. We simply record their opinion, as space will not permit the entire report being presented in these pages.]

“As Longstreet’s army pressed forward to strike Pope’s exposed left wing and flank, Warren, with his little brigade, sprang into the gap, and breasted the storm until but a handful of his brave men were left alive. Then Sykes, with his disciplined brigades, and Reynolds, with his gallant Pennsylvania Reserves, seized the commanding ground in rear, and like a rock withstood the advance of the victorious enemy, and saved the Union army from rout.

“Thus did this gallant corps nobly and amply vindicate the character of their trusted chief, and demonstrate to all the world that ‘disobedience of orders’ and ‘misbehavior in the presence of the enemy’ are crimes which could not possibly find place in the head or heart of him who thus commanded that corps.

“These events of the 30th of August were excluded from the evidence before the court-martial that tried General Porter; but justice requires that they should be mentioned here as having an important bearing upon the question of animus, which was so strongly dwelt upon in the review of Porter’s case by the Judge Advocate General.

“The fundamental errors upon which the conviction of General Porter depended may be summed up in few words. It was maintained, and apparently established to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only about one half of the Confederate army was on the field of Manassas on the 29th of August, while General Lee, with the other half, was still beyond the Bull Run Mountains; that General Pope’s army, exclusive of Porter’s corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal contest with the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack which Porter was expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of the Confederate force in their front under General

Jackson; that McDowell and Porter, with their joint forces, Porter's leading, had advanced toward Gainesville until the head of their column had reached a point near the Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of Confederate troops, 'seventeen regiments,' which Buford had counted as they passed through Gainesville, marching along the road across Porter's front, and going toward the field of battle of Groveton; that McDowell ordered Porter to at once attack that column just moving to join Jackson, or the flank and rear of the line, if they had formed in line, while he would take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw them upon the enemy's centre at Groveton; that Porter, McDowell having then separated from him, disobeyed that order to attack, allowed that division of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, and then fell back and retreated toward Manassas Junction; that Porter then remained in the rear all the afternoon listening to the sounds of battle and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the centre and right of the field; that this division of the enemy having passed Porter's column and formed on the right of Jackson's line, near Groveton, an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or rear of the enemy's line, upon which his own line of march must bring him, but that he had wilfully disobeyed, and made no attempt to execute that order; that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy Jackson's detached force before the other wing of General Lee's army could join it, and that this junction having been effected during the night of the 29th, the defeat of General Pope's army on the 30th thus resulted from General Porter's neglect and disobedience.

"Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors, the following all-important facts are fully established:

"As Porter was advancing towards Gainesville, and while yet nearly four miles from that place, and more than two miles from the nearest point of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confederate army, 25,000 strong, which had arrived on the field that morning, and was already in line of battle. Not being at that moment quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being then under orders from Pope to push rapidly towards Gainesville, Porter was pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, when McDowell arrived on the field with later information of the enemy, and later and very different orders from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested Porter's

advance. This latter information left no room for doubt that the main body of Lee's army was already on the field and far in advance of Pope's army in preparation for battle. General McDowell promptly decided not to attempt to go farther to the front, but to deploy his column so as to form line in connection with General Pope's right wing, which was then engaged with Jackson. To do this, General McDowell separated his corps entirely from General Porter's, and thus relinquished the command and all right to the command of Porter's corps. McDowell did not give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any order whatever to govern his action after their separation.

"It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to General Porter in any way the erroneous view of the military situation which was afterwards maintained before the court-martial, nor that he suggested to General Porter any expectation that he would make an attack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the witnesses as to what was said and done, the information which McDowell and Porter then had respecting the enemy, and the movement which McDowell decided to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively that there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to stand on the defensive and hold his position until McDowell's movement could be completed. It would have indicated a great error of military judgment to have done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then fully known to both McDowell and Porter.

"General Pope appears from his orders and from his testimony to have been at that time wholly ignorant of the true situation. He had disapproved of the sending of Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap, to meet Longstreet on the 28th, believing that the main body of Lee's army could not reach the field of Manassas before the night of the 30th. Hence he sent the order to Porter dated 4.30 P.M., to attack Jackson's right flank or rear. Fortunately that order did not reach Porter until about sunset—too late for any attack to be made. Any attack which Porter could have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily have been fruitless of any good result. Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intelligent conduct that afternoon saved the Union Army from the defeat which would otherwise have resulted that day from the enemy's more speedy concentration. The only seriously critical period of that campaign, viz. : between 11 A.M., and sunset of August 29th, was thus safely passed. Porter had understood and appreciated

the military situation, and, so far as he had acted on his own judgment, his action had been wise and judicious. For the disaster of the succeeding day he was in no degree responsible. Whoever else may have been responsible, it did not flow from any action or inaction of his.

“ The judgment of the court-martial upon General Porter's conduct was evidently based upon greatly erroneous impressions, not only respecting what that conduct really was, and the orders under which he was acting, but also respecting all the circumstances under which he acted. Especially was this true in respect to the character of the battle of the 29th of August. That battle consisted of a number of sharp and gallant combats between small portions of the opposing forces. Those combats were of short duration and were separated by long intervals of simple skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after 6 o'clock only a small part of the troops on either side were engaged at any time during the afternoon. Then, about sunset, one additional division on each side was engaged near Groveton. The musketry of that last contest and the yells of the Confederate troops about dark were distinctly heard by the officers of Porter's corps ; but at no other time during all that afternoon was the volume of musketry such that it could be heard at the position of Porter's troops. No sound but that of artillery was heard by them during all those hours when Porter was understood by the court-martial to have been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immediately to his right. And those sounds of artillery were by no means such as to indicate a general battle.

“ The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have somehow been strangely confounded with each other. Even the Confederate reports have, since the termination of the war, been similarly misconstrued. Those of the 30th have been misquoted as referring to the 29th, thus to prove that a furious battle was going on while Porter was comparatively inactive on the 29th. The fierce and gallant struggle of his own troops on the 30th has thus been used to sustain the original error under which he was condemned. General Porter was, in effect, condemned for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such was the error upon which General Porter was pronounced guilty of the most shameful crime known among soldiers. We believe not one among all the gallant soldiers on that field was less deserving of such condemnation than he.

"The evidence of bad animus in Porter's case ceases to be material in view of the evidence of his soldierly and faithful conduct. But it is our duty to say that the indiscreet and unkind terms in which General Porter expressed his distrust of the capacity of his superior commander cannot be defended. And to that indiscretion was due, in very great measure, the misinterpretation of both his motives and his conduct, and his consequent condemnation.

"Having thus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor to report, in accordance with the President's order, that in our opinion justice requires at his hands such action as may be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him—such restoration to take effect from the date of his dismissal from the service.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servants,

"J. M. SCHOFIELD,

"Major-General U. S. Army.

"ALFRED H. TERRY,

"Brigadier-General U. S. Army.

"GEO. W. GETTY,

"Brevet Major-General U. S. Army, Colonel 3d Artillery."

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,

"WASHINGTON, June 5, 1879.

"*To the Senate and House of Representatives :*

"I transmit herewith the 'proceedings and report' of the Board of Officers, convened by Special Orders No. 78, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, April 12, 1878, in the case of Fitz-John Porter. The report of the board was made in March last, but the official record of the proceedings did not reach me until the 3d instant.

"I have given to this report such examination as satisfies me that I ought to lay the proceedings and conclusions of the board before Congress.

"As I am without power in the absence of legislation to act upon the recommendation of the report further than by submitting the same to Congress, the proceedings and conclusions of the board are transmitted for the information of Congress, and such action as in your wisdom shall seem expedient and just.

"R. B. HAYES."

This action on the part of President Hayes has brought the truth to light, and the report of such soldiers of integrity and high standing as Schofield, Terry, and Getty lavished honor where only condemnation had obtained.

Gladly one turns the leaf to read the redeeming pages of the story. Friends are never lacking at the side of him who through long and bitter years had borne unmerited disgrace as only one strong in innocence could live. Comrades of other days and fields came with assurances of confidence unabated; his corps, by voice and act, called constantly for vindication; legal and judicial talent protested against the insult and disgrace inflicted on the land; and Congress heard again and again the words of truth that at last prevailed.

Though the truth had been discovered and praise given where censure had been awarded, still justice had not been meted out to the victim of a mistaken tribunal. One crowned by his countrymen with every honor grateful hearts could find and lavish hands bestow, at length found opportunity to investigate and weigh the facts, and he who, as victor over foemen well worthy the regard of valor, had acquired the title of "magnanimous," himself surrendering to indisputable truth, achieved the brightest victory of his life when writing :

"NEW YORK, December 30, 1881.

"MY DEAR GENERAL : I have your letter of yesterday. It is true that I have re-examined the proceedings of the Court-martial and Court of Inquiry in Fitz-John Porter's case, and believe sincerely that I have done him an injustice, and have so written to the President. When I gave General Porter the letter I requested him to send you a copy. If he has not done so, he will or I will. That letter will explain all that I would otherwise

write you on the subject. I reluctantly came to the conclusion I did, but was convinced beyond all preconceived notions, and felt it due to an accused man to say so.

“Very truly yours,

“U. S. GRANT.

“General LOGAN.”

Notwithstanding General Grant's endorsement of the honor and integrity of General Porter, as shown by his letter, Congress still withheld its approval of recommendations of the board, but President Arthur, desiring to demonstrate, as far as lay in his power, his absolute confidence in the innocence of Porter, as shown by the report of the board, published the following proclamation :

“CHESTER A. ARTHUR, President of the United States of America.

“To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting :

“Whereas on the tenth day of January, 1863, Fitz-John Porter, then major-general of volunteers in the military service of the United States, and also colonel of the Fifteenth regiment of Infantry and brevet brigadier-general in the United States Army, was, by a general court-martial, for certain offenses of which he had been thereby convicted, sentenced to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States ;

“And, whereas, on the twenty-first day of January, 1863, that sentence was duly confirmed by the President of the United States and by his order of the same date carried into execution ;

“And, whereas, so much of that sentence as forever disqualified the said Fitz-John Porter from holding office imposed upon him a continuous penalty and is still being executed ;

“And, whereas, doubts have since arisen concerning the guilt of the said Fitz-John Porter of the offenses whereof he was convicted by the said court-martial, founded upon the result of an investigation ordered on the twelfth day of April, 1878, by the President of the United States, which are deemed by me to be of sufficient gravity to warrant the remission of that part of said sentence which has not yet been completely executed ;

"Now, therefore, know ye that I, Chester A. Arthur, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and in consideration of the premises, do hereby grant to the said Fitz-John Porter full remission of the hereinbefore mentioned continuing penalty.

"In witness whereof I have hereunto signed my name and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington, this fourth day of May, A.D. 1882, and of the Independence of the United States, the one hundred and sixth,

L. S.

"CHESTER A. ARTHUR.

"By the President :

"FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
"Secretary of State."

Then it was that General Porter's disabilities were removed,—*twenty years* after his condemnation and *four years* after he was reported by the Board as being not guilty of that for which he had suffered so long. But Congress yet failed to accord that which it only had the power to accord. A bill, authorizing the President to restore him to his rank was continuously defeated until, in 1885, it finally passed both houses, and was vetoed by President Arthur, on the ground that Congress was without constitutional authority to pass such a bill. As right must triumph where unbiased judgment reigns, so General Porter triumphed when Congress finally passed the following bill, which received the approval of President Cleveland :

"*Whereas*, the board of army officers convened by the President of the United States, by special orders numbered seventy-eight, headquarters of the army, April twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, to examine into and report upon the case of Fitz-John Porter, late a major-general of the United States volunteers, and a brevet brigadier-general and colonel of the army, having, by their report of March nineteenth, eighteen hundred

and seventy-nine, stated that, in their opinion 'justice requires at his (the President's) hands such action as may be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the date of dismissal from the service'; and

"*Whereas*, the President, on the fourth day of May, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, remitted so much of the sentence of said court-martial remaining unexecuted as 'forever disqualified the said Fitz-John Porter from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States'; Therefore, that justice may be done the said Fitz-John Porter, and to carry into effect the recommendation of said board—

"*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled*, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint Fitz-John Porter, late a major-general of the United States volunteers and a brevet brigadier-general and colonel of the army, to the position of colonel in the army of the United States of the same grade and rank held by him at the time of his dismissal from the army by sentence of court-martial promulgated January twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and, in his discretion, to place him on the retired list of the army as of that grade, the retired list being thereby increased in number to that extent; and all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are suspended for this purpose only; *Provided*, that said Fitz-John Porter shall receive no pay, compensation, or allowance whatsoever prior to his appointment under this act."

This act was approved by President Cleveland in July, 1886, and General Porter was by him reappointed colonel in the army, his commission dating May 14, 1861. The work commenced by that good and upright man and brave soldier, Rutherford B. Hayes, was thus completed by that clear-minded, far-searching, and just President, Grover Cleveland. President Hayes, having before him the appeal and

statement of facts from the Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War during the trial, on the earnest and persistent appeals of Senator Randolph of New Jersey, and against the pressure of politicians, convened the Schofield-Terry-Getty Advisory Board, by the judgment of which, sustained by acts of Congress, and despite the veto of President Arthur, General Porter stands before his countrymen completely and triumphantly exonerated of all that has been alleged against him. And this, too, independent of party, by the united action of Democratic and Republican Senators and Representatives of Congress.

Attempt has been made to magnify the fact that this rehabilitation was reached through the action of a Democratic President on an enabling act of Congress, in favor of which Democratic votes had been cast, into a justification of the course pursued by the persistent opposition. With such an argument *ad hominem* history can have little sympathy. General Porter was either guilty or innocent of the crimes charged against him. If *guilty*, the sentence inflicted was notoriously inadequate, and mitigation would fall little short of practical participation, to his mind. If *innocent*, his vindication, full and complete, could be no stigma upon any party aiding to that end, and opposition could confer no favor.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RAPPAHANNOCK CAMPAIGN—BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

SOLDIERS are, universally, presented to the human mind as models of heroism. This is quite natural; for it is not alone the dangers of the battle-field which bring to light the elements of heroism in the characters of men. The soldier is heroic in having to stifle all the sentiments of human sympathy which his fellow-man—the citizen—is privileged to give expression to. He sees his best and dearest friend laid low at his feet by the enemy's bullet, and yet he must smother the desire he has to render assistance, in obedience to the mandates of duty, and leaving his comrade in his agonizing pain, pushes on over dead and dying for the accomplishment of the great end in view. His heroism is developed in a thousand ways that are little thought of by those who know nothing of a soldier's life. He stifles the longing he has for the fond wife and the dear little ones he left at home, and when he lays his tired form down to rest under the broad canopy of Heaven enjoys, in his dreams only, the warm welcome and clinging arms of those who have long waited for his coming.

And so the officers and men of the Fifth Army Corps displayed once more their heroism in smother-

ing their feelings for their lost commanders, knowing that they had come to do a certain work, and until that work was completed all else must yield to its accomplishment—the work of preserving “the Union, one and inseparable.”

McClellan and Porter had disappeared forever from their military lives ! But they knew it not, nor little did they deram of the future that awaited their heroes.

Sometimes there is magnetism in the sound of a human voice ; there is magnetism in the glance of a kindly eye ; there is magnetism in the touch of a gentle hand ; there is magnetism in the presence of a noble form. Yet who can demonstrate the cause ? Wherever it is felt, however, a harmony of spirit is produced, concert of action is enforced, and strength of purpose developed. It is a dangerous element for the leader of an army to possess. Only nobleness of character can restrain such leader from making use of that power to subserve his own selfish projects ; and only sublime loyalty to the people can restrain an army from the influence of an ambitious and disloyal leader.

The Army of the Potomac displayed its loyalty to the country when it said “good-bye” to the man “above suspicion,” and turned to face the work before it. Little do the people know of the influence that was brought to bear upon General McClellan at Harrison’s Landing to disobey the order for the removal of his troops from the Peninsula ; and but few can imagine what would have taken place in the event of his declining to give over his army to Burnside. But no thoughts of disloyalty to the government ever found a resting-place in the brain of McClellan or his army. The magnetic current between the commander

and his troops had simply been broken by ruthless hands, which required a redoubling of its already sorely tested element of heroism. A new era had begun, and the question which arose to every lip was "What shall the harvest be?"

General Burnside had assumed command of the Army of the Potomac and General Hooker the command of the Fifth Corps; but the latter retained this command for a few days only, and was succeeded by General Daniel Butterfield,¹ who was born in Utica, N. Y., graduated from Union College in 1849, and at the commencement of the war was engaged in civil pursuits; but having a military bent of mind he had early connected himself with the New York State militia, and was colonel of the 12th Regiment when Fort Sumter was fired upon. He promptly tendered his services and those of his command to the government, and he led the advance of the Union forces across the Long bridge into Virginia in May, 1861. General Butterfield was a thorough soldier and a rigid disciplinarian.

When General Burnside relieved General McClellan, the former knew of the latter's plans and the disadvantage at which General Lee's army was held—one wing being miles from the other and a range of mountains intervening, while his own army was in easy reach of Lee's right wing, ready for attack or a race to Richmond. Instead of taking to an active initiative, General Burnside, on the 9th of November, proposed, in a communication to General Halleck, to give up the pursuit (?) of General Lee and to move down the

¹ General Porter thus speaks of him in a personal letter to a friend: "He was certainly a splendid commander and a good model for any one; quick, brave, and his men had confidence in him. . . . His conduct at second Bull Run was admirable. He held his men well together."

north side of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, and establish a new base of supplies at Acquia Creek or Belle Plain. The reasons given by him for this change were, that if he marched upon Culpeper and Gordonsville, with a fight there, or a general engagement—even with the results in his favor,—the enemy would have many lines of retreat for his defeated army, and would, in all probability, be able to reach Richmond with enough of his force to render it necessary to fight another battle at that place ; and should he leave even one corps, with cavalry, on the right flank of the Union army, it would render the pursuit very precarious, owing to the great lack of supplies in the country through which the Union army was operating, and a liability to interruption of communication with Washington.

This proposed change of base was not approved by General Halleck, who, in a personal interview with General Burnside at Warrenton a few days afterwards, strongly urged the latter to retain his present base, and at the same time referred to the President's letter of October 13th to General McClellan. General Burnside did not fully concur in the President's views contained in that letter, but offered a compromise by proposing to so modify his plan as to cross his army by the fords of the Upper Rappahannock and then move down and seize the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be sent to the north of the Rappahannock, to enable General Haupt to reopen the railroad to Fredericksburg.

General Halleck declined to give any official approval of this plan, but submitted it to the President on his return to Washington on the 13th. The President gave his consent rather than approval, and Gen-

eral Burnside was accordingly telegraphed to that effect on the 14th. At the same time he was given permission to reorganize his army as he had recommended in his letter of the 9th. This he proceeded to do, creating three grand divisions, as follows :

Right Grand Division, to consist of the Second and Ninth Army Corps, Major-General Edwin V. Sumner in command.

Centre Grand Division, to consist of the Third and Fifth Army Corps, Major-General Joseph Hooker in command.

Left Grand Division, to consist of the First and Sixth Army Corps, Major-General Wm. B. Franklin in command.

The Fifth Corps was, at this time, organized as follows :

Brig.-Gen. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD commanding.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. CHARLES GRIFFIN commanding.

First Brigade.

Col. JAMES BARNES.

2d Maine, Lt.-Col. George Varney.
 18th Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Jos. Hayes.
 22d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. W. S. Tilton.
 1st Michigan, Lt.-Col. Ira C. Abbott.
 13th New York, Col. E. G. Marshall.
 25th New York, Capt. Patrick Connelly.
 118th Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. James Gwyn.
 2d Co. Mass. Sharpshooters, Capt. L. E. Wentworth.

Second Brigade.

Col. JACOB B. SWEITZER.

9th Massachusetts, Col. P. R. Guiney.
32d Massachusetts, Col. F. J. Parker.
4th Michigan, Lt.-Col. G. W. Lumbard.
14th New York, Lt.-Col. T. M. Davies.
62d Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. J. C. Hull.

Third Brigade.

Col. T. B. W. STOCKTON.

20th Maine, Col. Adelbert Ames.
16th Michigan, Lt.-Col. N. E. Welch.
12th New York, Lt.-Col. R. M. Richardson.
17th New York, Capt. John Vickers.
44th New York, Lt.-Col. Freeman Conner.
83d Pennsylvania, Col. Strong Vincent.
Brady's Co. Michigan Sharpshooters, Lt. J. H. Titus.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C), Capt. A. P. Martin.
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E), Capt. Chas. A. Phillips.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C, Capt. Richard Waterman.
5th U. S., Battery D, Lieut. Chas. E. Hazlett.

Sharpshooters.

1st U. S., Lieut.-Col. Casper Trepp.

Second Division.

Brig.-Gen. GEORGE SYKES commanding.

First Brigade.

Lt.-Col. R. C. BUCHANAN.

3d U. S., Capt. Jno. D. Wilkins.
4th U. S., Capt. Hiram Dryer.
12th U. S., 1st Battalion, Capt. M. M. Blunt.
12th U. S., 2d Battalion, Capt. Thos. M. Anderson.
14th U. S., 1st Battalion, Capt. J. D. O'Connell.
14th U. S., 2d Battalion, Capt. G. B. Overton.

*HISTORY OF**Second Brigade.*

Major C. S. LOVELL.

1st and 2d U. S. Battalion, Capt. S. S. Marsh.
 6th U. S., Capt. L. C. Bootes.
 7th U. S. Battalion, Capt. D. P. Hancock.
 10th U. S., Capt. H. E. Maynadier.
 11th U. S., Capt. Chas. S. Russell.
 17th and 19th U. S., Capt. Jno. P. Wales.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

5th New York, Col. Cleveland Winslow.
 140th New York, Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke.
 146th New York, Col. Kennar Garrard.

Artillery.

1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Lieut. Frederick Dorries.
 5th U. S., Battery I, Lieut. M. F. Watson.

Third Division.

Brig.-Gen. ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS commanding.

First Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. E. B. TYLER.

91st Pennsylvania, Col. E. M. Gregory.
 126th Pennsylvania, Col. James G. Elder.
 129th Pennsylvania, Col. J. B. Frick.
 134th Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. Edw. O'Brien.

Second Brigade.

Col. P. H. ALLABACH.

123d Pennsylvania, Col. J. B. Clark.
 131st Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. W. B. Shaut.
 133d Pennsylvania, Col. F. B. Speakman.
 155th Pennsylvania, Col. E. J. Allen.

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Lieut. W. H. Phillips.
 1st U. S., Batteries E and G, Capt. A. M. Randol.

On the 13th of November, Warren's brigade was reinforced by the 146th New York Infantry, under Colonel Kennar Garrard, who graduated at the U. S. Military Academy in 1851, and was at the time Captain in the 5th U. S. Cavalry. The regiment had been recruited in Rome, N. Y., during the summer of 1862, and was at present on its first campaign.

On the 15th of November, General Burnside, after having delayed a week at Warrenton, commenced his movement, and then, instead of crossing the Rappahannock, as he was expected to do, to the surprise of the authorities at Washington, marched his whole army down the north bank of the Rappahannock, the advance of Sumner reaching Falmouth on the 17th. This consisted of a small cavalry force, with a horse battery, and the commander endeavored to make a crossing at the ford above the town, but the opposite side was guarded by a regiment of cavalry, four companies of infantry, and a battery of light artillery, in the face of which the crossing could not be effected.

The system of securing information was so complete in the Confederate army that the very day that General Burnside put his troops in motion General Lee was informed of it, and sent a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery to reinforce the garrison at Fredericksburg, and at the same time ordered General Jackson to cross the mountains at once and place his corps in the vicinity of Orange Court-House, to await developments. His military mind fully appreciated the importance of securing the heights in rear of Fredericksburg, and he believed that General Burnside would undoubtedly take advantage of his opportunity and do so. He, therefore, gave special instructions to the commander of the

Confederate forces at that point, while notifying him of the reinforcement sent there, to keep on the look-out for the reinforcing party, and if it was unsafe for them to approach Fredericksburg to so notify them, and, in that event, for them to proceed through Spottsylvania Court-House and take position south of the North Anna River, in the vicinity of where it is crossed by the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad.

Being also informed that the entire force of General Sumner had left Catlett's Station on the 17th, and was moving towards Fredericksburg, and that Union gunboats and supply transports had entered Acquia Creek, the divisions of Generals McLaws and Ransom, accompanied by W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry and Lane's battery, were ordered to proceed to Fredericksburg. On the 18th, by a forced reconnaissance to Warrenton, it was made clear to the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia that the whole of the Union army was moving towards Fredericksburg, and therefore, on the morning of the 19th, the remainder of General Longstreet's command was put in motion for that point, and General Lee moved down the south side of the river, but had not occupied Fredericksburg on the 21st.

When General Sumner arrived with his command at Falmouth on the 19th, believing that this was the proper movement to make, he suggested to General Burnside the propriety of crossing a portion of his force in order to occupy Fredericksburg and its vicinity; but General Burnside decided that it was impracticable.

The Fifth Army Corps broke camp at Warrenton on the 16th, and without any incident of note it

marched to, and was established at, Hartwood (a few miles above Falmouth), on the 19th. Impressed with the necessity of a prompt and vigorous prosecution of the campaign, and without the knowledge of what had been suggested by General Sumner, General Hooker, fearing a delay in the construction of bridges over the Rappahannock, and believing that the enemy, by such a movement as he proposed would be effectually prevented from making that river (of itself a most formidable obstacle) his line of defense, addressed the following letter to General Burnside :

" HEADQUARTERS CENTRE GRAND DIVISION,
" CAMP AT HARTWOOD, VA., November 19, 1862.

" Lieutenant-Colonel LEWIS RICHMOND,

" Assistant Adjutant-General Army of the Potomac :

" *Colonel* : I have the honor to request that you will call the attention of the major-general commanding to the advantage it will be in the prosecution of the campaign to allow my command to cross the Rappahannock at the ford four miles distant from this point, and to march by the most direct route to Saxton's Junction. I have three days' rations from to-morrow morning, and forage I can obtain in the country. At Bowling Green, I am nearer to supplies delivered at Port Royal than I can be here, and supplies can be landed at that point in a day and a half from Washington. I make this suggestion in order to have it brought to the General's attention, in the event it should not have already received his reflection. I cannot possibly encounter a force in this advance which I cannot easily push away, and should Sickles join me and supplies be properly furnished, continue the advance. It has appeared to me that the lateness of the season almost demands celerity of movement on our part.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JOSEPH HOOKER,

" Major-General, Commanding Centre Grand Division."

This movement was not approved by General Burnside, for, in his reply, he directed his adjutant-general to say :

“As an independent movement, the one proposed would be a very brilliant one and possibly successful ; but, taken in connection with the movements of the other grand divisions, he is of the opinion that it would be a little premature. He would not think of making an important movement without full consultation with his generals.”

That two out of three of his grand division commanders saw the necessity of carrying out the plan agreed upon with the President and General Halleck, even at this late day, ought to have been sufficient to have induced General Burnside to have at least attempted it, knowing that by doing so he would be relieved of responsibility in case of disaster, and would have received due credit and reward in the event of success. Had there been any strategical position on the north bank of the Rappahannock which would have forced upon General Lee the necessity of making an attack on the Union forces, his course might have furnished food for argument ; but the military strategy developed by placing a deep and swift river on the front it was designed to form the base of attack was a movement so singular in its character that it formed a subject of comment at the time, even with the enlisted men. That such a movement could have been approved at Washington, as one is led to infer by the testimony of General Burnside before the Committee on the Conduct of the War ; or that General Halleck told General Burnside that he would at once order, by telegraph, the pontoon trains spoken of in his plan, and would, upon his return to Washington, see that they were promptly forwarded, is simply out of the question ; and General Halleck most emphatically denies this to be so, saying :

“In the first place, that plan was *never approved, nor was he ever authorized to adopt it.* In the second place, he could not

possibly have expected supplies and pontoons to be landed at points then occupied in force by the enemy. Again, he was repeatedly informed that gunboats could not at that time ascend the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg."

General Burnside, upon his arrival in front of Fredericksburg, had expected to find there pontoons sufficient to construct a bridge across the river, and telegraphed to Washington to that effect. But General Halleck claimed that he (Burnside) had no right to expect such to be the case. And this must be true; not only because General Burnside, without the knowledge of the authorities at Washington, had altered the plans agreed upon; but if he had asked for them his movements would thereby have been disclosed, and he would, without doubt, have been directed to pursue a different course.

On the 21st of November, the Fifth Corps was moved to the vicinity of the Potomac Creek crossing of the railroad from Acquia Creek to Fredericksburg, and the same day General Sumner summoned the corporate authorities of Fredericksburg to surrender the place by 5 P.M., threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard the city at nine o'clock the next morning. The weather had been tempestuous for two days, and a storm was raging at the time of the summons. It was impossible to prevent the execution of the threat to shell the city, as it was completely exposed to the batteries on the Stafford Hills. The city authorities were informed by General Lee that while his forces would not use the city for military purposes, its occupation by the Union forces would be resisted, and directions were given for the removal of the women and children as rapidly as possible. The threat to bombard was not carried into execution.

On the 27th of November, General Wade Hampton with, as he reports, about 200 Confederate cavalrymen, crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Mill, and having learned that some Union cavalry was stationed at Yellow Chapel, eight miles from Falmouth, with their pickets extending to Deep Run, halted within two miles of the chapel, and at 4 o'clock A.M. of the 28th, struck out through the woods between the Marsh and the White Ridge roads, and came out on the Marsh road half a mile from the chapel, charged the picket post, and captured every man who was there, consisting of one troop of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, Captain George Johnson commanding. Another troop of the same regiment was on picket on the two roads above mentioned. These were also captured with the exception of five men who escaped on foot through the woods. This was all done without a casualty on the Confederate side. This exploit resulted in taking 87 enlisted men, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 2 colors, and about 100 horses and carbines.

General Hampton's design, as he states, was also to cut off the 6th U. S. Cavalry on duty at Richard's Ferry; but he was "forced reluctantly to abandon his design," on account of his force being necessarily reduced by having to take charge of prisoners. Had he attempted such an exploit, it is more than probable that he would have had a more lasting impression of the episode forced upon him than that made by Captain Johnson's command. In reporting this affair General Averell says :

"On the evening of the 26th instant an officer was sent to visit the pickets, who remained with them until the morning of the 27th. He was directed to warn them of an expected demonstra-

tion on the part of our enemy ; to direct the officer in command to keep his reserve constantly saddled and ready for action ; to increase the vigilance of the patrols and pickets, and guard against the attack which he must soon expect. He was told to expect the attack in the morning. . . . After the most careful and comprehensive instructions, and with a timely warning fresh in his memory, Captain Johnson permitted his command to be surprised and a greater portion of it captured, bringing disgrace and shame upon his regiment and the brigade to which it belonged, and our cavalry service into disrepute. I have the honor to request that the name of Captain George Johnson, 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, be dropped from the rolls, or, if an opportunity shall occur, to bring him to trial."

Subject to the approval of the President, Captain Johnson was dismissed the service, December 2, 1862, in special orders from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. This was a severe lesson, but like all such it had its good effects, causing increased efficiency in the performance of outpost duty.

The day before this order was issued, the 1st Brigade of Griffin's division, under Colonel Barnes, was sent out with two days' rations on what was known as a secret mission. It proceeded to the spot where Hampton had captured Johnson's command of Union cavalry, and remained overnight, returning to camp the following day. On the way back there was much merriment among the men over what they termed "General Barnes' trap." The following is taken from the diary of one of the officers of the expedition :

"It was a poorly conducted affair throughout. The brigade (1st of the 1st Division) was put into a woods on three sides of an open field, near where the cavalry of General Averell were surprised, with the intention of seducing the enemy into this open space in the field by a show of small force. The lines had not been formed an hour before there were several hundred fires in

full blast, which I doubt not could have been seen by the enemy ten miles away. The 'wiseacres,' who kept the object of our expedition a secret on the way out, labored in vain; they forgot to prohibit the building of fires. My post of duty last night was about half a mile beyond 'the trap,' where, in a hollow space, I was sent with seven men. The hole I was put into struck me as a little queer. Had the enemy come upon me, I saw no way 'to get,' either in one direction or the other."

On the night of the 6th and 7th of December, about four inches of snow fell, and the troops suffered much from the severity of the weather. Two men of the 20th Maine were frozen to death. Indeed, the weather was very severe for that latitude, and the troops suffered much in consequence of living in shelter tents, where it was barely possible to sleep,—the feet of the men extending beyond the front of the tents.

The pontoons arrived on the 25th of November, but no action was taken towards crossing the Rappahannock until December 9th. In the meantime, (November 26th) General Jackson was directed by General Lee to proceed towards Fredericksburg. Some Union gun-boats having arrived at Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, about this time, General D. H. Hill's division was stationed near that place, and the remainder of Jackson's corps was so disposed as to support Hill or Longstreet, the latter having established his command on Marye's Heights in rear of Fredericksburg.

It having been determined by General Burnside to cross the river and attack the enemy in position, five bridges were ordered to be constructed—two at the upper part of the town of Fredericksburg, one at the lower part of the city, and two more about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles below the second crossing place, the first and last

bridge being some two miles apart. This required a certain disposition of the artillery to protect the construction and cover the passage of the army.

A brief description of the locality will make the subject much more comprehensive to the general reader. A range of hills south of Fredericksburg, occupied by the enemy, extends from above the ford at Falmouth to the Massaponax River, five miles below. This ridge forms an angle with the river, passes behind the town, and is itself overlooked by another ridge behind it. Between the ridge and the river extends the plain, on which the town of Fredericksburg stands; narrow at this point, but spreading out towards the Massaponax and the front of the lower bridges. This ridge is, from Falmouth down to where it touches the Massaponax, about six miles long. On the north of the river, the prolongation of the ridge, which crosses the river at Falmouth dam, forms a high and broken country at and near Falmouth. Bordering the river, a narrow plain and broken ground extend to near the position selected for the middle bridges, whence a higher ridge or bluff commences and stretches in nearly a straight line to a point below the position of the lower bridges. This high ridge is about 2500 yards long, is broken near the centre by a deep and heavily wooded ravine, and is terminated by another ravine perpendicular to its general direction. Beyond this ravine, plains extend for about 800 yards, where a lower ridge, some 900 yards in length, and curving toward the river, terminates at Pollock's Mill, near the mouth of White Oak Run. The course of the river forms a curve, opening from the upper point of the bluff and terminating near Pollock's Mill, thus

leaving a low plain, the extension of that on the south side, varying in width from the river to the hills from 350 to 1100 yards. Along the base of the ridge runs the main or river road, crossing White Oak Run by ford at Pollock's Mill.

In order to control the enemy's movements on the plain ; to reply to and silence his batteries along the crest of his ridge ; to command the town ; to cover and protect the throwing of the bridges and the crossing of the troops ; and to protect the left flank of the army from attacks in the direction of Massaponax River, it was necessary to cover the entire length with artillery, posted in such positions as were favorable for these purposes. The Reserve Artillery was not strong enough for this object, and therefore some of the divisional artillery was withdrawn from the service with the troops and temporarily attached to the reserve, which was arranged in four large divisions.

The right, under General Hayes, consisted of Batteries E, 2d U. S., Lieutenant Benjamin ; A, 4th U. S., Lieutenant King ; G, 1st Rhode Island, Captain Owen ; L, 2d New York, Captain Roemer ; 2d Pennsylvania Battery, Captain Durell, B, 1st New York, Captain Pettit ; and D, 5th U. S., Lieutenant Hazlett.

The right centre, under command of Colonel Tompkins, 1st Rhode Island, consisted of the 4th New York Battery, Captain Smith ; Battery K, 1st U. S., Captain Graham ; G, 4th U. S., Lieutenant Miller ; K, 5th U. S., Lieutenant Kinzie ; D, 1st New York Battalion, Captain Kusserow ; C, 1st Rhode Island, Captain Waterman ; and H, 1st Ohio, Captain Huntington.

The left centre, under command of Colonel R. O. Tyler, consisted of Batteries B, 1st Connecticut, Cap-

tain Brooker ; M, 1st Connecticut, Captain Pratt ; A, 1st New York Battalion, Captain Diedrichs ; B, 1st New York Battalion, Captain Voegler ; 3d New York Battery, Lieutenant Harn ; C, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain McCarthy ; and D, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain Hall.

The left, under command of Captain G. A. De Russy, 4th U. S., consisted of the 5th New York Battery, Captain Taft ; C, 1st New York Battalion, Lieutenant Wever ; A, 1st Maryland, Captain Wolcott ; 2d Maine, Captain Hall ; 1st New York Battery, Captain Cowan ; L, 1st New York, Captain Reynolds ; 4th Pennsylvania Battery, Captain Thompson ; F, 1st Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Ricketts ; and G, 1st Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Amsden.

The entire number of guns thus placed on the north bank of the Rappahannock River amounted to 147.

On the 9th of December, the three grand division commanders were ordered to meet at General Burnside's headquarters at 12 o'clock noon. They there received verbal instructions to the effect that the Right Grand Division (General Sumner's) would concentrate near the upper and middle bridges ; the Left Grand Division (General Franklin's), near the bridge below the town ; the Centre Grand Division (General Hooker's), near to and in rear of General Sumner. These instructions were given with the view to throwing the bridges on the morning of the 11th of December.

On the day appointed, additional instructions were sent to the three grand division commanders, as follows :

General Sumner was directed to use the first corps

which crossed the river in holding the town and covering the crossing of the other corps, after which he was to move his first corps directly to the front, with a view to taking the heights that commanded the plank and telegraph roads, supporting it with the other corps of his grand division. General Hooker was ordered, after crossing, to hold himself in readiness to support either Sumner or Franklin. General Franklin was directed, after crossing, to move down the old Richmond road in the direction of the railroad.

Under these orders the Fifth Corps broke camp on the morning of December 11th, and marched to the bank of the Rappahannock, moving in three separate columns—the 2d Division (General Sykes') on the right by the Stafford road ; the 1st Division (General Griffin's) on the left and to the left of the road passing from camp to the Phillips' house ; while the 3d Division (General Humphrey's) in a route to the right of that taken by General Griffin. The artillery moved in rear of the divisions, with the exception of Hazlett's and Waterman's batteries, which had been temporarily withdrawn for use with the Reserve Artillery.

On arriving at the river, about three miles from camp, the corps was massed on a level tract of land in rear of some of the batteries of position, and the engineers commenced to lay the pontoon bridges. The sharpshooters of the enemy were concealed in the houses on the Fredericksburg side of the river, and harassed the engineers terribly. Soon the interest of the situation was heightened by a terrific cannonading, which the Union batteries all along the heights opened upon the city. This was intended principally to sweep the rifle-pits which the enemy had

thrown up along the bank of the river and to drive the sharpshooters out of the houses, and was maintained for about two hours, during which the exploding shells kindled a number of fires at different points throughout the city. Succeeding this cannonading there came a lull, followed by musketry. This was from the men of the 19th Massachusetts and 7th Michigan, who had volunteered to cross the river in pontoon boats and clear the town. They made a gallant and daring passage under fire of the enemy, and did not discharge their pieces until they jumped from the boats, when they dashed up the the river bank, drove the enemy from their entrenchments, and soon obtained possession of the town. This was a daring piece of work, executed in the presence of the whole army. A commencement so bright should have had a more successful termination. While fighting their way through the town, the regiments suffered much from shots delivered from houses in the city.

General Lee had, after having taken position and watched the preparations of the Union forces, strengthened all his lines, extending from the river about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Fredericksburg along the range of hills in rear of the city to the Richmond railroad. Earthworks were constructed upon their crests at the most eligible positions. These were judiciously chosen. Two regiments of Barksdale's brigade (17th and 18th Mississippi) guarded the points opposite where the locations were made for the bridges. The former, assisted by the 8th Florida, of Anderson's division, being at the upper. The rest of the brigade, with the 3d Georgia, was held in reserve in the city.

On the range of hills Lee had posted his infantry

in excellent position, massing it at the most vulnerable points. Longstreet's corps constituted the left, with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries on Marye's and Willis' hills, at the foot of which Cobb's brigade of McLaws' division and the 24th North Carolina of Ransom's brigade were stationed, protected by a stone wall. The Washington Artillery occupied the redoubts on the crest of Marye's Heights, while those on the right and left were held by part of the Reserve Artillery, Alexander's battalion, and the divisional batteries of Anderson, Ransom, and McLaws. A. P. Hill, of Jackson's corps, was posted between Hood's right and Hamilton's Crossing on the railroad. His front line, consisting of the brigades of Pender, Lane, and Archer, occupied the edge of a wood. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, with fourteen pieces of artillery, supported by the 40th and 50th Virginia, of Fields' brigade, was posted near the right. Lane's brigade, thrown forward in advance of the general line, held the woods, which here projected into the open ground. Thomas' brigade was stationed behind the interval between Lane and Pender; Gregg's, in rear of that between Lane and Archer. These two brigades, with the 47th Virginia and the 22d Virginia battalion of Fields' brigade, constituted General Hill's reserve. Early's and Taliaferro's divisions composed Jackson's second line; D. H. Hill's division his reserve. His artillery was distributed along his line in the most eligible positions, so as to command the open ground in front. General Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry and his horse artillery, occupied the plain on

General Jackson's right, extending to Massaponax Creek.

On the morning of the 11th, at 5 o'clock, General Franklin moved with his two corps to the banks of the river, but the bridges had not been completed when he arrived, about 7.30 A.M. At 9 o'clock the lower bridge was completed, and at 11 A.M. both were reported as ready for crossing. The enemy made but feeble efforts to prevent the construction of these bridges, indicating by this action that they invited attack. It was not until 4 P.M., however, that the commander of the left grand division received orders to cross his troops; but this order was modified so that he was to cross about a brigade to insure the safety of the bridges. At daylight on the morning of the 12th, the remainder of General Franklin's command began to cross the river; by 1 P.M. the entire force was across, and by 4 P.M. the troops were in position to make the attack.

During the night of December 10th, pursuant to instructions from General Sumner, Hancock was directed to send two regiments to the river, to protect the bridge-builders in front of Fredericksburg. At daylight of the 11th the work commenced, covered by the guns already described as being in position. The pontonniers were annoyed during the day by the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, secreted in the houses near the proposed landing of the bridges. The engineer brigade, failing to accomplish its assigned work, under the fire it met with, Hall's brigade of Howard's division was sent to report to General Woodbury. Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter, 7th Michigan, followed by the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, crossed the river, as stated, and seized the town; and

it being 4.30 before the bridges were completed, only the remainder of Howard's division crossed before dark, and occupied the city. The next morning, the remainder of General Sumner's grand division proceeded over the river, and Wilcox was ordered to extend to the left, so as to connect with Franklin's right. General Couch was directed also to extend his right so far as to prevent the possibility of the enemy occupying the upper part of the town. At sunrise on the 12th, French's and Hancock's divisions were crossed and assigned positions in the streets running parallel to the river. The Ninth Corps occupied the left of the city, where scarcely an inhabitant was found remaining. French was directed to prepare his division for the advance and Hancock to follow with his division in the same order of attack, with a distance of 200 yards between the lines.

On the night of the 11th, General Hooker was ordered to send two divisions (Sickles' and Birney's, of Stoneman's corps) to the bridges, four miles below, to support General Franklin's two army corps. Subsequently, General Hooker was ordered to send the remaining division (Whipple's) of Stoneman's corps, to relieve the division of General Howard, in Fredericksburg. The Fifth Corps had, up to this time, remained intact, ready to cross the bridges. At 1.30 on the 13th, it was ordered to cross the river and attack. Before the corps had fully crossed, General Griffin's division, the strongest of the three and nearest in position for the purpose, was, under instructions from General Burnside, sent to support General Sturgis. General Hooker was thus left with but two of Butterfield's divisions, of the centre grand division, with which he could make any attack.

About 5 P.M. of the 12th, General Burnside was at General Franklin's headquarters, and remained an hour or more. While there General Franklin, in the absence of any definite plan of attack on the part of the former, strongly advised the commander of the Army of the Potomac to let him (Franklin) make a powerful attack on the Confederate right, with 30,000 men, at daylight the next morning, and at the same time asked that Hooker's grand division should be crossed during the night to keep his (Franklin's) line of retreat and bridges secure. Burnside went away, promising to send orders inside of two or three hours, or by midnight at farthest. Franklin remained up all night in momentary expectation of these orders, as he was in telegraphic communication with the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac; and, for fear of mistakes, had sent orderlies there asking for what had been promised. But the messengers only got as far as General Burnside's tent. He was asleep from the time he reached headquarters after leaving Franklin until the next morning. At half-past 7 A.M., on the 13th, Franklin received his orders. It was too late then to put Hooker across. These orders were carried by General James A. Hardie, and were so entirely different from what General Franklin had been led to expect, that he submitted them to his corps commanders, Generals William F. Smith and John F. Reynolds. They were surprised too. The orders were :

"Keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division at least to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's [Hamilton's Crossing] on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. . . . "

The same order said that Sumner, on the right, was to make an attack, with a division, from Fredericksburg.

At 8.30 A.M. of the 13th, General Franklin, in accordance with his orders, pushed Meade's division forward, which came under the enfilading fire of Stuart's horse artillery, and some time was spent before the horse artillery withdrew from the fire delivered by the Union batteries in position. Meade then advanced to seize the piece of woods held by Lane, Pender, and Archer's brigades, with Thomas and Gregg in reserve. Gibbon's division was ordered in support of Meade. Meade passed into the wood, carried it, broke through the line between Archer and Lane, crossed the railroad, and gained the crest of a hill, capturing two flags and about 200 prisoners. At the same time Gibbon's division advanced, crossed the railroad, entered the wood, took some prisoners, driving back the first line of the enemy; but the wood was so dense that the connection between Meade and Gibbon could not be kept up. At the crest of the hill Meade continued the combat for some time, maintained principally on the Confederate side by Hamilton, while the second line of Confederates was advancing. Lawton's brigade, under Colonel Atkinson, quickly followed on the right and left by the brigades of Trimble (under Hoke) and Early (under Walker), were pressed against Meade. Taliaferro's division moved forward at the same time on the left of Early, and joined in the attack. In consequence of this vigorous counter attack, Meade's line could not hold its ground, and was repulsed, leaving the wood at a walk, but not in order. Generals Reynolds and Meade rallied them beyond the Bowling Green

road. Gibbon's division was also repulsed shortly afterward. Just as Meade was repulsed, two regiments of Berry's brigade of Birney's division (Third Corps) which had just arrived, were thrown into the wood on Gibbon's left.¹ They also were soon driven out. While Meade's division was being rallied, the remainder of Birney's division came up and was thrown forward, and drove the Confederates from the front of the wood. This division, with the aid of the artillery, soon caused the enemy to seek shelter, from which he made no farther advance. It also materially aided in saving Hall's battery, then seriously threatened. Gibbon was then relieved by Sickles' division of the Third Corps. This ended all the attack that was made by the left grand division, it simply holding its position during the remaining period of the time the Union troops occupied the south bank of the Rappahannock.

In the meantime, General French, at 9.50 A.M. of the 13th, having reported to General Sumner that his dispositions had been made, moved out of Fredericksburg at noon by two parallel streets running into the Plank and Telegraph roads, and, covering his division with a strong line of skirmishers under Colonel John S. Mason, at 12.10 P.M. became engaged with the enemy.

Just to the rear of Fredericksburg, almost at the very outer edge of the town, runs a ditch or canal. This was impassable except at the bridges on the roads above mentioned. A little beyond it the ground rises, forming a slight cover, behind which General

¹ It appears somewhat singular that troops which were sent as support should have been thrown into the first action had by General Franklin, where only two divisions of his two army corps were engaged.

French's troops were able to deploy. The rise or crest is about half way between the outer edge of the city and the foot of the heights to be carried. The intermediate ground was obstructed here and there by houses and garden fences. This plain was swept by a converging artillery and infantry fire of the enemy.

General French pushed forward his troops, his left resting on the Telegraph road, to a small rise of ground, within about one hundred yards of a stone wall, at the foot of the hill occupied as the line of defense by the Confederates. Behind this wall was posted Cobb's brigade, from which French received a deadly fire, as well as from Cooke's brigade of Ransom's division, which had been placed at the top of the hill, supported by Ransom's own brigade. Hancock followed French with his division—Zook, Meagher, and Caldwell's brigades—and joined in the first assault, driving the enemy's skirmishers behind the stone wall.

At 1 P.M., Generals Hancock and French were ordered to carry the enemy's works by storm, but the Confederate batteries, paying no attention to the Union artillery, poured a rapid and destructive fire into Sumner's troops, temporarily throwing some of the men into disorder, causing them to seek shelter behind the rise of ground and the houses in proximity. Three separate assaults were made on this position by this command, but without effect.

While General Sumner's attack was in progress, General Butterfield, with the Fifth Corps, had crossed the river, and halting long enough in the city for his men to deposit their knapsacks on the sidewalks of one of the streets, and having sent General

Griffin with his division to support Sturgis, pushed out Humphreys and Sykes with their divisions to the junction of Hanover street with the Telegraph road, and formed between that and the Plank road, Sykes on the right. General Butterfield was ordered to attack and break the enemy's line, and carry the heights in his front. The crowded state of the streets of Fredericksburg prevented the crossing of all the artillery of the corps. Such portions of it as had crossed the river formed in the street to the left of Hanover, and took position on the right and left of the point of attack. Neither Humphreys nor Sykes had up to this time seen any part of the ground occupied by the enemy or the Union troops, and the necessity for the attack was so urgent that they could not take time to examine it. At General Humphreys' request, however, Captain Hancock, of General Hancock's staff, accompanied him to the ground, first to a small gully crossing the Telegraph road, where the troops could make preparations for the attack under partial cover; then to the high ground above, on which, some 200 yards in advance, were Sumner's men, lying down, slightly sheltered by the slight rise in the ground. About 150 yards in front of them was a heavy stone wall a mile in length.

After this cursory examination of the field, General Humphreys, being directed to reinforce General Couch on the left of the Telegraph road, moved Allabach's brigade to the front, and sent orders to General Tyler to follow with the 1st Brigade and form on the right of Allabach's brigade.

General Humphreys, in his report of this engagement, says :

“The 2d Brigade was quickly formed under my direction by Colonel Allabach, and then led by him and myself. It moved rapidly and gallantly up to General Couch's troops, under the artillery and musketry fire of the enemy. The nature of the enemy's line of defense could not be clearly perceived by me until I reached our line. The troops I was to support, as well as those on their left (I could not see those on their right from the interruption of the line by a road and the thick smoke), were sheltering themselves by lying on the ground. This example Colonel Allabach's brigade immediately followed, in spite of an effort to prevent it, and opened a fire upon the enemy. A part only of his men were able to reach the front rank, owing to the numbers already occupying the ground. The continued presence of the troops I was to support or relieve proved a serious obstacle to my success. As soon as I ascertained the nature of the enemy's position, I was satisfied that our fire could have but little effect upon him, and that the only mode of attacking him successfully was with the bayonet. This I resolved to do, although my command was composed of troops that entered the service in August. With great difficulty their firing was arrested, chiefly by the exertions of myself and staff and Colonel Allabach, aided by Colonel Allen, Colonel Clark, and Captain Tyler. While this was being done, I sent a staff officer to General Tyler, with instructions to bring his command to the left of the road, in the ravine, and prepare it to support or take the place of Allabach's brigade, as the event might require. The charge was then made, but the deadly fire of artillery and musketry broke it, after an advance of 50 yards. Colonel Allabach re-formed the brigade, a portion in the line from which the charge was made, and the remainder in the ravine from which they originally advanced.

“The greater part of my staff were now on foot, having had their horses killed or disabled, my own being in the latter condition from two wounds. Mounting the horse of my special orderly (Damond, 6th U. S. Cavalry), I rode to General Tyler's brigade to conduct it to the enemy, and while doing so received three successive orders from General Butterfield to charge the enemy's line, the last order being accompanied by the message that both General Burnside and General Hooker demanded that the crest should be taken before night. It was already growing dusky. General Tyler's brigade was not yet entirely formed, and was impeded in doing so by a battery of six guns, whose limbers occu-

ped a part of his ground, and whose fire would have rendered it impossible for him to advance. With great difficulty I brought this battery to cease firing. Then, riding along the two lines, I directed them not to fire; that it was useless; that the bayonet alone was the weapon to fight with here. Anticipating, too, the serious obstacle they would meet with in the masses of men lying under the little shelter afforded by the natural embankment in front, before mentioned, who could not be got out of the way, I directed them to disregard these men entirely and to pass over them. I ordered the officers to the front, and, with a hurrah, the brigade, led by General Tyler and myself, advanced gallantly over the ground, under the heaviest fire yet opened,¹ which poured upon it from the moment it rose from the ravine.

“As the brigade reached the masses of men referred to, every effort was made by the latter to prevent our advance. They called to our men not to go forward, and some attempted to prevent by force their doing so. The effect upon my command was what I apprehended—the line was somewhat disordered, and, in part, forced to form into a column, but still advanced rapidly. The fire of the enemy’s musketry and artillery, furious as it was before, now became still hotter. The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column. Officers and men were falling rapidly, and the head of the column was at length brought to a stand when close up to the wall. Up to this time not a shot had been fired by the column, but now some firing began. It lasted but a minute, when, in spite of all our efforts, the column turned and began to retire slowly. I attempted to rally the brigade behind the natural embankment so often mentioned, but the united efforts of General Tyler, myself, our staffs, and the other officers could not arrest the retiring mass. My efforts were the less effective, since I was again dismounted, my second horse having been killed under me. The only one of my staff now mounted was Lieutenant Humphreys, whose horse had been three times wounded. All the rest had their horses either

¹ Cobb’s brigade of Confederates and the 24th North Carolina were placed by General McLaws along the Telegraph road, in front of the Marye house (a stone fence and cut along this road gave good protection to the enemy). When Cobb’s brigade got in position, Ransom’s division was withdrawn and placed in reserve. This was the force occupying the stone wall when the Second Corps advanced. Afterwards the line of the stone wall was reinforced by Kershaw’s brigade, thus doubling the number to greet Humphreys.

killed or disabled, except one officer, who had been sent off with orders.

“Directing General Tyler to re-form his brigade under cover of the ravine, I returned to the portion of Allabach’s brigade still holding, with the other troops, the line of natural embankment. At this moment some one brought me Colonel Elder’s horse, the colonel having been dangerously wounded a short time before.

“My force being too small to try another charge, I communicated the result of the contest to General Butterfield, and received directions in return to bring the remainder of my troops to the ravine. This was accordingly done, the 123d and 125th regiments, commanded by Colonels Clark and Allen, retiring slowly and in good order, singing and hurraing. Colonel Allabach brought off the other regiments in equally good order.

“Our loss in both brigades was heavy, exceeding 1000 in killed and wounded,¹ including in the number officers of high rank. The greater part of the loss occurred during the brief time they were charging and retiring, which scarcely occupied more than ten or fifteen minutes for each brigade.”

We have given the greater part of General Humphreys’ report verbatim for several reasons: First, because it is the *official* report of that officer, who went forward with his men to “the farthest advance of the afternoon.” This is supported by all who saw the charge he made with Tyler’s brigade. Therefore, with his educated topographical eye, his perfect equilibrium of mind, his invincible courage, all rendered him capable of observing what took place, and Andrew A. Humphreys was not the man to make an official report that could not be relied upon as *the truth* in every respect. Second, because Brevet Brigadier-General Francis J. Walker, U. S. Volunteers, in his *History of the Second Army Corps*, has taken occasion to attack that report and attempt to impute reflections in it on the Second Corps; and

¹ Official revised reports in *Records of Rebellion* give 1019 in these two brigades.

through his attack, belittle the services of the Fifth Army Corps. He says, in commenting on General Humphreys' report :

“The historian of the Second Corps cannot admit the censure which is implied in this account, and which was subsequently strongly expressed in a letter of General Humphreys, printed in the revised edition of Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*. In that letter General Humphreys attributes his failure essentially to the confusion caused by his troops having to pass over the men of the Second Corps, and imputes blame that these men had not been withdrawn before his charge was ordered. Now, *it goes without saying that the presence of such a body of men, lying down, constitutes a certain obstacle to the progress of a fresh column* ; but it would have been as reasonable to quarrel with the corpses of French's and Hancock's men who had been killed in the charge, as with the bodies of their living companions who had clung to the ground when the attack failed, deeming it was their duty to hold what they had gained ; just as some of the same regiments did, eighteen months later, after the fatal charge at Cold Harbor. It is very likely true that, among those thousands, a few may have called out to Allabach's and Tyler's men that it was useless to go forward ; but their own situation on that plain, swept by fire, is proof enough that such men were very few, *if, indeed, the story is not the tale of some colonel or captain to excuse the breaking of his own command*. The fact is, General Humphreys' charge failed, not because of the presence of the remnants of the divisions that had made the previous assaults, but because, in General Humphreys' own words, ‘the stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column.’ Dense as was the line, four ranks deep, behind that wall, when Hancock's last attempt was made, it had just been freshly reinforced by the 15th South Carolina, in support of the 2d, while the 3d was brought into the sunken road on the left of Phillips' Georgia Legion between the time of Allabach's charge and that of Tyler's.

“Again, it cannot be admitted that this division approached nearer to the wall than other troops had reached. General Humphreys was not on the field when French's and Hancock's charges took place, he was not even on the same side of the river ; and therefore he could not know from personal observation what

points were reached in those charges, while a hundred officers who witnessed both the earlier and the later assaults can testify that no troops *went so near* the stone wall that bloody day as the men of Kimball, Zook, Meagher, and Caldwell. But upon this point we are not called to rely upon the observations and recollections of men inflamed and excited by conflict. The dead of Fredericksburg were buried on the following Saturday¹ by a detachment under the command of General Jno. R. Brooke. . . . The writer regrets to be obliged to bring controversial matters into this history, but the point is one respecting which it is a sacred duty to the dead not to keep silence."

We do not for an instant think that General Humphreys intended by his reports or letters to convey the idea that his troops were better than those of the Second Corps. Far from it. That his organizations were more or less broken by contact with (and the language of) the men lying down "goes without saying," as General Walker expresses it; and if his men did get a little closer to the stone wall than the well-tried men of the Second Corps, it would be but natural, and would detract nothing from the glory surrounding that famous body of men. This was their maiden fight, and every one knows that old soldiers can, in conflict, see impossibilities before them which new troops cannot comprehend, and therefore the latter "rush in where angels fear to tread."

As the bodies of the dead in front of the stone wall were more or less stripped of their clothing, and as the burial party did not view the remains for a week after the conflict, we fail to see how all the

¹ This was seven days after the engagement, when corpses, exposed to the climate, naked as they were, must have been in a state of decomposition and past recognition. That they were stripped of their clothing and therefore unrecognizable is affirmed by Martha Stevens (in front of whose house General Cobb was mortally wounded), as she stated that "the fields were blue in color before the Union troops left—next morning they were white," and every one knows that it did not snow that night.

corpses could be recognized. Leaving out all testimony on the part of those who participated in the engagement with the Union forces, which must be more or less biased, we simply produce a letter from the Confederate side, as follows :

“ FLEMING BUILDING, 1419 G STREET,

“ WASHINGTON, D. C., June 16, 1891.

“ DEAR CAPTAIN HUMPHREYS :

“ Pardon my delay in not replying to your letter before to-day. My recollection of the battle of Fredericksburg, in which I was an humble participant, is as follows :

“ The Richmond Fayette Artillery (a six-gun battery), of which I was an officer, was attached to General McLaws' division during the fall and winter of 1862, and was one of the first divisions to reach the hills in rear of Fredericksburg, on or about the 17th of November, 1862,—I believe about one day ahead of the Federal troops.

“ On the 11th day of December, 1862, we were placed in position in General Lee's line of battle near the Telegraph road on a commanding hill, which overlooked the whole town and the plains below and along the Rappahannock River ; we were also in close proximity to Marye's Heights. Generals Lee and Longstreet, with their staffs, occupied a position near our battery, to watch the progress of the battle.

“ Our guns were intended to rake the field and the old sunken railroad cut in our front. On our left, and down in front of Marye's Hill, ran the Telegraph road ; this road was about four feet below the level of the land on the side near the town, while on the other side arose Marye's Heights, a splendid natural fortification for any body of troops to resist the advance of an approaching enemy. In this sunken road were placed General Tom Cobb's and one other brigade of McLaws' division. On this day, the 11th of December, 1862, the town of Fredericksburg was shelled, driving out all the inhabitants. On December 13, 1862, the great battle was fought. From our position we could plainly see the whole line of battle. I saw the three grand, but desperate and unsuccessful assaults that were made upon the sunken road in front and at the foot of Marye's Heights. The first attack was made just after the repulse of General Franklin on our right, and

which I believe was General French's division. After a fierce struggle, over many obstacles, this division retreated with heavy loss.

"The second charge was made almost immediately after the repulse of the first; the troops in this charge were of General Hancock's division. Both of these assaults were made more to our left and immediately in front of Marye's Heights, and in consequence were farther from our position, so that we took little or no part in these two assaults.

"The third or last assault was made near sunset and came closer and nearer to our works than the first two. The troops in this charge were of General A. A. Humphreys' division; they were handled in a most masterly manner and were pressed forward with vigor and a determination to capture the works at the foot of Marye's Heights and the Telegraph road. As the troops of this last assault emerged from the railroad cut and formed line for the charge, our guns opened upon them with good effect, but [notwithstanding] this galling and disastrous fire in their front, they came forward with a rush nearly reaching the Telegraph road and the walks under the hill. It was with difficulty that Cobb's and Cook's brigades could hold their position during this assault. General Humphreys' division was repulsed with heavy loss, perhaps more so than the other two divisions, from the fact that he pressed his troops closer and harder in the attack. We lost many valuable officers and men in this assault.

"I do not hesitate to say that, if General Humphreys' division had attacked our line a little more to our right (your left), he would undoubtedly have avoided a greater portion of the sunken road and the fire from our batteries on Marye's Heights, and no doubt would have captured a part of the Telegraph road, there being only two brigades behind the stone wall. But it would not have been possible for any body of troops to have gone any farther, no matter how brave they may have been or how skilfully handled.

"A day or two after the battle, I went out with the flag of truce between the lines to see about burying the dead, but more especially to find the body of Captain King, who was on General McLaws' staff; and was killed during the last assault. I saw the dead as they had fallen in these charges, and while I do not wish to detract anything from the hard-fought, but bloody battle in which they had been repulsed, I must in justice say that the dead

bodies I saw close to our works belonged to General Humphreys' division.

“Very truly yours,

“ROBERT J. FLEMING.”

During the time of Humphreys' attack, the 1st Brigade of Sykes' division, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Buchanan, had been placed in line of battle in rear of the ditch or canal between Hanover Street and the Plank road bridges, and upon the repulse of Humphreys, Buchanan was ordered to move forward and take the enemy's batteries at the point of the bayonet. It was impossible to move across this canal in line of battle, but the brigade was ordered to fix bayonets and instruction was given as to what was expected ; but it being now dark, although the brigade had commenced to move by the flank, orders were given to suspend the movement.

Sykes' 2d Brigade, under Major George L. Andrews, was formed on the left of Buchanan ; while Warren's brigade was held in the edge of the city limits, awaiting orders.

General Sykes was ordered to hold the line occupied by his 1st and 2d Brigades, between the Plank and Telegraph roads. Resting the left of the 2d Brigade on the Telegraph road, the line was extended to the right, which caused Buchanan's brigade to overlap the Plank road. The 3d and 4th United States were therefore placed in the cemetery, ¹ under cover of the front wall of brick. These two brigades were under the severe shell fire of the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters' fire of the infantry from the time they

¹ A great many jokes were passed among the officers and men about having a decent place to be buried in, etc., as they dropped down to rest about the tombstones.

occupied the position until some time after night closed in.

General Griffin, with his division of the Fifth Corps, had, as has been previously stated, been ordered to support General Sturgis. He received orders at 3.30 P.M., to relieve the brigade of General Ferrero, then engaged with the enemy. This was promptly done. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel James Barnes, consisting of the 2d Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel George Varney; 18th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Hayes; 22d Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Tilton, 1st Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Ira C. Abbott; 13th New York, Colonel E. G. Marshall; 25th New York, Captain Patrick Connelly; 118th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel James Gwyn; and the 2d Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Captain L. E. Wentworth, passed through the town,¹ then over the intervening space between

¹ Major E. W. Everson, of the 18th Massachusetts, in his diary of that day, says: "We halted in the city for more than an hour, waiting orders, and then went to the rear of the city, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle near a sluice-way, hard to cross on account of its perpendicular sides, which were boarded. There was one piece of the enemy's artillery stationed on a hill at our right oblique which had a range of the railroad cut where we crossed, and did us considerable damage. Our lines were not disorganized, however, notwithstanding gaps were frequently made in them by the heavy shell this piece poured upon them. Two large gaps were made in our own regiment, notwithstanding we crossed the cut at double quick. At the sluice we straightened up our line and soon charged the enemy's works, in doing which a part of our regiment had to go through a heavy board fence. The bullets were coming through this fence as thick as hailstones from some quarter, and we lost many men killed here, but got through, with our line in tolerably good order, and charged near up to the base of the hill, when it became impossible to go a foot farther, the enemy being intrenched behind a stone wall within very short musket range, and our men dropping under their fire terribly. We stopped in this position until we had fired three or four rounds and our line had become completely riddled and disorganized. This spot was fifty yards beyond that reached by any other troops, even the six other regiments comprising our brigade being to our left and rear. We were obliged to fall back to the fence, where we immediately corrected our line, under fire, and then we charged to

that and the enemy, through a heavy fire from the Confederates. Although exposed to this galling fire, and notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, which afforded no protection, the brigade passed immediately to the front of the troops whom it was sent to relieve, and after making three attempts to reach the stone wall, maintained its advanced position during the remainder of the day. The firing here was incessant. The enemy poured upon the brigade a shower of balls and shells, but Barnes had been directed to hold the position at all hazards, and he most faithfully complied with instructions. When the ammunition was expended, the men simply remained lying on the ground and waited for relief, as nearly every man who raised any part of his body was either killed or wounded.

It was but a short while after the charge was made by the 1st Brigade, when General Griffin's 2d Brigade, under Colonel Sweitzer, consisting of the 9th Massachusetts, Colonel P. R. Guiney; 32d Massachusetts, Colonel F. J. Parker; 4th Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Lumbard; 14th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel T. M. Davies; and 62d Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Hull, advanced under the same circumstances as the 1st, encountering the same difficulties, passing through the fiery ordeal, and occupying ground with the 1st Brigade, holding the same until relieved during the night of the following day.

the same spot again. It was utterly impossible to go farther. Our men suffered terribly, and after firing a few rounds, we again had to fall back. In this charge all our color-guard were killed or wounded, and they all went down almost simultaneously when we occupied the rising ground so near the enemy. The remains of our regiment were again re-formed and made the third charge, but got no farther than the spot reached in the first, where they lay down, screened just a little by a slight rise, not two feet high."

General Griffin's 3d Brigade, under Colonel Stockton, consisting of the 20th Maine, Colonel Adelbert Ames ; 16th Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel N. E. Welch ; 12th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Richardson ; 17th New York, Captain John Vickers ; 44th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Freeman Conner ; 83d Pennsylvania, Colonel Strong Vincent ; and Brady's company of Michigan Sharpshooters, Lieutenant J. H. Titus, was ordered forward just before sundown. Immediately on receiving orders the line moved to the front, except the 12th and 17th New York, which were on the extreme right, and not distinguishing the bugle call which sounded the advance, did not move up until the other regiments had reached the position designated, which was about five hundred yards from the enemy's position, the left to rest on a small white house. It was dark by the time the position was reached. The formation of the ground being unknown, and the enemy continuing to fire for some time after, the brigade, like those which had preceded it, was much exposed.

During the night General Griffin visited the lines and instructed his brigade commanders to hold their positions until 10 o'clock the next day, when the Ninth Corps would attack. The division occupied the position until the night of the 14th. As soon as daylight came on the 14th, the Confederates opened fire on the whole line, and as the orders were not to return the fire or bring on an engagement, the men were directed to keep down and screen themselves as much as possible, which instructions were closely followed. In the afternoon, the Confederates extended many of their sharpshooters down to the left of Stockton's brigade, for the purpose of enfilading his line,

but the cross fire of the sharpshooters of the 16th Michigan, which was posted on the railroad, and some of the 20th Maine, 83d Pennsylvania, and 16th Michigan, on the left of the line, soon drove them from the position taken. About 10 P.M. of the 14th, the division was relieved by other troops and returned to the streets of Fredericksburg, where it bivouacked.

About 11 P.M. of the 13th, Buchanan, with his 1st Brigade of regulars, was ordered to occupy the line in his front on the crest of the slight ridge, extending from a brick tannery on the Plank road to a brick house on the Telegraph road, then occupied by the brigade of Colonel Hall, which was the extreme point gained by the Union troops on that part of the line of battle. The ground was slightly descending towards the city, but another small hill, rising above it in front (protected by a small field-work holding two guns), commanded its entire surface. Batteries on other hills to the right enfiladed not only the position occupied by the brigade, but the ground in front also. This, however, was not discovered until the morning of the 14th, when the men, after lying in the snow and slush all night, had, at early dawn, risen up to stretch themselves, were opened upon with a furious fire from the enemy, and this developed the fact that the position was completely commanded, so much so, that if an individual attempted to rise up or show his head above the edge of the ridge referred to, he was picked off by the enemy at once. The enemy's sharpshooters occupied some small frame houses on the right of the Plank road, about 75 yards distant, from which they kept up a continuous fire. By the use of their bayonets, the men of the 3d and 4th U. S. dug a hole through

the brick wall and effected an entrance into the tannery, and soon afterwards loop-holed the wall on the Plank road, and from these holes and from the windows fronting the enemy, drove them from the houses and rifle-pits, so that they could not occupy them again during the day.

At the same time that Buchanan's brigade was ordered to take its advanced position, Sykes' 2d Brigade, under Major Andrews, was advanced so as to connect with Buchanan's left, his right resting on the Telegraph road and extending to the left; where, in the early morning, it was found to be about 80 yards from the stone wall, behind which the enemy was still posted, while the slope occupied by the command was so slight as to compel the men to lie flat on their faces from the earliest dawn of day until darkness again veiled them from the view of their watchful foes. Dead and living lay alike, side by side. To move even was sure to draw the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, whose fire it was impossible to return. Thus the troops remained for twelve hours, unable to eat, or even take a drink of water from their canteens.

The position thus occupied proved to be the most trying ever experienced, and put to the severest test the nerve and endurance of the oldest and most courageous of officers and men. The most trying test of discipline and courage is to place men in a situation where they are compelled to endure the steady fire of an enemy without having the power to return it. This was the case with the whole line occupied by the Fifth Corps all day on Sunday, the 14th of December; for the men were directed not to fire unless some tangible effect could be thereby

produced, and they obeyed the order to the letter, although their comrades were killed or wounded by their sides while lying still.

The entire corps was relieved from this unpleasant situation during the night of the 14th, and returning to Fredericksburg, bivouacked in the streets.

As has been stated, Waterman's and Hazlett's batteries were detached from the corps, and were placed in position on the north bank of the Rappahannock River, where they joined in the general fire delivered upon the town and hills beyond. The other batteries of the corps followed their divisions into Fredericksburg on the evening of the 13th, but most of them arrived too late to participate in the action of that day. Captain Phillips' Massachusetts battery was placed in an advanced position near the centre of the corps line at 4 P.M., and opened fire at about six hundred yards from the stone wall; but as the enemy did not advance from his cover, there was but little opportunity to test its efficacy. It remained there until dark, when it was withdrawn into the city.

From dark of the 13th until noon of the 15th, the Union and Confederate armies lay confronting each other without a single action, and it was surmised that the enemy would move out from his stronghold and attack the troops in the town. Franklin, holding his position as he did, no doubt prevented what would have been, under the circumstances, a dangerous move for the Confederates.

At noon on the 15th, General Butterfield had assigned to him that portion of Fredericksburg extending from the Rappahannock River on the right to Hanover Street, to be put in a state of defense and held against any attempt on the part of the enemy to

force the position. General Whipple's division was ordered to report to him to assist in the performance of this duty. The different portions of this line of defense were apportioned according to the strength of the various divisions : General Whipple on the right, from the river to the juncture of the canal and Fall Hill road ; General Griffin on his left, to Fauquier Street ; General Humphreys on General Griffin's left, to Amelia Street ; and General Sykes on General Humphreys' left, to Hanover Street, his left connecting with the command of General Couch, who had been entrusted with the remaining portion of the defense of the town. General Warren was charged with the construction of the barricades and earthworks. Captain Weed, 5th Artillery, chief of artillery of the Fifth Corps, was charged with the distribution and disposition of the batteries.¹

The work assigned General Warren consisted of arranging a line of earthwork defenses on the south side of the city of Fredericksburg—battery epaulements and rifle-pits, connecting with brick houses and walls, intended to be loop-holed, and barricading all the streets, extending from the plateau to the right of the Gordon house to the street east of Hanover Street. Those to the right of Amelia Street were constructed by General Humphreys' division, and the batteries assigned to that portion. Those extending

¹ General Lee, in his report on the battle of Fredericksburg says : " The attack on the 13th had been so easily repulsed, and by so small a part of our army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit his efforts to an attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations and the extent of his force, seemed to be comparatively insignificant. Believing, therefore, that he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of our position and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries beyond the river, by advancing against him ; but we were necessarily ignorant of the extent to which he had suffered."

from Amelia Street to the Plank road, the barricade for artillery across that road connecting with the cemetery wall, and the barricade to the left of the same wall across Commerce or William Street, were constructed by details from the 2d and 3d Brigades of regulars. The barricade of Hanover Street and the rifle-pits to the left of it were constructed by the 146th New York.

Work was not commenced until after dark of the 15th, and the next morning the whole presented to the view of the enemy a complete line, which could have been strengthened during the day without interference from him. This duty of strengthening the work was to be assigned to the 140th New York, and that regiment was kept in reserve for this purpose during the night. The 5th New York performed the guard and picket duty in front of the lines the whole night in a most efficient manner, and during the withdrawal at daylight effectually disputed the advance of the enemy's skirmishers, so that no attempt was made to pursue the retiring forces.

General Burnside having, during the night of the 15th, decided to retire his command across the Rappahannock, General Sykes, at 4 A.M. on the 16th, was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the army from Fredericksburg. Simultaneously the pickets of Griffin, Humphreys, and Whipple were recalled, and those of Sykes (5th New York), being nearer the bridges and holding the most important front, retained their line until the last moment. Buchanan's brigade of regulars was designated as the rear-guard of the army in its withdrawal. At 8 A.M., most of the skulkers, stragglers, etc., having been driven in, the 5th New York assembled in rear of Buchanan's bri-

gade and crossed the river, followed immediately by the brigade, whose rear was covered by one company of the 3d U. S., Lieutenant Kent, and two companies of the 12th U. S., Captain Winthrop. These were left to protect the bridges; but the enemy not following, these companies joined the brigade, and the bridges were taken up under the direction of General Woodbury. The withdrawal was thus effected without loss of men or material.

General Franklin was at General Burnside's headquarters about 6 P.M. of the 15th, and received orders to cross his command to the north side of the river. This order was telegraphed to General Smith, who was directed to make the preliminary arrangements. Upon General Franklin's return to his headquarters, about 7 P.M., he found the movement just commencing, and it was successfully completed during the night of the 15th, so that by 4 A.M. of the 16th all the troops and material had been transferred to the north bank of the river, and the men located in their old camps.

About 3.30 A.M. of the 16th, Captain J. D. O'Connell, with the 14th U. S., was directed to move the regiment to the lower one of the three upper bridges, to protect the crossing of the troops. Lieutenant Powell, of Buchanan's staff, accompanied O'Connell, and hearing that the bridge had been taken up, suggested that the regiment be halted, while he went on alone to ascertain the truth of the report. The bridge was gone, it having been taken up without orders immediately after all of General Griffin's division and other troops in his neighborhood had crossed; and the lower part of the town was entirely deserted of troops, and open to any advance that the

enemy might have made. O'Connell was then ordered to the upper bridge, to await the crossing of Buchanan's brigade; but General Hooker, seeing the regiment there, directed it to cross at once.

Who that lives and was present in the city of Fredericksburg can forget the last night spent there? In the early part of the night it had rained—a cold December rain; but towards midnight it cleared away, and a chilling bleak wind from the north sent great black clouds scudding across the sky, through which occasionally peeped a feeble moon. Torn awnings and broken window-shutters flapped and banged about, starting echoes in every nook and corner, while broken sign-boards, swinging on their metal fastenings, uttered groans and shrieks as of incarnate fiends let loose from Hades. The horses' hoofs rang out upon the cobble-stone pavements with such rebounding echoes as to fill the mind with superstitious dread, while the ghastly dead lay on the door-stoops,¹ on the sidewalks, in the front yards of dwellings, with their pale faces turned towards heaven, while their open eyes, as a stream of moonlight fell athwart their faces, glared at one as if staring from another world. Through such as this it was that the writer of this

¹ The 1st Brigade of regulars bivouacked on the sidewalk. In front of one of the regiments was the high stoop, covered with a portico, of a rather nice-looking residence. One of the officers, who had neither overcoat nor blanket, thought he would get on this porch, and there, sheltered from the wind, lie down and get some sleep. He therefore mounted the steps, and saw that his contemplated haven of rest was already occupied. Two men were there wrapped in blankets. Observing a space between them, he decided that this was better than he expected to find, and so he crept into the space, but it proved rather limited. Nudging one of his bed-fellows he asked him to move a little, and was somewhat vexed at his failing to comply with the request. He, however, squeezed into the space and enjoyed two or three hours' repose. But when daylight came and he arose from his primitive couch, he was somewhat horrified at discovering that he had been *sleeping all night between two dead men*. Thus it is that "misfortune makes strange bed-fellows."

history made his lonely ride to the bridge, to find the lower part of the town deserted and the bridge removed.

During the time that the city was occupied by the Union troops, we are sorry to say that much vandalism was displayed: pianos, books, clothing, dolls, children's playthings and other articles were thrown from the houses to the streets; fine old family portraits had been beheaded with the penknife as they hung upon the walls; magnificent sofas and chairs were carried into the streets and used by the "coffee-coolers" and other vagabonds as chairs about the camp-fires. In one place a few bummers had effected an entrance into a tobacco store, and by the light of a single "tallow dip" were sitting about sampling the tobacco and cigars. In another place a fellow was dancing a jig, with his coarse soldier's shoes encasing his feet, on the top of a grand piano (rosewood), to the music of another, who played at the keyboard. These atrocious acts were committed by the vandals with which a great army is always beset—men who are too cowardly to fight, and skulk away at the first chance when the excitement is so great that they cannot be watched.

Captain John D. Lentz, of the 91st Pennsylvania, with his company, was detached from Tyler's brigade of Humphreys' division during the early morning of the 16th, to hold what was known as the "block-house," and was directed to retain it at all hazards. After posting his men on the defensive line, and having 12 remaining, he was ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Rowe, 126th Pennsylvania, to place them in the block-house and remain with them, which he did, from daylight until 10 A.M., at which time some of

the enemy approached and demanded his surrender. Waiting until they came within 30 or 40 yards of the house, Lentz gave orders to fire, when the officer in command and several of the Confederates fell, wounded. The others ran off. On looking around after this, Lentz discovered a large force of the enemy closing in on three sides of his position. He then ordered his men to retire as quickly as possible. Before starting, however, one of the Confederates appeared at the door. He was immediately seized, disarmed, and made a prisoner. The little party started for the town, but saw that it was filled with the enemy; they then changed direction towards the river, followed the bank to the railroad bridge, and there discovered that the pontoon bridges had all been removed. Private James Clark volunteered to swim the river and send a boat back, which he did, two men, employees of the railroad, taking it across, in which the party, with their prisoner, safely returned to the north bank about 12 noon. This small detachment of the 91st Pennsylvania (1st Brigade, 3d Division, Fifth Corps) was the very last of the entire army to recross the river.

The 18th Massachusetts, which occupied the right of Barnes' brigade line, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, in the eagerness of its gallant commander, pushed on in advance of the rest of the line,¹ and being thus temporarily separated from it,

¹ Major G. W. Everson, of the 18th Massachusetts, thus writes: "When we did advance, Company F, in which I was, met with an obstacle—a high board fence. Boards were knocked off here and there by clubbed muskets, and we went through 'Indian file' on the run. The missiles of the enemy were already making 'a skimmer' of the fence. It split our company, Captain Winsor having one platoon, I the other. I passed very near and to the right of the brick house. A hospital flag was floating from a window. Its rear, and all around where shelter offered, was crowded with wounded."

became exposed to a most galling fire. It was soon compelled to retire, re-form, and rejoin the brigade. Captain George C. Ruby, the senior captain of the regiment and a brave soldier, fell in this attack, and his body was never recovered. Captain Tucker, acting aide-de-camp on the staff of General Butterfield, was severely wounded in the arm while in the discharge of his duties, and General Butterfield reports him as deserving of special mention for his services.

The 13th New York, at first under Colonel Marshall, was, early in the action, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Schoeffel, Colonel Marshall being compelled to retire in consequence of a severe wound in the neck.

Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, commanding the 1st Michigan, was wounded in the face, and very narrowly escaped death.

Lieutenant-Colonel Varney, commanding the 2d Maine, was wounded in the head, and compelled to retire, the command devolving on Major Sergeant.

Lieutenant-Colonel Connor, commanding the 44th New York, was wounded early in the advance, and the command of that regiment devolved on Major Knox.

In the 83d Pennsylvania, Captain Sell and Lieutenants Foster, McGill, and Reed were wounded. Captain McCoy was knocked over by the windage of a shell, but returned to duty the same evening.

The 4th U. S. had 1st Lieutenants Abner R. Benedict and Ira F. Gensel wounded, the latter subsequently dying in hospital at Washington, from the effects of the wound.

In the 11th U. S., Captain James K. Lawrence was severely wounded in the throat while gallantly rally-

ing some broken troops, and Lieutenant Kennington was also severely wounded during the day.

In the charge of the 126th Pennsylvania, on the 13th, Colonel Elder was wounded in the thigh just as the regiment reached the farthest place in advance. The command then devolved on Colonel D. W. Roe. At the same time that the colonel fell, Captains Doebler, Walker, and Reed, and Lieutenants Pott, Mackey, and Fletcher were wounded. The commander of the regiment says: "Captain John H. Walker deserves especial mention; for, though wounded by a ball in the right shoulder, he rallied his company, and declared that one arm was enough to lead his men to another charge, and only left the field under peremptory orders to do so." Captain Whar-ton, feeble from sickness, gallantly led his men into action, but was run over and badly tramped while trying to rally his men.

In the 129th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Jacob Parvin was killed; Captains George J. Lawrence, Jonathan K. Taylor, Wm. Wren, Herbert Thomas, E. G. Rehrer, and Levi C. Leib; and Lieutenants A. A. Luckenbach and Joseph Oliver were all wounded in the charge made by General Tyler's brigade on the 13th.

The 134th Pennsylvania was on the right of Humphreys' line, and its commanding officer, in his report, claims that his regiment "reached a point nearer the enemy's works than any other." Captains Lyon, Breckinridge, Hague, and McCready were severally wounded while leading their companies amid the hottest fire. First Lieutenant H. Barnes fell, dead, nobly discharging his duty. Adjutant Reed was also severely wounded, and Major Thompson slightly.

In the 131st Pennsylvania, Captain Ryan and Lieutenant Bruner were killed, and seven other officers wounded.

Among the many whose loss the 133d Pennsylvania had to mourn was Adjutant James C. Noon, who fell while urging the men to the fatal charge. Captain John M. Jones, and 1st Lieutenant W. A. Scott, while nobly leading their men, were killed. Captains Schrock, Demarée, Sheibly, and Tressler, and Lieutenants John B. Hay and — Ashcom were all wounded.

The 155th Pennsylvania had Captain Anshutz killed and Lieutenant E. E. Clapp wounded.

The 14th New York had Major Michael and Captain Goss badly wounded.

There were many other officers killed and wounded, but the reports of the regimental commanders fail to give the names. In the Fifth Corps alone there were 21 officers killed, and 125 wounded, according to the revised returns in the *Records of the Rebellion*.

On the morning of the 15th, four companies of the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, under Major Hastings, were sent out on picket duty on the left, to connect with General Franklin's pickets, and cover a space not before covered. This detachment remained on the outposts between General Franklin's right and the block-house on the railroad until about 6.30 A.M., of the 16th, when it was withdrawn by order of General Humphreys. At 5 P.M. of the 15th, two companies, under Captain Seaton, were sent to the right of the division line on picket duty, and remained until 3 A.M. of the 16th, when they were relieved by order of General Griffin. All crossed the river, and were in camp by noon of the 16th.

Captain Martin's battery remained on the north bank of the Rappahannock until the morning of the 14th, when it was ordered across the river, and took position on the left of the poor-house, near Gunnery Green. It remained there until the evening of the 15th, without engaging the enemy, and was then changed to the right of the town, near the Gordon house, where an epaulement was thrown up. About 4 A.M., of the 16th, under orders, it re-crossed the river, and returned to its old camp.

Phillips' battery crossed the Rappahannock, following its division, about 4 P.M. on the 13th, and took position between the poor-house and some brickyards, and was soon engaged with the enemy. After dark, having fired 107 rounds of shrapnel and shell, the battery was withdrawn, under orders, to the city, but returned to the same position on the 14th, remaining until after dark on the 15th, when it was withdrawn, and early on the 16th recrossed the river and returned to its camp.

Battery I, 5th U. S., Lieutenant M. F. Watson, followed the troops across the river in the afternoon of the 13th, but was not placed in position until the evening of the 15th, when it was ordered to the Gordon house, and there remained in the defensive line until it was ordered to recross the river early on the morning of the 16th.

Battery L, 1st Ohio, Lieutenant F. Dorries, followed the 2d Division across the river on the 13th, but was not placed in position until the evening of the 15th, when it relieved Battery A, 4th U. S., in rear of the town, occupying this point until 2 A.M. of the 16th, when it received orders to recross the river, which it succeeded in doing about 6 A.M.

Randol's battery of the 1st U. S. crossed the river on the afternoon of the 13th, and occupied a position on the outskirts of the city near the Telegraph road, but was not engaged. During the evening of the 15th, however, it was placed in the defensive line, and intrenchments begun, but they were not completed when it was ordered to recross the river in the early morning of the 16th.

Battery C, 1st New York Light Artillery, Lieutenant Wm. H. Phillips, crossed the river on the 13th, and was placed in position on the extreme outskirts of the town at 4.45 P.M., about 500 yards from the enemy's rifle pits. A section immediately became engaged, expending some forty-five rounds of ammunition. At 3 A.M. of the 16th, the battery received orders to abandon its position, and it retired across the river to its original camp.

THE MUD MARCH.

Christmas day of 1862 found the Army of the Potomac re-established in its old camps on the north bank of the Rappahannock. The Fifth Corps during the holiday season received from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac a Christmas remembrance in the shape of a new commander. Major-General George G. Meade was assigned to command that corps by S. O. No. 360, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, December 26, 1862. The General was well known in the corps, and his fighting qualities had on previous fields of battle made themselves very apparent, so that he was warmly welcomed, and at once possessed the full confidence of officers and men. He brought with him two popular aides, Lieutenant A. G. Mason, of

the Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Captain Alex. Cox, A. D. C.

The dark days had come, when dissatisfaction, discouragement, homesickness, and many other ills of camp life prevailed. The weather itself had a most depressing effect, and the late decided failure and sacrifice of human life gave but little confidence in the abilities of the commander of the army. The cold was extreme for that latitude, the Potomac River at one time being so completely frozen over as to prevent the boats running. All sorts of devices were resorted to by officers and men to render themselves comfortable. Some dug holes in the ground, covered them over with three or four shelter tents combined, and many were the curious and novel methods adopted for producing heat, in the way of fire-places and chimneys; some chimneys being formed of barrels placed one on top of the other, some made of gabions, and others with crossed fagots bound together and plastered with mud. The monotony was dreadful; but, whenever possible, this was relieved by drills, parades, and reviews.

One day, in the early part of January, a lot of boxes and packages made their appearance. These had been sent from the homes of the men, and had accumulated in quantities at Washington City. Many of the things had been three months on their way, but having come at last they were most welcome—the eatables especially, as furnishing an agreeable variety to the army diet and the never-varying supplies of the exorbitant sutler.

Quite a flutter of excitement was produced in the camp of the 140th New York one afternoon at dress parade by the appearance, as a spectator, of a living

young lady on horseback—good-looking, well dressed, and well mounted, who, with her escort of some half dozen officers, honored the camp. This was an event of some moment, for the men had not seen a good-looking young lady, and one well dressed withal, for more than three months.

On the 8th of January (General Jackson's birthday), the Fifth Corps was reviewed by General Burnside. It was an occasion of considerable interest to some of the regiments of the corps, as it was the first review of the kind in which they had taken part. Reviews in the Army of the Potomac were generally the premonitory symptoms which accompanied the preparations for a campaign. Speculation therefore became rife as to our direction and purpose. We were not kept long in suspense, however, for on the 16th of January, 1863, orders were received to get ready, and the following day positive orders were promulgated to be ready to march at noon on the 18th ; but these orders were countermanded late the same night, and though kept in a state of constant expectancy, it was not until noon of Tuesday, January 20th, that camp was broken. This furnished plenty of time for the Confederates to be informed of the movement, and they, no doubt, were fully prepared to receive the Union forces ; but Nature, in this case, interposed her objections to any greater sacrifice of human life in futile attempts to accomplish what might have been done without any sacrifice of life two months previously. General Burnside, having experimented with the Rappahannock River and St. Marye's Heights, was now going to attempt to cross the fords in the face of Lee's whole force, to place his army where it could have been placed without opposition in a three

days' march from Warrenton Junction on the 15th of the previous November.

On the 13th of January, Lieutenant-Colonel Fred. T. Locke, assistant adjutant-general, was returned to his old duties. He was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Alex. S. Webb, the latter having been assigned to duty as Inspector-General of the Fifth Corps.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 20th, therefore, the Fifth Corps started on its march in a westerly direction, retracing for some distance the same road it had followed in reaching the camp ground at Falmouth. But little progress was made that afternoon, owing to the trains and troops which blocked the road. Not more than five miles had been overcome when night settled down and the corps bivouacked by the roadside. Just after dark rain began falling, gently but steadily, and continued all night. As most of the troops had no shelter, and only the protection of their clothing and blankets, which soon became saturated, the night was passed very uncomfortably, many sitting, most of the time, steaming themselves around the large fires, which a fortunate abundance of fuel made it possible to keep up. The march continued the following day with no abatement of the storm. By this time the mud had become very deep, and the rain continuing, it was every mile becoming worse. The impossibility of conducting an orderly march, at the rapid rate at which we were urged forward, was soon apparent. Each man picked his own path as best he could, in or out of the road. A great many fell out, exhausted, and were left behind. We were constantly coming up with wagons and artillery which had become stalled in the fearful quagmires

from which double and triple teams were vainly trying to extricate them. Organization was almost destroyed—many commands were reduced over half by the loss of those who had lagged behind or had become separated in the general confusion. Every one could see that an army in such a plight was incapable of making an offensive demonstration with any hope of success, and this opinion seemed to have been reached by the directing powers when, about noon, we halted in a pine woods and there rested from our labors. It did not rain long after that, but it had already rained a sufficient length of time to frustrate all pre-arranged plans, to ruin the roads, and break up all orderly movements in the army.

The important thing to be done now was to restore order as soon as possible, and to this end large details were made from all the infantry regiments to go out as working parties on the roads, to fell trees, to make corduroy, to assist in prying forage and ammunition wagons out of the sloughs into which they had sunk, and to try by every exertion to get together and set in orderly motion the supply trains and artillery of the army. It was terrible work for the poor horses and mules, and was no uncommon sight to see one exhausted, fall down and actually drown in the soft batter of mud, which in many places was not only up to the wagon hubs, but above them. Indeed, a statement of the awful condition of the roads might exhaust all the adjectives in the English language and yet not exaggerate the actual condition of things. We lay in the same place from Wednesday noon till the next Saturday morning. Meanwhile the scarcity of rations became a serious matter; the hard bread which the men had in their haversacks

and knapsacks was mostly spoiled by the rain ; the sugar and coffee likewise damaged. Many had nothing left but salt pork. On Friday about five or six hard crackers and a gill of whiskey per man were served out. The nearest point from which supplies could be obtained was the railroad station near our old camp. Many of the officers sent their cooks there on foot to get them something to eat.

During this period the enemy had lined the opposite banks of the Rappahannock, and amused themselves by taunting our pickets with the condition in which we were placed, going so far as to stick up sign-boards opposite the fords, bearing the legends, " Stuck in the mud," " This way to Richmond," etc., etc. On Saturday, January 24th, the Fifth Corps started on the return march. The whole plan had miscarried and was given up, and, mortifying as it was to General Burnside, there was no alternative but to return once more to the old camp, where we arrived during the afternoon of the 24th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General ERASTUS B. TYLER.							
91st Pennsylvania.....	1	8	3	43	20		75
126th Pennsylvania.....	1	11	7	59	14		92
129th Pennsylvania.....	1	16	8	92	22		139
134th Pennsylvania.....	2	12	10	99	25		148
Total First Brigade.....	5	47	28	293	81		454
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel PETER H. ALLABACH.....							
Staff.....			1				1
123d Pennsylvania.....	1	14	5	101	13		134
131st Pennsylvania.....	2	20	6	132	15		175
133d Pennsylvania.....	3	17	7	138	19		184
155th Pennsylvania.....	1	5	1	57	4		68
Total Second Brigade.....	7	56	20	428	51		562
Total Third Division.....	12	103	51	721	132		1019
Total Fifth Corps.....	21	185	125	1544	300		2175

for the useless sacrifice of human life and public treasure, that he should attempt to retrieve, with (this time) the consent of the powers at Washington, his fallen fortunes. Nature, however, beneficently interposed at this second effort ; then the disappointed chieftain gave vent to his disappointment in a startling manner. The army had not yet gotten out of the mud, when the following order was prepared and submitted to the President ; but (he not approving of the same) it was never issued, viz. :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“ January 23, 1863.

“ GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 8. }

“ I. General Joseph Hooker, major-general of volunteers and brigadier-general United States Army, having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticisms of the actions of his superior officers, and of the authorities, and having, by the general tone of his conversation, endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and having, by omissions and otherwise, made reports and statements which were calculated to create incorrect impressions, and for habitually speaking in disparaging terms of other officers, is hereby dismissed the service of the United States as a man unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present, when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism are due from every soldier in the field. This order is issued subject to the approval of the President of the United States.

“ II. Brigadier-General W. T. H. Brooks, commanding 1st Division Sixth Army Corps, for complaining of the policy of the Government, and for using language tending to demoralize his command, is, subject to the approval of the President, dismissed from the service of the United States.

“ III. Brigadier-General John Newton, commanding 3d Division, Sixth Army Corps, and Brigadier-General John Cochrane, commanding 1st Brigade, 3d Division, Sixth Army Corps, for going to the President of the United States with criticisms upon the plans of their commanding officer, are, subject to

the approval of the President, dismissed from the service of the United States.

“ IV. It being evident that the following named officers can be of no further service to this army, they are hereby relieved from duty, and will report in person, without delay, to the Adjutant-General United States Army : Major-General W. B. Franklin, commanding Left Grand Division ; Major-General W. F. Smith, commanding Sixth Corps : Brigadier-General Samuel D. Sturgis, commanding 2d Division, Ninth Corps ; Brigadier-General Edward Ferrero, commanding 2d Brigade, 2d Division, Ninth Army Corps ; Brigadier-General John Cochrane, commanding 1st Brigade, 3d Division, Sixth Corps ; Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Taylor, assistant adjutant-general Right Grand Division.

“ By command of Major-General A. E. BURNSIDE.

“ LEWIS RICHMOND,

“ Assistant Adjutant-General.”

Immediately after the President's disapproval of this order, General Burnside requested to be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and therefore, on the 25th of January, two days after the date of the above order, the following changes were directed by the President :

1st. That Major-General A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

2d. That Major-General E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

3d. That Major-General W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

4th. That Major-General J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

On the 26th of January General Hooker assumed command, and the same day the following letter was sent to him by the President :

“ EXECUTIVE MANSION,
“ WASHINGTON, D. C., January 26, 1863.

“ Major-General HOOKER :

“ *General* : I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm ; but I think that, during General Burnside’s command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

“ Yours very truly,

“ A. LINCOLN.”

There are but few men who would willingly have accepted the command of an army under such aspersions as is contained in the President’s letter. That letter, in itself, exhibits a spirit of almost reckless daring in the President. It is not to be wondered at,


however, for the soldiers of mark were falling about him like the autumn leaves from forest trees, and the political axe was being ground for the sacrifice of other victims. The horizon was filled with threatening clouds; the news of the defeat of our armies at all points brought to the President's ears wails of anguish from numberless mothers, wives, widows, and orphans, and already the distant rumblings of a discontented nation were being heard, which were to break like a cloud-burst upon the country later in the year. Could Mr. Lincoln have looked forward to the 4th of July of that year, and with prophetic vision beheld the glorious results of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, what a relief it would have been to that noble, overworked brain! But all was darkness and the future was shrouded in obscurity.

It was under such circumstances as these that General Hooker was assigned to, and assumed command of, the Army of the Potomac. His varied experiences on the Pacific coast served him well, for he thoroughly understood the power of organization, in which he was ably seconded by that gallant soldier, General Daniel Butterfield, as chief of staff. His orders soon made manifest his intention of placing his army in the best possible condition for active service. And we must give him due credit for having done this—notwithstanding his lack of success at Chancellorsville—in the battle of Gettysburg, he having been relieved en route to that point, and General Meade having no time or opportunity to make changes, even if he had desired so to do. The latter did not propose “to swap horses while crossing the stream.”

Many changes therefore took place in the Army of

the Potomac and particularly in the Fifth Corps. After assuming command, General Hooker announced the following staff: Major-General Daniel Butterfield, chief of staff; Brigadier-General Seth Williams, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Dickinson, assistant adjutant-general; Brigadier-General James A. Hardie, judge-advocate general; Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery; Brigadier-General M. R. Patrick, provost-marshal general; Colonel Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant-Colonel F. Myers, deputy chief quartermaster; Colonel H. F. Clarke, chief commissary; Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, medical director; Captain Samuel T. Cushing, chief signal officer; Lieutenant D. W. Flagler, chief ordnance officer; Major William H. Lawrence, aide-de-camp; Captain William L. Candler, aide-de-camp; Captain Alexander Moore, aide-de-camp; Captain Harry Russell, aide-de-camp.

Numerous officers were relieved and others assigned to command. In fact, almost a new *régime* was the consequence. General Meade was assigned to the command of the centre grand division, and the Fifth Corps was temporarily commanded by General Sykes. But General Hooker, deeming that "the division of the army into grand divisions impeding rather than facilitating the dispatch of its current business, and the character of the service it is liable to be called on to perform being adverse to the movement and operations of heavy columns," discontinued the grand division organization and returned to that of the corps as a unit on the 5th of February, assigning Major-General John F. Reynolds to the command of the First Corps, Major-General D. N. Couch, to the Second; Brigadier-General D. E. Sickles, to the



GEORGE G. MEADE,

Major-General U. S. Army,

August 18, 1864.

Died Nov. 6, 1872.

*HISTORY OF**First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General JAMES BARNES.

2d Maine, Col. George Varney,
 18th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes.
 22d Massachusetts, Col. Wm. S. Tilton.
 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Lt. Robt. Smith.
 1st Michigan, Col. Ira C. Abbott.
 13th New York (batt'n.), Capt. Wm. Downey.
 25th New York, Col. Chas. A. Johnson.
 118th Pennsylvania, Col. Chas. M. Prevost.

Second Brigade.

(1) Colonel JAMES MCQUADE.
 (2) Colonel JACOB M. SWEITZER.

9th Massachusetts, Col. P. R. Guiney.
 32d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. L. Stephenson.
 4th Michigan, Col. H. H. Jeffords.
 14th New York, Lt.-Col. T. M. Davies.
 62d Penna., Col. J. B. Sweitzer, and Lt.- Col. Jas. C. Hull.

Third Brigade.

Colonel THOMAS B. W. STOCKTON.

20th Maine, Lieut.-Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain.
 Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's Company.
 16th Michigan, Lieut.-Col. Norval E. Welch.
 12th New York, Capt. Wm. Huson.
 17th New York, Lieut.-Col. N. B. Bartram.
 44th New York, Col. James C. Rice.
 83d Pennsylvania, Col. Strong Vincent.

Artillery.

Captain AUGUSTUS P. MARTIN.

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C.), Capt. A. P. Martin.
 Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E.), Capt. Chas. A. Phillips.
 1st Rhode Island Light Battery, Capt. Richard Waterman.
 5th U. S., Battery D, Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett.

Second Division.

Major-General GEORGE SYKES.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.

- 3d U. S., Companies B, C, F, G, I, and K, Captain Jno. D. Wilkins.
- 4th U. S., Companies C, F, H, and K, Captain Hiram Dryer.
- 12th U. S., Companies A, B, C, D, and G (1st Battalion), and A, C, and D (2d Battalion), Major Richard S. Smith.
- 14th U. S., Companies A, B, D, E, F, and G (1st Battalion), and F and G (2d Battalion), Captain J. B. Hager.

Second Brigade.

Colonel SIDNEY BURBANK.

- 2d U. S., Companies B, C, F, I, and K, Captain S. S. Marsh and Captain S. A. McKee.
- 6th U. S., Companies D, F, G, H, and I, Captain Levi C. Bootes.
- 7th U. S., Companies A, B, E, and I, Captain D. P. Hancock.
- 10th U. S., Companies D, G, and H, Lieutenant E. G. Bush.
- 11th U. S., Companies B, C, D, E, F, and G (1st Battalion), and C and D (2d Battalion), Major De L. Floyd-Jones.
- 17th U. S., Companies A, C, D, G, and H (1st Battalion), and A and B (2d Battalion), Major George L. Andrews.

Third Brigade.

Colonel PATRICK H. O'RORKE.

- 5th New York, Colonel Cleveland Winslow.
- 140th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Ernst.
- 146th New York, Colonel Kenner Garrard.

Artillery.

Captain STEPHEN H. WEED.

- 1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Captain Frank C. Gibbs.
- 5th U. S., Battery I, Lieutenant Malbone F. Watson.

*HISTORY OF**Third Division.*

Brigadier-General ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General E. B. TYLER.

91st Pennsylvania, Colonel E. M. Gregory and Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Sinex.

126th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. Roe.

129th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. G. Frick.

134th Pennsylvania, Colonel Edwd. O'Brien.

Second Brigade.

Colonel P. H. ALLABACH.

123d Pennsylvania, Colonel Jno. B. Clark.

131st Pennsylvania, Major R. W. Patton.

133d Pennsylvania, Colonel F. B. Speakman.

155th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Cain.

Artillery.

Captain ALANSON M. RANDOL.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Captain Almont Barnes.

1st U. S., Batteries E and G, Captain A. M. Randol.

During this period of reorganization, General Butterfield devised the system of corps badges, to be fastened upon the centre of the top of the cap, for the purpose of ready recognition of corps and divisions in the Army of the Potomac, and to prevent injustice by reports of straggling and misconduct, as well as for the purpose of recognizing not only those engaged in conflict with the enemy, but those who might be left on the field among the killed and wounded. The order to wear these was issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, March 21, 1863, the following being designated.

While waiting for the winter to break, large details of from 1000 to 1500 men were made daily to repair and corduroy roads, make temporary bridges, etc., under the guidance of the engineer officers, and outpost duty¹ was performed in all earnestness.

Among the many improvements made by General Hooker was that in the system of securing information.

¹ There are many incidents connected with the service of the Fifth Corps which must be left to regimental historians to detail, but there is so much contained in the following that shows not only the fearlessness of the soldier in the presence of danger from disease as well as from that of the battle-field—so much that displays his tenderness of heart even to his enemies in time of trouble—and so much that brings to view the vicissitudes occasioned by war, that we produce here an incident which occurred in front of the outposts of the 140th New York, and related by Captain Porter Farley, a member of that regiment :

“On Tuesday, March 24th, our regiment went out again on picket duty, proceeding this time to a portion of the line farther south than that which we had picketed before, our extreme right posts being upon the Potomac Creek, and our left extending nearly to the line guarded by the Second Corps. Shortly after we had reached our positions and had posted our men we learned from some boys belonging in the neighboring farm-houses, that a young lady had that night died in a house just outside our lines, not an eighth of a mile distant. I went with several other officers to see if we could do anything for the family. As we walked along, the boys told us that the lady of the house was Mrs. Edrington, a widow, who for more than a year past had been living alone with her daughter, the girl now lying dead, her only other child being a son, who was in the rebel army.

“When we reached the house, we found it to be one of the better kind of hewn-log houses so common in Virginia. We entered and found everything exceedingly neat, but with all the signs of the poverty which comes with war. The old lady seemed quite intelligent and much more refined than her poor surroundings would lead one to expect. She received us kindly, accepting our visit in the same spirit in which it was made. She bore her affliction with great fortitude, though it was perfectly evident that she felt the full weight of it. With her were three or four girls, sixteen or eighteen years of age, from neighboring farm-houses. At one side of the room in which we were received was the body of the dead girl, decently laid out and with some trifling attempt at adornment, such as their poverty admitted. The body was covered with a white cloth, but the mother took it off and showed us her daughter. The face in death was one of really sweet and peaceful beauty, and we wondered that it could be so when the old lady told us of the sudden and agonizing way in which she had died. The disease must have been something like spotted fever. It was of only a few hours' duration. She had been terribly discolored and a raving maniac during her last hours, but no trace of the terrible struggle now re-

He is entitled to the full credit of a cavalry corps formation. Between the spies in Washington, the carriers of news always available in an enemy's country, and through cavalry reconnaissances made by dashing leaders, the Confederates had heretofore been kept fully informed as to the movements of the Army of the Potomac, the rank and file of the former seeming at times to be better informed of the

mained, and her face was white and placid. Mrs. Edrington showed us pictures of her daughter and son, and told us that the boy was in the Confederate army, but all without any bitter remarks or the exhibition of any unkind feelings toward us. We found that a surgeon from some other regiment had been with them during the young lady's sickness, and had promised to secure a coffin from the quartermaster's department and send it out to the farm-house. The boys who had first told us of the matter were engaged in digging a grave in the garden, for the want of any vehicle and the bad condition of the roads made it impossible to take the body to the family burial-ground, eight miles distant. We could do nothing but express our sympathy and leave them.

"About 4 o'clock that afternoon a boy came and told us that the old lady had herself just been taken sick in the same way that her daughter had. We immediately sent for one of our regimental surgeons, who went and saw her, and did what he could, and left her for the night in care of the young women who had all the time been with her. But the next morning early they came over to our post to tell us that Mrs. Edrington was dying and that none of them dare stay in the house with her. I immediately went over to the house with Sergeant Clapp of my company, and found all they told us to be true. The frightened young women and boys were all outside watching through the window the terrible scene within. Clapp and I went into the room where the poor woman was. In her delirium she had thrown herself off the bed upon the floor, and there beside the unburied body of her child she was writhing in her death agonies. Her face was of a dreadful livid color. She had torn out her hair by handfuls, and was wild, but speechless. We placed her on the bed, and tried to induce the terrified young women outside to come in and take care of her, but they would not do it. We made such a disposition of the furniture as we hoped would keep her on the bed and left her. About an hour later she died, and both mother and daughter were that afternoon buried in the garden. Several months after, as I was passing the spot, on our return from Chancellorsville, I saw their graves and found their house still standing, though stripped of all its scanty furniture, the doors and windows gone, the fence which had been around it torn down, and the whole scene one of perfect desolation. I wondered to myself if the son of that poor widow had ever learned the story of his home's desolation. Perhaps even then he had himself died upon some battle-field or in some wretched hospital; or perhaps he might some day come back and see the ruin which death and war had brought upon him."

objectives in such cases than the commanders even of brigades in the Union army. But the cavalry had been prepared by consolidation for action, instead of its usefulness being frittered away by details at the headquarters of the various general officers.

General Hooker, having given the subject his best reflection, on the 11th of April, 1863, submitted in general terms to the President his plan of campaign, which was to make an attempt to turn the enemy's left, and if practicable to sever his communications with Richmond by the Union cavalry force. He was apprehensive that General Lee would retire before him as soon as the Union army crossed the Rappahannock, and thus escape being seriously crippled. He says, in his communication :

"I hope when the cavalry have established themselves on the line between him and Richmond, they will be able to hold him and check his retreat until I can fall on his rear ; or, if not that, I will compel him to fall back by the way of Culpeper and Gordonsville, over a longer line than my own, with his supplies cut off. The cavalry will probably cross the river above the Rappahannock bridge, thence to Culpeper and Gordonsville, and across to the Aquia railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House. They will probably have a fight in the vicinity of Culpeper, but not one that should cause them much delay or embarrassment. I have given directions for the cavalry to be in readiness to commence the movement on Monday morning next. While the cavalry are moving, I shall threaten the passage of the river at various points, and, after they have passed well to the enemy's rear, shall endeavor to effect the crossing."

This plan having been approved by the President, General Stoneman, with his cavalry corps, on the 13th of April, began to feel his way towards the fords of the Upper Rappahannock. He moved cautiously—so cautiously that he consumed three days in marching

twenty-five miles. This did not please General Hooker, who thought he was frittering away time manœuvring against 2000 Confederate cavalry, under Fitzhugh Lee. He, therefore, on the evening of the 15th sent Stoneman a communication, calling attention to his instructions. The President also became annoyed at the delay and sent the following characteristic message to General Hooker ;

“ EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

“ April 15, 1863.

“ Major-General HOOKER :

“ It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your dispatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not 25 miles from where he started. To reach his point he still has 60 to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.

“ Yours truly,

“ A. LINCOLN.”

General Stoneman's reply to General Hooker's dispatch was to the effect that the movement on Fitzhugh Lee was but a feint to hide his objective, and that, on account of heavy storms and swollen rivers, his command was, on the 16th, still on the north bank of the Rappahannock. The rain continuing, and rivers still rising, kept the cavalry in and about Warrenton Junction, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, until the 29th of April, when it crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford.

In the meantime, General Hooker, notwithstanding this delay of the cavalry, determined to move his infantry, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, in the order named, were directed to move on the morning of the 27th and occupy camps, well screened from the observation of the enemy, near Kelly's Ford; the Fifth Corps was ordered to march the same day so as to reach the vicinity of Kelly's Ford by 4 P.M. of the 28th. The commanding officer of the Second Corps was ordered to send two divisions to encamp as near as practicable to Banks' Ford, without exposing his camps, and that one brigade and one battery should be sent to United States Ford with the same instructions. These troops at the fords were intended to protect the laying of the pontoon bridges at both the United States and at Banks' fords as soon as they were uncovered by the Union forces that were to cross at Kelly's Ford and move down the river towards Fredericksburg.

The First, Third, and Sixth Corps were ordered to be placed in readiness to make the passage of the river as follows: the Sixth at Franklin's crossing; the First at the crossing below at Pollock's Mill Creek; and the Third to be held as a support to cross at either point. These last-named movements were to be made so that the First and Sixth Corps were to be in position on or before 3.30 A.M. of the 29th, and the Third an hour later.

General Hooker's thoughtful instructions seem to have baffled the alertness of the bureau of information of the Confederate army. Although General Lee had been informed of the movements of Stoneman with his cavalry, he could not comprehend General Hooker's designs, and it was not until he received

a report from General Stuart that a large force of Union infantry and cavalry had crossed at Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th and was moving towards Germanna and Ely's fords of the Rapidan, that he began to take in the situation. Therefore, on the night of the 29th, General Anderson, with his division, was directed to proceed towards Chancellorsville, where he arrived at midnight and found Mahone and Posey already there.

On the 27th of April the following orders were issued to the Fifth Corps.

" HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
" CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 27, 1863.

" GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 15.

" The troops of the corps will move to-day in the following order : Sykes' division at 10 A.M. ; Griffin's division at 11 A.M. ; Humphreys' division at 12 M.

" Each division will be supplied, as heretofore directed, with 8 days' rations in knapsacks and haversacks, and will be accompanied by only one battery and two ambulances, with the pack train of small-arm ammunition. No wagons will be permitted with the column except such as are absolutely necessary to carry forage for the use of the authorized public and private animals.

" The trains of the corps will park under the direction of the corps quartermaster in the vicinity of Stoneman's switch ; and such guards as will be necessary for their protection will be selected from the regiments whose terms of service are soonest to expire.

" By command of Major-General GEORGE MEADE,
" FRED. T. LOCKE,
" Assistant Adjutant-General."

" HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
" April 27, 1863.

" CIRCULAR.

" Until further orders, in order to conceal the movements of the troops from the enemy, the usual duty calls will be omitted.

Division commanders will see that their men build only small fires, and those for cooking purposes only.

“By command of Major-General GEORGE MEADE.

“FRED. T. LOCKE,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

Camping at Hartwood Church on the 27th, and at Kelly's Ford on the 28th, Sykes' and Griffin's divisions crossed the Rappahannock, following the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, about 11 A.M., on the 29th, and, preceded by a detachment of the 6th New York Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Devin, marched to Ely's Ford, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps going to Germanna Ford. On reaching Ely's Ford at 5 P.M., two squadrons of cavalry were pushed across, which soon drove off the small force of Confederate cavalry that was there on reconnoitring duty. The crossing of Colonel Devin was immediately followed by Griffin's and Sykes' divisions, which forded the stream, notwithstanding it was three feet deep, with a very rapid current. Both these divisions were bivouacked on the right bank of the Rapidan by midnight.

Humphreys' division had been left at the Rappahannock to cover the passage of the trains and assist in taking up the bridges. This duty was not accomplished until late at night, at which time General Humphreys commenced his march, to rejoin the command; but, owing to the darkness and the ignorance of his guides, he did not reach the Rapidan until after the departure of the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps.

At the time the supervision of the crossing was turned over to General Humphreys, the cavalry corps had begun to cross the bridge, all of which passed

over, excepting one brigade, which crossed at the deep ford, just above. There were two interruptions during this crossing, owing to a partial failure of a part of the bridge. The delay caused thereby was from one to one and a half hours. As soon as the cavalry had passed, two regiments of infantry of the Twelfth Corps and the brigade of infantry of the Eleventh Corps, guarding its baggage-train, was passed over at the earnest solicitation of the colonel, who represented himself to have received orders to leave the train he was with and join his command. As soon as the infantry of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps was over, the headquarters train of the Twelfth Corps passed, then those of the Eleventh, followed by the supply trains, as General Humphreys understood them to be, of the Eleventh Corps. Two interruptions occurred during the passage of the latter, by the bad management of the wagons, one of which nearly proved fatal to the small bridge across Marsh Run, and the other to a span of the pontoon bridge. These caused a delay of at least half an hour more. The train mentioned consisted of at least 125 wagons and 55 spring wagons and ambulances, belonging almost entirely to the Eleventh Corps. The trains of the Fifth Corps succeeded immediately, and, when everything had passed, General Humphreys' division crossed. It was dark when its head reached the bridge. It was 11.30 P.M. before the pontoon train was ready to move. At that hour Humphreys set his column in motion for Ely's Ford, but the length of the trains of pack mules, cattle, etc., the bad condition of the roads, and the heavy rain made the march very slow. At about 3 A.M., just as the guide discovered that he was not on the road he had traversed twice the day before, it be-

came so dark that nothing could be seen, and so the command was forced to halt until daylight. Having received instruction to that effect, the pontoon train was sent in advance, under escort of two regiments, as soon as there was light enough to see, and the column resumed its march as soon as the pontoon train reached its head.

At 7 o'clock A.M. of the 30th, General Humphreys received directions to leave the trains under escort of one regiment and move up the rest of his command as quickly as possible. It reached Ely's Ford between 12 and 1 o'clock, but as the troops were much exhausted after fording the river, the division moved only as far as Hunting Creek, where it bivouacked, three miles from Chancellorsville, having marched about eighteen miles.

Before daylight on the 30th, General Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, sent out two squadrons of cavalry, with instructions for one to push on in the direction of Chancellorsville and the other to take the road to United States Ford after crossing Hunting Creek; both to drive in the enemy's pickets, if encountered, and pursue them as far as they could, reporting results. Just as the column of infantry was ready to move, Colonel Devin sent in a report that he had driven in the Confederate pickets on the United States Ford road, and had pursued them for several miles until he had encountered the enemy in force, drawn up in line of battle to the number of at least a brigade. Having no reason to doubt the authenticity of this report, General Meade concluded that the enemy had become apprised of his movements, and was prepared to dispute the opening of United States Ford, a point of vital importance to

the operations of the Union army. Sykes was, therefore, ordered in advance, to proceed at once to United States Ford, and Griffin's division was halted, after passing Hunting Creek, to await the development of Sykes' movements.

General Sykes proceeded to United States Ford, and after establishing communication with General Couch, on the north bank of the river, pursued his march to Chancellorsville unmolested, save by a small rear-guard which hung on the skirts of the retreating Confederates.

The cavalry, having reported their occupation of Chancellorsville, and being satisfied from this that there could be no enemy at United States Ford, General Meade pushed Griffin's division on to Chancellorsville, which place the latter occupied about 11 A.M., where Sykes subsequently joined.

Colonel Devin was then ordered by General Meade to open a way to Banks' Ford. About 3 P.M. a report was received from that officer, stating that he had driven in the enemy's picket on the Banks' Ford road, and had pursued them until he could see their line of battle; and, from the wagons visible, he concluded they were about to evacuate the position. General Meade immediately directed Griffin to advance a brigade to support the cavalry, and, if practicable, to drive in the infantry and uncover Banks' Ford.

General Barnes, in command of the 1st Brigade of Griffin's division, having been directed to perform this duty, advanced on the Old Turnpike road in the direction of Fredericksburg, about two miles from Chancellorsville. Here he struck Mahone's and Posey's brigades of Confederates, who were found advantageously posted on a ridge, with artillery com-

manding the road. The 25th New York, Colonel Johnson, and the 18th Massachusetts, Colonel Hayes, were deployed as skirmishers in the woods on the left and right of the road, and the remainder of the brigade held in reserve. The Confederates had already thrown up breastworks and were apparently too strong for Barnes to attack. He sent for a section of artillery, which could not be furnished him, and while reconnoitring, received instructions to withdraw without making an attack. This was done, through the woods on both sides of the road, unobserved by the enemy.

General Meade then, to his surprise, ascertained that the cavalry, instead of going down the Banks' Ford road, as they reported and led him to believe, had gone down the old Richmond turnpike, which makes a detour at Chancellorsville, coming in again to the Plank road about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chancellorsville, towards Fredericksburg. Upon referring the matter to General Slocum, who had arrived and assumed command, both Griffin's and Sykes' divisions were bivouacked in line of battle, the right resting on Chancellorsville and the left extending in a northeast direction toward the river.

After crossing at Kelly's Ford, the Twelfth Corps commenced the march at 4 A.M. on the 29th, followed by the Eleventh Corps, and proceeded towards Germanna Bridge, coming in contact with small parties of Confederates on the way, and the crossing of the Rapidan was opposed by a body of infantry, about 125 men, posted in a mill and behind timber. After an exchange of a few shots this party surrendered. The two corps arrived at Chancellorsville about 2 P.M. on the 30th. General Slocum placed the Twelfth

Corps in the woods, on a line nearly parallel to the Plank road, with the left resting near Chancellorsville and the right near a church about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles the refrom. The Eleventh Corps joined the right of the Twelfth, with its right resting on Hunting Run.

General Howard states, in his report, that as soon as the head of his column reached Dowdall's Tavern (4 P.M., 30th) he went to Chancellorsville and received his orders from General Slocum, who told him that he (Howard) was to cover the right, posting his command near Hunting Run. General Slocum gave him to understand that he (Slocum) would take care of the entire front from Chancellorsville to his position ; but afterwards, one of the division commanders of the Twelfth Corps sent Howard word that he would have to take about three fourths of a mile to the front, so as to connect with General Slocum's right. This Howard claims to have done, locating his command with reference to an attack from the front, in a direction perpendicular to the Plank road ; also from the right along the Plank and Old Turnpike roads. He sent a force of two companies to the point where the Ely's Ford road crosses Hunting Run. At this point General Pleasanton had a force of cavalry and some artillery.

The major-general commanding the army (Hooker) arrived at Chancellorsville on the evening of the 30th, leaving General Butterfield, his chief of staff, at his headquarters at Falmouth, to facilitate communications with both wings of the army.

While the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps had been engaged in securing a position at Chancellorsville, General Sedgwick, on the 28th, placed the First, Third, and Sixth Corps in position to cross the river,

carefully screening them from the view of the enemy. At the upper crossing, and shortly before daylight of the 29th, Brooks' division of the Sixth Corps crossed in boats, Russell's brigade taking the lead, receiving the fire of the enemy's pickets and reserves, but the brigade immediately occupied the Confederate rifle-pits, and three bridges were rapidly laid under the direction of General Benham. At Reynolds' (First Corps) crossing, one mile farther down, the passage was delayed by a severe fire from the Confederate sharpshooters in his front, but was at length gallantly accomplished, General Wadsworth crossing with a portion of his division in the boats and driving the Confederates from their rifle-pits. The remainder of General Sedgwick's command was held in readiness to cross all day of the 29th, the Confederates in the meanwhile intrenching on his entire front and occasionally shelling Reynolds' position, not knowing at that time but that the main attack was to come from this point. No demonstration, however, being made on any other portion of Sedgwick's front, and the strength of the force that had crossed, together with its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated to General Lee that the principal effort was to be made elsewhere, which was subsequently confirmed by General Stuart's report; hence the dispatch of Anderson on the night of the 29th toward Chancellorsville.

On the 30th, General Sickles' corps was detached from General Sedgwick's command and ordered to United States Ford.

On learning that the Union forces had crossed the Rapidan, and were approaching Chancellorsville in strong force, General Anderson, early on the morning

of the 30th, retired from the position Mahone and Posey had taken, and intrenched himself at the intersection of the Mine and Plank roads, near Tabernacle Church. Mahone was placed on the Old Turnpike, Wright and Posey on the Plank road.

In the meantime General Stuart had been directed to endeavor to impede the progress of the column marching by way of Germanna Ford; but this opposition was very slight and was suspended when it was ascertained that the column from Ely's Ford was already at Chancellorsville. Finding that the Union forces in front of Fredericksburg remained inactive all day of the 30th, as well as the 29th, General Lee determined to leave sufficient troops to hold the Confederate lines at that point, and with his main body to give battle to the approaching Union column, feeling sure that the main attack would be made on his flank and rear. Early's division of Jackson's corps, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division, with part of the Reserve Artillery under General Pendleton, were intrusted with the defense of the Confederate position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight of the 30th, General McLaws marched with the rest of his command toward Chancellorsville. General Jackson followed at dawn the next morning, with the remaining divisions of his corps, reaching the position occupied by General Anderson at 8 A.M., and making immediate preparations to advance.

On the 1st of May, at 7 A.M., General Humphreys, with his division, arrived at Chancellorsville and joined the corps. Shortly afterwards, under orders from General Hooker, the Fifth and Twelfth Corps were put *en route* to take a position to uncover Banks' Ford, the left resting on the river. For this purpose

General Sykes was ordered to advance on the Old Turnpike until after crossing Mott's Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy and open communication with Griffin to his left and Slocum to his right, and when all were in position to advance simultaneously against the enemy, supposed to be in position from the Plank road to the river. General Griffin was directed to move down the river on Mott road until in the presence of the enemy, when he was to deploy, his left resting on the river and his right extending toward Sykes. General Humphreys was ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reinforce Griffin or Sykes, as the exigencies might require. These movements were commenced about 11 A.M., the Twelfth Corps moving on the Plank road (which intersects the Old Turnpike about two miles west of Salem church). When about one mile from Chancellorsville, the Confederate skirmishers were met by General Slocum, who immediately deployed and advanced, the enemy falling back.

General Griffin moved down the river road without opposition, towards Banks' Ford, and when within about two miles of that place he was ordered to return. This was in consequence of some information which General Hooker had received.

General Sykes, accompanied by General Warren, chief engineer officer on General Hooker's staff, at $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chancellorsville found some Union cavalry engaged with the Confederate skirmishers; the former were giving ground, and by their behavior inspiring the Confederates with confidence. Ayres, Burbank, and O'Rorke's brigades were at once deployed, Burbank's in the front line, covered by the 17th U. S. as skirmishers, under Major G. L. Andrews.

By sharp fighting the ground lost by the cavalry was soon recovered, the Confederate pickets driven in, and Sykes took possession¹ of a crest, just in front of a heavy forest and in range of some rifle-pits of the Confederates to the left.² Weed's battery superintended by that officer, and immediately commanded by Lieutenant M. F. Watson, crowned the crest and opened an effective cannonade, being supported by a part of the 3d Brigade. The Confederates held the road in front with Anderson's and McLaws' divisions and two guns, and threw a part of this force in the breastworks, at the same time manœuvring for the purpose of turning either or both flanks of Sykes' command. Owing to the superiority in numbers of the Confederates, Sykes found himself outflanked both right and left. He therefore threw Ayres' brigade rapidly to the left, and six companies of the 146th New York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, to the right. Colonel Burbank held the front firmly, the 2d and 6th U. S., being on the right of the turnpike, and the 7th, 10th, and 11th U. S. on the left. Finding the brigade was much exposed in that position, being on the side of the hill, the line was ordered to advance to the bottom, to a fence bordering a small

¹ General Warren in his report says: "General Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss till he had gained the position assigned him. This he obtained about 12 o'clock. No sound yet reached us indicating that any of our columns had encountered the advance of the enemy. In General Sykes' front the enemy deployed to the right and left in line far outreaching ours, and I have never seen the steadiness of our troops more tried and proved.

² It is rather a singular coincidence that at exactly the same hour (11 A.M.), the opposing forces should have commenced advancing towards each other—Mahone's brigade, with T. C. Jordan's battery on the Old Turnpike and Posey's and Wright's brigades, with the other batteries of Alexander's battalion, on the Plank road. The whole of Anderson's and McLaws' divisions were on the ground as well as Jackson's corps.

stream, the right to advance to the shelter of the timber which touched the road at that point. Burbank was soon afterwards ordered to advance to some houses bordering on the road, and subsequently to advance to the crest of the hill in front of him. This the Confederates stubbornly opposed, but the movement of the regulars was irresistible; the Confederates retreated or were captured, and the position was occupied some time after 12 M.

Weed's battery checked any advance on the part of the Confederates by the main road, and Sykes' dispositions to secure his flanks kept the former quiet for a while; but as both these flanks rested on a dense growth of forest, and as Sykes was completely isolated from the rest of the army, he felt that the rear of his command could be gained by a determined movement of the Confederates under cover of the forest. No connection with the Twelfth Corps could be made, and General Warren's aide, Lieutenant James, in attempting to connect with the presumed position of General Slocum, ran against the enemy's skirmishers, from whom he fortunately escaped, though many shots were fired at him. A similar effort by one of General Sykes' aides was foiled in the same way. General Sykes, however, bravely resolved to hold his own, while General Warren rode rapidly back to General Hooker to explain the state of affairs. Sykes was thereupon ordered to retire in the direction of Chancellorsville.

Covered by skirmishers the brigades of the 2d Division retired in succession in line of battle to the height on which McGee's house is located. At that point General Hancock's division of the Second Corps was met, which had been ordered to Sykes'

aid. Soon after both commands were ordered to withdraw, Sykes' division to its previous bivouac near Chancellorsville, with General Hancock on his left. This was between 5 and 6 P.M.

In the meantime the column of Griffin and Humphreys proceeded on the river road, and had reached Decker's house, within view of Banks' Ford, without any opposition from the Confederates, when they were recalled by orders from General Hooker. General Slocum was also recalled after having proceeded on the Plank road about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chancellorsville, where he had met some Confederate skirmishers.

General Meade was now ordered to occupy a line from Chancellorsville to the river. General Humphreys' division was immediately sent to occupy the extreme left of this line, and directed to hold the approach to United States Ford by the Mott or river road in force. Griffin's division was halted on its return march and formed in line of battle in the woods on the left of Hancock. About 6 P.M. the enemy advanced in force on Sykes' front. O'Rorke had fortunately started to form his line of battle at the suggestion of General Hancock, who had informed him that the enemy was advancing. As he had received no orders to retire, he concluded to hold his position. While forming his line his pickets were driven in, and the Confederates were seen advancing over the crest of the ridge on the opposite side of the ravine. They showed two lines, each about equal to a regimental front. The right of the line was covered by a growth of young pines and could not be seen. As the 140th and 146th New York were under fire for the first time, O'Rorke thought it prudent to commence firing before the Confederates got very

close. As soon as the second line of the enemy showed itself, he gave the command to commence firing. The Confederates had been firing quite rapidly for some time before a gun was fired from O'Rorke's brigade. At the command, a rapid fire by file was commenced. The attack, which was apparently nothing more than a demonstration on the part of the Confederates to feel for the position of the Union lines, was quickly repulsed through O'Rorke's prompt action, supported by the 17th U. S. Infantry, under Colonel Andrews. No further trouble was given that day, and so, at 1 A.M., General Meade changed the position of his line to the Mineral Spring road, where the line was strengthened by inferior breastworks and abatis.

At 5 P.M. on May 1st, General Sedgwick received an order from the commanding general to make a demonstration in force at *one o'clock that same day*—to let it be as severe as possible without being an attack; to assume a threatening attitude, and maintain it until further orders. It was already some hours after the time fixed for the movement to begin when the order was received; but the last clause of the order, as above stated, determined Sedgwick to execute it without delay. Reynolds' corps was accordingly deployed in force; General Newton was directed to send one division of the Sixth Corps to Reynolds' support (to cover his bridges in case of an attack), and the light brigade across at the upper bridges, to support General Brooks, who was to display his force as if for advance. When these movements had been executed, General Sedgwick received an order countermanding the order for the demonstration.

The attempt to uncover Banks' Ford developed a bad line of attack, and had several commanding positions in its front for the Confederates to occupy. It was, perhaps, the best that could be designated. On account of the nature of it, however, Sykes had been ordered to withdraw. Two general plans of operations were at this time considered by General Hooker. One was to choose a position and intrench ; the other to choose a point of attack and advance with the corps then on the field. The saving of the men and the advantages of resuming the offensive after a successful repulse on the part of the Union troops favored the first ; the increased *élan* of the men and the choice of a point of attack, the second. General Warren was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. He thought that, with the position the Union army occupied and the advantage of numbers, Lee's right wing could easily be beaten, and that this could be done by advancing in force on the two main roads towards Fredericksburg, each being in good supporting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on the enemy's right flank by the river road. If this attack found the Confederates in extended line across the front, or in motion towards the right flank of the Union forces, it would secure the defeat of Lee's right wing, and consequently the retreat of the whole. General Hooker's original determination to await the attack had in it also the design to contract the lines and throw back his right to better position, the left being secure. On the assurance of the commander on the right that he was abundantly able to hold his position against any force the nature of the ground in his front would enable the Confederates to bring

against him, and because it was thought that to fall back would have some of the demoralizing influences of a retreat, it was decided to make no change in the right wing, but to strengthen it with breastworks and abatis. The sound of the axe, therefore, broke the stillness of the night along the lines of the army.

In the meantime, the Confederates had not been idle. At 11 A.M. of the 1st of May, they had moved forward on the Plank and Old Turnpike roads; Anderson, with the brigades of Wright and Posey, leading on the former; McLaws, with his three brigades, preceded by Mahone's, on the latter. Generals Wilcox and Perry, of Anderson's division, co-operated with McLaws. Jackson's troops followed Anderson's on the Plank road. Alexander's battalion of artillery accompanied the advance. This advance soon struck Sykes' division, and, as before stated, overlapped its wings, and Sykes was ordered to withdraw. The Confederates followed up the movement until, about 6 P.M., they again struck Sykes' front, and at that time ascertained the position of the Union line. General Lee describes it as "a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form almost an impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left of his line extended from Chancellorsville to the Rappahannock, covering the Bark Mill Ford. . . . His right stretched westward along the Germanna Ford road more than two miles." Night approaching before the extent of the Union line could be de-

veloped, Lee formed line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles to the Plank road, extending on the right to the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the Furnace. Most of the cavalry was on the left flank.

It was evident to General Lee that a direct attack upon the Union lines would be attended with great difficulty and loss, in view of the strength and position of the Union army and the superiority of its numbers. It was therefore resolved to endeavor to turn Hooker's right flank. We are certainly of the opinion that when General Lee ordered this movement he thought that the Union force was in line confronting him, with the right in the air, somewhere in the neighborhood of the Furnace. The execution of the plan was entrusted to General Jackson, with his three divisions. Only the commands of McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of Wilcox's brigade, which during the night of the 1st had been ordered back to Banks' Ford, remained in front of Hooker's lines.

The sagacity of General Warren, in his arguments with General Hooker as to an advance on the 2d, is here shown. Had such an advance taken place, he would have thrown three corps on McLaws' and Anderson's divisions, and with two corps at least struck Jackson in flank while on the march, for early on the morning of the 2d, Jackson marched by the Furnace and Brock roads, with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, under Stuart in person, covering him.

The Third Army Corps, under General Sickles, had been ordered up during the night of the 30th, and crossed at United States Ford about 7 A.M., of the 1st, and for a time was massed in the forest near

the junction of the roads leading to Ely's and United States fords, and about 4 P.M., was rapidly thrown into position parallel to the Plank road at Chancellorsville. Birney, with Ward's and Hayman's brigades (Graham's brigade having been sent to Dowdall's Tavern to take position at 1 P.M.), formed in two lines, and Berry's and Whipple's divisions were massed in column of battalions in the open ground north and to the right of Chancellorsville, the rear of the column covered by the woods. Toward sunset, Birney, with his brigades, was moved up the Plank road near the junction of the left flank of the Eleventh Corps with the right flank of the Twelfth Corps, and within supporting distance. On account of Slocum's right being weak, Birney bivouacked in rear of Slocum's line. Berry's and Whipple's divisions bivouacked at Chancellorsville. Birney threw out the 20th Indiana and 37th New York to the front, where they replaced two of the regiments of Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps. In order to gain some advantageous ground a strong line of skirmishers was advanced, which quickly dislodged some Confederates from the cleared fields and houses in front, thus obtaining possession of a high and commanding position.

During the night of the 1st, with the approval of General Hooker, Sickles ordered Birney to occupy, at daybreak of the 2d, a portion of the front advanced line on the left of General Howard, extending from the Plank road southwesterly through the Wilderness, and connecting with the right of General Slocum, thereby relieving portions of the troops of each of these corps, and enabling them to materially strengthen their lines. Birney, who had brought up

Graham's brigade (there being no use for it at Dowdall's, as that was General Howard's headquarters), held the crest along Scott's Run, from the farm-house on the left toward Dowdall's Tavern. General Sickles rode along the lines at sunrise and expressed great satisfaction at the disposition that Birney had made of his division, and on returning to general headquarters was directed to make a reconnaissance to the front and left of Chancellorsville. General Berry was therefore ordered to detail for this duty two reliable regiments, to be led by circumspect and intrepid commanders. The 11th Massachusetts, Colonel William Blaisdell, moving out to the left toward Tabernacle church, and the 26th Pennsylvania, Colonel B. C. Tilghman, to the front, with a detachment of Berdan's sharpshooters from Whipple's division, gallantly pressed back the Confederate pickets and skirmishers until they were discovered in force.

About this time a report was received from General Birney that a column of the enemy was moving along his front toward the right. General Sickles immediately hastened to the spot and found the column to be within easy range of Clark's guns (about 1600 yards off), and Clark, opening fire, so effectually annoyed the enemy that the infantry sought cover in the woods, or on some other road, while the artillery and trains hurried past in some confusion. This continuous column—infantry, artillery trains, and ambulances—was observed for three hours, moving apparently in a southerly or westerly direction towards Orange Court-House, yet nothing was done to harass it. The movement indicated to General Sickles a retreat on Gordonsville, or an attack upon the Union right. General Sickles hastened to report these

movements through staff officers to the general-in-chief, and communicated the substance of them in the same manner to Generals Howard and Slocum, inviting the co-operation of both in case General Hooker should authorize Sickles to follow up the Confederates and attack the column.

At noon General Sickles received orders to advance cautiously toward the road followed by the Confederates and harass the movement as much as possible. Immediately ordering Birney to push forward over Scott's Run and gain the heights in the Wilderness, two battalions of sharpshooters, under Colonel Berdan, were sent to the front and Sickles communicated again with General Slocum and Howard, and was assured of their prompt co-operation. This movement of Birney's necessarily *left a gap in the line between Howard's left and Slocum's right*. Two bridges having been rapidly thrown over Scott's Run, Birney pressed forward briskly, meeting considerable opposition from Anderson, who had extended his lines to the heights south of Poplar Run, covering the Furnace. Whipple was then ordered up within supporting distance, and Birney being checked at the Furnace by a twelve-pounder Confederate battery, Livingston's battery was moved forward and soon silenced his opponent.

Expecting to encounter a heavy force, General Sickles deemed it prudent not to attack without the supports from the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and therefore reported to General Hooker the condition of affairs. A considerable interval having occurred between Birney's and Williams' divisions and suffering from a heavy fire from the left, Whipple had to be drawn on to help fill the gap in Sickles' line.

Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps having come up on the right of Birney, an advance was again ordered, which was maintained by the sharpshooters, supported by the 20th Indiana and 5th Michigan. From this advance 300 prisoners were soon reported, besides nearly 100 previously captured at the Furnace by the sharpshooters.

General Pleasanton, with the 6th New York and the 8th and 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Martin's battery of horse artillery, had already reported to General Sickles, and were moving over the hill through the woods toward the Furnace; but thinking it was not quite time for the effective employment of cavalry, General Sickles had Pleasanton form his command in the open, near Scott's Run, and directed him to wait until the way could be cleared for his operations. After a thorough examination of every thing, and finding that the resistance of the Confederates in his front had almost ceased, Sickles was about to dispatch an officer to bring Pleasanton forward, when Jackson struck the right flank of the Eleventh Corps by crossing both the Orange Court-House and the Culpeper roads and moving down the Germanna Ford road.

THE ELEVENTH CORPS DISASTER.

This daring Confederate officer had marched the whole day long across the entire front of the Union army, with his flank exposed and so near as to be shelled by a Union battery, and then deliberately facing about, after uncovering the Union front, by which means he placed the entire Union army between himself and the remainder of the Confederate army, had the audacity to attack its superior

numbers in an intrenched position. General Lee must have been in a desperate strait to have permitted such a hazardous move, that is if he did give his consent to it, which we very much doubt. Its conception was evidently the offspring of despair, and the very recklessness of its execution, in the face of Sickles' advancing force towards the Furnace, was worthy of greater success. Nowhere in the annals of the war will be found its parallel. But it was near sunset, Jackson's favorite time for assault, and he knew that if he was repulsed, he could make his way back again during the night over the road he had travelled during the day.

Although attempts are said to have been made by the Eleventh Corps to secure information as to the objective of the heavy column as it passed across its front, no information seems to have been gained through its pickets and skirmishers, whose excuse was on account of the density of the undergrowth, etc., in the timber, yet the Confederates could not only mass there, but moved through it in line of battle. When the attack came, as it did with the Confederates deployed on either side of the Germanna road, which swept the breastworks in front and rear at the same time, no troops occupying the position the Eleventh Corps did could have withstood it; its right flank was overwhelmed, and, under the pressure, rolled back, like a breaker on a sandy shore, and dissolved in the shadows of the forest. The 1st Division occupied the right of the line, which was continued by the 3d and 2d Divisions, with two regiments each in reserve.

Notwithstanding the fact that the unvarying report from the infantry and cavalry patrols that "the

enemy is crossing the Plank road and moving towards Culpeper," nothing seems to have been done with the reserve, to either mass or deploy it near the right flank to meet possible emergencies or fill the gap left by Birney, and when the blow came, both line of battle and reserve were taken in flank. As the 1st Division disappeared before the yelling Confederates, carrying the 3d Division with it, the 2d Division attempted to form line and check the rush of the advancing foe, but they were pushing along both sides of the works with successful impetuosity, and, reaching the gap made by Birney, they enveloped the left of the Eleventh Corps.¹ In the meantime, Captain Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, had, by great exertions, got 34 guns in position on the crest of the hill in rear of the Twelfth Corps, and delivered a withering fire upon the Confederates as they poured through the gap and over the breastworks of the Eleventh Corps.

General Sickles was, at this moment, occupying an unenviable position. Nearly all the 1st Division of

¹ Captain Porter Farley, of the 140th New York, thus describes the scene : " Just at dusk we were called up and led, at the utmost of our speed, towards the scene of conflict. The Eleventh Corps men, in wild disorder, a perfect mob, without the slightest semblance of organization, were rushing back upon us in an uncontrollable torrent. It was useless to halt and detain the straggling crowds, for their demoralization was so great that they were an element of weakness rather than of strength. They were allowed to pass to the rear. . . . The scene as we neared the Chancellor house was wild and exciting to the last degree. Darkness was coming upon us. The roads were crowded with the flying troops going in one direction and the reserves advancing rapidly and orderly in another. Hooker's headquarters were at the Chancellor house, and the military band there stationed was energetically playing the national airs, having been ordered so to do as one means by which to check the disorder and encourage the Union troops. In front, the fight was raging furiously. A perfect storm of artillery lighted up, with fitful flashes, the forest opening. The rattle of musketry was incessant. The shouts of the officers and the shrieks of the wounded filled the air."

the Twelfth Corps, under General Williams, had been sent to Sickles' support, and at the same time a portion of the 2d Division, under General Geary, to feel the enemy in its front. In consequence of the Confederates being found in force, the 2d Division was recalled, and while it was retiring to take its position, the blow fell upon the Eleventh Corps. Williams was ordered to retire as rapidly as possible to his original line. The order was in the course of prompt execution, but the Confederates had possessed themselves of the right of Williams' line before he could reach it, and in attempting to regain it, Colonel Matthews and about 200 of the 128th Pennsylvania were captured. Williams at once took possession of the left of the line formerly held by him, and formed Ruger's and Knipe's brigades in line on the left of and at right angles to the Plank road leading toward the Wilderness, his right connecting with Berry's division, which had been held in reserve at Chancellorsville. Berry was sent with two brigades, by General Hooker, to attempt to stay the Confederates. He had moved promptly and established his troops in the woods to the right of and perpendicular to the Plank road, extending the line to the right of Williams. These dispositions had been made in perfect steadiness, notwithstanding torrents of fugitives broke through their intervals. Osborn, Berry's chief of artillery, in the meanwhile, planted Dimick's and Winslow's batteries on the crest of the hill near Best's guns, and advanced a section of Dimick's on the Plank road. These dispositions of the infantry, together with the fearful artillery fire, checked the enemy's advance.

THE ISOLATION OF SICKLES' COMMAND.

While these movements were going on, the commands of Generals Birney, Whipple, and Pleasanton had become isolated. At the time General Sickles was about to move Pleasanton forward at the Furnace, he was informed by an aide of General Warren's of the disaster which had occurred on the right, and desired a regiment of cavalry to attempt to check the enemy. The 8th Pennsylvania was immediately sent by Pleasanton, and right well they performed their duty, but with considerable loss. Sickles had time only to dispatch staff officers to recall Birney and Whipple, when the Confederate scouts and some cavalry disclosed themselves. Sickles confided to Pleasanton the direction of the artillery—Clark, Lewis, and Turnbull's batteries, together with his own horse battery. These with only the 6th New York and 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 110th Pennsylvania Infantry, as supports, took position. The fugitives of the Eleventh Corps swept over the cleared fields in which the artillery was massed, the exulting enemy at their heels, and terrible seemed the confusion. A few minutes were enough, however, to get the artillery in position, and Pleasanton met the shock at short range with the fire of 22 pieces, double-shotted with canister.¹ The heads of the columns were swept

¹ General Pleasanton, in his report, says: "They advanced in silence and with that adroitness they often display to gain their object. The only color visible was an American flag with the centre battalion. To clear up this doubt, my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thompson, 1st New York Cavalry, rode to within 100 yards of them, when they called out to him, 'We are friends; come on!' and he was induced to go 50 yards closer, when the whole line, in a most dastardly manner, opened on him with musketry, dropped the American color, and displayed 8 or 10 rebel battle flags."

away to the woods, from which they opened a furious but ineffectual fire of musketry. Twice they attempted a flank movement, but the first was checked by the artillery, and the second and most formidable was baffled by the advance of Whipple and Birney, whose troops were arriving in perfect order and formed in lines of brigades in rear and on the flanks of the artillery. The position being thus secured, twilight closed the combat. The Confederates had used their best endeavors to cut off Sickles' command, but the admirable handling of the guns, under Randolph on the flank and Osborn in front, rendered their efforts hopeless, and they sullenly withdrew to the breastworks formerly held by the Eleventh Corps. After dark the Confederate line could only be defined by the flash of musketry, from which volleys were occasionally poured.

SICKLES' MIDNIGHT BATTLE.

General Sickles now hastened to open communication with General Slocum and with General Hooker's headquarters through Colonel Hart, Assistant Adjutant General, reporting that a portion of Whipple's ammunition (mule) train, some of the battery caissons, and two or three guns were in the woods occupied by the enemy between his (Sickles') lines of battle and the road, and that to recover these, as well as the line of the Plank road, he would make a night attack, if supported by Williams' and Berry's divisions. About 11 P.M., Colonel Hart returned with the permission, and immediately confiding the dispositions on the flank to General Birney, and in front to General Berry, Sickles directed the attack to

be made on the flank in two lines of battle (with the bayonet) supported by heavy columns. By midnight all was ready, and Birney was ordered to advance. The night was very clear and still; the moon, being nearly full, threw enough light in the woods to facilitate the advance, and Ward's brigade led off in the brilliant execution of the movement, with Hayman about 100 yards in rear. Orders were given not to fire a musket until the Plank road and earthworks were reached. The Confederates were on the alert, and against a terrific fire of musketry and artillery—twenty pieces of which had been massed in the opening about Dowdall's Tavern (where General Howard's headquarters had been), the advance was successfully executed, the line of the Plank road gained, and the original breastworks reoccupied. All the guns and caissons, and a portion of Whipple's mule train were recovered, besides two pieces of the enemy's artillery and three caissons captured. Thrown into confusion by this attack upon the right flank, the Confederates endeavored to advance upon Berry's front in connected lines on the right and left of the road; but they were repulsed in less than 30 minutes, and with this closing effort the midnight battle at Chancellorsville was ended.

THE NEW LINE.

During the confusion resulting from the giving way of the Eleventh Corps, in the early part of the evening, General Meade moved Sykes' division of the Fifth Corps from the left of Chancellorsville to the right and pushed him out on the road to Ely's Ford, in front of the road to the United States Ford, to

cover and hold the same, in case the enemy should advance to that point. During the night, and by early daylight the next morning, under the order of General Hooker, the entire Fifth Corps moved to occupy the road from Chandler's house to Ely's Ford, the left resting at Chandler's and the right extending to connect with the First Corps. Griffin's division occupied the left of this line and Sykes' the right; Humphreys', in reserve, massed in rear of Sykes'.

At 9 P.M., General Hays, of the Second Corps, reported to General Berry, with a brigade, which was placed obliquely in rear of Carr's brigade and facing toward the left. Howard's (Eleventh) corps was sent to the extreme left, Schurz's division relieving Humphreys'. The remainder of the Eleventh Corps, extending Schurz's line to the right, relieved the other divisions of the Fifth Corps. The First Corps, under General Reynolds, having been called up from Franklin's crossing, came upon the field during the midnight battle, and was placed on the extreme right, along Hunting Run, facing west and connecting with the right of the Fifth Corps.

The real line of battle was situated as follows : north of and perpendicular to the Plank road, Berry's division, with Hays' brigade on its right, occupied the position to which these troops had been thrown forward from the Chancellor house the evening before ; Williams' division, was supported on its right by Mott's brigade of Berry's division, prolonged Berry's line south of the Plank road ; Geary's division, still holding the intrenchments it had occupied, formed an acute angle with Williams' left, and on Geary's left, the Second Corps divisions of Hancock and French remained as situated before Jackson's attack.

Whipple and Birney drew in behind Williams and Geary, Birney at first taking position at the angle formed by the two divisions of the Twelfth Corps. Captain Best, with his eight batteries of the Third and Twelfth Corps, supported by Bowman's brigade and Whipple's division, occupied Fairview crest.

THE DEATH OF JACKSON.

After General Jackson's attack on the right of the Union lines on the 2d had ceased, that officer ordered his third line, under General A. P. Hill, to advance to the front, and relieve the troops of Rodes and Colston, which had made the attack, and which were now completely blended and in disorder from the rapid advance and subsequent assault. As Hill's men moved forward, General Jackson, with his staff and escort, returning from the extreme front, met Hill's skirmishers advancing, and in the obscurity of the night were mistaken for Union troops and fired upon. Several were killed and General Jackson received a severe injury (from which he shortly afterwards died), and the command devolved upon General Hill. General Hill was disabled in Sickles' midnight attack, and General J. E. B. Stuart was sent for, to take command.

HAZEL GROVE ABANDONED—STUART'S ATTACK.

The operations of the night of the 2d left the Third Corps divisions of Birney and Whipple and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps on the high ground at Hazel Grove. From thence Huntington's guns, still there, could have acted with powerful effect upon the flank of any column advancing against Fair-

view. During the night General Hooker ordered the abandonment of this position. The order was not received at Hazel Grove until just before sunrise. Sickles was directed to march by the most practicable route to Fairview and there occupy the new line of entrenchments along the skirt of the woods, perpendicular to and on either side of the Plank road, his artillery to occupy the fieldworks on the crest of the hill, in rear of the lines of battle. Whipple commenced the movement by the left flank, preceded by the artillery of his own and Birney's divisions, except Huntington's battery, which was well posted on the right flank, to cover the withdrawal of the columns. Birney followed in good order. When the rear of his column (Graham's brigade) had descended the ravine, Stuart, who at early dawn was alert and preparing to attack, ordered an immediate advance of his whole line—Hill's division, under Heth, leading, and Colston and Rodes following in the order named. Graham, having been charged with covering the retirement, admirably performed that service. The Confederates assailed him fiercely and charged Huntington's battery, but this charge was handsomely repulsed, Huntington firing canister and clearing his ground, and Graham withdrew in good order, although not without considerable loss. Huntington then drew off his pieces, except one, which became entangled in the timber, and under a heavy fire of musketry crossed over the rude bridge of Scott's Run.

SUNDAY'S BATTLE.

This withdrawal was unfortunate, as Hazel Grove was the key to the whole position, and Stuart was not

long in seizing upon it and planting there thirty pieces of artillery. Under cover of the fire of these guns Stuart's divisions, crowding each other, and shouting the name of Jackson, rushed upon Williams and Berry—Hill's brigades in line of battle leading, followed by Colston's as a second line and Rodes as a third line. The momentum of this mass, accelerated by the concentrated fire of the Confederate batteries at Hazel Grove, which raked the lines of Williams and Geary from flank to flank, was tremendous, while at the same time the batteries of Anderson and McLaws, now closing in from the south, raked them from the opposite side. The works held by Williams were impetuously assaulted by McGowan and Lane, at a point near the Plank road, held by the 3d Maryland, under Colonel Revere, which had never been in action before, and Lane broke over the parapet. But while the enemy was pouring through this breach, Ross changed front with his brigade, and Mott's brigade, which had been brought up from the ford during the night and placed in reserve, was thrown forward. Mott countercharged, and after a desperate struggle recovered the lost ground, capturing several colors and about 1000 prisoners.

While Williams and Geary had been holding their own at the angle, Pender and Thomas, supported by Heth's brigade of Confederates, fell upon Berry, who was at the same time taken in reverse on the left by Lane, and his works were temporarily carried. But while Lane was being driven out by Mott and Williams, Berry recovered his line. Almost immediately a second assault was made upon Berry, resulting in the capture of a part of his rifle-pits. But again the Confederates were driven out. Stuart's left brigades

being hard pressed at this time, Colquitt was sent to reinforce them. Meanwhile, General French, of whose division Hays' brigade had been gallantly fighting on Berry's line, of his own accord quitted the rifle-pits, facing east where he had no enemy in his front, and moved into position on Berry's right, facing west. French then advanced by General Hooker's order, and took in flank the brigades of Thomas and Colquitt, then advancing on Sickles' right. The Confederates were at first seized with a panic by this sudden attack on their flank, and broke off to their right, leaving several hundred prisoners in French's hands, and abandoning a regiment of Union troops which they had captured. This was the moment for the First and Fifth Corps to have been pushed against the enemy,¹ but no orders were given, and French, whose own flank was now threatened in turn by Pender, was obliged to send for help to Meade, who immediately ordered forward Tyler's brigade of Humphreys' division. This was about 9 A.M. Lieutenant-Colonel Webb, of General Meade's staff, in person directed the brigade to its position on the right of General French. The 91st was on the right, the 134th second, the 126th third, and the 129th (all Pennsylvania troops) was fourth in line. The regiments were scarcely in position before the enemy opened fire, which was promptly and effectively returned by Tyler's men, and a further advance from that quarter was, for the time being, arrested.

The Confederates were now preparing for a third

¹ Colonel Webb, of General Meade's staff, rode to the left of Stuart's line. The Confederates were all moving forward with arms at a "trail." Webb reported this exposed flank to Meade, who took him to Hooker's tent, and there Webb told Hooker all he had seen. There were present in the tent at the time, Hooker, Meade, Van Alen (Hooker's aid), and Webb.

and desperate onslaught under cover of the Hazel Grove batteries, which commanded the entire position of artillery and infantry at Fairview. Ward's brigade of Berry's division had been ordered to support Berry's right, but before it could arrive the storm broke, the gallant Berry fell at the head of his division, and the noble Hays was wounded and captured. Colonel Revere succeeded to the command, and, General Sickles says, "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the 2d brigade and portions of two others. Colonel Stevens was then placed in command. He fell soon afterwards, and the division, left without a leader and greatly reduced by hard fighting, was pushed back into some low marshy thickets." Tyler had held his position for over an hour before he was forced to retire, by seeing his flank in danger of being turned, and having no ammunition to meet the double line of Confederates that were plainly seen advancing and extending beyond his right. Berry's division having fallen back, Williams' division was also compelled to withdraw, together with Graham's brigade, which had been fighting upon the line of that division for two hours. Graham held his ground until left alone and nearly surrounded, then drew off in good order, assisted by part of Hayman's brigade, led forward by General Birney.

Sickles' and Slocum's second line was quickly formed along the Fairview crest, and the Confederates lost no time in making an assault upon it. After a brief pause they came on again, supported by a heavy fire from the Hazel Grove batteries, which plowed the Union lines right and left, doing great execution. The assaulting lines, blended into one, rushed on towards Best's batteries, some of which

were taken, and the fighting was something fearful. But the Confederates were finally repulsed and driven down the slope. They quickly renewed the onslaught and were again repulsed. Taking advantage of the broken ground, seamed with ravines, the brigades of Jones, Colston, and Paxton, reinforced by those of Doles and Ramseur, advanced and again attacked Williams, who, with Birney's assistance and a vigorous use of his batteries, stubbornly held his ground. Finally Doles managed to get around Williams' left into the open ground at Chancellorsville, whither Paxton followed him. The two then rushed for Best's batteries, but were thrown back with heavy loss.

A GENERAL-IN-CHIEF NEEDED.

It was only too evident at this time that the Confederates had not only expended the most of their ammunition, but nearly all their strength. General Hooker had three corps lying comparatively idle—the First, Fifth, and Eleventh. The whole of the Union line was indeed short of ammunition. Sickles sent for reinforcements. None were sent to him. General Hooker lay senseless from a contusion caused by a cannon-shot which struck a pillar of the Chancellor house near which he had been standing.¹ For hours he was unfitted for anything, and during all that

¹ The historian of the 118th Pennsylvania says: "At an angle in the breast-works lately constructed stood the White House, the property of one Burns. . . . In its rear a large tent had been pitched for the use of army headquarters. The flaps open, its occupants and their doings were plainly in view. General Hooker, in reclining posture, still suffering from the blow he received from a falling pillar of the Chancellor House, was surrounded by a number of general and staff officers. The libations, in view of the character of the surroundings, were quite imposing and the beverage luxuriant and expensive. The light wines of France were apparently the exclusive tippie. The many abandoned bottles, the broken and empty baskets, the frequent and suggestive pop-

time the army was being fought by the subordinate commanders, and there was no one to direct. General Couch was the next senior officer, but he had no authority to assume responsibility, not having been officially informed that General Hooker was unable to command. Even when General Hooker resumed his functions, he was not at all in a fit condition to do so. His injuries were more severe than he himself then supposed, and it is believed that he ultimately died from their effects.

General Sickles, not receiving the assistance asked for, again withdrew from his position and reformed his line back of the Fairview crest. This caused Stuart, in spite of his great losses and the fatigue of his corps, to push for the Chancellorsville clearing. Another stubborn resistance was maintained by Sickles for half an hour, when, finding himself unsupported right or left, he again withdrew and re-formed on the right of Hancock, who had found enough to do in the meantime to sustain himself against McLaws' division. The brigades of Perry, Posey, Wright, and Mahone, extending Stuart's line towards Fredericksburg, had pressed forward against Geary, who, through some confusion of orders, having changed front at right angles with his first position, and then changed back again, clung to his rifle-pits until Wright's brigade had swung around his flank into the Chancellorsville

ping of champagne corks, indicated a free and liberal allowance of this intoxicant, just then so exclusively confined to army headquarters. An impertinent fellow, enviously overlooking the scene, observing General Hooker as the only one of the party not upon his feet, inquired the cause. A volunteer reply was made by an officer near by to the effect that he had been shot. 'Shot in the neck,' quickly responded the inquirer. Fearing the consequences of his levity, he quickly hid himself in the crowd, but not before the restrained smile with which his response was received, assured him in his belief that he had not shot very far from the mark."

clearing. He then withdrew, by General Slocum's order, and subsequently passed over to the left of the Eleventh Corps.

General Couch at this time had two divisions facing in opposite directions—Hancock's east and French's west—about one mile apart. The withdrawal of Sickles and Slocum exposed the flanks of these lines, compelling Hancock to change direction so as to be prepared for an attack from the west as well as from the east. Referring to his western front, he says :

“I had a good deal of artillery, and, although the enemy massed their infantry in the woods very near me and attempted to advance, I always held a very threatening attitude. I judge they had exhausted their troops so much that they dared not attack me, although I remained there for some time, alone in this position, very heavily engaged with artillery all the time.”

General Hooker had, by this time recovered sufficient self-control to give directions, and by his order the whole line withdrew to a new position north of the Chancellor house, covering the Ely's and United States fords, the right of which from Chandler's to the ford being already occupied by the First and Fifth Corps. In the angle formed by the junction of the Ely's Ford with the Mineral Spring road, Captain Stephen H. Weed, under the orders of General Hooker, placed 56 guns, 28 on the right and 24 on the left and 4 in the angle. Nearly, if not quite, every corps in the Army of the Potomac was represented in this line of artillery, which occupied about 500 yards on each side of the salient angle.

THE FIRE IN THE WOODS.

It was nearly 2 o'clock when the Chancellor house was abandoned, and it, now being between the contend-

ing armies, caught fire and was destroyed.¹ Moreover, the woods had become ignited by the artillery fire, and the wounded and dying in their midst were beyond the hope of rescue. Great volumes of smoke arose and darkened the sky. All efforts to suppress it were unavailing. Amid the crash of falling timber, the roar of the billows of flame, and the lashing of the serpent-like tongues of the fiery element seizing upon its prey, came the piteous groans of the wounded as they were being roasted in this furnace of fire. This was a truce of itself, and there was a lull in the hostilities as the exterior lines gradually retired behind the troops holding the interior. With Hancock's withdrawal, Sunday's battle ended.

SEDGWICK'S BATTLE AT MARYE AND SALEM HEIGHTS.

There seems to have been some misconception of time and distance, or some dreadful tardiness, on the

¹ "Driving to Chancellorsville [in May, 1864], Gen. Joseph Dickinson, chief of staff of Gen. Hooker, described the position and movements of the Federal army, the disaster that befell the Eleventh Corps, and its retreat, and also the wounding of Gen. Hooker on the porch of the Chancellorsville house, and the subsequent destruction of that house by fire, caused by the bursting of shells. Miss Chancellor, a young lady who was in the house at the time, was standing just back of Gen. Dickinson during his recital. In conversation with this lady she said to me: 'I owe my life to Gen. Dickinson. On the morning of May 3d, by the withdrawal of the Union troops to a more available position, this house, where we are now standing, which has been rebuilt, a part of the old brick wall remaining, was between the two contending armies. Seventeen persons besides myself, including my mother, were grouped together in the cellar. A bursting shell set the house on fire, and in the noise and tumult of battle we were not aware that one part of the roof had already fallen in, and that we were so near being burned alive, when Gen. Dickinson, at great risk of life and capture, left his men and came alone to the house and rescued us.' Pointing to a ravine about one half mile to the north, she said, 'He assisted us to that ravine, inside the Union line, where we found shelter till the battle was over,' and added, 'I shall always feel grateful to Gen. Dickinson; he saved our lives.'"—Washington Correspondence, *Ithaca (N. Y.) Journal*, June 2, 1864.

part of those intrusted with dispatches to General Sedgwick. His first order to cross the river in front of Fredericksburg was *received some four hours after the time fixed in the order for the movement to commence*; and again, on the 2d, when Reynolds' corps was withdrawn from Sedgwick's command, the latter received an order at 5.25 A.M., some time *after daylight*, to take up all the bridges at Franklin's crossing and below *before daylight*. This order, of course, could not be executed as directed.

At 6.30 P.M. of May 2d, General Sedgwick received again the order to pursue the enemy by the Bowling Green road. This order was similar in character to Pope's famous order to Porter at Second Bull Run, to "pursue the enemy." But the enemy would not get out of the way. Early's division, about 8500 strong, was at that moment occupying a position with its right at Hamilton's Crossing, and its front extending along the railroad towards Fredericksburg, close upon Sedgwick's flank, whose corps had mostly crossed the Rappahannock the day before, and advanced towards the Bowling Green road. However, Wheaton's division having been sent to cover Newton's crossing and take up his bridge, the command was immediately put under arms and advanced upon the right, driving the enemy from the Bowling Green road and pushing him back to the woods.

At 11 o'clock P.M., General Sedgwick received another order, dated 10.10 P.M., directing him to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, immediately upon receipt of the order, and to move in the direction of Chancellorsville until he connected with the major-general commanding; to attack and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of the

general at daylight.¹ As we have stated, the order to cross at Fredericksburg found Sedgwick with his command on the south side of the river, ready to "pursue the enemy." To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg where Sedgwick says "no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight." He therefore commenced to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg on the Bowling Green road, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light Brigade and Howe's division. A sharp skirmish commenced as the head of the column moved from the immediate vicinity of the bridges and continued all the way to town, the Confederates falling back slowly. At the same time a sudden attack was made on the pickets in front of the Bernard house. When the head of the column entered the town, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the rifle-pits and the batteries on the heights, which were then being held by Barksdale, with 1400 men and several batteries in an intrenched position, reinforced by Hays' brigade from Early, and Wilcox from Banks' Ford; but the latter did not reach the Confederate position in time.

By this time daylight of the 3d had appeared, and some of Sedgwick's batteries were placed in position

¹ While the order did not direct it, it is claimed that by changing the direction of General Sedgwick's movement from the Bowling Green road to the crossing at Fredericksburg, it was intended that Sedgwick should avoid any interference from the enemy remaining in his front; and that by returning to the north bank of the river and recrossing at Fredericksburg during the night, he would be on a shorter line, and would take the river road from that point to Chancellorsville, which would bring him in contact only with the Confederate force holding Banks' Ford. But the congratulatory dispatch of General Hooker, announcing that the Confederate army was in full retreat, had reached Sedgwick about sunset of that day, and he evidently acted upon that supposition.


to shell the enemy. A bridge had been ordered to be placed across the river at the Lacey house, and General Gibbon was directed to cross his command as soon as it was completed, which he did about 7 A.M., and took position on the right. General Howe was directed to move with his division on the left of Hazel run, to turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as directed, that officer found some works in his front, and the stream of water between his command and that of General Newton's prevented any movement of his division to the right. General Gibbon, upon moving forward to turn the left of the enemy, was checked by the canal, and compelled to halt. General Sedgwick deemed that nothing remained then but to carry the works by direct assault. Two strong columns were formed and moved on the Plank road and to the right of it, directly up the heights. The line of battle moved in double-quick time on the left of the Plank road, neither halting nor firing a shot until the Confederates were driven from their lower line of works. In the meantime the storming columns had pressed forward to the crest, carried the works, and captured the guns and many prisoners.

Howe had also advanced on the left of Hazel run in three columns of assault, and forced the enemy from the crest, capturing five guns. The entire corps was at once put in motion for pursuit.

It was not until after daylight of the 3d that Early heard of Sedgwick's operations. Moving out from his position, he found that the artillery on Lee's hill and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with one of Hays' regiments, had fallen back on the Telegraph road, while Hays, with the remainder of his brigade

had been compelled to retire up the Plank road, as he was on the left. Early succeeded at once in halting his infantry and artillery, and had the right brigades thrown back into a second line. On the arrival of Hays' brigade, which moved around from the Plank road, and three regiments of Gordon's, which had been sent for, a line was formed across the Telegraph road at Cox's house, about two miles back of Lee's hill.

The way was now open for Sedgwick up the Plank road. He had nothing in front of him but Wilcox, for Early did not get into position on Cox's hill until Sunday night. Sedgwick moved forward and met with some resistance from Wilcox on Salem Heights, but the position was carried without halting, Wilcox falling back slowly until he reached Salem church, about five miles from Fredericksburg. Sedgwick formed rapidly for another assault, and advanced upon the woods held by the Confederates. After a sharp contest, the heights were gained. But at this moment three brigades of McLaws' and one of Anderson's, having been permitted by Hooker to leave his front (although reports of this fact from the pickets around Chancellorsville were being sent in to the army headquarters), were precipitated upon Sedgwick's tired command. For a short time the crest was held by Sedgwick's men with obstinate resistance, but they were contending against comparatively fresh troops. At length the left of the line was forced slowly back through the woods. The advance of the Confederates, however, was checked by the splendid firing of Williston, Rigby, and Parsons' batteries, and Wheaton held on to the right with a firm grip, gallantly fight-



ing all the while. The left of Sedgwick's line was rapidly re-formed, and after a short while it advanced, forcing the enemy back in some confusion in front of the right, but was firmly resisted on the left.

This was the condition of things, when night put an end to the conflict : Sedgwick was holding the road connecting the Plank road with both Banks' and Scott's fords with his right and covering the Plank road with his left, occupying two sides of an angle, the salient point of which was at Williamson's house and in front of the toll-gate. His left continued along the Plank road to the Cabin house, where it made a sharp angle and then faced towards Fredericksburg, from which point General Sedgwick anticipated an attack. During the night the wounded, as far as was practicable, were sent into Fredericksburg.

General Early, having previously informed General McLaws of his intention to attack Sedgwick, on the morning of the 4th moved forward and closed in the Confederate lines, thus cutting off Sedgwick's communications with Fredericksburg. An effort was made to cut him off also from Banks' Ford, where a pontoon bridge had been laid the previous day, but General Howe promptly extended his left to the river and admirably checked the movement, capturing 200 prisoners and a battle-flag. General Sedgwick was now surrounded, while the left front of the army at Chancellorsville had nothing in front of it. Early's line was occupied by Smith on the extreme right, and connected to the left with Gordon, Hays, Hoke, Wright, Posey, Perry, Wofford, Kershaw, Wilcox, Semmes, and Mahone, who was on the extreme left, touching the river above Banks' Ford.

While these things were occurring General Sedg-

wick received a dispatch from General Hooker informing him that he (Hooker) had contracted his lines ; that Sedgwick must look well to the safety of his corps, preserve his communications with Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and suggesting that Sedgwick fall back on the former place, or recross, in preference, at Banks' Ford. To adopt the first proposition was impossible ; to take the other alternative, except under the cover of night, was equally so, as the enemy was reconnoitring and skirmishing all the time. Thus situated he was compelled to await attack, determined to hold the position until night and then withdraw across the river. A dispatch from General Hooker informed Sedgwick that he (Hooker) could not relieve him, as he was in position in which he hoped to be attacked, and that he was too far away to direct Sedgwick's operations.

About 6 P.M., Early precipitated the brigades of Hays, Hoke, and Smith upon Howe's left, but they were resolutely thrown back, the division artillery assisting materially in the operation. Howe then advanced his right and captured the 8th Louisiana, but in so doing he opened the way for Gordon's brigade to march down a ravine to his rear, and take possession of a bluff on the river, known as Taylor's hill, which commanded everything in the vicinity. This compelled Howe to withdraw to a new line, whence he threw back Hoke and Smith in confusion. In the meantime a demonstration had been kept up in front of Newton, but without any material effect. With the repulse of Early's attack the battle here ended, and as soon as it was dark Newton's and Brooks' divisions, with the Light Brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks' Ford, and took position on the

heights in that neighborhood. When these movements were completed, Howe was ordered to fall back, and was assigned a position on the right of Newton. At 2 A.M., of the 5th, General Sedgwick received orders from General Hooker to withdraw, cross the river, take up the bridge and cover the ford. This was immediately executed. When the last of the column was on the bridge, General Sedgwick received another dispatch from General Hooker countermanding the order to withdraw. But the command was on the north bank. It could not recross again before daylight, and then, if done, it would be in the face of the enemy, whose batteries completely commanded the bridge. Sedgwick accordingly went into camp in the vicinity of the ford.

HOOKER'S WITHDRAWAL.

During all this time, General Hooker, with five army corps, had been waiting for Stuart to attack him. But that officer was very well satisfied to keep quiet for the time being, and managed to do so until the evening of the 5th, when, in the midst of a violent storm, he was rejoined by Lee, Anderson, and McLaws. In the afternoon of the 4th, however, General Griffin, with the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps made a reconnaissance in the direction from which the attack had come on Saturday night. A sharp fight ensued, sufficient to show Stuart's presence there. Lee at once laid plans to attack the Union army the next day (6th), but Hooker had, meanwhile, made up his mind to retreat across the river, and as soon as darkness fell the movement began, he leading the way, over United States Ford, the Fifth Corps forming the rear-

guard, under General Meade. The last of the army crossed about 8 A.M., without pursuit by the Confederates.

General Meade detailed General Barnes with his brigade to assist in taking up the bridges, and all were safely drawn to the top of the hill by 4 P.M.¹ The Chancellorsville campaign was over and a tired, disappointed, disgusted army had nothing to do for the

¹ Captain Porter Farley, 140th New York, thus graphically describes this retirement: "Shortly after dark there came on a drenching rain—no ordinary storm but a wide opening of the sluice-gates of Heaven. The ground where we stood was covered with water. Every effort was made to keep the guns and ammunition dry, but it is hardly likely that an hour after the storm broke on us half the muskets in the army could have been discharged. Sleep was out of the question, and moreover word soon came to be ready to move at the word of command. The whole army was retreating. The withdrawal from the southern to the northern bank of the river had begun at nightfall, but as our corps was to cover the retreat it was about midnight before we moved from our position. When we did finally start our progress was but slow, as the forest roads by which we moved were very bad, and were choked up by the troops in advance of us. The retreat was across pontoon bridges laid at United States Ford. . . . Our position had not been more than two or three miles from it yet so slow and tedious was our progress that it was broad daylight when we came to the bridges, and even then we were not to cross, for the Eleventh Corps was just going over, and it was evident that it would be a long time before our turn would come. Prudence dictated but one course, and it was adopted. Lines of battle were formed facing towards the enemy, and we marched back some way to occupy higher ground and make the best possible disposition to resist an attack should one be made.

"Whatever might have been done, we felt pretty certain that in case we were attacked no help would be sent back to us, and that our only dependence was our own exertions and the batteries planted on the northern bank. It was a repetition of our experience at Fredericksburg; better, perhaps, as regards the position we were in, which was not a bad one for defense, but worse, as regards time, for it was broad daylight and we were kept waiting and waiting till it seemed a wonder that the enemy did not come.

"Meanwhile, the Regulars of our division had maintained the old picket line three miles distant in the woods. They were in great peril, and their withdrawal was an operation of great delicacy. To us, as we watched the Eleventh Corps filing over the two bridges it seemed as if they moved at but a snail's pace. At last they were over and our corps began to make the crossing. We breathed easier when our feet at last struck the planing of the bridge. As we toiled up the steep northern bank we looked back and saw the Regulars coming safely in from their perilous picket-line."

present but to wend its way back to the old camping grounds opposite Fredericksburg.

OBSERVATIONS.

Captain Stephen H. Weed, Chief of Artillery of the Fifth Corps, reports :

“No battery of the corps was in the presence of the enemy until the 1st instant, when an advance of Sykes' division was ordered up the old road from Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg, about 3 miles from the first-named place. After the division had carried the crest of a hill, Battery I, 5th U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Watson commanding, was engaged for about an hour with effect, at point-blank range. The battery remained in position until the division was ordered to retire. On the 2d, five batteries of the corps were posted on the heights on the extreme left of our line. These batteries were at no time engaged. . . . On the 3d instant, Gibbs' and Watson's batteries were engaged in repelling an attack upon our right centre. They remained in the position assigned them that day until our withdrawal on the evening of the 5th. One section of Captain Waterman's battery was also posted in the centre under the command of Lieutenant Sackett (afterwards wounded). The other four guns of that battery were posted about midway between the centre and extreme left. The guns of the corps in the centre were engaged on the 3d, 4th, and 5th in repelling attacks upon our lines.”

While the armies were lying at rest, with the pickets glaring at each other like wounded gladiators through the tangled growth of underbrush, on the night of May 4th, a council of war was called to meet at General Hooker's headquarters. As some misunderstanding occurred afterwards with regard to the opinions of the Fifth Corps commander, as to the advisability of an attack upon the Confederates, General Meade addressed a note to the officers who were present on that occasion to give their views.

The following extracts are therefore given :

From General Reynolds :

“ My recollection of the substance of the remarks made by you at the consultation of the corps commanders, held on the night of the 4th of May, is that you were decidedly in favor of an advance in the direction of Fredericksburg at daylight the next morning ; that you considered this army had already too long been made subservient to the safety of Washington, and you threw that out of the question altogether. . . . I simply said, as my corps was the only one which had not been engaged, I would not urge my opinion, but that I agreed with you.”

From General Sickles :

“ You expressed the opinion that General Hooker should attack the enemy ; that a retrograde movement in his presence, flushed with the success of his flank attack, the retreat of Sedgwick, and the reoccupation of Fredericksburg had become impossible. This opinion afterward yielded somewhat to other considerations. . . . At the close of the discussion, my opinion was that your original preferences appeared to be surrendered to the clear conviction of the commanding general of the necessity which dictated his return to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and his unhesitating confidence in the practicability of withdrawing his army without loss of men or material.”

From General Howard :

“ I understood you at first to say that you thought it best to attack, for you believed a retreat would be disastrous. After General Hooker returned to the tent, just before we broke up, and gave his decided opinion that he would withdraw the army in safety, I think you made no further objections, and from something you said,—what I do not precisely recall—the impression I had was, that your opinion in favor of an attack was contingent upon the practicability of withdrawing the army to this side of the Rappahannock.”

General Warren's memorandum :

“ That night General Hooker consulted me about the situation, and I strongly urged an attack in force next morning, and an

immediate plan of battle adopted. All the corps commanders met by order for consultation. General Hooker stated the condition of affairs, and expressed some apprehension of the want of steadiness of some of our troops as exhibited by uncalled for firing along some parts of the line; and, as I understood, presented to their consideration on this account the question of advancing or retiring. General Hooker and General Butterfield then withdrew; but I, thinking that some information might be desirable from me about the field of operations generally, remained. In this way, I heard Generals Meade, Reynolds, and Howard speak in favor of advancing. General Couch did not at first feel competent to give an opinion, as he had not all the facts in his knowledge. General Sickles then said that his profession had not been that of a soldier, and perhaps his opinion was entitled to but little consideration in opposition to that of those he had heard. But he did not think the effect on the country of our withdrawal would be fatal; that a victory over the enemy was doubtful, and a defeat would endanger Washington. The uncertainties were against us. For his part he would confess that he was astonished at the manner in which the commanding general had presented the subject. He expected that the responsibilities would not be thrown on them. At this point, fearing I was, on account of my confidential relations to the commanding general, out of place during such discussion, I withdrew."

Thus it will be seen, that, in spite of all—in spite of the rout of Saturday and the defeat of Sunday—neither of which was discreditable to the Union army, four of the most prominent generals present—three of them corps commanders—favored an attack on the morning of the 5th of May, and by advocating such did not consider the army either seriously crippled or disheartened.

In connection with General Meade's actions on the 3d (during the Sunday battle) a scurrilous communication¹ appeared in the *New York Times* of June 3,

¹ "HOW THE BATTLE CLOSED.—The troops in position to make any such attack, however, were only those of the Third Corps, which had already lost

1867; in rebuttal of which we present communications, viz. :

“ WASHINGTON, 16th June, 1867.

“ Major-General GEO. G. MEADE,
U. S. Army, Philadelphia, Pa.:

“ *General*: I have yours of the 14th inst., bringing to my notice an article on the battle of Chancellorsville, published in *The New York Times* of the 3d inst., in which certain statements are made concerning your action that day.

“ I commanded the 3d Division of the Fifth Corps (your corps) at the battle of Chancellorsville, and at an early hour of the morning (Sunday, May 3d) my division was in position in the open ground around the Chandler house, ready to move against the enemy. I was in constant personal intercourse with you during that morning, both you and myself being, during the greater part

nearly one third of its members; and they, having been engaged all day, were without a round of ammunition. Nevertheless, they were formed for attack, with the intention on the part of their commander of attacking with the bayonet alone if the ammunition did not speedily arrive, and relying upon the assistance of the troops to the right (Couch's) and left (Meade's) who were comparatively fresh, and one corps (Meade's) hitherto disengaged.

“ Reports of the state of affairs were transmitted to General Hooker, and the co-operation of these corps requested to be ordered. Unfortunately, at this time, General Hooker had been obliged to succumb to the effects of the contusion he had received early in the day, and which hitherto he had not believed had disabled him.

“ But he had been obliged to yield to the demands of Nature, and when this report and request were brought to him, he was about to seek repose in a tent hastily pitched near General Meade's headquarters. The course suggested, however, seemed to him so obviously proper that, suffering from extreme physical pain, he merely remarked to the officer who brought the communication, to give it to General Meade, presuming it would meet with proper attention. General Hooker then sent a staff officer to General Couch to say that he desired to confer with him. Were the gallant and chivalric Dahlgren now living these details might be further particularized. Meanwhile, General Couch had been apprised of the proposed attack, and the desired co-operation; but his troops being yet slightly engaged, he did not wish to become seriously involved in other quarters without General Hooker's instructions, suggested that Meade's troops were more available. General Meade, who, being nearer Hooker's tent, was well informed of his condition, declined to change his dispositions or to assist in any new attack, unless ordered to do so by General Hooker.

“ But it was urged upon him that the latter was unable just at present to give any specific orders, and that he had already directed the matter to his (Meade's)

of the time, near the Chandler house, between the two brigades of my division. The object of my remaining with you was, that not a moment should be lost in moving against the enemy, should the orders you received authorize it. You expressed to me and to others in my presence, frequently that morning your conviction that your corps (the Fifth) and Reynolds' corps (the First) and all the troops in that part of the field ought to be thrown forward and attack the enemy, who was then engaged with the Third Corps, a short distance in our front, about 800 or 1000 yards. We could see nothing of the troops engaged, a dense wood encircling the open ground of the Chandler house. You stated that you had communicated your opinion to Genl. Hooker, but that he dissented from your view, and would neither order you to attack nor authorize it; that in his opinion the main battle should and would be fought on the ground occupied by the Fifth and First Corps, and other troops not then engaged. Genl. French, commanding

attention. General Meade then insisted upon orders from General Couch, who was his senior, and declined positively to co-operate in any proposed attack unless such orders were given him. It was urged upon General Meade that his troops were fresh, and that before General Couch could be communicated with, or could be fully apprised of the general condition of affairs, the opportunity presented might be lost, and new dispositions made by the enemy. But General Meade sat quietly on his horse outside of Hooker's tent, and declined to fight.

"The distance between where Hooker and Meade were, and where Couch was, might have been about half a mile, and staff officers of Hooker's and other generals galloped back and forth with the communications of which the foregoing are the substance.

"Meanwhile, precious time was lost. No attack could be made successfully without thorough co-operation, and by the time Couch was ready to take the formal command, the battle had quite ceased, and the new second line ordered to be assumed, as it were afterwards occupied by the army for the two succeeding days.

"The occurrences of the two subsequent days are quite fully described in the testimony of the different officers examined on the subject before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

"The foregoing may serve to explain the statement of Dr. Guernsey, in the *Times* of April 10, 1867, and perhaps also to fix the responsibility for the failure he implies in saying that 'no one could or would assume the responsibility of sending assistance to Sickles, although the two corps of Reynolds and Meade were within half an hour's march, and wholly unengaged. Half of either of them sent to Sickles would have defeated Stuart.' To this statement and the foregoing narrative, who will take exception?

"AN OFFICER AND EYEWITNESS."

a division of the Second Corps (Couch's) was, however, advanced into the wood on the right of the Third Corps, and engaged the enemy.

"About 9 o'clock, a staff officer from Genl. French rode up to you (Genl. Couch joined you simultaneously, I think) and asked for the support of a brigade. You turned to me and gave the order, and my 1st Brigade moved at once, in double quick, to French's support, on his right, and in a few minutes after the staff officer requested the support this brigade was engaged with the enemy. Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps was also moved at the same time to French's support.

"You stated to me shortly afterwards that upon your informing Genl. Hooker of your action he had disapproved of it, and prohibited your sending any more troops forward, as he still adhered to his view that the main battle must be fought in the position along the Ely's Ford road and the Mineral Spring road.

"While the 1st Brigade of my division was still engaged with the enemy (about half-past nine or ten), I rode along the front of my 2d Brigade to say a few words to them, and while thus occupied, Genl. Hooker with his staff rode up and remained ten or fifteen minutes near it. I did not perceive that he was suffering from the effects of the blow he had received that morning.

"From my brigade he rode (as I have understood) along the line of the other divisions of the Fifth Corps (posted on my right) and along the First Corps line, which extended towards Ely's Ford on the right. Some time after this, you had (as I recollect) a tent put up for Genl. Hooker's use near the Chandler house.

"At about 11 o'clock I was directed by you to place two regiments of my 2d Brigade at Genl. Couch's disposition, and was instructed by him to have them advanced through the wood along the road to Chancellorsville, and hold the edge of the wood bordering the open ground around Chancellorsville, then occupied by the enemy, whom these regiments were to keep in check until the Third and Second Corps had taken up their new positions, which they were then moving to. This was promptly done under the command of Col. Allabach (commander of the 2d Brigade), whom I accompanied; the enemy's skirmishers were driven out of the wood. Upon our near approach to the open ground the enemy's artillery opened upon us. As soon as the Third and Second Corps had taken up their new positions these regiments retired slowly through the wood and rejoined their brigade.

"The loss of my division (about 3500 strong) was 330. Instead of declining to fight or to send reinforcements to others, or being indisposed to fight or support others that day, your action and disposition were the very reverse. You urged the attack of the enemy with your corps and with the whole force of the army. This was disapproved. When asked for support, on the instant you sent it. Your doing so was disapproved, and you were directed not to send forward another man. Your whole course that morning was entirely inconsistent with the disposition and action attributed to you in the article of the *Times*.

"So far as I know or ever heard you were not ordered or authorized directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, by the commander of the Army of the Potomac at any time on that day to send forward a single man against the enemy, except the two regiments that I have named, nor was any discretion in the matter allowed you. Further, I take it that if any such order, authority, or discretion had been given you, it is hardly possible that I should not have known it, owing to the intimate relations, personal and official, existing between us, and my proximity to you all that morning. Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Chief of Engns., Maj.-Genl."

"DEAR ROBERT :

"I could not leave this morning, but I send Higgins to Washington with ——, who will tell you all about me. I was very anxious to see you in reference to our state here. I wish you would tell *all*, that General Meade was head and shoulders above *all out in the field*. He advised the attacks *which were not made*, and which would have gained the day. He asked to be allowed to attack with his corps, supported by Reynolds ; it was refused. He advised *not to fall back*. And since this battle he has received messages from three senior generals stating that they would willingly serve under him. Yes, he is splendid. Tell Benton to tell Generals Ripley and Barry and all the most prominent officers—Meade deserves it. *He is our best man on the field*. They will not let us get the N. Y. papers ; will you send any interesting extracts from them ? Please give Higgins money if he needs it and advance it for me. God bless you, old fellow. Affectionately,

(Signed) "ALEX.' S. WEBB."

(Written from field of Chancellorsville or from first halt.)

“ PHILADELPHIA, June 8, 1867.

“ GENL :

“ I write to call your attention to an article headed ‘Chancellorville,’ and signed by ‘A Staff Officer’ and eye-witness, which appeared in the *N. Y. Times*, of June 3d, on the second page. Altho’ you may not be able to contradict positively the statement therein contained that ‘I positively refused to send troops or make an attack,’ when the troops of the Fifth and Twelfth corps were being pressed in the Germania Ford road, yet I think you will be able to give sufficient credence of the desire I had to make an attack on the occasion referred to, as will be irreconcilable with this officer’s statement, and will serve to assist me in the denial which I may feel myself compelled to make, in case my efforts to ascertain the authenticity in which this wanton charge is based, is such as to justify or require my stating further notice of it. I think the credence of Genl. Griffin, Humphreys, yourself, and others of my personal staff of the animus displayed by me on that occasion will be sufficient to vindicate me from this charge. Hoping to hear from you at your earliest convenience, and with kind remembrances to your family,

“ I remain,

“ Very truly yours,

(Signed)

“ GEO. G. MEADE,

“ Bvt. Maj.-Genl. A. S. WEBB,

“ Major-Genl.

“ U. S. A.,

“ West Point, N. Y.”

“ WEST POINT, June 11, 1867.

“ DEAR GENERAL :

“ I have kept the *Times* of 3d inst. The statement of this officer, ‘eye-witness,’ is false. You told General Hooker that I could show you Jackson’s position. You *asked* to be allowed to fight.

“ Do you recollect the scene in the tent? I do.

“ I will write you more in a few days. You can count on my most positive testimony against this staff officer, &c.

“ With kindest regards for your family and with respect and affection for you,

“ I remain, your ob’dt. servant,

“ ALEX. S. WEBB,

(A true copy of the original.)

“ B. M. G.”

“ WEST POINT, June 11, 1867.

“ Major-General GEORGE G. MEADE,

“ U. S. Army.

“ *Genl* : Since I have seen the statements of ‘ An Officer and Eye-witness,’ in the *Times* of Monday, June 3, 1867, I feel called upon to testify to the utter want of historical truth in that portion which might lead some to believe that you either declined to fight or were disinclined to fight during that battle.

“ When the ‘ Third ’ Corps was in position on your front and left and the morning after the Eleventh Corps had ‘ given way,’ you sent me to examine the ground with the intention of moving forward the ‘ Fifth ’ Corps to take position to assist the ‘ Third.’ I was then Lt.-Col. and Inspector-General of the Fifth Army Corps. I made the examination required. I saw the enemy moving towards our left and towards the Third Corps. This I reported to you and you took me into General Hooker’s tent. I was there when you told him that you and Reynolds ought to move at once, when you asked him to let you do so, when you told General Hooker that I had seen the enemy moving towards Sickles. You wished to attack. You had without orders prepared to attack. I was with you at all hours during that Chancellorsville campaign, and I hope that I shall yet be allowed to testify contrary to the statements of ‘ Eye-witness.’ He must be the individual who thinks that he under competent authority urged you to fight, &c., &c., &c.

“ I have in my possession my notes made just after this battle. I find that my impressions are correct, and I can testify from these notes.

“ I have the honor to remain, General,

“ Your ob’t. servant,

“ ALEX. S. WEBB,

“ Lt.-Col. and Bvt. Major-General,

“ U. S. Army.”

(A true copy of the original.)

Although the Fifth Corps had but little opportunity to distinguish itself as it had done on other fields, still its services are fully acknowledged by General Meade in his report on the battle of Chancellorsville, to wit :

“To my division commanders, Major-General Sykes and Brigadier-Generals Humphreys and Griffin, I have to return my thanks for their prompt and hearty support throughout the ten days' campaign.

“To the men under their command I cannot adequately express the satisfaction with which I witnessed their ready and cheerful obedience to all orders, their submission to every privation and exposure, night marches in mud and rain, fording deep streams, using the axe and the spade more than the musket, and ready at all times to go forward and meet the enemy. It is such service as this that tries and makes the real soldier.

“I desire to call particular attention to the intelligence and zeal exhibited by Lieutenant-Colonel Webb, Assistant Inspector-General, and Colonel Ames, 20th Maine, throughout the whole of the operations.

“The conduct of Sykes' division on the 1st instant, when, in the advance on the old pike road, they met and drove back and then held in check the enemy's advance of superior numbers, was a brilliant operation, adding to the already well-earned reputation of that gallant body of soldiers. So, also, the advance of Tyler's and Allabach's brigades, of Humphreys' division, to meet the advancing columns of the enemy, flushed with the success of having compelled our line to fall back, was in the highest degree creditable, particularly when most of this force were nine-months' men, whose terms of service had very nearly expired.

“Finally, the conduct of the brigades of Griffin, the one advanced on the 30th, and the other on the 4th, proved by their steadiness and coolness that this division only wanted a fair opportunity to show that the laurels acquired in so many previous fields were still fresh and undimmed.”

No battle-field of history is more worthy the attention of the military student than that of Chancellorsville. The flank marches and attacks, the separation of attacking forces, the numerous changes of front of commands during action, the contraction of lines of defense—all combine to show more of the elements of

warfare than are to be found in the details of any battle of modern times.

During the action of May 3d, Battery K, 4th U. S. Artillery, lost a large number of men, and was thus somewhat disabled. When the battery took position near McQuade's brigade of the Fifth Corps, the lieutenant commanding the battery reported the fact to McQuade, when the latter called upon the 14th New York for volunteers to man the guns. Nearly the whole regiment volunteered, and from the number the lieutenant selected 24, who took their position at the guns, and remained until the battery was relieved in the evening.

Major Lowry, with five companies of the 62d Pennsylvania, made a reconnoissance on the afternoon of the 3d in the handsomest manner.

In the action of May 4th, Lieutenant Sackett, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, was severely wounded in the wrist by a musket ball.

Captain S. S. Marsh, 2d U. S. Infantry, was shot dead while giving an order at the head of his regiment in the advance on the 1st.

Acting Assistant Surgeon Hichborn, on duty with the 7th U. S. Infantry, was also killed during the action of that regiment on the 1st.

Captain Wm. J. Temple, 17th U. S. Infantry, fell while gallantly leading his company on the 1st.

Captain John Brant, of the 134th Pennsylvania, was killed and Col. E. M. Gregory, 91st Pennsylvania, and Major Joseph Anthony, 129th Pennsylvania, were wounded in Tyler's advance to support French.

The *Records of the Rebellion* give the loss of both armies as follows: Union 17,287 officers and men; Confederates 10,281 officers and men.

LIST OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS AT THE
BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., MAY 1-4, 1863.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GEORGE G. MEADE.							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JAMES BARNES.							
2d Maine.....			1	2			3
18th Massachusetts.....	1			10		2	13
2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters.....		1					1
1st Michigan.....		2		12		1	15
13th New York (battalion).....				4		1	5
25th New York.....				3			3
118th Pennsylvania.....				8			8
Total 1st Brigade.....	1	3	1	39		4	48
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel JAMES MCQUADE.							
Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.							
9th Massachusetts.....				13			13
32d Massachusetts.....	1			5		5	11
4th Michigan.....		6		12		2	20
14th New York.....				3			3
62d Pennsylvania.....		2	2	11			15
Total 2d Brigade.....		9	2	44		7	62
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel THOS. B. W. STOCKTON.							
Michigan Sharpshooters (Brady's Co.).....		1					1
16th Michigan.....				6			6
17th New York.....		1		4			5
44th New York.....				4			4
83d Pennsylvania.....				4			4
Total 3d Brigade.....		2		18			20
ARTILLERY :							
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C.....		2	1	3		2	8
Total 1st Division.....	1	16	4	104		13	138

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Major-General GEORGE SYKES.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brig.-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
3d United States, Cos. B, C, F, G, I, and K.....				4		5	9
4th United States, Cos. C, F, H, and K.....		1		2		1	4
12th United States { Cos. A, B, C, D, and G, 1st Batt. Cos. A, C, and D, 2d Batt.				5		18	23
14th United States { Cos. A, B, D, E, F, and G, 1st Batt. Cos. F and G, 2d Batt.		3	1	5		6	15
Total 1st Brigade.....		4	1	16		30	51
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel SYDNEY BURBANK.							
2d United States, Cos. B, C, F, I, and K.....	1			27			28
6th United States, Cos. D, F, G, H, and I.....		1		21		6	28
7th United States, Cos. A, B, E, and I.....		2		9		5	16
10th United States, Cos. D, G, and H.....				12			12
11th United States { Cos. B, C, D, E, F, and G, 1st Batt. Cos. C and D, 2d Batt.		7	1	15		5	28
17th United States { Cos. A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Batt. Cos. A and B, 2d Batt.	1	5	2	21		6	35
Total 2d Brigade.....	2	15	3	105		22	147

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel PATRICK H. O'RORKE.							
140th New York.....		2	1	11	1	6	21
146th New York.....		2	1	16	2	29	50
Total 3d Brigade.....		4	2	27	3	35	71
ARTILLERY :							
Captain STEPHEN H. WEED.							
1st Ohio Light, Battery L.....	1	1		8		1	11
5th United States, Battery I.....				5			5
Total Artillery.....	1	1		13		1	16
Total 2d Division.....	3	24	6	161	3	88	285
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brig.-General ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brig.-General ERASTUS B. TYLER.							
91st Pennsylvania.....		8	4	39		25	76
126th Pennsylvania.....		5	2	55	2	13	77
129th Pennsylvania.....		4	1	31		6	42
134th Pennsylvania.....	1	3	1	33		7	45
Total 1st Brigade.....	1	20	8	158	2	51	240
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel PETER H. ALLABACH.							
123d Pennsylvania.....				7		1	8
131st Pennsylvania.....				4			4
133d Pennsylvania.....	1		1	9			11
155th Pennsylvania.....		3		10		1	14
Total 2d Brigade.....	1	3	1	30		2	37
Total 3d Division.....	2	23	9	188	2	53	277
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	6	63	19	453	5	154	700

CHAPTER IX.

THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN—BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG —THE PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY TO THE POTOMAC.

THE officers of the Confederate Government, as well as the citizens of Richmond, were in a very troubled and unhappy state during the battle about Chancellorsville. We might add that General Lee was also somewhat disturbed in mind, for he had asked for Longstreet's command (then at Suffolk, Va.), on the 2d of May; and when he found that Hooker had simply contracted his lines on the night of May 3d, instead of retreating across the river, as Lee fondly hoped and expected, the latter appealed more strongly for assistance from the Confederate authorities. At the same time, so completely had General Hooker preserved the secrecy of his movements, that no organized bodies of troops had been kept in the city of Richmond, and a part of Stoneman's cavalry had actually advanced to within two miles of that city.¹ A brigade could have entered it without opposition, arrested the President and Cabinet officers, burned the bridges across the James, and destroyed everything of value. With his whole force, and the bridges

¹ On the 8th of May President Lincoln telegraphed to General Hooker that Richmond might have been taken.

across the James burned, Stoneman could have held the city until General Dix's command could have reached him from Fort Monroe. Although Longstreet was ordered to join Lee, Peck held on to him with such tenacity that his troops did not reach Petersburg until May 6th, and on that day General Hooker was back again on the north side of the Rappahannock River. Never had Dame Fortune held out such golden favors for the mere grasping of them, as she held out to General Hooker during the Chancellorsville campaign, even to the very day he determined to recross the Rappahannock, for General Hooker had secured a position with over 50,000 men, directly in Lee's rear, before the latter was fully informed of his movements, while being confronted with fully 70,000 men threatening an advance on his front at Fredericksburg; then came the separation of the Confederate army by Jackson's flank movement, wherein the opportunity was given to Hooker to attack it on the flank in march; then again was offered what any commander should have hailed with delight, the chance to attack the flank of Jackson's corps with two *corps d'armée* during the fight of Sunday, when the Confederates had to cease fighting almost from sheer exhaustion and lack of ammunition. But the well planned campaign was an abortion. However, as soon as the troops reached their old camp grounds about Falmouth, the subject of another campaign was considered. Preparations were at once made to place the army in condition, with this end in view, which was strongly urged by Mr. Lincoln, and this was one reason why it was so well able to maintain the summer campaign which followed.

General Lee, having been reinforced, at once pro-

ceeded to put his command in condition for a movement. Indeed, it was simply a case whether the Union or Confederate army was the first prepared to take the initiative in a new campaign. The first notice received of any movement on the part of the Confederate army was a note received by General Gregg, from Captain Brown, at Warrenton Junction, dated May 23, 1863, to the effect that Mosby had established pickets from near Quisenberry's house toward Catlett's Station; and the infantry at Catlett's reported a continual sound as of wagons or artillery moving towards Bristoe. In consequence of this the 2d cavalry division and Pennington's horse battery were directed to proceed, on the morning of the 25th, and report to General Gregg for duty.

The Confederate army had been reinforced by Pickett's division of six brigades and Hook's division of four brigades, from Suffolk; but they had been halted near Hanover Court-House. At that time Early was massed about Hamilton's Crossing, with Trimble directly in rear; McLaws was next on the left, and in rear of Fredericksburg. Anderson next on McLaws' left; Rodes' (D. H. Hill's old division) was on the right of Early and back from the river; and A. P. Hill occupied the extreme right of the line. Each of these six divisions had five brigades. Pickett was at Taylorsville, near Hanover, and Hood was between Louisa Court-House and Gordonsville. There were three brigades of cavalry three miles from Culpeper Court-House—Fitz Lee, Wm. H. Fitzhugh Lee and Wade Hampton's. Jones was in the valley (Shenandoah), near New Market, with about 1400 cavalry and 12 pieces of light artillery. Mosby was above Warrenton, with 200 men.

All sorts of rumors as to the movements of the Confederate army penetrated the Union lines, the result of which was to cause General Hooker to direct the commander of the First Corps (Reynolds) to have his corps in readiness to move May 27th.

On the 28th, Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps was ordered from its camp to take position on the Rappahannock River, covering the fords, and to make such dispositions as would enable him to check any body of Confederate troops attempting to cross the river by any of the fords, for which purpose the division was furnished with intrenching implements and a supply train, together with two batteries of artillery, under Captain A. P. Martin.

General Gregg was ordered to destroy the railroad bridge over the Rappahannock and to hold his command for use. Buford was ordered to move with Elder's battery to Bealeton, and drive rebel scouts and parties in the neighborhood of Warrenton across the Rappahannock River. Kilpatrick was ordered with his brigade from Gloucester Point to report as soon as possible to General Hooker.

In the meantime, on the 30th of May, the Confederate army had been organized into three *corps d'armée*. Longstreet commanded the First Corps; the brigades of Heth and Archer, with Pettigrew's and Cooke's, constituted Heth's division; those of Pender, Lane, Thomas, and McGowan, Pender's division. Heth's and Pender's divisions, together with Anderson's constituted the new Third Corps, the command of which was given to General A. P. Hill. The divisions of Early, Johnson, and Rodes, formed the Second Corps, under Ewell.

Leaving A. P. Hill with his corps to occupy Fred-

ericksburg and amuse General Hooker, General Lee directed his other corps, on the 5th of June, to concentrate at Culpeper and its vicinity. General Hooker received an intimation of this movement, and detained General Lee all day of the 5th at Fredericksburg by making a demonstration upon that place, laying a pontoon bridge and crossing a force under the protection of two or three batteries, capturing the Confederates in the rifle-pits. General Hooker was divided upon two opinions, whether to attack the force remaining at Fredericksburg or counteract the movements of the detached portion of the Confederate army. Upon submitting the matter to President Lincoln, he received from him the following characteristic reply :

“ In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him or act on the defense, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own.”

Not much time was allowed for consideration of this important matter, for Imboden and Jenkins had been ordered to co-operate in an expedition to the Shenandoah Valley, Imboden moving towards Romney, to prevent the Union troops at Winchester from being reinforced by means of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, while Jenkins advanced toward the latter place, supported by a battalion of infantry and a battery of the Maryland Line artillery.

General Ewell, with his corps, slipped away from Culpeper Court-House on the 10th of June, crossed the branches of the Shenandoah near Port Royal,

and reached Cedarville on the 12th, where he was joined by Jenkins with his cavalry. Detaching Rodes, with his division and the greater part of Jenkins' brigade, to dislodge the Union force at Berryville, General Ewell, with the remainder of his command, moved upon Winchester, Johnson's division advancing by the Front Royal road, and Early's by the valley turnpike, which it entered at Newton, and where it was joined by the Maryland troops.

The Union troops occupying Berryville retired to Winchester on the approach of Rodes, and on the morning of June 14th, Ewell made his attack upon Winchester, defeating General Milroy and driving him from the valley, thus opening the way for the movement of the Confederate army northward.

General Lee, in order to mislead General Hooker as to his intentions, as well as to be within supporting distance of Hill's corps in its withdrawal from Fredericksburg, kept Longstreet at Culpeper until the 15th, and then advanced along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, occupying Ashby's and Snicker's gaps in that range of mountains. He had been joined while at Culpeper by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Hooker had, in the meantime, withdrawn from the front of Fredericksburg on the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester. Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the gaps. Hampton's and Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel rivers, in front of Culpeper, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

While waiting for Hill to come up, Ewell had

worked his way into Maryland, and Jenkins, with his Confederate cavalry, had advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg; and it now became necessary to General Lee that the remainder of his army should be within supporting distance of Ewell. Hill having reached the valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville on the 21st of June. On the 22d Ewell commenced his march into Pennsylvania with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown, Md., through Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division, which had occupied Boonsboro', moved by a parallel road to Greenwood and marched toward York. On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and on the 27th encamped near Chambersburg. Imboden had been operating on Ewell's left, driving off the troops guarding the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and destroying all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, Md., besides damaging the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock, Md., when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and proceeded to that place by McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army *en route*.

General Stuart having been detached for special purposes east of the Blue Ridge, it was expected that he would give notice of the movements of the Army of the Potomac under General Hooker. This General Lee claims he failed to do, and nothing having been heard from him since the entrance of the Confederate army into Maryland, it was inferred by General Lee that the Union army had not yet left.

Virginia. He therefore issued orders to move upon Harrisburg. Early had already been sent on an expedition to York, which was designed in part to prepare for the movement upon Harrisburg, by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and the former place, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. Early succeeded in his first object; but the Union troops which had been hastily gathered at that point from various places, designing his motive in the latter, retired and burned the bridge. Early then marched to rejoin his command at Carlisle.

On the night of the 28th, General Lee received information through a scout that the Army of the Potomac was at his heels, and as his cavalry was all absent on marauding expeditions he could gain no exact information as to the intentions of its commander. To secure his lines of communication, therefore, Hill's corps was ordered to move to Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow on the 30th, leaving Pickett at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and ordered to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and on the 30th Pettigrew's brigade, having been sent to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by Union troops. Not knowing what was there, he returned to Cashtown minus what he had started to obtain at Gettysburg. General Hill arrived with Pender's division in the evening, and the following morning (July 1st) advanced towards Gettysburg. There he met a wall of rock in that heroic old soldier, General John Buford.

Never, in the whole history of the war had out-post, reconnoitring, patrol, screening, and advanced-guard duty been as well performed as during the period intervening between the battles of Chancellorsville and that of Gettysburg by the cavalry under Pleasanton ; and so well were the duties performed by the Confederate as well as the Union cavalry that neither of the commanders of the opposing forces could discover the movements of each other's infantry until an engagement rendered a development necessary.

At the very first attempt to concentrate the Confederate forces about Culpeper, it was understood that Stuart was there preparing for a raid. General Pleasanton was determined to nip this movement in the bud, and crossing the Rappahannock at Beverly's and Kelly's fords, attacked Stuart on the 9th of June, and fought from early morning until late in the afternoon. Buford's cavalry had a long and desperate hand to hand encounter, capturing over two hundred prisoners and one battle-flag. General Pleasanton says, in his report : " We captured Stuart's camp, with his orders, letters, etc. He was to move to Maryland with 12,000 cavalry and 25 guns, and he was camped at the ford we crossed (a perfect hornet's nest), but we drove them over two miles before Gregg came up."

Although compelled to return to the north side of the Rappahannock, it might be said that from this moment Pleasanton never lost sight of his wary and dashing antagonist. Following up the Confederate movements along the Blue Ridge, he, on the 17th, attacked Fitzhugh Lee with a brigade of cavalry at Aldie and drove him from the place. Then there

came a series of almost daily skirmishes and actions, as the two armies neared each other.

On the 5th of June, 1863, the Army of the Potomac was posted as follows: First Corps (Reynolds), in the vicinity of White Oak church; Second Corps (Hancock¹), near Falmouth; Third Corps (Birney), at Boscobel, near Falmouth; Fifth Corps (Meade), in the vicinity of Banks', United States, and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock; Sixth Corps (Sedgwick), near White Oak church, with the 2d Division (Howe) thrown forward to Franklin's crossing of the Rappahannock, a little below Fredericksburg; Eleventh Corps (Howard), near Brooke's Station, on the Acquia Creek railroad; Twelfth Corps (Slocum), near Stafford Court-House and Acquia landing. The Cavalry Corps (Pleasanton, with headquarters at Manassas Junction) had two divisions—Duffie and Gregg—and the Cavalry Reserve brigade, all under Buford, in the vicinity of Warrenton Junction; and one division (Davis) in the neighborhood of Brooke's Station. The Artillery Reserve was near Falmouth.

On the 8th of June Colonel J. B. Sweitzer, in command of the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Army Corps, was ordered to report with his brigade to General Gregg, commanding division of cavalry, to support the latter in a reconnaissance. The brigade crossed the Rappahannock River in rear of the cavalry, and proceeded as far as Mountain Run. The brigade did not become engaged, but when the cavalry retired from the contest the brigade was ordered to resume its previous position on the north bank of the Rappahannock near Kelly's Ford.

General Hooker moved the 2d Division of the

¹ Assumed command of Second Corps June 9, 1863.

Sixth Corps to Acquia Creek on the 10th of June. On the 11th the Third Corps was moved to Hartwood church; on the 12th, the First Corps moved to Deep Run and the Third Corps to Bealeton; Humphreys' division advanced to the Rappahannock, and the Eleventh Corps to Hartwood. On the 13th, the Twelfth Corps moved to Dumfries; on the 16th, the Sixth Corps moved from Acquia Creek and the Second Corps from Falmouth to Acquia Creek. General Hooker not being able to ascertain the exact designs of the enemy, and realizing the importance of an immediate protection for the national capital, marched the Second, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps on the short line along the Potomac River, covering Washington, while the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Corps were moved by the route along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad and thence along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge mountains.

The Fifth Corps left its position on the Rappahannock River¹ on the 14th of June, and marched to Catlett's Station. It then moved by way of Manassas Junction to Gum Springs; thence by the way of Aldie to the Potomac River, crossing that stream on a pontoon bridge at Edwards' Ferry. It went into camp on Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick, Md., on the 27th of June.

¹ On the 12th the First Corps approached our camp, halted and massed in the fields. One regiment, the 19th Indiana, left the column for the purpose of witnessing an execution of one of their men, who had been sentenced by a general court-martial to be shot to death with musketry. The regiment formed hollow square, and the poor victim was marched out to pay the penalty of his crime. The affair was conducted badly. The firing party was either nervous or not well drilled, for their fire was scattering and the man was not killed at once. This forced the disagreeable duty of giving the *coup-de grace* on the officer performing the duties of provost marshal, who had to step up to the poor wounded fellow and with his revolver shoot him dead. The whole scene was distressing in the extreme.

On the 21st of June, General Barnes, with the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps, under instruction from the corps commander, reported for duty to General Pleasanton, commanding the cavalry corps, and in obedience to orders from the latter, proceeded to Middleburg. At that point, the 3d Brigade, under Colonel Vincent, was detached to accompany the cavalry force under General Gregg, to meet the enemy, who was strongly posted a short distance toward Upperville, on the Ashby Gap road. The dismounted men of the enemy were in position on the south side of the road, behind a series of stone walls, running at right angles with it. Pushing forward his command, Vincent sent Captain Woodward with the 83d Pennsylvania, to move rapidly through some woods to the left, keeping his force concealed, and the instant he had passed the stone walls to emerge and take the enemy in flank and rear. The movement was entirely successful, and the Confederates fled. The 16th Michigan, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh, advanced in double time on the right, and gallantly compelled them to abandon a fine Blakely gun. Moving in conjunction with the cavalry, the Confederates were driven until they were pushed across Crummer's run, where they made a sharp resistance and opened an effective artillery fire. Forging the stream, the fight continued with the same success to the Union troops for a distance of nearly four miles, until, arriving at Goose Creek, the Confederates again took advantage of a stone wall commanding the defile and bridge by which the Union troops must pass. The skirmishers of the 83d Pennsylvania pushed into the stream, while the 16th Michigan, led by Captain Fuller, gallantly rushed over the

bridge and up to the stone wall under a severe fire, dislodging the enemy and capturing a number of prisoners. The enemy fled, followed by the cavalry, who drove them from this point into and beyond Upperville, but the infantry could not keep up with the cavalry. It proceeded as fast as possible and took position under General Pleasanton's directions in support of the artillery until 6 P.M., when Vincent's brigade was relieved by Colonel Tilton's (1st) brigade. The whole division returned to the corps by the morning of the 23d, having successfully accomplished the object for which it had been detached.

On the 28th of June, the First Corps was at Frederick, Md.; the Second Corps at Monocacy Junction; the Third Corps, near Woodsborough; the Sixth Corps, at Hyattstown; the Eleventh Corps, near Frederick; the Twelfth Corps, at Frederick; Buford's cavalry division at Middletown; and Gregg's at New Market and Ridgeville.

The meagre information obtained by General Hooker as to the movements of Lee's main army compelled the former to watch the rear as well as the front, for fear that as soon as he threw his army across the Potomac River, Lee would pass through the gaps of the Blue Ridge and move upon Washington and Alexandria. And this was the fear at Washington. It was therefore necessary that he should keep some of his corps south of the Potomac as long as any portion of the Confederate force remained in the Shenandoah Valley. He was now in the presence of the enemy, where a collision was liable at any moment. He had gathered his army about him near Frederick, as stated, when he received the following order :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“WASHINGTON, June 27, 1863.

“GENERAL ORDERS, }
“NO. 194. }

“By direction of the President, Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Major-General George G. Meade¹ is appointed to the command of that Army, and of the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it.

“By order of the Secretary of War.

“E. D. TOWNSEND,

“Adjutant-General.”

The causes which led to the issuance of the above order are comparatively trifling, as they appear on record. The fact is they were somewhat of the character of those which confronted General McClellan prior to the battle of Antietam—the principal of which related to the garrison at Harper’s Ferry. General Hooker made a special visit to this point when his army entered Maryland, for the purpose of determining in his own mind its relative importance to him in the campaign which was then progressing. He concluded that it would be best to temporarily abandon the place, by doing which he could add

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Locke, Assistant Adjutant-General Fifth Corps, in his diary, kept at the time, says: “June 28th.—At 2 A.M., I was awakened by some one at my tent, inquiring if that was General Meade’s tent. It was General James Hardie, who had just arrived from Washington, with dispatches for General Meade. The General’s tent was next to mine, and I so informed General Hardie. Soon I heard loud talking on the part of General Meade, who said, ‘Well, I have always tried to do my duty in any position in which I have been placed’—the rest I could not hear. I thought the General had been placed in arrest. Soon I heard him calling for his orderly, his horse, and one of his aides. Soon after the party mounted and rode off without even asking my leave, and I went to sleep. In a few hours Captain Mason returned with the news that General Meade was in command of the Army of the Potomac, vice Hooker, relieved. I was directed to inform General Sykes that he was in command of the Fifth Corps.”

10,000 effective men to his army. His original instructions were that he should cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. Not receiving any authority to abandon the place by the 27th, he dispatched the following :

"My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed on me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy."

This dispatch was received in Washington by General Halleck at 3 P.M., June 27th ; the order was issued the same day relieving Hooker, and Hardie delivered it during the night.

This was a delicate time to be changing the commanders of an army—on the move and in the presence of an enemy ; or, as Mr. Lincoln might have termed it, "swapping horses while crossing the stream." It was a dangerous experiment, and might have been a fatal one with a man of less nerve than George G. Meade. It, however, had better have been done on Sunday, May 3, 1863, on the battle-field of Chancellorsville, where General Meade was urged to assume command.

General Meade, however, assumed command of the army and General George Sykes the command of the corps. Many changes had taken place in the Fifth Corps since the battle of Chancellorsville. The 1st Brigade of the 1st Division lost the 2d Maine and 13th New York ; the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, lost the 14th New York ; the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, lost the 12th and 17th New York ; the 3d Brigade,

2d Division, lost the 5th New York ; the 3d Division, (except the 91st and 155th Pennsylvania) with its gallant commander, General Humphreys, was entirely lost. The two brigades of which it was composed were principally nine-months' men. All these regiments were sent home on account of the expiration of their terms of service.

The 91st and 155th Pennsylvania regiments were assigned to duty with the 3d Brigade of the 2d Division. General Humphreys was assigned to command a division in the Third Corps.

On the 13th of June, Captain Stephen H. Weed, who had been chief of the corps artillery, was made Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and assigned to command the 3d Brigade of the 2d Division, formerly commanded by General Warren.

Brigadier-General R. B. Ayres succeeded to the command of the 2d Division, and Colonel Hannibal Day to the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, *vice* Ayres. The valuable services of the gallant "Andy" Webb were lost to the Fifth Corps. Being honored with the appointment of Brigadier-General of Volunteers (brought to him by General Hardie when he arrived with General Meade's order to command the army), he was assigned to a command in the Second Corps.

After these various changes had been effected, the following was the organization of the Fifth Corps, June 30, 1863 :

Fifth Army Corps.

Maj.-Gen. GEORGE SYKES commanding.

General Headquarters.

12th New York Infantry, Cos. D and E, Capt. H. W. Rider.

17th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Cos. D and H, Capt. Wm. Thompson.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. JAMES BARNES commanding.

First Brigade.

Col. WM. S. TILTON.

18th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes.
22d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Thos. Sherwin, Jr.
1st Michigan, Col. Ira C. Abbott.
118th Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. Jas. Gwyn.

Second Brigade.

Col. JACOB B. SWEITZER.

9th Massachusetts, Col. P. R. Guiney.
32d Massachusetts, Col. G. L. Prescott.
4th Michigan, Col. H. F. Jeffords.
62d Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. J. C. Hull.

Third Brigade.

Col. STRONG VINCENT.

20th Maine, Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain.
16th Michigan, Lt.-Col. N. E. Welch.
44th New York, Col. James C. Rice.
83d Pennsylvania, Capt. O. S. Woodward.

Second Division.

Brig.-Gen. ROMEYN B. AYRES commanding.

First Brigade.

Col. HANNIBAL DAY.

3d U. S. (6 cos.), Capt. H. W. Freedley.
4th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. Julius W. Adams, Jr.
6th U. S. (5 cos.), Capt. L. C. Bootes.
12th U. S. (8 cos.), Capt. T. S. Dunn.
14th U. S. (8 cos.), Maj. G. R. Giddings.

*HISTORY OF**Second Brigade.*

Col. SIDNEY BURBANK.

2d U. S. (6 cos.), Maj. A. T. Lee.
 7th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. D. P. Hancock.
 10th U. S. (3 cos.), Capt. Wm. Clinton.
 11th U. S. (6 cos.), Major De L. Floyd-Jones.
 17th U. S. (7 cos.), Lt.-Col. J. D. Greene.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. STEPHEN H. WEED.

140th New York, Col. P. H. O'Rorke.
 146th New York, Col. Kenner Garrard.
 91st Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. J. H. Sinex.
 155th Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. J. H. Cain.

*Third Division*¹ (Pennsylvania Reserves).

Brig.-Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD commanding.

First Brigade.

Col. WM. MCCANDLESS.

1st (9 cos.), Col. Wm. C. Talley.
 2d, Lt.-Col. Geo. A. Woodward.
 6th, Lt.-Col. W. H. Ent.
 13th, Col. Chas. F. Taylor.

Third Brigade.

Col. JOSEPH W. FISHER.

5th, Lt.-Col. George Dare.
 9th, Lt.-Col. J. McK. Snodgrass.
 10th, Col. A. J. Warner.
 11th, Col. S. M. Jackson.
 12th (9 cos.), Col. M. D. Hardin.

¹ Joined Corps June 28th. The 2d Brigade left in the Department of Washington.

Artillery Brigade.

Capt. AUGUSTUS P. MARTIN.

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C), Lt. A. F. Walcott.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Almont Barnes.

1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs.

5th U. S., Battery D, Lieut. Chas. E. Hazlett.

5th U. S., Battery I, Lieut. M. F. Watson.

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, General Meade lost no time in familiarizing himself with the situation of his army and the movements of the Confederates as far as was practicable, and employed the 28th in collecting information and closing up his columns. On the 29th he put the army in motion to occupy the line between Westminster and Emmittsburg, Md. On the evening of the 30th,¹ the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps were collected

¹ On this date the Army of the Potomac had present for duty equipped, as follows :

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Guns.	Total Men.
First Army Corps	9,403	—	619	28	10,022
Second Army Corps	12,363	82	551	24	12,946
Third Army Corps	11,247	—	677	30	11,924
Fifth Army Corps	11,054	—	555	26	12,509
Sixth Army Corps	14,516	124	1,039	48	15,679
Eleventh Army Corps	9,197	52	644	26	9,803
Twelfth Army Corps	8,193	—	396	20	8,589
Cavalry Corps	—	17,104	—	50	17,104
Artillery Reserve	—	335	2,211	110	2,546
	76,873	17,697	6,692	362	101,262

The Confederate Returns for June are not to be found in the *Records of the Rebellion*; but as far as can be ascertained the total force in officers and men was about 85,000. If divided about equally, this would give nearly 25,000 to each of the three corps, exclusive of 10,000 cavalry. General Lee, in his report on the battle of Gettysburg, claims much credit for his four divisions having fought two corps of the Army of the Potomac, July 1st, not knowing at the time that those corps numbered only about 20,000 men, which his four divisions exceeded by 5000.

about Emmittsburg, under the command of General John F. Reynolds; the Twelfth was at Taneytown, the Second at Frizzellburg, the Fifth at Union, and the Sixth at Manchester—the cavalry covering the flanks and rear.

During the movement of the 29th, Kilpatrick, with his division of cavalry, was in front at Hanover, Pa., where he encountered Stuart's Confederate cavalry (which had crossed the Potomac at Seneca Creek, and, passing the right flank of the Union army, was making its way toward Carlisle) and punished it severely, the conflict taking place in and about the town. The engagement was short and sharp, Stuart being forced to retire, with severe loss for the time engaged.

Buford, with his division of cavalry, had, in the meantime, been taking care of the left flank of the Union army. On the 29th he moved to Fairfield, and on the 30th, via Emmittsburg, to Gettysburg. He had barely occupied the last-named place when a portion of the Confederate army made a visit to obtain supplies, as has been stated, Buford having previously located the Confederate forces at Cashion, and thrown his division forward to cover the movements of the Army of the Potomac, at the same time notifying General Meade of the condition of affairs. Reynolds was thereupon directed to occupy Gettysburg. Moving forward with his corps on the 30th, he took up a defensive position for the night at Marsh Creek. Here he received orders to re-assume command of the right wing, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, and placed General Doubleday in command of the First Corps.

The Confederate forces that had assembled at

Cashtown on the morning of the 1st of July consisted of Heth's and Pender's divisions, under General Hill. With these two divisions, accompanied by Pegram's and McIntosh's battalion of artillery, Hill advanced on Gettysburg to ascertain the strength of the Union forces. About 9 A.M., the Confederates struck the first brigade of Buford's cavalry, which maintained a stubborn resistance for more than two hours, until the leading division of the First Corps, which had been put in motion for Gettysburg by General Reynolds, arrived upon the ground between 7 and 8 A.M. Owing to the intervals between the divisions and the necessity of calling in the pickets, nearly two hours elapsed before the remainder of the corps was placed *en route*. Wadsworth's division was, therefore, obliged to sustain the brunt of the early action. General Doubleday rode into action with this division, and, in a charge of the Iron Brigade,¹ drove the Confederates back, captured about 1000 prisoners of Archer's brigade, together with General Archer himself. General Reynolds had by this time selected a line of defense on the eastern side of Willoughby Run, and had sent orders for the Eleventh Corps to advance as quickly as possible from Emmitsburg. The troops were withdrawn to the new position by General Doubleday under the supervision of General Reynolds, when the latter was killed by the enemy's fire. In the meantime the remainder of the First Corps had arrived and was placed in line. At 11.30 A.M. the Eleventh Corps arrived on the field, and General Howard assumed command. Howard pushed forward two divisions out on the Mummasburg road, while the First Corps was warmly engaged on the

¹ 2d and 7th Wisconsin, 19th Indiana, and 24th Michigan.

ridge north of Gettysburg, and posted his third division, with three batteries of artillery, on Cemetery Ridge, on the south side of the town.

Up to this time the battle had been with those forces of General Lee which had debouched from the mountains on the Cashtown road, known to be Hill's corps. In the early part of the action success had attended the Union arms ; but about 2.30 P.M. Ewell's corps began to arrive by both the Middletown and Heidlersburg roads, when a general advance was made with them. This force outflanked Howard's line, and pressed it so severely that about 4 P.M. he withdrew his forces to Cemetery Ridge, south of the town, where he had already established one of his divisions. This was successfully accomplished ; not, however, without considerable loss in prisoners, arising from the confusion incident to portions of both corps passing through the town of Gettysburg and the men getting confused in the streets. Just about the time of the withdrawal, General Hancock arrived on the field, having been sent by General Meade to represent him. Ewell then made an attack on Howard's right flank ; but it was not vigorous, and was, of course, repelled.

General Lee claimed that it was not intended to deliver a general battle so far from his base unless attacked ; but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Union army, to withdraw through the mountains with his extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time he was unable to await attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of an enemy who could restrain his foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A bat-

tle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and General Lee sought a position where his artillery could be rendered useful. He in consequence occupied Seminary Ridge, opposite the position taken up by General Howard.

About 7 P.M. of the 1st, Generals Slocum and Sickles, with the Twelfth and part of the Third Corps, reached the battle-field and took position to the right and left of the troops posted,

On Wednesday, July 1, 1863, the Fifth Corps crossed the celebrated Mason and Dixon's line, and entered the State of Pennsylvania. In the latter part of the afternoon it reached the town of Hanover, and went into camp in the suburbs, having marched from Union Mills, Md. All the country through which the corps passed that day had been overrun by the Confederate cavalry, and many dead bodies were found where actions with the Union cavalry had taken place. The inhabitants hailed the advent of the Army of the Potomac with delight. From the hour of crossing the Potomac River, the campaigning was under circumstances entirely different to any of former experience. The kindly, anxious interest with which the country women and children gazed upon the troops as they marched by, and the alacrity with which they furnished water and food to those who needed it, were incentives to better feelings than those engendered by the sulky faces and contemptuous treatment with which the soldiers had become familiar in the Virginia marches. One good woman (we wish we had remembered her name) on the road from Frederick to Union Mills, stood at her table all day long making the celebrated Maryland biscuits, and as fast as a panful was baked sent them by her children

to the gateway, where two or three were given to each soldier as he passed.

The tents had just been pitched when the order came to move on. The thunder of distant guns had been heard during the entire day's march, but no reliable information as to the character of the engagement could be ascertained. There was one piece of information received, however, that cast a gloom over the command, and that was the news of the death of the gallant Reynolds. At 6 P.M. the corps was in motion again, making all possible speed towards Gettysburg (some twelve or thirteen miles distant), to which point General Sykes had received orders to move. A country gentleman mounted his horse and tendered his services as a guide to conduct the corps in its night march. This service was, of course, accepted, and the troops pushed on until one o'clock in the morning, when they halted and lay down in the road to rest. At 4 A.M. they were aroused, and without waiting to cook coffee or get anything to eat, moved to the battle-field, some three miles distant.

Upon receipt of the first rumors of the encounter with the enemy on July 1st and the death or wounding of General Reynolds, General Meade had sent General G. K. Warren to the front for positive information. At 1.10 P.M. he directed General Hancock to turn over the command of the Second Corps to General Gibbon, proceed to the front, and in the event of General Reynolds' death, assume command of the corps there assembled. His order concludes:

“ If you think the ground and position there a better one on which to fight a battle, under existing circumstances, you will so advise the General, and he will order all the troops up. You know

the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds."

At 3.30 P.M. General Hancock reached Gettysburg. Soon after 4 P.M. he sent his staff officers to General Meade informing him of the situation, and saying that he would hold the position until night—that it was a strong one, but might easily be turned.

By 5 P.M. the remnants of the Eleventh Corps were re-formed upon the northern crest of Cemetery Ridge, and the First Corps had fallen back slowly into position on their left, facing west, while Buford's little cavalry brigades formed front across the valley, ready still to charge the enemy they had faced unflinchingly for twenty-four hours and had "fought like the devil" since daybreak. Wadsworth's battered division was placed in position on Culp's Hill, and about 6 P.M. a portion of the Third Corps, under General Sickles, and the Twelfth Corps under General Slocum, had arrived and were posted on the left of the First Corps, Geary's division being sent by General Hancock to the extreme left to occupy Little Round Top. General Geary reports :

"These hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since their possession by the enemy would give him an opportunity of enfilading our entire left wing and centre with a fire which could not fail to dislodge us from our position. This line was held by the First and Third Brigades."

Upon the arrival of the Twelfth Corps General Hancock surrendered the command of the field to General Slocum, his senior, and returned to report to General Meade. Meeting the Second Corps about ten miles east of Gettysburg, he halted it there for the night, as a precaution against any movement of

the enemy upon the Federal lines of communication. On reaching Taneytown about 10 P.M., he found that General Meade, even before the receipt of his reports, had given orders for the concentration of the whole army at Gettysburg, and was about starting for that place himself.

Two brigades of Humphreys' division of the Third Corps, which had left Emmittsburg about 3 P.M., arrived upon the ground about 1 A.M. July 2d, having been misled by their guide and forced to counter-march after discovering the enemy bivouacked in force at the Black Horse Tavern. At 7.30 P.M., July 1st, General Meade sent orders to the remainder of the Third Corps—the 3d Brigade of each division—which had been left in position at Emmittsburg to move without delay to Gettysburg, saying that he expected them to be up by daylight. They rejoined the corps about 9 A.M., July 2d, and were followed by the ammunition train of the corps, which arrived at a still later hour.

General Meade reached Gettysburg about 1 A.M., and soon after, in company with Generals Howard and Hunt and Captain Payne of the engineer staff, examined the line by moonlight, decided upon his general dispositions, and gave the necessary instructions, including directions to General Hunt to re-examine in detail in the morning and see to the proper posting of the artillery. The line remained virtually as it had been projected the evening before. Believing that General Lee would avail himself of the advantage in attacking an enemy that could scarcely have recovered from the disaster of the previous day, and was in position but hastily selected under pressure and very inadequately prepared, and with whatever reinforce-

ments it had received still fatigued by night marching, General Meade anticipated an attack in the early morning, particularly upon his right, before which Ewell's columns had been formed the evening before. General Slocum was placed in command of this wing, which occupied Culp's Hill, on the extreme right, and from there to the right centre of the line at Cemetery Hill, and was held by the Twelfth, Eleventh, and First Corps—the latter now under command of General John Newton. The Second Corps reached the field about 6 A.M., and, by personal direction of General Meade, held the left centre of the line along the Cemetery Ridge, facing west. General Sickles was directed to continue this line and relieve Geary's division, which was ordered to rejoin the Twelfth Corps as soon as so relieved. Having marched over sixty miles since the morning of June 29th, and twenty-six of the sixty since 7 P.M., July 1st, the Fifth Corps reached Gettysburg about 5 A.M. July 2d, and was placed in reserve on the right of the line. Early in the morning General R. O. Tyler had two brigades of the Artillery Reserve in park behind the line prescribed for the Third Corps, and by 10.30 A.M. the remainder of the Reserve had arrived and was parked between the Taneytown road and Baltimore pike.

By night of July 1st, Ewell's corps, on the Confederate left, confronted the Federal lines on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge on the north; Hill's corps occupied Seminary Ridge, and in the morning was extended to nearly opposite the peach orchard; and Longstreet's corps, except Lewis' brigade and Pickett's division, bivouacked on Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg. The Confederate Artillery Reserve reached the field at 9 A.M. July 2d. It will be seen,

therefore, that early in the morning of July 2d nearly all of the Confederate army had reached Gettysburg, and was in condition for immediate action, while a large part of the Federal army had but just arrived, after the fatigues of night marching, and one corps—the Sixth—was still distant, and only arrived at 2 P.M., after a march of thirty-two miles accomplished since 9 P.M. July 1st.

The rapid concentration of the Federal army certainly was creditable alike to the army and to its commander, whose course from the time of assuming control had evinced precision, boldness, and decision. Now upon the ground, with the grave responsibilities of his position pressing upon him, and the circumstances attending the assembling of his troops compelling him tactically to act upon the defensive, he established his lines as the field best favored that course, and, while watchful for an opportunity to strike, if not attacked, waited the assault he expected at any moment. He knew that a battle, then and there, was a necessity to General Lee, and, with his accomplished chief of artillery, he was also aware that, under existing circumstances, to the Federal army “the additional risks of an offensive battle were out of all proportion to the prospective gains.”

On the evening of July 1st General Lee decided to attack early in the morning with his right, under General Longstreet. Hood's division, formed at an acute angle to the Emmitsburg road and extended so as to envelop the Federal left, was to seize and hold the Round Tops; McLaws' division was to move directly upon the peach orchard, and Anderson's troops were to advance to and along the Emmitsburg road, while General Ewell, upon the left, was to aid with demon-

strations against the Federal right and attack if developments favored. Providentially, this attack was delayed till long after the intended time.

To understand clearly the condition upon the Federal left, it is necessary to bear in mind some incidents connected with the movements of the preceding days.

June 30th, by special and general orders, General Reynolds was placed in command of the left wing of the army, consisting of the First, Eleventh, and Third Corps. General Sickles was at the same time directed to move his command "with all possible dispatch" to Emmittsburg, and report to General Reynolds, whose authority over him was stated in the order which he (General Sickles) acknowledged to have received at 1 P.M. The authority thus delegated to General Reynolds was never revoked; on the contrary, it is expressly recognized in the precautionary order of July 1st, which General Sickles, in the face of official records, still attempts to misquote as a positive order confining him to Emmittsburg; and, also, in the order of 1.10 P.M. of the same day, which conditionally placed General Hancock in command at Gettysburg. General A. A. Humphreys has remarked of this much misquoted and misrepresented order:

"In similar circumstances the agreement between Wellington and Blücher to concentrate their armies—nearly double the numbers of Napoleon—far to the rear, in the vicinity of Waterloo, has been esteemed a proof of their great ability."

Nevertheless, at about 8 P.M., June 30th, General Sickles wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac:

“Enclosed please find communication from Major-General Reynolds. It is in accordance with my written orders, received from headquarters Army of the Potomac at 1 P.M., but in conflict with the verbal orders given me by the general commanding while on the march.

“Shall I move forward? My first division is about a mile this side of Emmittsburg.”

General Sickles, therefore, received the order to move to Emmittsburg and report to General Reynolds at 1 P.M., and, evidently, when at or very near headquarters of the army, since the order was dated at 12.45 P.M. General Birney, commanding the 1st Division, Third Corps, camped between Walkersville and Taneytown, received his order for the march at 3 P.M. The 2d Division was moving at about that time, and was in bivouac for the night at 6 P.M.

At 3.15 P.M., July 1st, General Sickles communicated to General Meade the receipt of General Howard's dispatch at 1.30 P.M., informing him of the death of General Reynolds, and urging the immediate movement of the Third Corps to Gettysburg. At 3.25 P.M. he reported the dispositions made of the two brigades and batteries left in position at Emmittsburg, and at 3.30 P.M. he directed his 1st Division to move at once to Gettysburg and report to General Howard.

At 4.45 P.M. instructions were sent to General Sickles by General Meade, looking to just such precautionary dispositions as had been made at Emmittsburg, but, while informing General Sickles that General Hancock had been sent to take command at Gettysburg, in no way interfering with the authority of the senior officer present with the left wing pending General Hancock's arrival.

At 9.30 P.M. General Sickles reported to General Meade his arrival at Gettysburg with a portion of his corps ; acknowledges receipt of General Meade's dispatch at 4.45 P.M. ; states erroneously that General Howard and not General Hancock is in command, and concludes :

" My impression is, if I may be allowed to make a suggestion, that our left and rear are not sufficiently guarded. Nothing less than the earnest and frequent appeals of General Howard and his supposed danger could have induced me to move from the position assigned to me in general orders ; but I believe the emergency justified my movement.

" Shall I return to my position at Emmittsburg, or shall I remain and report to General Howard ?

" If my corps is to remain in position here, I hope my brigades at Emmittsburg (and batteries) may be relieved and ordered to join me.

" This is a good battle-field."

In brief, the record reads that the commander of the Third Army Corps, General Daniel E. Sickles, instead of urging General Meade to come to Gettysburg with his army, as he has repeatedly claimed, was the first and only one to suggest withdrawal from that field.

Magnificent as was the corps ordered to that point, the Federal line was dangerously weak upon its left, as the sequel proved.

THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

Soon after 6 A.M., July 2d, General Meade directed his son and aide, Captain George Meade, to ride down to General Sickles, explain where headquarters of the army were located, find out if his troops were in position, and ask if he had anything to report. Captain

Meade, returning, reported that his mission had been made known to General Sickles, who was resting in his tent, by Captain Randolph, chief of artillery, Third Army Corps, who had brought in reply the statement that his troops were not yet in position, and that he was in some doubt as to where he was to go. General Meade directed his son to ride back to General Sickles as quickly as possible and urge on him the necessity of getting his troops in position immediately. Captain Meade returned at once to Third Corps headquarters, where he found the tent previously occupied by General Sickles struck, the staff mounted and on duty, and General Sickles himself about to mount. In reply to General Meade's message, General Sickles reported that his troops were then moving and would soon be in position. General Meade sent no order by his son with regard to the line to be occupied. It could not have been far from 7 A.M. when Captain Meade found General Sickles preparing to mount.

In his official report General Geary says :

“ At 5 A.M. on the 2d, having been relieved by the Third Army Corps, in obedience to orders from Major-General Slocum, the division was placed on the right of the centre of the main line of battle east of the turnpike.”

General Geary afterward explained to General Meade that upon receiving notice that he would be relieved by General Sickles he sent to him a staff officer instructed to explain the importance of the position he held, and to ask that, if troops could not be sent at once to relieve him, at least a staff officer might be sent to acquaint himself with the position and be ready to post the troops when they arrived.

He received for answer that "General Sickles would attend to it in due time," and after waiting some time in vain for either troops or officer he withdrew, considering himself relieved.

In his official report General D. B. Birney says :

"At 7 A.M., under orders from Major-General Sickles, I relieved Geary's division and formed a line, resting its left on the Sugar-Loaf Mountain (Little Round Top), and the right thrown in a direct line toward the cemetery, connecting on the right with the 2d Division of this corps. My picket line was in the Emmittsburg road, with sharpshooters some three hundred yards in advance."

General A. A. Humphreys, in his report, says :

"At an early hour of the morning my division was massed in the vicinity of its bivouac, facing the Emmittsburg road, near the crest of the ridge running from the cemetery of Gettysburg in a southerly direction, to a rugged, conical-shaped hill, which I find goes by the name of Round Top, about two miles from Gettysburg."

Manifestly, General Sickles, at or about 7 A.M., formed his line where General Meade, upon reaching the field, had instructed him to post it. If further proof could be needed, it is amply furnished by General Sickles' criticisms of the line. The order, however, was repeated to General Sickles by General Meade in person, just before noon of July 2d.

General Humphreys reports :

"Shortly after midday I was ordered to form my division in line of battle, my left joining the right of the 5th Division of the Third Corps, Major-General Birney commanding, and my right resting opposite the left of General Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, which was massed on the crest near my place of bivouac. The line I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of the ridge I have already mentioned."

"Shortly after midday" was shortly after General

Meade had repeated his order to General Sickles, and the line occupied in disregard of that order was that styled by General Hunt "the Plum Run line," and declared by him "not an eligible line to occupy." It was some five hundred yards in front of the position assigned to the Third Corps by General Meade.

The Sixth Army Corps reached Gettysburg about 2 P.M., July 2d. Upon its arrival being reported to him, General Meade directed the Fifth Corps to move at once to the left of his line, and the Sixth to occupy the position vacated by the Fifth. Shortly after 2 P.M. he rode to the left to await the arrival of the troops. He then found that General Sickles had advanced his line still farther, taking a position with his 1st Division in front of Little Round Top, from the Devil's Den to the peach orchard, and was about advancing his 2d Division up to the Emmittsburg road. Up to this time, with the exception of a reconaissance sent out at General Hunt's suggestion just before noon, little more than picket firing had occurred along the Third Corps front, but now the brief discussion of the situation by the army and corps commanders was interrupted by the advance of the Confederate lines in force. To General Meade's remark that he had moved out too far, General Sickles had just rejoined: "Very well, sir, I'll withdraw then," when Longstreet's artillery opened. Saying, "I wish to God you could, sir, but you see those people do not intend to let you," General Meade left him and rode out upon the line.

General Sickles then ordered his 2d Division, General A. A. Humphreys commanding, to advance to the Emmittsburg road. As this movement was commencing, General Humphreys received an order,

directly from General Meade, instructing him to move his division at once to Little Round Top. The division was immediately started by the left flank toward that point, but had only started when the order was recalled by General Meade; the troops retraced the steps taken and moved out to the Emmitsburg road.

At General Warren's suggestion, General Meade had previously sent that officer to ascertain the exact condition of affairs upon the extreme left, and beyond doubt it was his confidence in General Warren, and his knowledge that the Fifth Corps must soon appear upon the ground, and would be aided by Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, which he had ordered to report to General Sykes at Little Round Top, that induced the recall of his order to General Humphreys, which would have left the right of the Third Corps temporarily unguarded, while securing the far more important and more imperilled left.

Attended by Lieutenants N. A. Roebing and Ranald S. Mackenzie, General Warren reached the summit of Little Round Top and found it held only by a signal officer and his assistants. It is an injustice to General Warren to assert that he discovered Little Round Top to be the key to the Federal position when he reached the lookout on its summit on July 2d. It is not to be supposed that the fact escaped his quick eye on July 1st, when General Hancock noted it and took possession. General Geary had not failed to recognize the importance of the position assigned to him that night, and General Meade, in ordering the Third Corps into position relieving Geary's division on July 2d, or in directing the movement of Humphreys' division from the right

of the Third Corps line to the unguarded point, had not acted ignorantly. General Humphreys was not blind, and General Sykes' dispositions as the Fifth Corps reached the field evince his comprehension of the evident facts, and even General Sickles admits knowledge of the importance of the trust he disregarded. While Warren, standing upon the rocky summit, undoubtedly realized better than any other officer on the field the full importance of the position, his notable service lay in his instant comprehension of how utterly it had been abandoned, and in his characteristic promptness in securing the dispositions that held it safe. He was the savior, not the discoverer, of Little Round Top.

General Warren at once sent Lieutenant Mackenzie to General Sickles with a request that troops should be sent to occupy it. General Sickles refused, saying that his whole command was necessary to defend his front. General Warren sent, by the same messenger, a note to General Meade requesting him to send at least a division to him. But the emergency grew more urgent with every moment. The whole Confederate line was sweeping from out the woods in which it had formed, far outflanking the left of the Third Corps line, where Smith's battery, in air and almost unsupported on the rocks of the Devil's Den, gallantly waited its doom,—and between that left and Round Top the way to the death of the nation lay invitingly open to the confidently advancing enemy. To Warren's quick eye and clear mind the fate of the Third Corps line was manifest, and at that moment this was the only eye that saw, the only mind that comprehended the full gravity of the situation. But with him to see and know was to act. Noticing

troops moving out the Peach Orchard road to join in the hopeless struggle in front,—bidding the signal officer to continue waving his flags in defiance,—he spurred down the steep hillside.

In the meantime, General Meade had sent orders to Sykes to send a brigade to report to Sickles. The corps was then waiting orders on the bank of Pipe Creek. Weed started promptly, and after going a little distance, he turned to Colonel O'Rorke and said that he would go on and find General Sickles, and would leave O'Rorke in command of the brigade. He left all the brigade staff, except Lieutenant E. W. Warren, and brigade flag with O'Rorke. Weed and his aide rode forward at a rapid gait and found General Sickles, and then sent Lieutenant Warren back to pilot the brigade to him. The Lieutenant rode back rapidly, and when he got to Little Round Top, found the brigade going up the slope. He told O'Rorke that the brigade was expected to go to General Sickles. General Warren was there also, and he said he would keep O'Rorke's regiment.

SEIZURE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP.

General Warren, in descending from Little Round Top, where he had been scanning the field, having observed the approach of Weed's brigade, rode straight towards the head of the column. He called out to O'Rorke, beginning to speak while some eight or ten rods from him, that he wanted him to go up there; that the enemy was advancing unopposed up the opposite side of the hill down which he had come, and he wanted one regiment to meet him. He was apparently greatly excited and spoke in his usually impulsive style. O'Rorke told him that General Weed

was ahead and expected the brigade to follow him. "Never mind that," said General Warren; "bring your regiment up here and I will take the responsibility." It was at this time that Lieutenant Warren put in an appearance. O'Rorke, without hesitation, turned to the left and followed the officer who had accompanied General Warren, while Warren himself rode rapidly down the hillside. The remainder of the brigade started to join General Weed, under the guidance of Lieutenant Warren. It had gone but a short distance before General Sykes sent a staff officer to know where the brigade was going? Being told, "To report to General Sickles," and although the brigade was not stopped, the staff officer requested Lieutenant Warren to go with him to General Weed. They rode as fast as they could—the distance was not great—and he told General Weed that he would have to return, as no troops could be spared by General Sykes, and that he would have to return and rejoin his brigade. General Weed informed General Sickles of the message and hurried back to the troops, and on rejoining was ordered to double-quick them and hurry to Little Round Top, where the 140th was hotly engaged. General Warren had ridden to the head of the column in quest of General Weed, and finding that he was still absent, halted the brigade to await his return. In the meantime, he had met Hazlett's battery and started it after the 140th New York. Upon Weed's return, he having received the orders from General Sykes, the brigade countermarched and followed the 140th into position.

Guided by Lieutenant Roebing, O'Rorke had dashed up the eastern slope of Little Round Top to gain the face beyond the summit, some of the guns

of Hazlett's battery plunging through his line, as, with horses urged to frantic efforts and cannoneers aiding at the wheels, it made for the pinnacle it gained—and holds in history. As they reached the crest, the very jaws of hell yawned before them. Upon their right the Third Corps line was completely outflanked by Longstreet's impetuous advance, and up the ravine at their feet in front, Hood's brigades were panting in their effort to gain the vantage ground that would enable them to add the ignominy of a rout to the disaster of the day. The 140th was moving right in front, and not a musket was loaded or a bayonet fixed. The emergency, however, called for action far more than for tactics or precaution. Springing from his horse, with the shout, "Down this way, men!" O'Rorke, followed by his command, rushed down the rocky slope, with at least the impetus of a charge. It took such order as was possible and opened fire upon the enemy. The firing for a few moments was rapid and deadly on both sides, and, standing erect and unsheltered to urge on and encourage his men, O'Rorke, shot through the neck, fell dead without a word. But the Confederate rush was checked, and before it could be urged on again Weed had closed the 91st Pennsylvania upon the 140 New York, while the 146th New York and the 155th Pennsylvania had formed line upon the right of Hazlett's battery, which now crowned the crest. Then Weed and Hazlett fell upon that rocky crest, martyrs to the cause of the Union.

CHAMBERLAIN'S DESPERATE DEFENSE OF THE LEFT.

Immediately after starting Weed's brigade from where the corps was lying at Pipe Creek, General

Sykes received General Meade's order to take position upon the left. Sykes started his corps upon the road, and, accompanied by General Barnes, commanding the 1st Division, preceded it for the purpose of examining the position he was to occupy. Discovering the undefended left of the Third Corps line and the inadequacy of the support given to Smith's battery, he suggested to General Birney to close his division line upon the battery, while he (Sykes) would fill the gap which would be made by the movement with troops from the Fifth Corps. Barnes was about being placed in position when General Warren rode rapidly up to General Sykes, with whom Barnes was riding, and pointing out the position of Round Top, urged the importance of assistance in that direction. General Sykes yielded to his urgent request, and General Barnes directed Colonel Vincent, commanding the 3d Brigade, to proceed to that point with his brigade, consisting of the 16th Michigan, Colonel Vincent; 44th New York, Colonel Rice; 83d Pennsylvania, Captain Woodward; and 20th Maine, Colonel Chamberlain. Vincent moved with great promptness to the post assigned him. Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some Union batteries were going into position, Vincent reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which there was a heavy musketry fire (O'Rorke's), and when about to go forward into line, Colonel Chamberlain received from Colonel Vincent orders to move to the left at the double-quick, taking a farm road crossing Plum Run, in order to gain a rugged mountain spur, called Granite Spur, or Little Round Top.

The enemy's artillery got range of the column as it was climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells

among the rocks and tree-tops made the men move lively along the crest. One or two shells burst in the ranks. Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vincent indicated to Colonel Chamberlain the ground his regiment was to occupy, informing him that this was the extreme left of the general line, which he was to hold at all hazards. These were the last words Chamberlain ever heard from Vincent, as it was only a few moments afterwards the latter met his death.

The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence to the southwest, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top. Between this and Chamberlain's position intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. His line formed, he immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill commanding, to extend from the left flank across this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise in the exposed flank and rear.

The artillery fire on the position had meanwhile been constant and heavy ; but his formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the centre of the brigade to Chamberlain's right. This very soon involved the right of the 20th Maine, and gradually extended along its entire front. The action was quite sharp and at close quarters. In the midst of this, an officer from the centre informed Chamberlain that some important movement of the enemy was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with which they were engaged. Mounting a large rock, Chamberlain saw a considerable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of their engaged line, and passing

from the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the front of his left. The close engagement not permitting any change of front, he immediately stretched his regiment to the left, by taking intervals, at the same time refusing his left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with his right, thus occupying about twice the extent of his ordinary front, some of the companies being brought into single rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength or shelter. The officers and men understood Chamberlain's wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or suspect their advantage. But they were not a moment too soon; the enemy's flanking column, having gained its desired direction, burst upon the left with great demonstration, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank.

A brisk fire was opened at close range, which was so sudden and effective that the Confederates soon fell back among the rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came. They pushed up to within a dozen yards of the Union line before the terrible effectiveness of its fire compelled them to break and take shelter.

They renewed the assault on the whole front, and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through the line in several places, and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded were now in front and then in rear. Forced from its position, the regiment desperately recovered it and pushed the enemy down to

the foot of the slope. The intervals of the struggle were seized to remove the wounded of both sides, to gather ammunition from the cartridge-boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to secure better muskets than the Enfields, which were found not to stand service so well. Rude shelters were thrown up of the loose rocks that covered the ground.

The Confederates gathered all their energies for a final assault. Chamberlain had gotten his thin line into as good shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from the scrub-wood in the valley, in two lines in *échelon* by the right, and, opening a heavy fire the first line pressed forward as if it meant to sweep everything before it. Fire was opened on it as well as could be with the scant ammunition snatched from the fallen. It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like the one coming on. The loss had been severe. One half of Chamberlain's left wing had fallen, and a third of the regiment lay just behind it dead or badly wounded. At this moment, the anxiety was increased by a great roar of musketry in the rear, on the farther, or northerly, slope of Little Round Top, apparently on the flank of Weed's brigade, then on the crest, in support of Hazlett's battery. The bullets from this attack struck in the left rear of the 20th Maine, and it was feared that the enemy had nearly surrounded Little Round Top, and therefore only a desperate chance was left for the small force in the valley. Chamberlain's ammunition was soon exhausted. His men were firing their last shots, and getting ready to club their muskets.

Chamberlain deemed it imperative to strike before

he was struck by the overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which he could not possibly have withstood or survived. At that crisis he ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not thirty yards distant. Like greyhounds they bounded over shelter, from rock to rock, and launched their fury on the advancing foe. It was veritably a "forlorn hope." The effect was surprising; many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain's head with one hand, while he handed him his sword with the other. Holding fast by the right and swinging forward the left, the 20th Maine made an extended right wheel, before which the enemy's second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until the devoted little Union band had swept the valley of the enemy and cleared the front of nearly the entire brigade. Four hundred prisoners, including two field and several line officers from the 15th and 47th Alabama, with some of the 4th and 5th Texas, were sent to the rear, while one hundred and fifty Confederates were found killed and wounded in the front. These troops could not be reinforced at the critical period, as Ayres had been thrown to the front and Crawford was only arriving.

Historians have exhausted themselves in describing the actions of the "Peach Orchard" and the events of the third day at Gettysburg. Great stress has been laid upon the results of Pickett's charge, while famous pictures have presented that scene to the gaze of the American public; but the truth of

history is, that the little brigade of Vincent's with the self-sacrificing valor of the 20th Maine, under the gallant leadership of Joshua L. Chamberlain, fighting amidst the scrub-oak and rocks in that vale between the Round Tops on the 2d of July, 1863, saved to the Union arms the historic field of Gettysburg. Had they faltered for one instant—had they not exceeded their actual duty—while the left of the Third Corps was swung in the air half a mile to the right and front of Little Round Top, there would have been no grand charge of Pickett, and "Gettysburg" would have been the mausoleum of departed hopes for the national cause; for Longstreet would have enveloped Little Round Top, captured all on its crest from the rear, and held the key of the whole position. In view of such possibilities, it is no wonder that General Meade said to General Sickles, "I wish to God you could, sir, but you see those people do not intend to let you," when that officer desired to withdraw his line.

While these events had been taking place on the left of Round Top, General Sykes had directed the posting of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades by Barnes in the gap left between the Third and Fifth Corps on the right of Little Round Top. The division thus placed constituted the right of the Fifth Corps. The line was on the edge of a thick wood, the ground to the front being cleared of timber, but interspersed with rocks and some straggling trees. As the two brigades entered the woods they passed over a line of troops, understood to be a portion of a brigade of the Third Corps; they were lying down upon the ground. Upon the right of Barnes' division an open space, apparently unprotected, extended to some distance.

Upon General Barnes calling General Sykes' attention to it, the latter remarked (referring to the part of the Third Corps over which the division had passed, and at the time lying in the rear) that those troops were to be removed. The remaining portion of the Third Corps was at some distance to the right and much in advance of what seemed to General Barnes to be their natural and true position. This unguarded space was watched with great anxiety. Indeed, it was the place where Caldwell's division should have been posted, as he was sent to the assistance of the Third Corps.¹ There was little time, however, for deliberation. The arrival of Ayres' brigades of regulars called General Sykes to the left, and he threw Ayres into position on the left of Barnes, to complete his corps line. The attack of the enemy commenced almost immediately along Barnes' front. It was very severe, but gallantly withstood. After some time the Confederates showed themselves in great force on Barnes' right flank. They had penetrated through the unguarded space on the left of the Third Corps, and commenced pouring in a destructive fire from the advantageous position they had gained. Tilton changed front to the right, while Sweitzer was ordered to fall back and take up a new position a short distance in rear, for the purpose of co-operating in opposing this heavy attack on the flank. The two brigades only numbered 1664 officers and men.

¹ General Caldwell says, in his report on Gettysburg: "The battle was raging with considerable fury at the left, where, between four and five o'clock, I received orders to report to General Sykes. I moved off immediately by the left flank, and sent forward my aide (Lieutenant Cross) to find General Sykes, but he did not succeed in finding him. Before reaching the position designated for me I met a staff officer (I think the Adjutant-General of General Sykes), who told me he had orders where to place me. . . . The position assigned me was on the right of the Fifth and left of the Third Corps."

General Ayres, with his two brigades of regulars, having, in the meantime, been thrown into action, advanced across the valley in front of Little Round Top, driving the enemy back to Devil's Den, and the 2d Brigade was pushed forward into the woods to the left of the wheat field, the 1st Brigade being held in reserve at the edge of the wood. Crawford, with his two brigades, was massed in reserve to the right and rear of Little Round Top.

As the Third Corps was being hard pressed, General Caldwell's troops moved forward, Colonel Cross advancing with the 1st Brigade in line of battle through the wheatfield, his left resting on the woods which skirted the field. He had advanced but a short distance when he encountered the enemy and opened upon him a heavy fire, driving him to the other end of the field. In the meantime he had put the 2d Brigade in on the right of the 1st, and the 3d was ordered still farther to the right, while the 4th Brigade was held in reserve. The 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of Caldwell advanced with great gallantry, driving the enemy before them. But the 1st Brigade expended its ammunition, and Colonel Brooke was ordered to relieve it with his brigade. Brooke advanced until he gained the crest of the hill, which was afterwards gained by Caldwell's whole line. In this advantageous position Caldwell halted and called upon Barnes for support, stating that one of his brigades was driving the enemy in his front and he wished assistance.

Barnes directed Sweitzer to move his brigade forward for the purpose of rendering assistance, which he did in line to the front and left, the men giving cheers as they advanced across an open field to the edge of the wood. But the progress of the enemy

on the right flank still continued, and Sweitzer was again compelled to change his front to repel the Confederate advance, and soon found himself in close conflict, Col. Jeffords, commanding the 4th Michigan, being thrust through with a bayonet while gallantly attempting to rescue his colors from the grasp of the Confederates. Being unable to compete with numbers far superior to his own, and seeing that the enemy was gaining ground to his rear, Sweitzer directed his command to retire slowly, but orderly, halting and firing as they retired. He then took position on elevated ground a short distance to his rear, and succeeded in preventing the enemy from making any further progress in that direction. The movements of the 1st Brigade corresponded with those of the 2d, and this line was maintained until the next morning, when both brigades were withdrawn to the ridge in rear and the 1st relieved the 3d on Little Round Top.

General Caldwell, having secured the assistance of Barnes' 2d Brigade, galloped to the left, as he says in his report, "to make a connection with Ayres," when he found that his troops had advanced some distance beyond those of Ayres.

Just as Sickles' line gave way, the writer of this history, who was then on General Ayres' staff, remarked: "General, you had better look out, the line in front is giving way." General Caldwell, who was in conversation with General Ayres, turned and said, in rather a sharp manner, "That's not so, sir; those are my troops being relieved." With this assurance the two generals continued their conversation, while the writer continued to watch the line in front. In a few moments the latter again said: "General Ayres,

you will have to look out for your command. I don't care what any one says, those troops in front are running away." At this, both generals scanned the battle-field. Without a word, General Caldwell put spurs to his horse and rode off to the right, along the stone wall.¹ The Confederates were at this time in the wheat field. Time was precious! General Ayres sent a staff officer to Colonel Day to direct him to deploy his brigade behind the stone wall.² Time

¹ General Caldwell, in his report on Gettysburg, says: "I found, on going to the right that all the troops on my right had broken and were fleeing to the rear in great confusion."

In his letter of July 13, 1872, General Warren, in a paragraph omitted in the *Century* publication, says:

"The full force of the enemy was now sweeping the Third Army Corps from its untenable position and no troops nor any reinforcements could maintain it. It was the dreadful misfortune of the day that any reinforcements went to that line, for all alike—Third Corps, Second Corps, and Fifth Corps, were driven from it with great loss. The earnest appeals for support drew, I suppose, the troops of the Fifth Corps away from their intended position, that is, Little Round Top, out on the road to the Peach Orchard, and so it was that the Fifth Corps reached this vital point in such small detachments."

² In a letter on this subject, Lieut.-Col. Jno. H. Page, then a lieutenant of the 3d U. S. Infantry, says: "I saw General Ayres with some staff officers about fifty yards to our right. I also saw our troops 400 yards to our right and front, retiring with their colors drooped. I ran to where General Ayres was and heard him say: 'Those regiments are being driven back.' Some one said they were retiring to a new position. General Ayres replied: 'A regiment does not shut up like a jack-knife and hide its colors without it is retreating.' I ran back to my company. General Day was right behind it. A staff officer came to him and told him to retire to the base of Little Round Top, just as soon as our 2d Brigade in the woods came out. General Day asked me to strike a match, as he wanted to light his pipe. I did so, and as he bent over, his horse was shot through the neck. As our 2d Brigade was coming out of the woods we all joined the line without hearing any order, as the rebels were crossing the wheat field, and turned for us when they saw us. As we were falling back, we saw the battery officers at the base of Round Top waving their hats for us to hurry up. We realized that they wished to use canister, so took up the double-quick. As I was crossing the swampy ground, Captain Freedley, 3d U. S., was shot in the leg, fell against me, and knocked me down. When I got the mud out of my eyes, I saw the artillery men waving their hats to lie low. I got behind a boulder with a number of my men when the battery opened with canister. The rebels came from all directions for the guns, and

was lost before the order was given. Inside of three minutes the Confederates had the stone wall and the 1st Brigade was still in column of battalions with the enemy firing into its flank from the wall; the 2d Brigade was alone in the woods almost cut off by the enemy. General Ayres then gave the orders to fall back to the position previously occupied on the right of Little Round Top. Almost surrounded, receiving fire from the direction of Devil's Den as well as from the other flank, Ayres fought his way back through the swampy ground, losing 53 officers and 776 men out of 2500 engaged. Crawford moved forward gallantly with his Pennsylvania Reserves to cover the retirement and drove the enemy back through the wheat field, holding this advanced position during the entire night. Then, with Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps arriving on the right, together with further aid from the Second Corps, General Hancock being now placed in command of the left wing of the army, and with the Sixth Corps closing up on the left and rear of Round Tops,—with the closing day the conflict of July 2d came to an end, with the Federal troops beaten back to the line the Third Corps had been ordered to hold in the morning—in the words of General Newton, “hammered into a

lost all formation. They waved their battle-flags—a dozen being just in front of me. They came to where we were when a number were shot down; then they recoiled, and retreated through the wheat field and woods. To my right and rear, among the rocks, I could see a twelve-pounder mountain howitzer at work. A soldier asked me what kind of a gun it was; he said it kicked over at every discharge. When the guns in our rear ceased firing, I saw a line of troops wearing the Sixth Corps badge. I was going back to see them, when Colonel Penrose, 15th New Jersey Volunteers, rode down to me and shook hands. The battery men called to us to get out of the way. I ran to the left of the battery and met the ‘bucktails’ just coming over the ridge on the road, in columns of fours.”

good position," and with the key to the field held in the steady grasp of the Fifth Army Corps. After 9 P.M., in the darkness, Colonel Chamberlain, with his gallant 20th Maine (some 200 men), pushed up the rugged side of Great Round Top, driving the enemy's pickets in front of him, and secured the crest, capturing some twenty-five prisoners and a staff officer of General E. M. Law. During the night he was reinforced by the 83d Pennsylvania, under Captain Woodward, and five regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserves under Colonel Fisher.

Thousands of forms stretched upon the shot-ploughed ground attested the hideousness of the error committed when the risks of that fatal advanced line were forced upon the Federal army. It was not alone the honor, efficiency, or lives of the renowned Third Army Corps that were at stake. It was not alone the safety of the right wing of the army, threatened with assault when depleted to succor the crumbling left, that was endangered. It was not the safety of the Army of the Potomac alone that was imperilled. There were more than trains of ambulances and ordnance stores and artillery reserves sheltered behind the Round Tops. Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia—the nation—were guarded by those ragged rocks, upon which the right arm of the rebellion was broken, thanks to the God of battles and to the quick comprehension and prompt action of General G. K. Warren, responded to by the ever-ready gallantry and enduring nerve of his comrades of the Fifth Army Corps. Had these failed the commander of the army in that moment of supreme need, in vain would have been the sacrifice of Zook and Cross and all the lavish offering of blood

and life in the Devil's Den, and field and orchard—in vain the noble struggle of Graham at the angle, or the skill and gallantry of Humphreys on the right, or of Rice and Chamberlain upon the left—in vain the disciplined courage of Ayres' Regulars, or the heroic self-sacrifice of Bigelow and his cannoneers. With the Federal signal flags on Little Round Top displaced by the stars and bars, the standard of the Confederacy would have been established before the world.

There can be no question but that Weed was originally ordered to report to General Sickles with his brigade. Otherwise he would not have gone in advance of his troops and reported for position. It must be borne in mind, however, that when this order was given it was supposed that the Third Corps was in the position to which it had been assigned, and the brigade was for the purpose of extending that line to Little Round Top, which would have been the right of the Fifth Corps line. The Fifth Corps was to take this position as soon as the Sixth Corps came near enough to form a reserve for the army. But, upon discovering the location of the Third Corps, General Meade at once ordered up the Fifth. General Sykes says :

“ At 3 P.M., General Meade sent for me, and while myself and other corps commanders were conversing with him the enemy formed, opened the battle, and developed his attack on our left. I was at once ordered to throw my whole corps to that point and hold it at all hazards. This, of course, relieved my troops from any call from the commander of the Third Corps. *En route* to the position thus assigned the Fifth Corps various staff officers from General Sickles met me, and in the name of that officer asked for assistance. I explained to them that it was impossible for me to give it ; the key of the battle-field was intrusted to my

keeping, and I could not and would not imperil it by a division of my forces."

Never was artillery better served or more usefully employed in various positions than the artillery of the Fifth Corps on the 2d of July. Hazlett's battery (D, 5th U. S.), as has been stated, under extreme difficulties, and by the aid of the men of the battery and those of the 140th New York, established itself on Little Round Top between 4 and 5 o'clock P.M., and immediately became the target for the Confederate batteries and sharpshooters. It kept up a continuous fire until dark, and occupied the position until July 5th, when it took up the line of march with the corps. Lieutenant B. F. Rittenhouse says :

"The battery had been engaged only about an hour, when 1st Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett (who commanded the battery) was shot in the head. He was carried to the rear and died at 8 P.M. In his death the Government has lost one of its bravest and most able officers."

Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, and I, 5th United States, were left in rear of the line of battle of the 1st Division, with instructions to await orders. When positions had been selected and orders sent for the batteries to move to the front, they were not to be found. Subsequently Battery C was found in rear of the Third Corps. The officer commanding reported that he had been ordered there by an officer of General Sickles' staff, who had orders to take any batteries he could find, no matter where they belonged. This battery not having been relieved until about dark, was not put in position with the Fifth Corps.

Battery I, 5th U. S., was placed in position by some unknown officer of the Third Corps. First Lieuten-

ant M. F. Watson, commanding the battery, was wounded in the opening of the engagement while in the faithful discharge of his duties. Lieutenant MacConnell, upon whom the command of the battery devolved when Lieutenant Watson was wounded, says :

“The battery was without support of any kind. The enemy appeared shortly—say twenty minutes—after taking position, nearly in front, at a distance of about 350 yards, and the battery immediately opened on them with shell. As they approached nearer, the battery poured in canister—some twenty rounds—until men and horses were shot down or disabled to such an extent that the battery had to be abandoned.”

This, however, did not suit the men of the battery. Securing the services of the Garibaldi Guards, Second Lieutenant Samuel Peeples, 5th U. S., took a musket and led a charge to recapture the guns. They drove the Confederates from them and retook everything that was lost, conveying them safely to the rear. On the 3d, the battery was reported unserviceable, and it was directed to proceed to Westminster and subsequently to Washington, for re-equipment. The battery lost one officer, twenty-one men, and forty-one horses.

Battery L, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain Frank C. Gibbs, moved up to the field in rear of the 2d Division; one section, commanded by First Lieutenant Guthrie, was posted on the slope of Little Round Top, to the right of Hazlett's battery. Another section, under Lieutenant Walworth, was posted at the base of the hill, commanding the ravine in front of Little Round Top. The third section was held in reserve. The two sections posted in front opened upon the Confederates, when they advanced upon the Union lines, with spherical case and canister and did good work.

Battery C, 1st New York Artillery, Captain Almont Barnes, took up a position on the right of Battery L, 1st Ohio Artillery, with instructions not to fire until orders reached it to do so, the 1st and 2d divisions being in line covering its front. The battery remained in position under fire until the fighting ceased without firing a shot or losing anything in men, horses or *materiel*.

At 3 A.M., on the 3d instant, Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, and Battery C, 1st New York Artillery, reported to Brigadier-General Howe, commanding division in the Sixth Corps, and moved to the extreme left of the line, and there remained in position without action until the close of the engagement.

The 83d Pennsylvania lost its gallant colonel, Strong Vincent, he having fallen, mortally wounded, early in the engagement. He lingered a few days after being wounded. His promotion as brigadier-general was sent to him at once as an appreciation of his services at Little Round Top, by the Government, but it reached him too late for his own recognition. He expired soon after its receipt.

The 4th Michigan also had the misfortune to lose its brave commander, Colonel Jeffords, who sealed his devotion to his country with his blood while contending hand to hand with overpowering numbers. He received a bayonet thrust through the body in endeavoring to rescue the colors of his regiment from the hands of the enemy.

The 20th Maine records the loss of Lieutenant Kendall killed, and Captain Charles W. Billings and Lieutenant A. H. Linscott mortally wounded.

The 44th New York had Capt. L. S. Larrabee and Lieutenants Dunham and Thomas killed, and Cap-

tains Bourne and Munger and Lieutenants Herendeen and Zeilman wounded.

The 16th Michigan lost Lieutenants Browne, Jewett, and Borden killed, and Lieutenants Borgman and Cameron wounded.

The 140th New York lost its gallant colonel (O'Rorke), killed amid the rugged rocks of Little Round Top, and Lieuts. Charles P. Klein and Hugh M. McGraw mortally wounded.

The 11th Regiment of Pennsylvania Reserves had Lieut. Jno. H. Woods killed, while the 13th Reserves lost its colonel, Charles F. Taylor, and Lieut. Robert Hall killed.

The 22d Massachusetts had Lieut. Chas. K. Knowles mortally wounded.

The 32d Massachusetts had Lieut. W. H. Barrows killed.

The 1st Michigan had Lieut. Amos. M. Ladd killed.

The 62d Pennsylvania had Major Wm. G. Lowry, Capt. E. H. Little, Lieuts. Scott McDowell and J. C. Monck killed, and Capt. James Brown and Lieut. Patrick Morris mortally wounded.

The 118th Pennsylvania had Capt. Richard W. Davids killed.

The 2d U. S. had Lieut. Frank C. Goodrich killed; Lieuts. F. E. Lacey, D. W. Burke, and Geo. H. McLoughlin wounded.

The 3d U. S. had Capt. H. W. Freedley, commanding, and Lieuts. D. Parker, S. Morton, and Geo. B. Butler wounded.

The 4th U. S. had Lieuts. Saml. T. Crowley and Geo. Williams wounded.

The 6th U. S. had Lieut. T. T. Britton wounded.

The 7th U. S. had Lieut. W. Miller killed, and Lieuts. Woodruff, Comba, Crawford, and Grossman wounded.

The 10th U. S. had Lieut. W. J. Fisher killed, and Lieut. M. C. Boyce mortally wounded.

The 11th U. S. had Capt. Thos. O. Barri, Lieuts. H. Kenaston and H. Rochford killed; Lieuts. Matthew Elder, A. J. Barber, Lemuel Pettee, A. A. Harbach, O. H. Nealy, and Capts. J. M. Goodhue and W. G. Edgerton wounded.

The 12th U. S. had Lieut. S. A. Miller killed, and Lieutenants Liscum, Alston, and Vanvalzah wounded.

The 14th U. S. had two officers wounded, but the names cannot be found.

The 17th U. S. had Lieut. W. H. Chamberlain killed, and Lieut. E. S. Abbott mortally wounded.

The 5th U. S. Artillery had Capt. (Brig.-Gen. Vol.) S. H. Weed and Lieut. Chas. E. Hazlett killed, and Lieut. M. F. Watson wounded.

THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

East of Cemetery Hill, the Union line curved to the right and rear. This was occupied by the Twelfth Corps on the extreme right, with the First Corps on its left. This line was along the crest of a rocky and wooded ridge of moderate elevation, running, in irregular shape, in a southeasterly direction from Gettysburg to Rock Creek. This strong natural position was strengthened by the construction of log breastworks along the entire crest of the ridge. A thick strong fence, parallel to the ridge, less than fifty yards behind it, furnished an excellent cover for the second line. On the afternoon of the 2d, dur-

ing the engagement on the left, Ruger's division and Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth Corps had been detached to go to the support of the left. Soon afterwards, General Geary, by direct orders from General Slocum, was directed to follow Ruger, with two of his brigades, leaving Greene's brigade to hold the breastworks. Greene, in attempting to extend his brigade so as to occupy the entire line, found that Ewell had already seized upon and occupied in strong force the right of the line, from which he attacked Greene with great vigor. Fortunately, this brigade occupied a portion of the works which, turning at almost right angles to the line on the right, ascended a broken and rocky slope toward the left, and presented a steep wall of rock to the front. Greene seized, with skill and judgment, the advantages of this position and held it with his small brigade against overwhelming numbers, exhibiting great gallantry and determination. After three hours of night conflict, and having been reinforced from the First and Eleventh Corps, Greene succeeded in repulsing the Confederates from his immediate front.

Upon ascertaining the condition of things late at night, and Ruger, Geary, and Lockwood having returned to the neighborhood, about the time of the cessation of the attack, Gen. Slocum ordered Gen. Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, at daylight on the third to drive the Confederates from the intrenchment they had taken. They, however, did not wait for this attack, but themselves attacked Geary with great fury. The combat continued for about six hours with unabated zeal, Ewell appearing determined to possess himself of the Baltimore pike, in rear of the Union lines, with the evident confidence.

of carrying the position, which would have been of vast consequence had his attack been successful. A determined advance of Geary's division at last effectually expelled the Confederates from the breastworks, and several hundred prisoners were captured.

This engagement was unexpected by General Lee at the hour it occurred. He had given orders to Ewell to attack at the same time with Longstreet; but, unfortunately for the Confederates, it could not have happened otherwise, as Williams would have attacked Ewell if the latter had not first made the assault.

In the meantime, from the centre to the left of the line, the Union and Confederate armies stood, like two huge gladiators, scanning each other, watching for the first sign of attack. Sunrise came, and yet no movement from either side. The golden orb rose higher in the heavens, and when the noise of the action on the right had ceased, stillness pervaded the atmosphere. The Fifth Corps held its position and was firmly established, with strong supports, on Great and Little Round Tops. General Lee, however, had not been idle. He had made preparations for Longstreet to continue his attack on the Union line, that officer having been reinforced by the arrival of Pickett's three brigades; and at the same time Ewell was directed to assail the Union right, Johnson having been reinforced with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's divisions.

Unfortunately for Longstreet, he was not able to carry out his designs as soon as desirable, he being annoyed by the artillery fire from Round Top, and hearing of the approach of a large force of Union cavalry on his right flank, found it necessary to look

out for his flank and rear. Hood's and McLaws' divisions were not only held for the purpose, but were reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's. Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford Longstreet further assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained. A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet the day before, and his batteries were placed in the positions it was believed would enable them to silence the Union batteries. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting columns to advance under cover of the combined force of the three. Henry's battalion of artillery held about its original position on the right flank; Alexander's was next in front of the Peach Orchard; then came the Washington artillery, and Dearing's battalion on his left; beyond Dearing, Cabell's battalion had been arranged, making nearly sixty guns for that wing, all well advanced in a sweeping curve of about one mile. Major Poague's battalion of artillery had been advanced to the line of the right wing, while the other battalions of the Second and Third Confederate Corps held the positions of the day before; all constituting a line of one hundred and fifty guns,¹ whose fire could be brought to bear upon the point of attack.

To oppose this number only eighty guns of the Union batteries could be used to reply effectively.²

General Warren had been on Little Round Top for a long while watching the preparations of the Con-

¹ Report of General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, C. S. A., p. 352, serial No. 44. *Records of the Rebellion.*

² Report of General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, U. S. A., p. 239, serial No. 43. *Records of the Rebellion.*

federates. It was plain that they were preparing for a desperate effort; but where the blow was to be struck, no one could tell. Every corps in the Union line had need to stand prepared to receive it, and in consequence there could be no doubling-up of forces. At 10 A.M., General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, made an inspection of the artillery of his whole line, which was posted as follows: Knap's battery (E, Pennsylvania, six 10-pounders) on the hill known as Slocum's headquarters, and near the Baltimore pike, with Winegar's (M, 1st New York, four 10-pounders) at a short distance east of it; Muhlenberg's (F, 4th U. S., six 12-pounders) and Kinzie's (K, 5th U. S., four 12-pounders) opposite the centre of the line of the Twelfth Corps, so as to command the ravine formed by Rock Creek; Rigby's (A, Maryland, six 3-inch) was also on the hill. At the centre, on and near Cemetery Hill, were Stevens' (5th Maine, six 12-pounders); Reynolds' (L, 1st New York, four 3-inch); Ricketts' (F, 1st Pennsylvania, six 3-inch); Wiedrich's (I, 1st New York, four 3-inch); Stewart's (B, 4th U. S., four 12-pounders); Dilger's (I, 1st Ohio, six 12-pounders); Bancroft's (G, 4th U. S., six 12-pounders); Eakin's (H, 1st U. S., six 12-pounders); Wheeler's (13th New York, three 3-inch); Hill's (1st West Virginia, four 10-pounders); and Taft's (5th New York, six 20-pounders). On the left of the cemetery, in line on the crest occupied by the Second Corps, were Woodruff's (I, 1st U. S., six 12-pounders); Arnold's (A, 1st Rhode Island, six 3-inch); Cushing's (A, 4th U. S., six 3-inch); Brown's (B, 1st Rhode Island, four 12-pounders); and Rorty's (B, 1st New York, four 10-pounders). Next, on the left of the Second Corps, were Thomas' (C, 4th U. S., six

12-pounders); Thompson's (C and F, Pennsylvania, five 3-inch); Phillips' (5th Massachusetts, six 3-inch); Hart's (15th New York, four 12-pounders); Sterling's (2d Connecticut, four James and two howitzers); Rank's section (two 3-inch); Dow's (6th Maine, four 12-pounders); and Ames' (G, 1st New York, six 12-pounders); all of the Artillery Reserve, to which was added, soon after the cannonade commenced, Cooper's battery (B, 1st Pennsylvania, four 3-inch). On the left, on the slope of Little Round Top, Gibbs' (L, 1st Ohio, six 12-pounders) was posted, while Hazlett's (D, 5th U. S., six 10-pounders) occupied the crest. On the extreme left of Great Round Top were placed batteries C, Massachusetts, and C, 1st New York.

The Twelfth Corps occupied the extreme right of the line; then, to the left, in succession, the First, Eleventh, Second, Third, and Fifth Corps, with two divisions of the Sixth in reserve and one division guarding the extreme left.

The quiet of the lines remained undisturbed until 1 P.M., when the Confederates fired, as usual at such times, a single signal gun. Instantly, from the throats of their one hundred and fifty guns, there belched forth a curved sheet of flame, and the fire was gradually concentrated on the clump of trees (the point of attack) held by Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. The whole air was filled with shrieking shot and bursting shell. No irregularity of ground afforded much protection, and the plain in rear of the Union line-of-battle was soon swept of everything movable. This fearful cannonade was kept up for two hours, while the Union batteries, in obedience to the orders of General Meade, maintained a death-like silence; the men of the infantry and artillery hugging the ground

closely behind stone walls and low rifle-pits constructed of fence-rails hastily piled together and covered with dirt.

The Confederates then ceased firing, and the lull before the storm was simply painful. The masses of Confederate infantry then became visible, and the assaulting column was directed principally against the point occupied by the Second Corps, which was supported by Doubleday's division and Stannard's brigade of the First Corps. A strong line of skirmishers soon advanced (followed by two deployed lines of battle) supported at different points by small columns of infantry. General Hancock, in his report, says :

" Their lines were formed with a precision and steadiness that extorted the admiration of the witnesses of that memorable scene. The left of the enemy extended slightly beyond the right of Gen. Alexander Hays' division ; the right being about opposite the left of General Gibbon's. Their line of battle thus covered a front of not more than two of the small and incomplete divisions of the corps. The whole attacking force is estimated to have exceeded 15,000 men."

Forward moved the attacking force up the gradual slope of Cemetery Hill, through a stillness that was pall-like. The Union cannoners began to grow restless ; infantrymen grasped their pieces and with thumb on the hammer and finger on the trigger, watched the gallant foe. No attempt was made to check him until the first line had arrived within about seven hundred yards, and then a feeble fire of artillery, was opened on it, to let the Confederates know that the Union army was not asleep. But the column moved on. Two regiments of Stannard's Vermont brigade, which had been posted in a little grove in front of, and at an angle to, the main line, first opened

with an oblique infantry fire on the right of the Confederate column, which had the effect to make the troops on that flank double in a little toward their left. But they still pressed on without halting or returning fire. The rifled guns of the Union artillery, having no canister, were withdrawn from the line, and the double-shotted 12-pounders were left to do the work. When the attacking column arrived at between two hundred and three hundred yards, the guns which could bring their fire to bear upon it belched forth their murderous charges, while the infantry rose to a man, and Cemetery Hill was a scene of carnage. Gibbon and Hays sustained the shock of this first assault, and the fight was fierce and general; but the left of the enemy broke in disorder, leaving 15 colors and 2000 prisoners in the hands of Hays' division.

Those of the Confederates who did not fall into disorder in front of the 3d Division now moved to the right and joined the line attacking Gibbon. The right of this attacking line was repulsed by Hall's and Harrow's brigades, assisted by Stannard's fire, which caused the right of the column to double to the left and reinforce the centre. And now the attack was in its fullest strength opposite Webb's brigade, which was disposed in two lines—the first behind a low stone wall—a slight breastwork, indeed,—while the second line was on the crest, some sixty paces to the rear, and so disposed as to fire over the heads of those in front. When the Confederates had nearly reached the stone wall, led by General Armistead, the right of that part of Webb's brigade posted there abandoned the position, but, fortunately, did not retreat entirely. By the personal bravery of General

Webb and his officers, they were immediately formed on the crest referred to.

This apparent weakness emboldened the Confederates, and with yells they seized the wall, numbers of them crossing over it. The fight here was close and deadly. Hunt brought up Cowan, of his reserve artillery; Gibbon and Hays lent their oblique fire, while Hall and Harrow reinforced Webb's gallant little band, now furiously engaged. Stannard poured his volleys into the flank of the doomed column; and, after a few moments of desperate fighting, the Confederates were repulsed. They threw down their arms and sought safety in flight, or threw themselves on the ground to escape the terrible fire from the Union line. Gibbon secured two colors, Webb captured four colors, and prisoners enough were taken to swell the number to 4500. Just in time to increase the panic of the fleeing fugitives, Kinzie's battery (K, 5th U. S.) and Fitzhugh's New York battery arrived and opened on them with dreadful effect, strewing the ground with thousands of dead and wounded. The Confederate attack was feebly renewed, with about 3,000 men in a single line, but the line was utterly broken by the fire of the batteries on Hancock's left, and numbers of the men ran into the Union lines and gave themselves up. The magnificent phalanx of a few hours before had melted away, and the well tried and fully tested veterans of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac had covered themselves with glory.

THE CALVARY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

We cannot let this opportunity pass for paying a tribute to the calvary corps of the Army of the Poto-

mac, under the leadership of the gallant Pleasanton, with his magnificent divisions under those daring and competent commanders,—Buford, Gregg, and Kilpatrick. Ever ready—ever on the go; never hesitating to commence a fight, their operations, from the commencement of the Gettysburg campaign, paralyzed the efforts of the Confederate calvary, which had heretofore appeared to hold a supremacy over the Union troopers.

By daylight on July 1st, General Buford had obtained positive information as to the enemy's position and movements, and made his dispositions accordingly; and then, for more than two hours gallantly checked every attempt made by the Confederates until the arrival of the First and Eleventh Corps, holding his position with great courage and obstinacy and displaying splendid skill in frustrating their designs. On the 2d, Buford held a position on the left until relieved by the Third Corps, when he was directed to take post at Westminster, to assist in guarding the army train at that point.

On the 29th of June, Gregg's division moved by the right flank of the army on Westminster, covering the country toward York and Carlisle, while Kilpatrick advanced from Frederick City direct to the front on Hanover. They were attacked on the morning of the 30th by Stuart's calvary, and after a gallant fight the Confederates were repulsed. General Gregg, with two brigades of his division, took position on the right of the Union line about noon of July 2d. Late in the evening he was attacked by two regiments of Confederates, deployed; but they were quickly compelled to retire. On the 3d of July, Custer's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division, having occupied the position of

Gregg's division of the day previous, the latter was placed three quarters of a mile nearer the Baltimore turnpike. About noon the enemy threw a heavy force of calvary against the position, with the intention of gaining the Union rear. This attack was met and handsomely defeated by Gregg's division, with Custer's assistance.

On the 2d of July Kilpatrick's division moved towards Gettysburg, from the direction of Heidlersburg, to prevent the Confederates from concentrating their forces by that road. Late in the afternoon this division met the Confederate calvary near Hunterstown, and after a spirited affair of two hours, the Confederates were driven from their position. Moving forward on the right flank of the Confederate position, he connected with Merritt's brigade, and on the 3d attacked the Confederate infantry with great gallantry, rendering valuable service thereby, although very naturally he was repulsed.

From this time forward the entire corps was employed in following, harassing, and fighting the Confederate columns as they retreated back to Virginia.

THE MEDICAL CORPS.

There is no more fitting place than here, at the turning-point in the history of the War of the Rebellion, to notice the Medical Corps of the Army. Words are too feeble to express the praise to which its members are entitled. Gallant in their bearing on the field of action, untiring in their efforts to relieve the wounded and suffering under fire, night would scarcely clothe the battle-field with its shadows before they would set out to gather from the remot-



est points the bodies of those left on the field; and then, while the armies were taking repose, these were conveyed to the field hospitals in rear of the lines, where the surgeons would sometimes work the whole night long, with coats off and arms bared to the shoulders, dressing wounds and amputating limbs, not even resting long enough to eat—food being poked into their mouths by attendants while they cut away the mangled limbs of the poor unfortunates. After working all day and all night, they would then rejoin their commands without sleep and go through the weary march of the day. The names of Milhau, Sternberg, Spencer, Woodhull, Jacquette, Gibson, Webster, Russell, Dean, Lord, and many others of the Fifth Corps' surgeons will ever remain indelibly impressed upon the memories of those who received attention at their hands and now live.

Immediately after the engagement on the 2d of July, the surgeons and attendants, with the ambulance corps, under Capt. James A. Bates, chief ambulance officer of the Fifth Corps, gathered from the field of battle, between 4 P.M. and 2 A.M. of July 3d, *thirteen hundred wounded men*, and placed them in the field hospitals of the corps, under the direction of Surgeon J. J. Milhau, Medical Director. Eight hours afterwards they were compelled to move these wounded a second time (making a handling of 2600 wounded men) and transport them to a safer place some two miles distant, on account of the tremendous artillery fire, which it could be seen the Confederates were preparing to deliver, and when subsequently delivered on that day, fairly swept the plain of everything in rear of the Union lines.

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At the sacrifice of many valuable lives, the Army of the Potomac had once more stood its crucial test under a new leader, and *success* (a word scarcely known in the vocabulary of that army) had attended its heroic effort to defend the three great cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington ; and while the people of the Nation were rejoicing in the success of their Eastern army, the wires flashed forth the news of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, with all its men and material, rendering the 4th of July, 1863, truly a day of national rejoicing.

As was the case with all the other battles fought by the Army of the Potomac, there were questions which came up for discussion. Inasmuch as those referring to Gettysburg do not concern directly the history of the Fifth Corps, we take no part in the discussion of them. However, we publish an extract of a letter from General Meade, in which it will be seen that he attributes, as commander of the army, a loss of *fifty per cent.* in the Fifth Corps to the advanced position taken by General Sickles, to-wit :

“Now let me tell you another historical fact. Lieut.-General Ewell, in a conversation held with me shortly after the war, asked what would have been the effect if at four P.M. on the first he had occupied *Culp's Hill* and established batteries on it. I told him that in the then condition of the Eleventh and First Corps, with their morale affected by their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge with the loss of over half their numbers in killed, wounded, and missing (of the six thousand prisoners we lost on the field, nearly all came from these corps on the first day), his occupation of Culp's Hill, with batteries commanding the whole of Cemetery Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of that ridge and the withdrawal of the troops by the Baltimore pike and Taneytown and Emmitsburg roads. He then informed me that at four P.M. on the first he had his corps, twenty thousand (20,000) strong, in

column of attack and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee, directing him to assume the defensive and not to advance; that he sent to General Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply was a reiteration of the previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained him, he said our troops coming up (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was under the impression the greater part of my army was on the ground, and deemed it prudent to await the rest of his, as you quote from his report.

"But suppose Ewell with his twenty thousand (20,000) men had occupied Culp's Hill and our brave soldiers had been compelled to evacuate Cemetery Ridge and withdraw on the roads above referred to, would the Pipe Clay Creek order have been so very much out of place?

"That order was to meet the very contingency here in question, to wit: A part of my army overwhelmed by superior numbers, compelled to fall back, and a line of battle formed to the rear of my most advanced position thus necessitated. As to Gen. Sickles having by his advance brought on an attack and thus compelled a battle which decided the war, you have completely answered—and it is a very favorite theory with the partisans of this officer. But these gentlemen ignore the fact that of the eighteen thousand (18,000) men killed and wounded on the field *during the whole battle*, more than *two thirds* were lost on the second day; and but for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps, and the prompt sending a portion on Round Top, where they met the enemy, almost on the crest, and had a desperate fight to secure the position—I say but for these circumstances, over which Sickles had neither knowledge nor control, the enemy would have secured Round Top, planted his artillery there commanding the whole battle-field, and what the result would have been I leave you to judge.

"Now when I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed Gen. Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misunderstanding of my orders; but I have recently learned from *Gen. Geary*, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the great importance of Round Top, and *posted a brigade on it*, that on the morning of the third (second), when he received my or-

der that he would be relieved by the Third Corps, and on being relieved would rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right—that after waiting for some time to be relieved, he sent to Gen. Sickles a staff officer, with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that Gen. S. would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that Gen. S. would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and after waiting till his patience was exhausted Gen. Geary withdrew and rejoined his corps. Now my first orders to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps division (Geary's) and occupy their position. Here is the evidence that he knew the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when he came to my headquarters, at about noon, and said he did not know where to go, I answered: 'Why, you were to relieve the Twelfth corps.' He said they had no position, they were massed awaiting events. There it was I told him his *right* was to be Hancock's *left*; his *left* on *Round Top, which I pointed out*. Now his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left, and his left a quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that *very point unoccupied which ought to have* been occupied by Longstreet, before we could get there with the Fifth Corps. Sickles' movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third, caused a loss of *fifty per cent.* in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps, as I said before, producing sixty-six per cent. of the loss of the whole battle—and with what result?—driving us back to the position he was ordered to hold originally. These losses of the first and second day affected greatly the efficiency and morale of the army, and prevented my having the audacity in the offense that I might otherwise have had. If this is an advantage, to be so crippled in battle without obtaining any object, I must confess I cannot see it. Pardon my writing with so much prolixity; but your generous defense, and the clear view you have taken of the battle, have led me to wander thus far.

“Very truly yours,

“GEO. G. MEADE.”

LETTER OF GEN. H. J. HUNT TO GEN. A. S. WEBB.

SOLDIERS' HOME,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,

January 12, 1888.

MY DEAR WEBB :

Now, I was by no means a favorite with Meade ; he rarely consulted me as a Chief of Artillery is consulted—or *e. g.*—he consulted the Chief of Engineers, or of Staff, etc.

I am under no sort of obligation to him that would lead me to sustain him if wrong, nor have I any occasion for ill-feeling or malice towards him—*i. e.*, there was no close personal relations between us, such as there was with Humphreys and Gibbon and yourself that could or would in any respect whatever sway my judgment. We differed on some points, sometimes I was vexed, once I *demande*d to be relieved,—so I could be impartial—I think.

Now, Webb, as I have studied this battle because I have written about it and had to study it, Meade has grown and grown upon me. I won't say, for I don't know, what were his views and determinations about the different phases of the campaign and battles. He did not take me into his confidence. I don't complain of it, mind, but I am now very sorry that he did not. Had he done so, I am firmly convinced that I could now very effectively speak with authority *in his favor*. He did ask or direct me to look for a battle-field behind Pipe Creek, and of course I inquired of my own mind his reasons, as he did not give them to me himself. I did not have to look far, for the only reasonable solution presented itself. He *did* tell me, July 2d, that he feared we were in no condition to fight at Gettysburg, but in this matter he did give me his reasons, so far as it concerned *me*—"lack of ammunition (artillery)." I assured him that whilst we had none to throw away there would be enough, and that apparently fully satisfied him. Therefore I concluded when the charge was made that he did n't want to fight there, that it was all "poppy-cock."

More than that, I believe, as my Gettysburg paper, I think, shows, that Pipe Creek was our true place, and it was Meade's order to me to look for a field there that suggested that fact to me. *I infer Meade's views and intentions from his acts*. His word is sufficient to establish them—and does establish them,—but they had no weight with me, because they were unnecessary to, yet

confirmed my convictions, which were formed on his *acts* before he went before the Committee.

Meade was suddenly placed in command. From that moment *all* his acts and intentions, as I can judge of them, were just what they *ought* to have been, except perhaps in his order to attack at Falling Waters on the morning of the 13th, and especially on the 14th of July, when his Corps Commanders reported against it, and I was *then* in favor of the attack, so I can't blame him. He was *right* in his orders as to Pipe Creek ; *right* in his determination under certain circumstances to fall back to it : *right* in pushing up to Gettysburg after the battle commenced ; *right* in remaining there ; *right* in making his battle a purely defensive one ; *right*, therefore, in taking the line he did ; *right* in not attempting a *counter-attack* at *any* stage of the battle ; *right* as to his pursuit of Lee. Rarely has more skill, vigor, or wisdom been shown under such circumstances as he was placed in, and it would, I think, belittle his grand record of that campaign by a formal defense against his detractors, who will as surely go under as will this show story.

I am bold enough to believe that had the Rapidan campaign been conducted by him free from the trammels of the higher headquarters, it would have been better for the A. P., and for the country, but of this you need say nothing. I have n't finished my study of it yet.

H. J. HUNT.

To Bvt. Maj.-Genl. ALEXANDER S. WEBB, U. S. A.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS AT THE
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, PA., JULY 1 TO 4, 1863.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Major-General GEORGE SYKES commanding.							
FIRST DIVISION : Brigadier-General JAMES BARNES.							
FIRST BRIGADE : Colonel WILLIAM S. TILTON.							
18th Massachusetts.....	1	23	3	27			27
22d Massachusetts.....	3	24	1	31			31
1st Michigan.....	1	27	4	42			42
118th Pennsylvania.....	1	16	3	25			25
Total First Brigade.....	2	10	12	90	11		125
SECOND BRIGADE : Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.							
9th Massachusetts.....	1	6		7			7
32d Massachusetts.....	1	12	7	55	5		80
4th Michigan.....	1	24	9	55	1	75	165
62d Pennsylvania.....	4	24	10	97	40		175
Total Second Brigade.....	6	61	26	213	1	120	427
THIRD BRIGADE : Colonel STRONG VINCENT. ¹ Colonel JAMES C. RICE.							
Staff.....			1				1
20th Maine.....	29	6	85	5			125
16th Michigan.....	3	20	2	32	3		60
44th New York.....	2	24	5	77	3		111
83d Pennsylvania.....	1	9	3	42			55
Total Third Brigade.....	6	82	17	236	11		352
Total First Division.....	14	153	55	539	1	142	904

¹ Mortally wounded and died after being appointed Brig.-General.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel HANNIBAL DAY.							
Staff.....				1			1
3d United States (6 companies).....		6	4	62		1	73
4th United States (4 companies).....		10	2	28			40
6th United States (5 companies).....		4	1	39			44
12th United States (8 companies).....		1	7	4	67	13	92
14th United States (8 companies).....		18	2	108		4	132
Total First Brigade.....	1	45	13	305		18	382
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel SIDNEY BURBANK.							
2d United States (6 companies).....	1	5	4	51		6	67
7th United States (4 companies).....	1	11	3	42		2	59
10th United States (3 companies).....	1	15	5	27		3	51
11th United States (6 companies).....	3	16	7	85		9	120
17th United States (7 companies).....	1	24	13	105		7	150
Total Second Brigade.....	7	71	32	310		27	447
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General STEPHEN H. WEED. ¹							
Colonel KENNER GARRARD.							
Staff.....	1						1
140th New York.....	1	25	5	84		18	133
146th New York.....		4	2	22			28
91st Pennsylvania.....		3	2	14			19
155th Pennsylvania.....		6	2	11			19
Total Third Brigade.....	2	38	11	131		18	200
Total Second Division.....	10	154	56	746		63	1029
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WILLIAM McCANDLESS.							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....		8	3	35			46
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....		3	2	31		1	37
6th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		2	1	21			24
13th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		2	5	8	31	2	48
Total First Brigade.....	2	18	14	118		3	155

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE : Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER.							
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....				2			2
9th Pennsylvania Reserves.....				5			5
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		2		3			5
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	2	3	35			41
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		1		1			2
Total Third Brigade.....	1	5	3	46			55
Total Third Division.....	3	23	17	164		3	210
ARTILLERY BRIGADE : Captain AUGUSTUS P. MARTIN.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C).....				6			6
1st Ohio Light, Battery L.....				2			2
5th United States, Battery D.....	1	6		6			13
5th United States, Battery I.....		1	1	18		2	22
Total Artillery Brigade.....	1	7	1	32		2	43
Ambulance Corps.....				1			1
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	28	337	129	1,482	1	210	2,187
Total Army of the Potomac...	246	2,900	1,145	13,384	183	5,182	23,049
Total Confederate Army ¹		2,592		12,700		5,150	20,451

PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

On the morning of the 4th of July, the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, Fifth Corps, together with the 6th U. S., of the 2d Brigade, same division, was ordered on a reconnoissance to the front of Little Round Top.

¹ The record of prisoners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant-General U. S. Army bear the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates captured by the Union forces at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to 5th, inclusive. The number of wounded Confederates is reported by the medical director of the Army of the Potomac as 6802.

Moving about one mile to the front through the wheat field, it was found that Lee had refused his right flank, but was still holding a strong position toward the centre of the line.

While this was being developed, General Slocum, with the 3d Brigade of the 1st Division of the Twelfth Corps, and the 46th Pennsylvania and 5th Connecticut, made a reconnaissance on the right, the line of march being along the turnpike about two miles, thence by a cross-road to the Hanover road, and by the Hanover road to Gettysburg. This reconnaissance developed the fact that the Confederates had wholly withdrawn from the front of the right of the army.

It is presumed that General Lee rather courted an attack from General Meade at this time; but the latter was too clear-headed to give up his defensive position when he knew that the former must attack him or run away. Moreover, the rain was now falling in torrents, and continued to pour down all day. Therefore, the remainder of the 4th of July was occupied by the Union army in getting up its various wagon trains, burying the dead, caring for the wounded, and generally putting things in order.

On the morning of the 5th of July it was ascertained that the Confederates were in full retreat by the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. The Sixth Corps was immediately sent in pursuit on the Fairfield road and the Union cavalry on the Cashtown road and by the Emmitsburg and Monterey passes in the mountains.

General Sedgwick having pushed the pursuit of the Confederates as far as Fairfield pass, and reporting that the pass was a very strong one, in which a small force of the enemy could hold in check and delay for a considerable time any pursuing force, General Meade,

leaving McIntosh's brigade of cavalry and Neil's brigade of infantry to continue harassing the Confederate rear, put the army in motion by the flank for Middletown, Md.

General French, who was at Frederick, was ordered to re-occupy Harper's Ferry and send a force to occupy Turner's pass in South Mountain. This competent officer had not only anticipated these orders in part, but had pushed a cavalry force to Williamsport and Falling Waters on the Potomac River, where it destroyed Lee's pontoon bridge and captured its guard. Buford had, in the meantime, been sent to Williamsport and Hagerstown. These expeditions were most successfully accomplished, the Confederates being greatly harassed, their trains destroyed, and many captures of guns and prisoners made.

The Fifth Corps started on its march on the afternoon of the 5th of July, moved by the way of Emmitsburg, Creagerstown, and Middletown, crossing the Catoctin and South Mountain ranges at High Knob and Fox's Gap, and reached Delaware Mills, on the upper Antietam, on the 10th. The day on which it crossed the Catoctin range the men were without rations, and a nasty rain fell until they reached the Middletown valley. At this point food was procured, and from that time forward both officers and men were in the best of spirits. They were satisfied, from what they had accomplished at Gettysburg, that if they met their old enemies again, they could easily vanquish them, and, in consequence the *morale* of the corps was at its best.

Upon advancing his right flank across the Antietam on the 12th, the Confederates abandoned Funkstown

and Hagerstown, and General Meade moved his line forward so as to extend from the latter place to Fair Play. The cavalry on the right reported the Confederates as strongly posted on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road. That on the left reported them in position back of St. James' College and at Downsville. This was reported to Washington by General Meade, stating that it was his intention to attack the next day. That same evening he called his corps commanders together and submitted to them the question as to whether or not an attack should be made on the Confederate forces. Five out of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it. Under these circumstances, and in view of the momentous consequences attendant upon a failure to succeed, General Meade did not feel himself authorized to attack until after he had made more careful examination of the Confederate position, strength, and defensive works.

Upon reporting to Washington the result of this council of corps commanders, General Halleck telegraphed :

"You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no Council of War. It is proverbial that Councils of War never fight. . . . Do not let the enemy escape."

At 9 P.M. General Meade directed that a reconnaissance in force be made the next morning (14th) by a division from each of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps. This reconnaissance developed the fact that during the night previous the Confederates had slipped across the Potomac River, which virtually closed the Pennsylvania campaign.

The authorities at Washington were much disgruntled at the escape of General Lee's army without another battle, and insisted upon that army being at once pursued, General Halleck having telegraphed as follows :

"The enemy should be pursued and cut up, wherever he may have gone. . . . I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore."

To this General Meade replied :

"Having performed my duty, conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President, conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P.M. this day [July 14th] is, in my judgment, so undeserved, that I feel compelled, most respectfully, to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army."

This dispatch brought forth the following from General Halleck :

"My telegram, stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army, was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved."

From the time the Fifth Corps left Gettysburg, rumors had been flying about, all tending to raise the hopes of the army to the highest pitch. The men knew that the Confederate losses had been tremendous, and since the battle prisoners had been constantly taken by the cavalry ; that the heavy rains had made the river fords impassable, and that the harassed troops were short both of food and ammunition. For twenty-four hours the Union army had been lying with closely drawn lines investing the

rebel position, and when the morning of the 14th disclosed the fact that the Army of the Potomac had no opponent to face it north of the river, the least that can be said for the officers and men is, that they were disappointed.

No one, who saw the approach of that army to Williamsport can ever forget the sight. Upon advancing beyond the Antietam, the army moved in battle-array, each corps in line, each brigade in columns of regimental front, and as the ground marched over consisted of open cultivated fields, the whole line could be seen, with its colors proudly floating in the breeze and bayonets by the tens of thousands gleaming in the sunlight. The artillery moved along two parallel roads, in the centre of the mass, all ready for action, while one hundred pioneers from each division moved to the front and swept away obstructions—fences, stone-walls, outhouses—everything but dwelling-houses and large barns. The fields were groaning with the yellow ripened grain, and when the army had passed everything bore the appearance of having a tornado pass over it. Hardly a stalk of grain was left standing in the fields.

This magnificent exhibition lent its enchantment to the rank and file and filled them with an ardor that would have made itself felt, if in this manner they could have moved on the enemy. But the procrastination and delay, caused by the talk and then the advice of the corps commanders, soon removed whatever of *élan* the troops possessed. When they discovered that the enemy had gone, they consoled themselves with the fact that they had answered the call which had been made upon them. That call,

when Lee crossed the Potomac and threatened Northern cities with fire and sword, had been a cry for protection. In a fortnight's time, by marches so wearying that only the strongest reached the battlefield—by conflicts so desperate that its ranks had been more than doubly decimated—the army had delivered the country from the presence of invaders, the people breathed freely; and then began to be heard the complaints of a large class of war critics who were not satisfied because Lee's army had not been "bagged."

Some of the editorial criticisms of those days would have been better if based upon a little actual experience in the presence of the enemy. A great deal of it was pitiable in the utter non-comprehension by the writers of the nature of military operations on a large scale. However, had General Lee remained north of the Potomac on the 14th of July, notwithstanding the opinions of the corps commanders, General Meade would have attacked with a tremendous force; or, in other words, he would have stormed the Confederate position with the concentrated power of his whole army. What the result of that would have been no human being knows.

These criticisms, no doubt, represented not so much the opinions of the authors as they did the disgust at having to undergo the necessities of the operation of the law for drafting men for the army, for while the Army of the Potomac was trudging its way back into Virginia, this law was put in force.

BACK TO VIRGINIA.

It being impossible, for lack of pontoon bridges, and for means to properly supply the troops, in the

event of a desire to cross the Potomac, General Meade, on the 15th of July, put the army in motion for Harper's Ferry, leaving General Couch, with sufficient force, to control and cover the upper Potomac. He decided to take the interior line, keeping the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, and strike them if possible on the flank by way of the passes.

Crossing the Potomac at Berlin, the Fifth Corps moved by the way of Lovetsville, Goose Creek, and Rectortown; and on the morning of the 23d moved at 6 A.M. towards Manassas Gap. The Third Corps was in advance and the Second Corps followed closely in the rear of the Fifth. The three corps were very closely massed, and, after entering the Gap at its eastern extremity, the advance of the greater part of the whole force was made in compact order, the formation in the Fifth Corps being for the most part by brigades in columns of full regimental fronts. As the manner of the advance threw the corps out of the road upon the slopes, another of those beautiful spectacles, as a tactical display on a large scale, was witnessed. The skirmishers of the Third Corps encountered the Confederate outposts after marching two or three miles through the Gap, and there ensued a sharp fight, in which the Third Corps constantly drove the enemy back, until near dark, when the Confederates made quite a determined stand, and a part of the Fifth Corps was pushed to the front. After a short fight, in which the Union troops kept steadily advancing, darkness came on, so that nothing could be seen. Early the next morning a general advance was made, and it was found that the Confederates had disappeared. The force had

simply been holding the position to permit Lee's trains to pass the point.

Retracing its steps through the Gap, the Fifth Corps moved by the way of Warrenton, and on the 6th of August went into camp at Beverly Ford, on the banks of the Rappahannock River. On the morning of the 8th the 3d Brigade of the 2d Division crossed the river on a pontoon bridge laid for the purpose and made a reconnaissance, but found no enemy. It was returned the same evening to camp, but almost immediately was ordered to strike tents and move south of the river again. On the 9th, the brigade moved along the south bank a mile or so down the stream, when the pontoon bridge was again placed and the brigade recrossed and returned to its old camp.

After the failure of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, men were not so ready to volunteer for service in the field. The two-years' men had all been discharged; the regiments of the regular army had become reduced by casualties to mere skeletons, and companies and battalions had to be consolidated. The latter were unable to procure recruits owing to the large bounties which towns, counties, and States were offering for volunteers. The need of men became a serious factor to the successful prosecution of the war. The question, therefore, became a subject for Congressional legislation, and an act was passed enrolling all available citizens of the loyal States for military duty, said States to furnish their proper quota on the call of the Government for additional troops. These were to be drawn by lottery, and each man so drawn was to be held for duty, or required to furnish an acceptable substitute who had himself not been drawn. This

act, as might be conceived, was not a popular one, and when its enforcement was ordered great riots occurred in New York City. It was about this time that the Army of the Potomac reached the Rappahannock River, in its march towards Richmond, after the battle of Gettysburg.

On the 13th of August, 1863, therefore, the two brigades of Regulars, from the 2d Division of the Fifth Corps, under command of Gen. R. B. Ayres, were, in conjunction with other troops from the army, detached, and sent to New York City, where they camped in the various public squares, the headquarters and the 14th Infantry pitching their tents in Madison Square, and the hospitable proprietors of the Fifth Avenue Hotel furnished meals to the officers free of charge.

A reign of terror was overthrown and peace of mind was restored to the people of the metropolis from the moment of the arrival of these hardy veterans, although the actual rioting had been controlled by the very small force that had previously been available. Leaving this command to perform its duties in the heart of civilization, we again return to the field to note what was proceeding there.

A MILITARY EXECUTION.

There are some incidents in a soldier's life that are much more impressive than a battle, and we recount one here as a thrilling example : The 20th of August, 1863, was a day appointed for the execution of five deserters of the 118th Pennsylvania, belonging to the Fifth Corps. The place selected for the execution was an immense meadow, in the shape of a large amphitheatre, through which ran a small stream of

water. Across this stream the pioneers of the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps had thrown a bridge, and on the other side of the stream, to the right of the bridge, five graves had been dug; a coffin was placed by the side of each grave. Orders had been issued for the parading of as many organizations of the Fifth Corps as could be spared from picket and other duties. The troops were marched to the ground soon after mid-day, and formed in line of battle on three sides of a square, the gorge, or fourth front, opening towards the fatal spot.

When all was ready, the signal was given, and the sound of funeral music was heard proceeding from the vicinity of the guard tents. Soon afterwards the mournful procession was seen approaching. The prisoners—five in number—were of the following religious persuasions: two Roman Catholics, two Protestants, and one Jew. They were attended by ministers of their own faith. First came the Jew, with his rabbi; then the Catholics, with a priest; followed by the Protestants, with two ministers. Behind these followed the band and the surgeons. The rear was closed by the provost guard of the 1st Division, whose neat and clean uniforms and equipments, glistening muskets, and splendid drill excited admiration.

Slowly and sadly the procession marched between the rear and centre line of troops to the right; then filing to the left, passed between the centre and front lines to the left; then filing right, passed in front of the first line. The column then filed to the left and marched towards and over the bridge, halting in front of the newly made graves. The prisoners were then seated on their coffins. The firing party, consisting

of sixteen files of men who had fought on numerous bloody fields, was drawn up in front of the condemned men. The bearing of these individuals—except the Jew, whose feelings completely overcame him—was firm and steady.

After a few minutes of delay, the bugle sounded "Attention!" which was the signal for the chaplains to retire. The prisoners were then blindfolded; the firing party was marched to within ten paces of the prisoners, while a breathless silence pervaded the atmosphere. Suddenly the sharp, quick commands of the provost marshal, "*Ready, Aim, Fire!*" rang out on the clear summer air. Like one piece, the thirty-two muskets belched forth their flaming tongues and five men fell dead upon their coffins.¹ The surgeons examined the bodies and pronounced them dead. The assistant inspector-general received the report of the surgeons, and communicated it to the general of division, who, in turn, reported to the major-general commanding the corps that the sentence of the court-martial had been duly executed. The bugle sounded the "Recall," the troops were marched to their respective camps, the dead bodies were buried, and thus ended one of the saddest episodes of the war.

AN ADVANCE OF THE ARMY.

An apparent cessation of important movements of both the Union and Confederate armies now followed.

¹ These men were Charles Walter, Gion Reanese, Emil Lai, Gion Folaney, and George Kuhn. Although assigned to the regiment, they had never joined it, were wholly unknown to it, and the regiment ought never to have had credit of the affair. Charged with a crime, conviction for which was likely to be followed by capital punishment, they were sent to the regiment only as a place where judicial cognizance could be taken of their offenses. They had, therefore, while prisoners, been thrown into an organization where they were entire strangers, and the members of which had neither friendship, memories, nor association with them.

The Union army was posted along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad and from Waterloo to Falmouth, on the north bank of the Rappahannock River, the Fifth Corps occupying a position controlling Beverly Ford. The Confederate army was in various positions, watching the movements of General Meade, about as follows: A. P. Hill was between Stevensburg and Culpeper; Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was opposite Kelly's Ford of the Rappahannock, while the remainder of the corps was between Stevensburg and Slaughter's Mountain. Ewell was at or in the neighborhood of Gordonsville, with a large force at Madison Court-House; Fitz-Lee's division of cavalry was at Chancellorsville; while Cooke's brigade and a battery, all of Georgia troops, were at Fredericksburg.

The entire South was in an extraordinary state of excitement over the retreat of General Lee from Pennsylvania, and a disagreement occurred between the President of the Confederacy and the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia regarding the line of defense to be occupied—the former insisting upon holding the line of the Rappahannock, while the latter desired to retire to the line of the James. This caused General Lee to tender his resignation, which was not, however, accepted.

The President of the United States was not especially pleased with the inactivity of the Army of the Potomac, and through General Halleck, on the 15th of September, 1863, urged a move upon Lee, it having been positively known that Longstreet's corps had been detached from Lee and sent to Tennessee. Upon the strength of this communication, General Meade issued orders at 11.25 P.M., the same day, for

a forward movement to commence at 5 A.M. of the 16th. The First Corps was ordered to a position midway between Stevensburg and Culpeper Court-House; the Second Corps to Culpeper; the Third Corps midway between Culpeper and Stone-House Mountain; the Fifth Corps in rear of Culpeper; the Sixth Corps to Stone-House Mountain; the Eleventh Corps distributed to guard the bridges at Rappahannock Crossing, Catlett's, and Bristoe; the Twelfth Corps to Stevensburg; the cavalry to picket the front and guard the flank of the army; and the Artillery Reserve to take position in the vicinity of the Fifth Corps. On the 17th, the Second Corps was ordered from Culpeper to relieve the cavalry pickets from Somerville Ford to Cedar Mountain; and the Fifth Corps was directed to occupy the position vacated by the Second on the ridge in front of the village of Culpeper, in the neighborhood of which village it remained until October 13th. In the meanwhile, General Ayres, with his two brigades of Regulars, rejoined (September 21st) from New York City, having, in obedience to orders from Washington, left the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 10th Regiments of U. S. Infantry in and about the harbor of New York, to recruit their depleted ranks.¹

How well the two armies were kept posted on the movements of each other may best be inferred from the following extract from the report of General Lee to Mr. Davis, on the 23d of September²:

"No time ought now to be lost or wasted. Everything should be done that can be done at once, so that the troops may be speedily returned to this department. As far as I can judge, they will not get here too soon. The enemy is aware of Longstreet's departure.

¹ See Organization of Corps, p. 594.

² *Reb. Rec.*, No. 49, p. 742.

They report in their papers the day he passed through Augusta, and give the position of Ewell's and Hill's corps. General Meade is strengthening himself daily. Our scouts report the return of the troops sent North to enforce the draft. Nine trains, loaded with troops, reached Culpeper Thursday night. Three trains arrived on Monday and three on Tuesday last, in addition to between 4000 and 5000 by marching."

On the 18th and 19th of September, General Meade had quietly massed his cavalry on his right and moved them through Madison Court-House. General Gregg moved down the road to Orange Court-House, by Barnett's Ford ; Kilpatrick, the road by Liberty Mills ; and Buford, the road by Barboursville, leading to Gordonsville. Stuart so obstinately opposed this movement that the Union cavalry was brought to a halt at the Rapidan, from which point it retired during the night.

From this time on, until winter finally closed in, the country about the Rappahannock, and along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad became a chess-board, on which Generals Meade and Lee played a great game. After taking up a position around Culpeper, with the advance of two corps to the Rapidan, General Meade found, upon an examination of the Confederate position, that it was entirely out of the question to attempt to force the passage of the river in his immediate front. Just when a plan of operations for a flank movement had been matured, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac for duty in the West. They left on the 24th of September.

General Lee was not slow in ascertaining these facts, and considered it was now his turn to make a move. He therefore commenced his scouting opera-

tions preparatory to an advance. General Meade, however, learning of this, anticipated the movement ; sent General Buford, with his division of cavalry, across the Rapidan, with orders to uncover, if practicable, the upper fords of the river, and the First and Sixth Corps, in advance on the river, were ordered to force the passages in their respective fronts. Before the intelligence of Buford's movements could be received, the Confederates crossed Robertson's River, and advanced from Madison Court-House in heavy force, driving in the Union cavalry, their evident intention being to pass the right flank of the Union army and gain its rear. In this belief, the Union army was withdrawn to the north side of the Rappahannock October 11th.

On the 12th of October, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps again crossed the Rappahannock and advanced as far as Brandy Station ; but during that night General Meade received dispatches from General Gregg, stating that his division of cavalry had been forced back from the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Hazel rivers, and that the Confederates were crossing in heavy force at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo.

Then commenced a race for the old and famous battle-field of Bull Run. As it was too late, when Gregg's report reached General Meade, to attempt to occupy Warrenton in advance of the Confederates, the Union army was withdrawn, on the 13th, to Auburn and Catlett's Station, and on the 14th to Centreville. This retrograde movement was accomplished without molestation until the 14th, on which day the Second Corps skirmished with the Confederates at Auburn, and in the afternoon of the same day the latter attacked the former at Bristoe, which attack was

handsomely repulsed by General Warren, who captured five pieces of artillery and some 450 prisoners.

General Lee claims that when leaving Madison Court-House, it was his intention of forcing General Meade to a battle, but that the latter declined it; that he then resolved to turn the flank of the Union army and intercept its line of retreat. This he failed to do. Meade having reached Centreville in advance of the Confederate forces, Lee did not think it advantageous to attack him, for several reasons. If he (Lee) advanced beyond where he then was, he would have been obliged to go to Loudon for supplies. This would have carried him so far from Richmond that, with the uncertain conditions of the roads and stage of the streams at that time of the year, any further movement northward would have been extremely hazardous, particularly as his men were poorly supplied with clothing—shoes, blankets, and overcoats. He therefore destroyed the bridges over Cub, Broad, and Cedar runs, and tore up the railroad track between the points named, burning the ties and bending the rails, and retired again behind the Rappahannock.

Finding that the Confederate army did not advance beyond Broad Run, General Meade was about re-crossing Bull Run, when a severe rain-storm occurred (on the 16th) which rendered Bull Run unfordable and required the sending for pontoon bridges. Up to the 18th, the time was spent in efforts to ascertain the precise position of the Confederate army, which efforts developed the fact that it was retiring. Therefore the Union army was put in motion on the 19th, advancing to Gainesville. The next day it occupied Warrenton without opposition, and followed the Confederates to the Rappahannock. Here it was found

that the Orange & Alexandria Railroad had been completely destroyed from Bristoe to the Rappahannock. Through the energy and skill of Colonel McCullum, the road was put in order to Warrenton Junction by November 2d.

At this period General Meade submitted to the general-in-chief (Halleck) the prospect of seizing, by a prompt movement, the heights of Fredericksburg, and transferring the base of operations to the Potomac & Fredericksburg Railroad. This did not meet with approval. It is impossible, even at this late day, to conjecture why the authorities at Washington insisted on retaining the Orange & Alexandria Railroad as a base of supply, when it was well known that every commanding general (even Grant himself) had to cut loose from it the moment the Army crossed the Rapidan.

As it was Halleck's desire for the Army of the Potomac to continue (or rather renew) offensive operations on this line, General Meade, on the 7th of November, put his troops in motion to force the passage of the Rappahannock. General Sedgwick, in command of his own (the Sixth) and the Fifth Corps, advanced to Rappahannock Station, where the Confederates were entrenched on the north bank of the river. By a brilliant charge the Sixth Corps took the works and captured some 1600 prisoners. The two corps then crossed the river and went into camp some four miles east of the railroad, and about an equal distance south of the river, where were left standing log cabins which had been constructed but a few days before by the Confederates, evidently with the expectation of occupying them as winter quarters, which they eventually did, as subsequent events will show.

The other three corps of the army crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 7th, where the Third Corps forced the passage of the river, taking the works on the other side and capturing some 400 prisoners. This movement was a surprise to the Confederates, who retired during the night.

On the 8th, the pursuit was carried as far as Brandy Station, the cavalry proceeding to Culpeper. It now being necessary to have the railroad repaired to this point, a position was taken up by General Meade, which stretched from Kelly's Ford, through Brandy Station, to Welford's Ford.

THE MINE RUN AFFAIR.

The railroad repairs having been made, and the depot at Brandy Station completed, General Meade decided to cross the Rapidan at the lower fords in three columns, and by a prompt movement seize the Plank road and turnpike, and advance rapidly towards Orange Court-House, thus turning the enemy's works, compelling him to give battle on ground not previously selected or prepared; and he hoped that, in the execution of the plan, he would be able to strike a portion of the Confederate force before a concentration could be effected, and thus so cripple them as to render more certain the success of the final issue.

On the 23d of November, therefore, orders were issued for the movement. A storm, however, occurred during the night, and the movement was delayed until the morning of the 26th.

A division of cavalry, under General Gregg, was ordered to cross at Ely's Ford, and proceed on the Catharpin road as far as Corbin's Bridge, to cover the left flank of the army. Custer's division was to hold

the upper fords of the Rapidan, while Merritt's division was ordered to guard the trains assembled at Richardsville.

The Third Corps, under General French, was directed to cross the Rapidan at Jacob's Mill, and continue the march by a road from that point to Robertson's tavern, where he was to effect a junction with the Second Corps, under General Warren, who was ordered to cross at Germanna Ford and take the turnpike to Robertson's.

The Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, received instructions to cross at Culpeper Ford, and, entering the Plank road, to continue the march as far as Parker's store, and, if practicable, to the crossing of the road from Robertson's tavern.

The Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, was to follow the Third Corps, while two divisions of the First Corps, under General Newton (the other division being left on the railroad), were directed to follow the Fifth Corps.

It was General Meade's intention to concentrate his army about Robertson's tavern by the evening of the 26th, but delays occurred in crossing the river, so that it was not until the morning of the 27th that the march was resumed. Warren reached the tavern with the Second Corps about 10 A.M. of the 27th, driving the Confederate skirmishers for some distance before reaching it. It was at this point that General Meade directed Warren to halt and maintain his ground until connection was made with the Third Corps.

The Fifth Corps left its camp on the 26th, under command of General Sykes, and reached the Rapidan at 10.30 A.M. A regiment was thrown across in boats, a bridge was rapidly laid, and the crossing of the en-

tire corps was effected by noon. In consequence of delays happening to the troops on the right, at Germanna and Jacob's Mill fords, the Fifth Corps was ordered to await the passage of the river by the Second and Third Corps. About 3 P.M. the line of march was resumed, and the corps bivouacked at the Wilderness farm. On the 27th the corps continued its march,¹ arrived at Parker's store at 9 A.M., and there found General Gregg engaged with the Confederate cavalry, which he was driving from point to point. The country was so densely wooded, however, that they could only fight dismounted. About 3 P.M. the Confederates threw forward a division of infantry when General Sykes deployed the Fifth Corps, took position in advance of New Hope church and relieved Gregg. After the infantry skirmishers had been thrown out, the Confederates relapsed into a state of quietude, and made no further demonstration. Upon reporting this condition of affairs to General Meade, Sykes was directed not to advance beyond the intersection of the road from Raccoon Ford with the Orange and Alexandria Plank road, as the Third Corps had not yet effected a junction with the Second Corps.

¹J. L. Smith, in the history of the 118th Pennsylvania says: "Lieutenant-Colonel Sherwin, 22d Massachusetts, noticing a cavalryman closely buttoned in a Union great-coat, intently observing the column, rode to him, and not receiving satisfactory responses to his interrogations, demanded he should open his coat and expose the uniform underneath. His hesitancy confirmed the Colonel's suspicions. He instantly drew his revolver, and with his other hand tore open the coat. Beneath was a Confederate uniform. Further parley was unnecessary; a well directed shot brought the career of the spy to a sudden termination. His body lay where it fell, and many, as the column passed, in order to confirm the story which was soon abroad, dropped out of ranks to view it. This man had evidently been instructed, among other things, to count the numbers moving to the Union left. Unable to secure a satisfactory point of observation from a distance, and deeming the duty of sufficient importance to warrant the risk, he took his life in his hands and ventured once too often within the Union lines."

The Third Corps, under General French, had, in the meantime, pursued its indicated direction, and, upon arriving at Raccoon Ford, met the enemy, and quite a spirited engagement followed. The delay in forming a junction with the Second Corps, thus occasioned, was the cause of some animadversions by General Meade, in his reports, on the conduct of General French. These are replied to by General French, and form part of an interesting chapter in the history of the Third Corps; but as the facts in no way relate to, or have any connection with, the history of the Fifth Corps, any further mention of them is omitted.¹

On the 28th of November, disposition was made to attack the Confederates; but on driving in their pickets, it was found that General Lee had moved from his position during the night previous. Pursuit was immediately organized, with the Second Corps in advance. After a march of about two miles, the Confederates were found to have established themselves on the west bank of Mine Run. A severe storm of rain had now begun, delaying the march of the troops, particularly the artillery, and preventing a position being taken up until after dark, at which time the Second, Sixth, First, and Third Corps were in line fronting the enemy.

Floundering through mud, in the cold and darkness of a winter night, the Fifth Corps moved to and took position, at 4 A.M. of the 29th, in front of Mine Run, the line stretching out on both sides of the turnpike, relieving the Second Corps. The opposite bank of Mine Run, at this point, had an elevation of over one hundred feet, with a gentle and smooth

¹ For investigation, see *Rec. Reb.*, Serial No. 48, pp. 735-744.

slope to the creek, averaging over 1000 yards of cleared ground. At almost all other points the banks were precipitous, rocky, and wooded, and were formidable in themselves; but strengthened, as its western bank now was, with strong earthworks, the dislodgment of the Confederate army by direct assault seemed wholly impracticable. The stream itself was inconsiderable, flowing northward and emptying into the Rapidan at Mitchell's Ford, but there were many swampy and impassable places.¹

General Meade was thoroughly convinced, after a careful personal examination, that there was no probability of success in an attack in front of the turnpike. Replacing the Second Corps with the Fifth, he sent General Warren, with the Second and a division of the Sixth Corps, to feel the Confederate right and turn it if practicable. Warren moved up the Plank road, drove in the enemy's outposts, and took a position which outflanked the Confederates, and from which he reported that there was no difficulty in assaulting and turning the enemy's flank. About this time General Wright, commanding a division of the Sixth Corps, reported that he had discovered a point on the extreme right of the Union line, where an assault, he thought, was practicable, with inconsiderable loss. Captain Michler, of the U. S. Engineers, also reported that an assault in

¹ Captain Porter Farley, a member of the Fifth Corps, in his *Reminiscences*, says: "Could the force there drawn up cross an open valley, half a mile in width, swept as it was in its whole extent by hostile batteries? Could it ford that creek, re-form on the other side, and then, its perilous charge only half made, recover its lost momentum, and sweep on to storm, take, and hold intrenchments which were manned by Lee's veteran infantry? The thing did not look within the range of possibility. Moreover, the weather was so cold that, had the charge been attempted, every man severely wounded would almost to a certainty have perished."

front of the Third Corps was not impracticable, though hazardous.

These favorable reports caused General Meade to decide to make three assaults—one on the Confederate left, with the Sixth and Fifth Corps; one in the centre, with the Third and First Corps; and one on the Confederate right, with General Warren's command. Warren reported at General Meade's headquarters during the evening of the 29th, and expressed such confidence in his ability to carry everything before him, as to induce Meade to believe that the Confederates would not remain overnight, so completely did he command them. This caused General Meade to modify his plan so far as to abandon the centre attack, and reinforce Warren with two divisions of the Third Corps, which gave him nearly half of the infantry under Meade's command. Orders were issued accordingly. The batteries of the centre and right were to open at 8 A.M. of the 30th, at which time Warren was to make the main attack, and at 9 o'clock Sedgwick was to assault with his column. When these assaults were successful, the centre was to move forward, after making demonstrations in its front, in conjunction with the others at 8 o'clock. Warren returned to his command, flattered with its size as well as with the importance of the part he was to take, and sanguine of success.

Promptly at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 30th the batteries opened. The skirmishers of the First and Third Corps advanced across Mine Run and drove in the Confederate skirmishers, and all due preparations were made by Sedgwick and others for the assault. Fifteen minutes after eight came, and no sound from Warren. Intently listening, another

fifteen minutes rolled by, yet nothing was heard. General Meade was fretting like a war-horse under curb. Three quarters of an hour passed, with still an ominous silence on the left. Finally, amidst the greatest impatience, at ten minutes to 9 o'clock, a dispatch was received from Warren, to the effect that "the position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in my present front, that I advise against making an attack here—the full light of the sun shows me that I cannot succeed."

This was not only a damper upon the ardor of the troops, but the announcement was like a death-knell to General Meade. He had barely time to suspend Sedgwick's assault, which was dependent upon Warren, and then he rode to General Warren's headquarters, which he reached between 10 and 11 A.M. He found Warren's views, as expressed in the dispatch, unchanged, and that it was his decided opinion that it was hopeless to make an attack. General Meade, upon an examination of the position, reluctantly coincided with General Warren's views. It was, however, too late to move the troops back in order to make an attack from the centre that day, and any movement to further attempt to turn the Confederate right could not be continued without ordering up the remainder of the army in support and abandoning the turnpike—the main line of communication. Therefore, at night, the two divisions of the Third Corps returned to the centre, and the Fifth and Sixth Corps returned to their former positions. It was then ascertained that the opening of the batteries in the morning had exposed the threatened attack by Sedgwick, and the Confederates could be seen strengthening the position by earthworks, abatis, etc.

Knowing that the Confederates would work all night to render that point as strong as any other part of the line, General Meade, after mature deliberation, decided to withdraw his army, regarding the whole campaign a failure. This was successfully effected, and by the 2d of December the Fifth Corps was back at Rappahannock Station. The next day it moved to Warrenton, and was assigned the duty of guarding the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, being disposed of by brigades at intervals along the line from Brandy Station to Fairfax. And here, on Christmas day, we will leave them to the enjoyment of a winter in camp, and thus close the annals of 1863.

The total loss of the entire corps during the campaign consisted of four enlisted men killed, one officer and eighteen enlisted men wounded ; two officers and fifty-nine enlisted men captured or missing. Total, eighty-four.

CHAPTER X.

FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES—BATTLES OF THE
WILDERNESS—SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE—
NORTH ANNA RIVER—TOTOPOTOMOY RIVER—
BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR.

First Epoch.

WE have now arrived at a period in the history of the War of the Rebellion where a complete change was to be effected in the management and organization of the Army of the Potomac. The military power of the United States was to be concentrated in one individual, and the armies of the nation were to move on converging lines and somewhat simultaneously, in order to prevent the Confederates from using their forces, by means of interior lines, as supports in different sections of the country, at periods of inactivity in the Union armies, produced by lack of combined action.

General Grant's almost phenomenal success with the western armies had brought him so prominently before the American people, that Congress passed a bill, which became a law on the 26th of February, 1864, restoring the grade of Lieutenant-General. The President nominated Major-General Grant, on the 1st of March, to fill the office ; he was confirmed by the

Senate on the 2d, and on the 3d the General was ordered to Washington to receive his commission. This was delivered to him on the 9th, and in handing it to him, the President said :

“General Grant, the Nation’s appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the Nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence.”

To this General Grant replied :

“MR. PRESIDENT : I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your earnest expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving upon me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.”

The following day General Grant visited General Meade at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, then located at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. He had known General Meade slightly during the Mexican war, but had not met him since. General Grant, in his *Memoirs*, says :

“I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all, except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change

not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman especially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation, that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right man for all positions. For himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him. As for Sherman, he could not be spared from the West.

“This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service.

“Meade’s position afterwards proved embarrassing to me, if not to him. He was commanding an army, and for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac—except from the authorities at Washington. . . . I tried to make General Meade’s position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington, or any other place away from his command.”

General Grant returned to Washington on the 11th of March, and the day afterwards orders were issued placing him in command of all the armies of the United States. He then proceeded West, whence he returned on the 23d of March, and on the 26th established his headquarters at Culpeper Court-House. Here the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

Many changes in the organization of the Army of the Potomac had already been made, and more were to follow. The First and Third Corps were broken up, and the 1st and 2d Divisions of the former were assigned to the Fifth, and constituted the 2d and 4th Divisions of that corps, with Brigadier Generals Jno. C. Robinson and James C. Wadsworth

commanding, respectively. Thenceforward the history of the Fifth Corps is the history of those divisions. That the disbandment of those two gallant corps was keenly felt by the officers and men is best attested by the following tribute written at the time by a member of the old First Corps :

“ It is no more ; the deed is done ; the fiat has gone forth, and the First Army Corps has ceased to exist. The corps that was first formed—it seems to us a long time ago—in the early days of this unholy rebellion, the nation's first and greatest hope after the sun went down in dark and threatening clouds at the First Bull Run ; that band that prided themselves upon being the first in thorough organization ; the corps that has fought in a score of battles, losing over twenty thousand men, has been sacrificed and parcelled out to another. We weep. Is it unmanly ? Is it womanly ? We may have the woman's heart : she weeps over her lost idol ; we weep over ours. We were of the First Corps ; its history is our history. Its glory ours ; we were it, and it was us. Unmanly ? Who struck fiercer or deadlier when the hoarse-mouthed cannon spoke, and his word was death ? Who loved their country more ? Hated its enemies more ? What corps can boast of a list of names like Meade, Reynolds, McDowell, King, Hartsuff, Ord, Seymour, Gibbon, Ricketts, and Newton. Every one a hero. Our comrades sleep upon the hillsides of Fredericksburg, in the Wilderness, at Chancellorsville, upon the plains of Manassas, the rugged slopes of Slaughter and South Mountains, by the sluggish Antietam, and the blood of five thousand of our brave boys colored the ground of historic Gettysburg.

“ In the field beyond the town is a spot marked by our memento, before which the pilgrim will come, bow his head in reverence, and drop tears of sorrow and joy, upon the spot where our noble commander gave up his life to save his country. The tear of sorrow that so brave a man, so skilful a soldier, must need be killed—the tear of joy, that the man who died was the instrument, under God, that saved the battle of Gettysburg, and thus revived the drooping spirit of the loyal North.

“ It is sad to contemplate the change that has come over us. The mind goes back over nearly three years of war, and views the forty thousand men, who have said, with pride, ‘ We belong to the

First Corps,' many of whom lie buried in known and unknown, though honored graves, upon all the important battle-fields of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. 'Badgers,' 'Wolverines' and 'Hoosiers'—men from the 'Bay' State, the 'Empire' State, the 'Keystone' State, the 'Pine Tree' State and the 'Nutmeg' State, have stood side by side in our ranks; side by side won victories, indulged in like hopes, dejected by the same fears; side by side attested their love for our starry flag, emblem of our freedom, and never faltered in duty, never turned their back to the foe, in disgrace. To write the history of our band is to write, almost, a history of the war.

"Let every man who belonged to the old First Corps register a vow to faithfully perform his duty in the Fifth. Let it never be said that the men who have made their names glorious while with Doubleday and Wadsworth, Meredith and Robinson, turned their backs to their country's foe, and stained their fair fame. With our glorious past, as a distinctive organization, let us make an equally glorious future, though our lot be cast with a strange corps. They are noble brothers, fighting for the same cause, with the same determined purpose. We must have our new allies recognize that we are all that soldiers should be; and in the not distant future, when our erring sister States shall again sing the hosanna of peace beneath the old flag, we will return to our homes and be called blessed. Our name, our deeds, will live, though no costly cenotaph should be raised in memoriam. We will be known in the future; and until the angel shall come and rouse with the trumpet, all the host, we will be spoken of as among the bravest and best of the brave."

That grand old soldier, Major-General George Sykes, who had marched from Washington in the spring of 1862 as the commander of only the Regular brigade, and had risen by degrees to be the commander of the Fifth Corps, was relieved of his command, and General G. K. Warren was assigned in his stead. General P. H. Sheridan, whom Grant had known in early days in the 4th Regular Infantry, and who had operated with pronounced success in the West, was called to the command of the cavalry corps. The

three corps were denominated the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, and Major-General W. S. Hancock was assigned to the command of the former, while Major-General John Sedgwick was assigned to the latter. There was also established : a reserve park of artillery, under the direction of Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt ; an engineer and pontoon train, under Major Duane, U. S. Corps of Engineers ; and a large park of supply wagons, under the charge of Brigadier-General Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac. The 4th and 10th regiments of U. S. Infantry were ordered to the field from New York Harbor, and directed to report to General Burnside at Alexandria, Va. These regiments were assigned to the 1st Division, Ninth Corps, and served with it throughout the Wilderness campaign until the 18th of June, at which time they rejoined the Fifth Corps.

The organization of the Fifth Corps, when the various changes had been made, was as follows :

FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

MAJOR-GENERAL GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

Provost Guard.

12th N. Y. Battalion, Major Henry W. Rider.

First Division.

Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.

140th New York, Col. George Ryan.

146th New York, Col. David T. Jenkins.

91st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex.

155th Pennsylvania. Lt.-Col. Alfred H. Pearson.
 2d U. S. (Cos. B, C, F, H, I, K), Capt. James W. Long.
 11th U. S. (Cos. B, C, D, E, F, G), 1st Battalion, Capt. Francis M. Cooley.
 12th U. S. (Cos. A, B, C, D, G), 1st Battalion, } Maj. Luther B.
 12th U. S. (Cos. A, C, D, F, H), 2d Battalion, } Bruen.
 14th U. S. 1st Battalion, Capt. E. McK. Hudson.
 17th U. S. (Cos. A, C, D, G, H), 1st Battalion, } Capt. James
 17th U. S. (Cos. A, B, C), 2d Battalion, } F. Grimes.

Second Brigade.

Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.

9th Massachusetts, Col. Patrick R. Guiney.
 22d Massachusetts (2d Co. Mass. Sharpshooters attached), Col. Wm. S. Tilton.
 32d Massachusetts, Col. George L. Prescott.
 4th Michigan, Lt.-Col. George W. Lumbard.
 62d Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. James C. Hull.

Third Brigade.

Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.

20th Maine, Maj. Ellis Spear.
 18th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes.
 1st Michigan, Lt.-Col. William A. Throop.
 16th Michigan, Maj. Robert T. Elliott.
 44th New York, Lt.-Col. Freeman Conner.
 83d Pennsylvania, Col. Orpheus S. Woodward.
 118th Pennsylvania, Col. James Gwyn.

Second Division.

Brigadier-General JOHN C. ROBINSON.

First Brigade.

Colonel SAMUEL H. LEONARD.

16th Maine, Col. Charles W. Tilden.
 13th Massachusetts, Capt. Charles H. Hovey.
 39th Massachusetts, Col. Phineas S. Davis.
 104th New York, Col. Gilbert G. Prey.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER.

12th Massachusetts, Col. James L. Bates.
83d New York (9th Militia), Col. Joseph A. Moesch.
97th New York, Col. Charles Wheelock.
11th Pennsylvania, Col. Richard Coulter.
88th Pennsylvania, Capt. George B. Rhoads.
90th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter Lyle.

Third Brigade.

Colonel ANDREW W. DENISON.

1st Maryland, Maj. Benjamin H. Schley.
4th Maryland, Col. Richard N. Bowerman.
7th Maryland, Col. Charles E. Phelps.
8th Maryland, Lt.-Col. John G. Johannes.

Third Division.

Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.

First Brigade.

Colonel WILLIAM McCANDLESS.

1st Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. William C. Talley.
2d Pennsylvania Reserves, Lt.-Col. P. McDonough.
6th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. W. H. Ent.
7th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. LeG. B. Speece.
11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. S. M. Jackson.
13th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. W. R. Hartshorne.

Second Brigade.

Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER.

5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lt.-Col. George Dare.
8th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. S. M. Bailey.
10th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lt.-Col. Ira Ayer, Jr.
12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lt.-Col. Richard Gustin.

*HISTORY OF**Fourth Division.*

Brigadier-General JAMES S. WADSWORTH.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.

- 7th Indiana, Col. Ira G. Grover.
- 19th Indiana, Col. S. J. Williams.
- 24th Michigan, Col. Henry A. Morrow.
- 1st New York Battalion, Sharpshooters, Capt. V. J. Shipman.
- 2d Wisconsin, Lt.-Col. John Mansfield.
- 6th Wisconsin, Col. Edw. S. Bragg.
- 7th Wisconsin, Col. William W. Robinson.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General JAMES C. RICE.

- 76th New York, Lt.-Col. Jno. E. Cook.
- 84th New York (14th Mil.), Col. E. B. Fowler.
- 95th New York, Col. Edward Pye.
- 147th New York, Col. F. C. Miller.
- 56th Pennsylvania, Col. J. W. Hoffman.

Third Brigade.

Colonel ROY STONE.

- 121st Pennsylvania, Capt. Samuel T. Lloyd.
- 142d Pennsylvania, Maj. Horatio N. Warren.
- 143d Pennsylvania, Col. Edward L. Dana.
- 149th Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. John Irvin.
- 150th Pennsylvania, Capt. George W. Jones.

Artillery Brigade.

Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.

- Massachusetts Light, Battery C, Capt. Augustus P. Martin.
- Massachusetts Light, Battery E, Capt. Charles A. Phillips.
- 1st New York Light, Battery D, Capt. George B. Winslow.
- 1st New York Light, Batteries E and L, Lieut. George Breck.
- 1st New York Light, Battery H, Capt. Charles E. Merik.
- 4th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion, Maj. William Arthur.
- 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Capt. James H. Cooper.
- 4th U. S., Battery B, Lieut. James Stewart.
- 5th U. S., Battery D, Lieut. B. F. Rittenhouse.

On the 9th¹ of April, 1864, General Grant communicated confidential instructions to the commanders of the various armies to prepare them for his plan of action. To General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, he sent the following :

“ Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going North on a raid ; but if we take this route, all we do must be done while the rations we start with hold out ; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.”

General Meade was also informed that General Butler, with 20,000 effective men, would co-operate with the Army of the Potomac on the south side of the James River. General Butler was directed to seize City Point, at the junction of the Appomattox River with the James, with as much force as possible, and was ordered to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper.

The Army of the Potomac, at this time, occupied a position on the north bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Confederate army under General Robert E. Lee. The latter, composed of the corps of Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill, with Stuart’s cavalry, occupied

¹ A rather singular coincidence, as it was this day, just one year later, that General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to General Grant.

a strong position on the south bank of the Rapidan, well protected in front by field-works, the left flank covered by the Rapidan and the mountains near Orange Court-House, while the right flank was guarded by an intrenched line extending from Morton's Ford to Mine Run.

The Army of the Potomac had on its rolls, at the commencement of operations, 165,757 officers and men, with 274 pieces of artillery, and there were present for duty, equipped, 4737 officers and 99,048 enlisted men, an aggregate of 103,785.

After due consideration, General Grant directed a movement to turn Lee's right flank. Therefore the army was put in motion on the 4th of May, the Fifth Corps taking the advance, followed by the Sixth Corps. These corps were ordered to cross at Germanna Ford and proceed to the Old Wilderness tavern, on the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike. The Second Corps, followed by the Artillery Reserve, was ordered to cross at Ely's Ford and take position at Chancellorsville. Each column was to be preceded by a division of cavalry, that was directed to push well out to the front and flanks and feel for the enemy. The park of supply trains was to be assembled at Richardsville, guarded by a division of cavalry. General Burnside, in command of the Ninth Corps, was at this time left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, guarding that road as far back as Bull Run. He was instructed not to change his position until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan had been effected, and then to move promptly as soon as such notice was received.

THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

At midnight, the commencement of May 4, 1864, the Fifth Corps, with the 2d Division (Brigadier-General J. G. Robinson) in the lead, marched from the vicinity of Culpeper, and crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford. All was quiet. An ominous silence was the only greeting, surrounded, as the corps was, by the tangled thickets of the Wilderness. The column proceeded boldly on the most direct road to Old tavern. On arriving at the junction of Germanna Ford road with the turnpike, the corps bivouacked on a line stretching from the turnpike to the neighborhood of the Lacy house, covering the tavern.

From Orange Court-House two roads (the Orange turnpike and the Orange and Fredericksburg Plank road) led directly across the line of march of the Army of the Potomac. General Lee, being fully informed of the movements of the Union army, put the Confederate army in motion on the afternoon of the 4th with a view to striking the right flank of the former. Ewell's corps moved on the turnpike, while A. P. Hill's corps followed the Plank road. Longstreet was ordered to move rapidly across the country with his corps and unite with Hill on the Plank road.

A glance at some of the salient facts connected with the movement of the Army of the Potomac from May 4th to 6th, seems necessary and fitting for the general reader, as a prelude to the detailed account of the battle of the Wilderness. In his letter to General Meade of April 9, 1864, General Grant states :

“ Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or

below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections."

These advantages and corresponding objections constituted no new problem for the commander of the Army of the Potomac. General Humphreys writes from actual experience when he says (*Va. Camp.*, pp. 10 and 11):

"The objection to moving by our left consisted in the character of the country south of the Rapidan. . . . To handle large bodies of troops in battle in such a field was exceedingly difficult. . . . Superiority in numbers on such a field would be of less value than on any other."

The problem was now considered by General Grant, and as the result of his unconstrained deliberation he decided, according to General Badeau's account, "to plunge direct into the Wilderness and threaten the right of Lee," notwithstanding his recognition of the fact that "all the conditions were favorable (to his adversary) for defensive operations."

The halting of the Army of the Potomac within the Wilderness from 2 o'clock P.M. of May 4th until 5 o'clock A.M. of May 5th, was also a matter determined by General Grant's judgment. It was not a matter of absolute necessity. It was a matter, on the contrary, of the utmost importance to get through the Wilderness without a battle, if possible. If the movement to New Hope church and Robertson's tavern, as indicated by General Humphreys, had been executed, the Army of the Potomac would have been placed in contact with the Army of Northern Virginia at daylight of May 5th, on comparatively favorable ground. Bearing still further on this point, General Humphreys says (*Va. Camp.*, p. 20):

“The troops might have easily continued their march five miles farther, the Second Corps to Todd’s tavern, the head of the Fifth Corps to Parker’s store, and the head of the Sixth Corps to Wilderness tavern; but even that would have left the right too open during the forenoon of the 5th, and it was more judicious to let the troops remain for the night where they had halted, as it made the passage of the trains secure, and the troops would be fresher when meeting the enemy the next day, of which there was much probability.”

By 5 o’clock P.M. of May 5th the last of the trains had finished crossing at Culpeper Mine Ford, and with their guard of 3600 men and the Reserve Artillery, supported by Colonel Kitching’s Heavy Artillery brigade (serving as infantry), were covered by the forest between the Rapidan and Chancellorsville, with the approaches on their lines of advance covered by two divisions of cavalry. A division of the Sixth Corps was in position covering the bridge at Germanna ford until the arrival of the Ninth Corps. General Stevenson’s division of the Ninth Corps crossed during the morning of May 5th, and by night of the same day General Potter’s and Wilcox’s divisions had also crossed and advanced some three miles from the river. General Ferrero’s division crossed on the morning of May 6th. From this it appears that the danger to the trains could scarcely be considered imminent—it was a *possibility*, however. With regard to the *probability* which affected the whole army, General Humphreys says (*Va. Camp.*, p. 11):

“It was well-known that daylight would divulge our movement to Lee’s signal officers on Clark’s mountain,¹ and at other points

¹ General Ewell, C. S. A., in his report of the battle of the Wilderness says: “By order of General Lee, his corps and division commanders met him on Monday, May 2, 1864, at the signal station on Clark’s mountain. He then gave it as his opinion that the enemy would cross by some of the fords below us, as Germanna or Ely’s. They began to do so next day. About noon of the 4th, we moved from our camps on the Rapidan toward Locust Grove, on the old turnpike from Orange Court-House to Fredericksburg.”

along his lines, and it was believed that he would at once move by the Orange and Fredericksburg pike and Plank roads to oppose us."

The belief here expressed was substantiated by the movements made by General Lee's army. The advantage proffered to him by General Grant's decision to accept the consequences of a probability rather than to risk loss by a possibility was not declined by General Lee. While General Grant was telegraphing to General Halleck that "forty-eight hours will now demonstrate whether the enemy intends giving battle this side of Richmond," General Early was bivouacking his troops near Robertson's tavern, General Hill was halting for the night on the Orange Plank road, at Mine Run and Verdiersville, and General Longstreet had moved northwardly from Gordonsville, all intent on proffering that battle at the earliest moment. Certainly, General Grant had never encountered a more accommodating objective.

All the conditions of the problem involved were thoroughly understood by General Grant as well as by General Meade and his subordinates of the Army of the Potomac, and there can be no question as to the boldness evinced by the choice of routes and the determination to make the passage of the Rapidan secure against possible interruption. Up to the morning of May 5th, the movement was an uninterrupted success. General Grant expressly states that the movement of the Army of the Potomac was made under the immediate direction and orders of General Meade, to whom he had given general instructions, leaving all the details and the execution to him. The project for the movement had been carefully elaborated in all its details by General Humphreys,

chief of staff, and the army, under its admirable corps commanders proved equal, as ever, to the task laid upon it. Referring to General Grant's expressed satisfaction at the successful crossing of the river, General Humphreys says :

“ And he might well be gratified at the result, for it was a good day's work in such a country, for so large an Army, with its artillery and fighting trains, to march twenty miles, crossing a river on five bridges of its own building, without a single mishap, interruption, or delay.”

Certainly, the opening of the campaign was auspicious, and the morning of May 5th was not unpromising. The troops were well rested after their good work of the previous day, and promptly at five o'clock in the morning the columns were in motion as the order for the day prescribed. General Wilson, with his cavalry division, was to push forward to Craig's meeting-house, and send out parties on the Orange Court-House pike and Plank road, on the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads, and toward Troyman's store and Good Hope church ; the Second Corps was to move to Shady Grove church and extend its right toward the Fifth Corps, which was to move to Parker's store, its right extending towards the Old Wilderness tavern, meeting the Sixth Corps, which was to advance to that point, leaving a division to await the arrival of the Ninth Corps at Germanna Ford. That the Confederates were on the alert was well known. General Humphreys says (*Virginia Campaign*, p. 21) :

“ Indications concerning the movements of the enemy were noted before one o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th ; some few shots were fired towards Robertson's tavern, and they were observed moving in some force from Orange Court-House on the Plank road toward New Verdiersville.”

It was, therefore, no surprise to General Meade when, at a quarter past seven o'clock, he received word from General Warren that the enemy in some force was on the pike about two miles west of the Wilderness tavern, or when about eight o'clock General Crawford found his skirmish line engaged with the enemy's infantry, before which the cavalry advance was slowly falling back from Parker's store, on the Plank road.

The situation now deserves consideration. General Ewell had advanced from his bivouac of the night to the point previously indicated on the turnpike, and had sent a brigade down a road upon his left, leading from the turnpike to Spottswood, on the Germanna Plank road, as he claims, "driving in the enemy's pickets within a mile and a half of Germanna Ford." General Hill moved from Mine Run and Verdierville with the divisions of Heth and Wilcox (General Anderson remained in the intrenchments on the upper Rapidan, and did not reach the Wilderness till the morning of May 6th), and met the advance of the Fifth Corps near Parker's store. The Confederate cavalry had been drawn in to operate on the Catharpin and other roads on the right of their army, and General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was moving from Brock's Bridge to the Catharpin road, nearly twenty miles from Shady Grove church. On the right of the Union army, General Sedgwick, leaving one division, as stated, to guard Germanna Ford until the arrival of the Ninth Corps, coming up rapidly from Brandy Station, Rappahannock Station, and Bealeton, was moving with the Sixth Corps on the Germanna Plank road towards Old Wilderness tavern, the head of his column having passed Spottswood's.

General Wilson, with his cavalry division, had crossed from Parker's store to the Catharpin road, when at 8 o'clock A.M. he encountered the Confederate cavalry at Craig's meeting-house, and drove it back two miles. General Hancock, with the Second Corps, had advanced past Todd's tavern on the Catharpin road, and at 9 o'clock A.M. his advance was two miles beyond the tavern, and but little more than a mile from Shady Grove church. General Sheridan, with Gregg's division of cavalry, covered the trains on the left rear of the army, and at noon was strengthened by the arrival of Torbert's division at Chancellorsville.

At 6 A.M. on the 5th of May the march of the Fifth Corps was resumed, by a farm road, toward Parker's store, General Crawford's division leading. When the advance of this division reached the Plank road at Chewing's farm it encountered Hill's column.

It has been stated by several authors that, upon sending word to the headquarters that the enemy had been struck, Warren received orders to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. General Grant in his *Memoirs* says :

“ At 6 o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and *was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him*. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, *I informed Meade*, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was.”

General Badeau says :

"The general-in-chief was promptly informed of the approach of Lee, and at 8.24 A.M. he sent word to Meade: '*Your note giving movements of enemy and your dispositions received.*'"

And again, in a foot-note, General Badeau says:

"As early as 7.30 A.M. Meade informed Grant of the appearance of the enemy."

The order to halt and prepare to meet and attack the enemy at 8.24 could not well be considered, as Hill was advancing from the direction of the point (Parker's store) to which Warren was proceeding. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to say that a halt became imperative, and the battle soon commenced. Crawford immediately established himself in line of battle, while Wadsworth, who was following Crawford, and Robinson, who was under arms ready to advance when the firing was heard, were directed by Warren to form line of battle, with their divisions to the left of the Lacy house, and Griffin's division was thrown across the turnpike to the right of the Lacy house. Ayres' brigade formed in line to the right of the pike, with his left resting thereon, while Bartlett continued the line to the left of the pike, with Sweitzer on his left, forming an oblique angle to the rear.

It was about 9 A.M. that the Confederates developed their presence in front of Griffin, up the pike. This road, for some miles to the westward, was perfectly straight, so that groups of men could occasionally be seen crossing it some two miles distant. No large bodies could be observed. One or two pieces of Confederate artillery were planted in the road and opened fire at long range, without doing any damage. A section of Winslow's battery was sent a short way up the pike, and replied to the Con-

federate guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Otis, of the 140th New York, had been thrown well to the front in the woods, in command of the picket line. The Confederate skirmishers soon reached him, and a rattling fire began. This was kept up until about noon.

Generals Grant and Meade, having, in the meantime, arrived upon the scene of action, determined to attack, and the order to advance was given. As we have before stated, the left of Ayres' brigade (140th New York, Colonel Ryan) rested on the pike, with the 146th New York (Colonel Jenkins) in rear. The Regulars extended the line to the right. Fifteen minutes before the appearance of the Confederates along the pike, Lieutenant-Colonel Throop, 1st Michigan, on picket duty in front of Bartlett's brigade, had received orders to withdraw his line and join his brigade on the march, and he was in the act of assembling his regiment when the enemy was reported advancing. The regiment was again deployed, and Colonel Hayes was directed by General Bartlett to take the 18th Massachusetts and the 83d Pennsylvania, and move up the pike to develop the enemy.

In the meantime, Wadsworth's division had been thrown forward in line to the right of Crawford, supported by the Maryland brigade from Robinson's division, Cutler on the right, Stone in the centre, and Rice on the left connecting with Crawford. Robinson's division was held in reserve.

By reference to the map, it will be observed that Griffin, moving on both sides of the pike, advanced directly to the westward, while Crawford and Wadsworth, moving by a diagonal road from the Lacy house to the Plank road, advanced in a southwesterly direction, and as there was no connection between

Wadsworth's right and Griffin's left, the farther they advanced the more widely they became separated.

About 12 m. both columns advanced upon the Confederates. Griffin moved forward about half a mile, when he reached his picket line. The Confederate skirmishers fell back as the troops pushed on. In about five minutes an opening in the woods, of some acres in extent, was reached. It was a kind of valley or hollow, 200 or 300 yards in width, directly across the line of march of the 140th and 146th New York. The Confederates were posted on the crest of a ridge on the far side of the vale, in the edge of some timber. The very moment the Union line emerged into the opening, a volley was delivered by Jones' brigade of Confederates, at which an order was given by one of General Ayres' staff officers, to charge the Confederate line. Unimpeded by undergrowth, the 140th New York rushed impetuously across the opening, undaunted by a fire that thinned its ranks, and never slackened its speed until the woods were gained, where they expected to close with the bayonet. But the Confederate line fell back slowly into the undergrowth. As the enemy retired before the regiment, the enthusiasm became so great that it was neglected to observe whether the line to the right and left, which was struggling through the tangled thicket of the woods,¹ was

¹An officer of General Ayres' brigade thus writes of this advance: "The forward-march by company-front through the underbrush, interwoven with wild grapevines and other creepers, soon became almost impossible. I remember that, in order to break an avenue for my own company, I pushed ahead with my back to the front, forming a passage for my men, who rushed after me in single file, as soon as possible, but without regard to the original formation of the company. As soon as we reached a clearing large enough for the purpose, we would re-form again on the run and try to re-establish the connection with the companies to the right and left of us. Thus we moved forward, unable to see anything else in front of us but tree-trunks and underbrush. I had just noticed that the right company of my regiment, and a few files of the right of my own

connecting with their flanks. As it was, their position was perilous, for the remainder of the line to the right was far behind them. Suddenly the 140th became subjected to a raking fire on the right flank, which caused the regiment to melt away like snow, and Colonel Ryan was killed. During the movement forward, the 140th had made an oblique to the left until the left of the right wing rested on the pike, thus separating the right from the left of the Regulars. Colonel Jenkins, with the 146th New York, moved promptly to the support of the right wing, and had to take the brunt of the fight. By this movement he saved the remainder of the 140th from capture. He led his regiment in gallant style, but it was the last time he was seen. He was lost in that charge and never afterwards heard of.¹

The line, broken in a dozen different places, and with its left flank shattered, the remainder of Ayres' brigade pushed forward to a point where the woods became clearer, when all at once the familiar "yell" was heard, and volley after volley was poured into the

company were going out of sight, diagonally to the front, losing the touch towards the road and to the left. I called to them with all my might in order to bring them back, but they either could or would not hear me, and we parted company right then and there. The next time I saw some of these men was at the close of the war, when they returned from Southern prisons."

¹ Captain Porter Farley, of the 140th New York, in his *Reminiscences*, says: "Of commissioned officers we lost eleven. . . . Not one of the non-commissioned staff remained. There were but three captains left. Our mortification at our utter dispersion and repulse found some relief in the losses which we had sustained; but that comfort was like the hot iron and boiling oil of ancient surgery, more terrible than the hurt to which it was applied. . . . The day was exceedingly hot. The leaves upon the ground were dry and inflammable. A new element appeared upon the scene. Fire broke out at many points. Some were promptly checked and others spread over acres, disfiguring beyond all possibility of recognition the bodies of many of the slain, and proving fatal to many others who lay in the forest wounded and helpless, looking for the friendly aid which never came, and dying at last, the victims of the relentless flames."

Union ranks, from a point which could not be seen and only guessed at. No brigade line was in sight. Each regiment fought on its own responsibility.

The peculiar nature of the ground fought over made this a weird, uncanny contest—a battle of invisibles with invisibles. There had been wood-fights before, but none in which the contestants were so completely concealed as in this. Here nothing could be seen of the enemy or his doings but the white smoke that belched out of the bushes and curled and wreathed in fantastic designs as it slowly floated upward through the hot air, for it was a very sultry day. The tremendous roll of the firing shut out all other sounds. Here and there a man toppled over and disappeared, or, springing to his feet, pressed his hands to the wounded part and ran to the rear. Men's faces were sweaty black from biting cartridges, and a sort of grim ferocity seemed to be creeping into the actions and appearance of every one within the limited range of vision. The tops of the bushes were being cut away by the leaden missiles that tore through them, and occasional glimpses of gray, phantom-like forms crouching under the bank of cloud were obtained.

Rodes' division of Confederates was now thrown forward and Ayres was completely outflanked; the Sixth Corps not having been able to get in position on his right, he was forced to fall back, leaving his dead and wounded in the woods.

While Ayres was engaged on the right of the pike Bartlett was pushing forward on the left, and soon struck the Confederate line. His gallant and impetuous attack caused the enemy to give way, and the Confederates fell back rapidly, leaving their wounded

and about 40 prisoners in the Union lines. The advance was continued gallantly until orders were received to fall back, the Confederates appearing in numbers on his right, following up the advantage they had gained in Ayres' front, and were moving down the pike to strike Bartlett in flank.

When the report of the approach of the Confederates was received at 8 A.M., Sweitzer's brigade formed line of battle and constructed a breastwork of logs, the brigade being at an oblique angle to the left of Bartlett. When the order was given to advance, the brigade moved to the right in two lines, the right resting on the turnpike, in support of Bartlett. Afterwards, the 22d Massachusetts, with the 32d Massachusetts on its right, was thrown across to the right of the road, and both regiments placed under command of Colonel Tilton. The two regiments moved towards the enemy in this line until Bartlett's left was out of the timber on his side of the road, but Tilton's command remained partially concealed by bushes. Tilton posted the 22d nearly parallel with the road, with the 32d on its right, refused. Here they engaged the enemy as they debouched from the woods on the opposite side of the clearing, from which the 140th New York had been driven, and held this position under a severe fire until about 3 P.M., when they were relieved and returned to the position originally occupied.

Wadsworth with his division had moved forward at the same time Griffin advanced, and he soon encountered the enemy. The division advanced through a dense wood for nearly a mile, when it was met by a heavy fire of musketry from an unseen force. A halt was made and the fire returned. Shortly

afterwards the Confederates were reported to be advancing in a line extending far beyond the left of Rice's brigade, whose flank was in the air. Stone's brigade (the centre of the division) gave way soon after meeting the enemy, thus leaving a great interval between Cutler and Rice. The latter, however, maintained his position for some time, the Confederates, still unseen, pouring in a very destructive fire. It was now observed that the brigade was outflanked, both right and left, which threw it into some confusion and the line fell back somewhat precipitately. About half a mile to the rear, the officers succeeded in rallying about 350 men, on the crest of a slight elevation, intending to hold it, when an aide of General Wadsworth arrived with instructions to move some distance to the rear, where the division was re-forming. Rice lost nearly all of his skirmish line (three companies of the 76th New York) as prisoners.

General Cutler had, in the meanwhile, driven the enemy nearly a mile, capturing 289 prisoners and three battle-flags. Under the impulse of success, his line moved forward with gallantry and was still driving the Confederates with resistless impetuosity, when he suddenly found both his flanks enveloped and also discovered that the enemy was closing in his rear. Thus almost surrounded, he had nothing to do but retire, and was forced to fight his way back, losing very heavily in killed and wounded.

Crawford's division, during the advance of Wadsworth, had been moved to the right of the farm road toward the pike, for the purpose of connecting with Wadsworth's left, but a junction had not been formed, owing to the dense thicket. Rice found himself out-

flanked, and the retirement of Rice's brigade left Crawford's division somewhat isolated, but it maintained its position with its usual gallantry until ordered to fall back, not, however, without severe loss.

Robinson's division was then ordered to relieve Griffin on the turnpike, where a brisk fire was kept up during the remainder of the afternoon, without advantage to either side. An advance was made by Robinson, but of course it failed. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Lyle, was ordered to advance upon the Confederates, and the 90th Pennsylvania, having to cross an open field (as in the case of the 140th New York in the morning), was exposed to a terrific fire of musketry and artillery, which nearly destroyed the regiment. For some reason, the troops on the right of this brigade, although protected by the woods, failed to advance with it. This terminated the fighting on this front for the day.

About 6 P.M., however, General Grant directed the occupation of the woods south of the Lacy house. Wadsworth's division was ordered to perform this service, supported by Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division. Soon after entering the forest, the Confederates were encountered, but they retired before Wadsworth's line, keeping up a brisk fire, by which many valuable men were lost, among them Lieutenant-Colonel David Allen, 12th Massachusetts, assistant inspector-general of Robinson's division.¹ Wadsworth advanced steadily, driving the enemy before

¹ By permission of General Warren, General Robinson had accompanied Wadsworth, and Colonel Allen was riding beside General R., when killed. He and Lieutenant-Colonel Moesch, of the 83d New York, were buried in the private burial-ground of the Lacy family; but the remains were subsequently removed—Allen to Gloucester, Mass., and Moesch to New York City.

him until dark, when he bivouacked with both flanks in the air.

The Sixth Corps had followed the Fifth across the Rapidan, and had proceeded a couple of miles or more on the Germanna Ford road toward the Old Wilderness tavern, on the morning of May 5th, when Upton, Brown, and Russell's brigades of the 1st Division, under General Wright, were ordered into position parallel to the road, and from thence advanced to connect with the right of the Fifth Corps. Shaler's brigade had been left with the army trains. The 2d and 3d Divisions were massed near the Old Wilderness tavern. Wright's skirmish line moved with the greatest difficulty through the woods and tangled underbrush, which necessarily impeded its progress, and in many instances broke it completely. Connection was at length made, and a lively skirmish fire was kept up, during the day and night of the 5th.

Wheaton, Grant, and Eustis' brigades of the 2d Division, Sixth Corps, under General Getty, about noon of the 5th, were directed to hasten to the junction of the Germanna Ford and Orange Plank roads, to support the cavalry, which was being driven in from Parker's store. The division secured the junction and moved rapidly up the Plank road for a mile, and then took the Brock road, which crossed the Plank road. Upon arriving at the cross-roads with his personal staff, Getty found the Confederate skirmishers rapidly advancing to gain possession of this point. His small retinue, standing firmly under the enemy's fire, served to delay the Confederate advance a few minutes, during which time Wheaton's brigade pushed forward at the double-quick, and pouring in a volley, drove back the enemy. The division

was then formed in two lines at right angles to the Plank road, Eustis on the right and Grant's Vermont brigade on the left. Several attempts were now made to establish connection with the left of the Fifth Corps, but without success, owing to the fact that the Confederates were in force between the division and that corps.

About 3.30 P.M. the head of the Second Corps, under General Hancock, came up on Getty's left by the Brock road. This corps had crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, and moved to Chancellorsville, preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry. When the Fifth Corps became engaged, Hancock, who was *en route* to Spottsylvania, was recalled, and moved across the country to the junction of the Brock and Plank roads, and was forming as rapidly as possible on Getty's left, when orders were received by the latter from General Meade to attack at once, without waiting for the Second Corps. Accordingly, Getty advanced at once with his division. A section of artillery from the Second Corps, under Captain Ricketts, was planted on the Plank road, then advanced with the lines, and did excellent service. The Confederate divisions of Heth and Wilcox were struck, and Getty found his line outflanked. Though the centre of the Confederate line was forced back some distance, it held its ground and repulsed every attack. So fierce had been the contest that, although the Second Corps' formation lacked much of completeness, Hancock threw Birney's and Mott's divisions forward. Birney advanced on both Getty's right and left, a section of Rickett's battery on the road moving forward with the troops. The struggle becoming fiercer, Owen's brigade was thrown on either side of the Plank road to support

Getty. Then Brooke's and Smyth's brigades went in on the extreme left and drove back Hill's right a considerable distance. The Confederates now made a counter-charge and the Union line fell back about one hundred yards, leaving behind them Ricketts' two guns, but before the Confederates could secure them, detachments from the 14th Indiana and 8th Ohio, of Carroll's brigade, which had been hurried forward in support of the line, dashed forward and hauled them down the road. This ended the combat for the day.

OPERATIONS OF MAY 6TH.

At 2.30 A.M. Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps was ordered forward, from the breastworks they had constructed and occupied the night before, to the scene of the fight of the previous day. There was some skirmishing when the position was taken up, but the day passed without an attack on its front. In the meanwhile, the Ninth Corps, under General Burnside, had, after performing the duties assigned it, made a forced march, and arrived on the field of battle early on the morning of the 6th. Stevenson's 1st Division was directed to report to General Hancock. The 4th Division (Ferrero), composed of colored troops, was ordered to report to General Sedgwick, and subsequently was assigned to duty with the trains of the army. With the remaining two divisions (2d Potter, and 3d Willcox), Burnside moved out on the Parker's store road, between the positions then held by Generals Warren and Hancock. After crossing the Wilderness Run about daylight, Potter was directed to make his dispositions with a view to pressing his force forward so as to seize Parker's store. Willcox was dis-

posed so as to support Potter, who pushed his advanced line across the open ground beyond the run, and gained the edge of the timber on the opposite side. Just as preparations were being made to charge the Confederates, an order was received from General Grant to move all the available force of the corps to the left, with a view to attacking the enemy on the right of General Hancock.

During the night of the 5th, Hancock had received orders to move upon the Confederate line at 5 A.M. the next day. Before the hour at which the attack was directed to commence, information was communicated to General Hancock to the effect that Longstreet's corps was passing up the Catharpin road to attack his left flank. Barlow's division was therefore posted in position to meet this emergency, and the Second Corps artillery was placed so as to cover the road leading from the Catharpin to the Brock road, while a strong skirmish line was thrown out covering the latter. These preparations were made under the supervision of General Gibbon, who was placed in command of his own and Barlow's divisions and the left of the line, General Birney having been placed in command of the right.

At 5 A.M., according to instructions, Birney's and Mott's divisions, supported by Owen's and Carroll's brigades of Gibbon's division, advanced along the Plank road, simultaneously with Getty's division (now under Wheaton, General Getty having been wounded the day before), and attacked the Confederates with vigor. After a desperate encounter the enemy's line was broken at all points, and he was driven in confusion through the forest for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, suffering severely in killed, wounded,

and prisoners. This fierce onset sent Hill's troops reeling back, and General Lee, throwing himself into their midst, could not restrain the ebbing tide; but pressing, as the Union troops had done, through a tangled mass of dwarf oak, hazel, and chestnut, interwoven with briars, grape and other vines, the line had varied in the rapidity of its forward movement. The left had advanced much farther than the right or centre, while some brigades and even regiments had pushed far in advance of others, in many places occasioning wide gaps. Birney halted to adjust his formation. This was unfortunate, for just at this time the head of Longstreet's column arrived upon the field from Parker's store, and Kershaw, who was leading with his division, had only time to deploy two regiments, when Heth and Wilcox's divisions broke in confusion. With considerable difficulty, but with steadiness, Kershaw opened his ranks to let the retreating divisions through, and then formed his line on the right, while Field formed on the left, of the Plank road, the time occupied by Birney in adjusting his lines having given full time for the two Confederate divisions to get into position.

About the commencement of the action, Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division was ordered to the right to report to General Birney, and upon reporting was directed to deploy on the right of the Plank road, and move forward to join General Getty. General Webb at once deployed and advanced as ordered. Having been directed to advance to join a body of troops, the natural inference was that the troops were in front of him, and therefore he did not throw out a skirmish line. The brigade moved gallantly forward, little dreaming of such an untoward event as happened.

Suddenly it was the recipient of a volley from the Confederate front, which it had nearly run into. No Union troops were found, and there were no evidences of any having been in that vicinity. Webb attempted to give the enemy a blow, although he hardly thought that he was expected to make a charge with an individual brigade; he had met Field's division of four brigades west of the Plank road. Finding Webb's line entirely without support, the Confederates forced him to change front to rear on his left regiment, the 20th Massachusetts. This regiment was securely posted on the left of the Plank road.

It was at this juncture that General Wadsworth joined General Webb and assumed command of the front. The 20th Massachusetts, which was on the left of the Plank road and facing the enemy, was ordered forward by General Wadsworth without Webb's knowledge, and in the attack which it made as an isolated regiment, suffered severely. Colonel Macy was wounded in the arm, and Major Abbott and General Wadsworth were mortally wounded.

Webb had no support, and he was not driven in, but outflanked twice by Field's division.

It was after Webb had seized his first line for the third time that General Wadsworth, without troops, joined him, and assumed command of both Webb and Stevenson, who had reported to General Hancock at the intersection of the Brock and Plank roads at 8 o'clock, and was going to the support of Webb.

At 7 A.M. Hancock sent a staff officer to General Gibbon, informing him of the success of the advancing troops, and directing him to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division, and to press the right towards

the Plank road. General Hancock says, in his report of the battle :

“ This order was only partially carried out. Frank’s brigade, of Barlow’s division, was sent to feel the enemy’s right, and after an obstinate contest, succeeded in forming connection with the left of Mott’s division. I do not know why my order to attack with Barlow’s division was not more fully carried out, but it was probably owing to the apprehended approach of Longstreet’s corps on my left about that time ; but had my left advanced, as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the enemy would have been assured. At all events, an attack on the enemy’s right by the troops of Barlow’s division would have prevented the turning of the left of Mott’s division, which occurred later in the day.”

About 8 A.M. General Wadsworth was placed under Hancock’s orders, and the latter was informed at this time by General Meade that two of Burnside’s divisions had pushed forward nearly to Parker’s store, and would attack across his front, to relieve him, but nothing was heard from these two divisions until after Birney’s repulse.

Wadsworth’s division of the Fifth Corps, which had bivouacked alone in the dense thicket on the night of the 5th, advanced, in conjunction with Hancock, early the next morning, ignorant of what was in its front, but soon discovered that it had been about one quarter of a mile from the Plank road and facing it. The division continued to advance, the left swinging forward until Rice’s brigade ran upon a battery at canister range, in the attempt to take which the brigade was repulsed, and this threw the greater part of the division into confusion. The men were rallied, however, in a short time.

General Hancock had placed Wadsworth in command of the line to the right of the road. The Con-

federates now began to make demonstrations against Hancock's extreme left, which gave him some uneasiness; but at 8.15 he was notified that General Sheridan, with a division of cavalry, had been directed to attack the enemy on the Brock road. It was supposed that Longstreet's corps was marching on that road to strike the left of the Union line.

Hancock was now in command of six divisions (Wadsworth's, Stevenson's, Birney's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and Barlow's), and at 8.50 A.M. he ordered the first four to move forward, supported with Webb, Carroll, and Owen's brigades, from Gibbon's division. These troops became furiously engaged with the enemy, but the firing had hardly commenced when Hancock's left flank became seriously threatened. Rapid firing was heard in the direction of Todd's tavern, which was supposed to be Sheridan's attack on Longstreet. This was strengthened by a report that infantry was moving on the Brock road¹ from the direction of Todd's tavern. Brooke's brigade was immediately sent out on the Brock road, to the extreme left, where a strong breastwork was constructed across the road, while Leasure's brigade of the Ninth Corps and Eustis' brigade of the Sixth Corps were held in readiness to support Barlow.

The reports about General Longstreet's corps moving upon Hancock's left flank were entirely erroneous, as at 12.30 A.M. on the 6th, the former received orders to proceed to Parker's store, where he arrived at daylight, and was then directed to move

¹ General Hancock, in his report, says: "This body proved afterwards to be a body of several hundred convalescents, who had marched from Chancellorsville, and were now following the route of the Second Corps around by Todd's tavern. Sheridan, instead of meeting Longstreet, had encountered Stuart's cavalry."

his column down the Plank road to relieve the divisions of Heth and Wilcox, which were then in position in face of the Union troops on the right and left of the road.

Wadsworth's division had been formed in four lines, the left resting on the Plank road. These lines were closed in mass to avoid the Confederate artillery fire. While in this position, Longstreet made a furious attack, and the Union line was driven back and badly scattered, a large portion of Wadsworth's division taking the route over which they had marched the night before. This portion of the command was rallied and re-formed near the tavern. That portion which retired on the Plank road was rallied by Rice, and again went forward with Webb's brigade, the 4th and 10th U. S., the 20th Indiana, a New York regiment, and the 57th Massachussetts, but they were lacking in dash. Attacked in turn by Field's division of Confederates, this command was swept from the field, General Stevenson having been killed in the attack.

Hancock's success would have been a brilliant one, but for the unfortunate story about Longstreet being on the Brock road. It would have been equally as brilliant had it not been for the misunderstanding with Gibbon, who, not moving forward, left Hancock's flank exposed, and thus, about 10 A.M., it was reported to Longstreet that the left of the Union line extended but a short distance beyond the Plank road. Mahone, Anderson, Davis, and Wofford's Confederate brigades were, in view of this knowledge, sent beyond the Union left and directed to attack Hancock's left and rear—the flank movement to be followed by a general advance. They moved by the flank until the unfinished railroad from Gordonsville to Fredericksburg

was reached, and then formed on the railroad facing north. General Hancock, at this time, was engaging the brigades of Gregg, Benning, and Law, in his front. Hancock's fears for his left had been allayed by the 8.15 A.M. dispatch he had received. It was as impossible for him to see through that jungle where the left of his line rested, as for him to have seen through the space of time to the result of the battle. While he was resting thus happily in his advanced position, Mahone, Anderson, Davis, and Wofford were silently moving through the thicket to strike him in his most vital part. Cautiously the Confederates moved, unseen, unsuspected, and when they were within a hundred yards, a terrible yell, a furious onslaught, and Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, which occupied the left of the Union line, having been heavily engaged in the earlier part of the day, during which it had exhausted its ammunition, was swept over by the Confederates, who then struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was rolled back. Great confusion existed now, and General Hancock endeavored to establish a new line, but owing to the disorganization of the troops this became impossible. Organizations were almost destroyed; the men stood, some of them six deep, and, facing the foe, contested the ground; but it was of no avail; they were forced to retire from the wood, and re-form in the breastworks along the Brock road—the original line of battle. This was accomplished, and by the exertions of the officers order was soon restored. Longstreet pushed forward until he was within a few hundred paces of the breastworks, but he did not attempt to assault them at that time.

When Hancock made his splendid charge on Hill, a large gap was created between Frank's brigade (which was the left of the advanced line) and that

portion of the force under Gibbon that still remained on the Brock road. It so happened that, in consequence of the false alarm about Longstreet and the left of the Union line, Hancock's success was the cause of his own ultimate failure. The forces under Gibbon, disposed on the extreme left to resist a flank movement of the enemy, would, in all probability, have thwarted an attack had Hancock maintained his original line of battle. But as he moved forward Gibbon was left behind. With nothing but Hill before him, Hancock would have annihilated his opponent, had it not been for the unfortunate halt of Birney, to adjust his line. The two hours occupied in re-forming this gave ample time for Kershaw to dash with the head of his column through the mass of retreating Confederates, and, undaunted by the wild confusion surrounding them, place his men in position.

General Meade was informed by General Hancock that he had been forced to retire to his breastworks, and that he was about to attack the enemy with Leasure's brigade of the Ninth Corps. This was in position toward the left of the line, under the command of General Gibbon. Leasure was instructed to sweep along the front of Hancock's line to the right, in the direction of the Orange Plank road, keeping his right about one hundred paces from the breastworks. Deploying his brigade at right angles to the breastworks, he traversed the entire front of Birney's and Mott's divisions, crossing the Plank road in his march, encountering as he proceeded what he supposed to be a brigade of the enemy, which fell back without engaging him. The brigade then resumed its position in line of battle.

At 2.10 P.M., the Maryland brigade (Colonel Denison) of the Fifth Corps and two regiments of heavy artillery reported to General Hancock for duty. These were massed near the Plank road in reserve. There was then a lull in hostilities, and Hancock was notified to prepare to make another attack at 6 P.M. But General Field, who had succeeded Longstreet in command,¹ did not propose to await another attack. At 4.15 P.M., he advanced against Hancock's line in force, pressing forward until his troops arrived at the edge of the *abatis*, less than one hundred paces from Hancock's first line, where they halted and continued an uninterrupted fire of musketry. After continuing this for about half an hour some of the troops began to waver, and finally a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's division, in the first line, gave way, retiring in disorder toward Chancellorsville. Great exertions were made to rally these men, and many of them were returned to the line of battle, but a portion of them could not be collected until the battle was over.² As soon as the break in the line

¹ After the flank attack on Hancock's left, Longstreet made arrangements to follow up the successes gained, and ordered an advance of all his troops for that purpose. While he was riding at the head of his column, moving by the flank down the Plank road, when opposite the regiments that had made the flank movement, and which were drawn up parallel to the Plank road, a portion of them fired a volley, which resulted in the death of General Jenkins and the severe wounding of General Longstreet.

² This disorganization was attributed to the fact that the front line of breastworks had taken fire a short time before the Confederates made their attack, having been communicated to it from the forest in front (on the battle ground of the morning), which had been burning for several hours. The breastworks on this portion of the line were constructed entirely of logs, and at the critical moment of the Confederate advance were a mass of flames, extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and smoke, which was driven by the wind directly in the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet and at some points compelled them to abandon the works.

occurred, the Confederates pushed forward, and some of them reached the breastworks and planted their flags thereon.

At this time Rice's brigade of the Fifth Corps, which had become separated from Wadsworth's division when it was repulsed, was in reserve behind the Second Corps line. This consisted of the 56th, 143d, 149th, and 150th Pennsylvania ; 76th, 95th, and 147th New York, and a company of the 6th Wisconsin. Hancock ordered the brigade forward in support, and it moved rapidly out by the right flank, under Colonel Hoffman, and when the head of the column arrived at the point of works where they had been vacated by the Second Corps troops, the brigade was formed in line of battle at nearly a right angle with the works, the men commencing to fire as soon as they came into line. In the course of ten minutes this effective assault, in connection with one made at the same time by Carroll's brigade, drove the Confederates from the works and back into the woods. Several hundred men of the Fifth Corps brigade sprang over the works in their eagerness to pursue the enemy, but they were recalled by Colonel Hoffman. This brigade appears to have been one of general utility, for at 8 P.M. it was relieved and ordered into the second line of works ; at 3.30 A.M. on the 7th it again moved into the front line ; at 7 A.M. it was moved three fourths of a mile to the left and erected new works ; and at 11 A.M. it was ordered to rejoin the division. General Rice, who had had a special command, now returned, and at 4 P.M. moved the brigade to the Lacy house, and at 10 P.M. it took up the line of march with the corps.

Just after the enemy had been repulsed, General

Hancock was notified that the order for attack at 6 P.M., had been countermanded, and no further demonstrations were made by the Confederates on this front.

At 6 P.M., however, Gordon, with two or three brigades of Ewell's corps, advanced quietly through the thicket and suddenly rushed upon and through the Union skirmish line in front of General Wright's division on the extreme right of the army, forcing the line of battle to give way in some confusion. The Confederates captured a considerable number of prisoners, among them General Shaler, whose brigade had rejoined from detached service early that morning. Crawford, with his division of the Fifth Corps, was promptly sent to reinforce Wright, and the line was soon restored, and the Confederates retired, it having become too dark to continue operations.

This virtually closed the battle of the Wilderness, although the two armies lay confronting each other during the entire day of the 7th without action, except upon the skirmish line.

The battle of the Wilderness afforded but little opportunity for the use of artillery. When Crawford first met the enemy on the morning of the 5th, Cooper's battery went into position in a clearing near by, but did not open fire. Meanwhile, Breck's and Stewart's batteries had, with Wadsworth's division, followed the same route and reached an open space about one half mile to the rear of that occupied by Crawford. All these batteries were withdrawn to the neighborhood of the Lacy house about noon. E, Massachusetts; D, 5th U. S.; H, 1st New York; and B, 1st Pennsylvania, were then posted on the crest of a ridge to the right of the Lacy house, com-

manding the valley and the road to Parker's store. Before this, however, D, 1st New York (Winslow), advanced up the turnpike with Griffin's division. One section was pushed up the road with the infantry advance, to the opening where the 140th New York Infantry made its fatal charge. It moved into position part way up the rise on the far side of the opening and fired solid shot up the road. When the 140th gave way, Winslow withdrew his section to the bottom of the vale, nearly across the opening, and again went into position, but the enemy was close upon him. A few shots were fired even after the infantry had left him. The guns were fought to the last as honorably as guns could be lost. Nearly all the horses were shot. Captain Winslow was severely wounded, Lieutenant Shelton was wounded and made prisoner, and the Confederates were actually between the guns before they were abandoned. The remaining four guns of Winslow's were placed in position on the right of the pike, on a crest where a little timber had been felled, while a section of Phillips' battery was at the same time brought up and posted on the pike, where it replied to and several times silenced a Confederate battery similarly posted at a distance of about 1400 yards.

On the 6th of May, the following batteries of the Fifth Corps were moved into position to the left of the line occupied by E, Massachusetts, and D, 1st New York, which was the main line held by the Fifth Corps: D, 1st New York, now commanded by Lieutenant Richardson, on the right of the pike; E, Massachusetts, across the pike; C, Massachusetts, H, 1st New York, L, 1st New York, and B, 1st Pennsylvania, still to the left. None of these, however,

were brought into action. When the troops of the Sixth Corps gave way, on the evening of the 6th, Colonel Wainwright, chief of the corps artillery, tried to get three batteries into position on a knoll to the rear of the line above mentioned, so as to command a high piece of ground and a ravine to the right. Rittenhouse's and Stewart's batteries were at once brought up, together with the 7th Maine battery, of the Ninth Corps. It was found, however, that but one battery could be placed so as to be of service, so Stewart and Twitchell were ordered back to their previous positions, and Rittenhouse remained until withdrawn the following morning.

The loss in the Fifth Corps during the battle of the Wilderness was 253 officers and 4879 men—an aggregate of 5132. Among these were several distinguished officers and many others of note. That intrepid and self-sacrificing soldier, Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, was killed while rallying his men to attack. Brigadier-General Alexander Hays, whose gallantry and military enthusiasm on other fields had marked him as a rising commander, was killed in the jungle of that fatal field. Colonel George Ryan (Captain 7th U. S. Infantry), 140th New York, was killed while leading his regiment in its fatal charge on the 5th of May; and Colonel David T. Jenkins, 146th New York, lost his life in furnishing relief to the 140th with his regiment. The following officers were also killed or mortally wounded during the battle while nobly doing their duty:

Indiana.—Captain George P. Clayton, 7th; Colonel Samuel J. Williams, 19th.

Maine.—Lieutenants Frederick W. Lane and John M. Sherwood, 20th.

Maryland.—Lieutenants Levi T. Heath and Robert M. Gorsuch, 4th.

Massachusetts.—Captains James W. McNamara and Wm. A. Phelan, 9th; Lieutenants Charles B. McGinnisken and Nicholas C. Flaherty, 9th; Lieutenant-Colonel David Allen, Jr., 12th; Lieutenant Joseph H. Stewart, 13th.

Michigan.—Captain Darius C. Bradish, 1st; Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Lumbard and Captain Wm. H. Loveland, 4th; Captain George Hutton and Lieutenant Wm. B. Hutchinson, 24th.

New York.—Captain Seth F. Johnson, 44th; Captain Norman G. Bartholomew, 76th; Colonel Joseph A. Moesch, 83d; Captain Benjamin B. Burn and Lieutenants Charles W. Osborne and Stark W. Woodrow, 95th; Lieutenants Francis T. Brennan and Wm. C. Drescher, 67th; Lieutenants Frederick Bauer and Joseph H. Pool, 140th; Colonel David T. Jenkins, Major Henry H. Curran and Lieutenant Peter D. Froeligh, 146th.

Pennsylvania.—Lieutenant-Colonel George K. Dare and Lieutenant J. Woods Russell, 5th Reserves; Captain Daniel D. Jones and Lieutenant Achibald W. Stewart, 11th Reserves; Lieutenants Henry C. Titman and Henry Evey, 56th; Lieutenant George H. Collins, 142d; Lieutenant-Colonel John D. Musser, Lieutenant Michael Keenan and Lieutenant John C. Kropp, 143d; Captain Horatio Bell and Captain Roland Stoughton, 150th.

United States.—Lieutenants Charles I. Pleasants and Wright Staples, 11th Infantry; Lieutenant Jean P. Wagner, 12th Infantry; Captain S. W. Burbank and Lieutenant Daniel M. Brodhead, 14th Infantry.

Wisconsin.—Captain John R. Sperry and Lieu-

tenant Wm. Noble, 2d ; Major Philip W. Plummer, Captain Rollin P. Converse and Lieutenant James L. Converse, 6th ; Lieutenants James Holmes and Wm. W. Walrath, 7th.

The 7th Pennsylvania Reserves had the misfortune to become nearly decimated—losing 20 officers and 283 men as prisoners to the Confederates.

Second Epoch.

General Lee had, during the battle of the Wilderness, up to the time of Longstreet's arrival, remained on the defensive, except when opportunity offered of giving a counterstroke. As the Union army had made no impression on the Confederate lines, Lee was somewhat at a loss as to what would be Grant's next move. Heretofore, whenever the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Rappahannock and had been unsuccessful, that army had retired to the north bank. It might, at least, have been presumed that the same thing would again occur. But such was not the intention of General Grant. Although he had lost officers and men sufficient to form a small army,¹ and was evidently considerably surprised with the fighting qualities of the Army of Northern Virginia, he had no idea of a retrograde movement. After lying idle all day of the 7th, and seeing that Lee had no disposition to assume the offensive, he directed a further movement towards Spottsylvania Court-House.

The army was therefore put in motion on the night of the 7th, when the Fifth Corps, preceded by a division of cavalry, took the lead on the Brock road, followed by the 6th Corps. General Meade says that—

¹ The loss of the Army of the Potomac from May 5th to 7th was 17,666.

“in order to clear the roads, it was necessary to move the trains by daylight, which undoubtedly was observed by the Confederates, for early on the 8th of May the Fifth Corps met Longstreet's corps on the Brock road, near the crossing of the Po River, prepared to dispute the passage.”

LAUREL HILL AND PO RIVER.

May 8th.

The Fifth Corps started at 9 P.M. on the evening of the 7th of May,—Robinson's division in the lead,—with orders at all hazards to secure and cover a cross-road leading to Fredericksburg, by which the wounded could be removed to Washington. Robinson made his movement as rapidly as possible, though much delayed by the rough road and fallen timber. About 3 o'clock in the morning, General Merritt's division of cavalry moved into the road ahead of Robinson, which also caused delay. At daylight the head of the column overtook the cavalry, about two miles beyond Todd's tavern, engaged with a force of the enemy, which Merritt said he was unable to dislodge. After being delayed about two hours, the cavalry gave up their task, and Robinson formed two lines of battle across the road, and drove the Confederates from one position to another for two or three miles. In a field on the left of the road was a section of Confederate artillery. A charge on this resulted in the capture of one caisson, the Confederates succeeding in getting away with the gun.

General Lee, having become aware of General Grant's movement, had put his army in motion. General Longstreet's corps, now under General R. H. Anderson, making a forced march, reached Spottsyl-

vania ahead of the Union column. Stuart's cavalry was posted across the Brock road to impede Meade's advance; but, being unable to resist it, Kershaw, Humphries, and Laws were sent to aid him.

Robinson moved steadily forward, the Confederates contesting every inch of the way, until the division reached the forks of the road near Alsop's house. Then moving down the left-hand road about one mile to where the forks reunite, it was re-formed and continued over a broad open field. Although he had passed and secured the road leading to Fredericksburg, Robinson continued to advance; but upon reaching nearly the opposite side of the field, he encountered a terrible fire of infantry and artillery from the Confederates, holding the wood covering the junction of the old court-house road with the Brock road. His advance here received a permanent check, and he fell back to the shelter of the woods he had occupied before crossing the field, in order to make preparations for an assault. There he re-formed his division by brigades in columns of regiments, the Maryland brigade on the right, the 1st in the centre, and the 3d on the left.

In the meantime Griffin, on arriving at the forks of the road near Alsop's, moved down the right-hand road, throwing Bartlett's brigade into line of battle on the right of it, while the other brigades moved in column on the road. As Robinson emerged from the woods for his assault, his troops discovered Bartlett's brigade, and with a cheer both moved gallantly forward, and had arrived within 50 yards of the Confederate position when General Robinson received a musket-ball in the left knee, resulting in the amputation of his leg. Never did soldiers exhibit a more

resolute and determined spirit. Although they had fought a two-days' battle, marched the entire night previous, and had had neither rest nor refreshment, there had been no wavering, and when they had nearly reached the Confederate lines, a furious fire of infantry and artillery was poured into them. Their long charge over the open field, together with their wearied condition, precluded the possibility of attempting to assail the position so strongly defended. Under these circumstances, and without any leader, the division began to waver and finally gave way. Bartlett was thus forced to retire his brigade to the shelter of the woods in his rear, where Ayres had already formed his line of battle, and Sweitzer, coming up in double time, moved into line on Ayres' right. Griffin now ordered another charge, which was handsomely made, and, driving the Confederates, reached the Burned house and held the ground. It was now discovered that they were in front of the Confederate intrenchments. Subsequently Griffin was ordered to fall back about 200 yards, where breastworks were constructed.

When Robinson's division was forming for the assault, Captain Martin moved to the front with his battery, and went into position on the right of the Maryland brigade, near the point of woods where the two branches of the road near Alsop's again come together, and fired solid shot into the woods on the opposite rise during the advance of the infantry. The 22d Massachusetts, reinforced by the 4th Michigan, under Colonel Tilton, was ordered to the support of Martin, and the brigade was posted on a wooded knoll to the right of the battery. Robinson's line was now coming back sharply pursued. The 18th Massachusetts and 1st Michigan rallied on Til-

ton's right. Tilton had, meanwhile, opened fire, and the Confederate advance was checked. They soon, however, were seen in a piece of woods a few hundred yards to the left, aiming to get in Tilton's rear. Martin's battery now retired. All the troops on the knoll then moved off by the right flank to the right and rear amidst some confusion. But he found the 22d Massachusetts in line facing to the late left, and he endeavored to rally the others on that regiment. Not succeeding, he made for the ravine in which the 2d Brigade had first formed. Here the command suffered some from artillery fire until it was again ordered to the wooded crest, where a barricade of logs was constructed.

By the time the 4th Division of the Fifth Corps, under General Cutler, reached the field the 2d Division had been repulsed. But Cutler formed line of battle and advanced to the right of Griffin. Cutler's right wing being uncovered and unsupported, was attacked in flank from the woods. This forced him to retire a short distance; but the 3d Division (Crawford's) moved up in line on Cutler's right, supported by the 20th Maine, 16th Michigan, and 118th Pennsylvania, all of the Fifth Corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Herring. This movement enveloped the right of Longstreet's corps, and came unexpectedly upon Rodes' division of Ewell's corps, moving by the flank. A gallant charge was made, and Rodes' division was forced back some three fourths of a mile towards Laurel Hill. Herring received no instructions from General Crawford until about 4 P.M., when he was ordered to advance in support of a brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves. Much time was consumed in arranging for the movement, and it was

6 o'clock, then almost night in the shadows of the dense thicket, before Herring began his advance. As the line moved forward it came abruptly on Crawford's brigade, halted and firing. Herring also halted. Suddenly, and without unusual noise, the Confederates advanced to a counter charge. Without intimation, and for some unaccountable reason, Crawford's line disappeared, and the force and shock of the attack fell upon Herring's command, principally upon the 20th Maine, which met it heroically.¹

While advancing and endeavoring in line of battle to pass over an almost impassable swamp, three fourths of the 16th Michigan, in the darkness which had by this time become complete, became separated from the 118th Pennsylvania. It was therefore alone, under the command of Captain G. W. Fuller. He formed it into line on the edge of the swamp. The Confederates had advanced two regiments by the flank down a ravine on the left, and deployed them with the evident intention of turning the left of the line; but the 16th opened on them a destructive fire, throwing them into confusion, and many of Fuller's men advancing, a hand-to-hand conflict in the almost impenetrable darkness ensued, which resulted in the capture of a Confederate colonel and a large number of men. Ultimately the whole Confederate force

¹ Mr. J. E. Smith, the historian of the 118th Pennsylvania, says: "Men fought with desperation. Hungered, fatigued, discouraged, they were goaded to a frenzied madness. Hand-to-hand conflicts were numerous; bayonets crossed frequently; muskets were clubbed repeatedly. Swords clashed, and revolvers that had never left their holsters to be discharged in anger were freely used. Shouts, yells, imprecations, heard above the noise of battle, were incessant. Alone, a mile beyond relief, menaced by death or captivity, the men were in a mood to fight and fight hard. They were sustained by the officers, who joined personally in the combat with great vigor. . . . Front, rear, and flanks were lost in the whirl; organization was gone."

disappeared, and Herring was left to occupy the crest of Laurel Hill. Trophies were added to the success of this combat. The 20th Maine took 77 prisoners; the 22d Massachusetts captured 50, and Captain Davis, of that regiment, took the colors of the 6th Alabama. The whole number of prisoners taken aggregated about 200. Herring then took all due precautions to sustain himself in his position, but knew that when daylight came it would be untenable, and he therefore sent officers to the rear to find Crawford and get orders. Crawford's headquarters could not be found, but they came upon General Neill, of the Sixth Corps, and he directed Herring to hold the position until 3 A.M. At that hour he withdrew his men within the lines, and after daylight the command returned to its proper corps.

The Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, arriving upon the field in the afternoon of the 8th, was pushed forward to press the success Crawford had met with in the early part of the afternoon. Only one of the brigades, however, had become engaged when night came on. The 1st Division, except Penrose's brigade, which was on Crawford's left, was established in line on the right of the 5th, and all intrenched. The other two divisions established lines to the left of Warren.

The Fifth Corps batteries could furnish but little assistance in the above mentioned engagements. Breck's battery, on its arrival at the Alsop house, was left in position on high ground close to the house, while Martin went into position with Robinson's division. When that division fell back, the battery retired by the right-hand road about half a

mile to a small knoll which commanded the valley of a little stream emptying into the Po River. During the withdrawal of his battery, Martin received a severe wound in the back of his neck, just grazing the spine. The command of the battery then fell to Lieutenant Wolcott.

As the other batteries of the corps moved up they were formed on the right and left of the Alsop house, about a quarter of a mile to its front, except Mink and Richardson, who went into position near the house. When the line was subsequently pushed forward, Breck, Mink, and Winslow's batteries were thrown into position on the right of the road, commanding the valley above referred to, the latter battery relieving Martin's. This battery, together with Stewart's, again advanced to near its first position at the corner of the woods near the salient, and both at once became engaged in a severe artillery contest, finally silencing a Confederate battery about six hundred yards to the front. In this engagement Lieutenant Goodman, temporarily serving with Stewart, was mortally wounded. Soon after dark all the batteries were withdrawn to the neighborhood of the Alsop house, and parked for the night.

The Second Corps had been ordered to move to Todd's tavern during the night of the 7th. General Hancock expected to start at 10 or 11 P.M., but owing to the occupation of the roads, the fatigue of the men, and other causes, his march did not commence until after daylight. On arriving at the tavern at 9 A.M., of the 8th, he relieved Gregg's cavalry, which had been holding that point. Mott was placed in position to cover the Brock road, Barlow formed on Mott's

left, Gibbon covered the Catharpin road, and Birney was held in reserve. Subsequently the lines were extended by Birney taking position on Gibbon's left, between the Catharpin and Spottsylvania roads.

About 11 A.M., Colonel N. A. Miles, with his own brigade, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, made a reconnaissance on the Catharpin road towards Corbin's Bridge. When within half a mile of the bridge the Confederates opened on the command with artillery on the south side of the Po. Replying with his battery, Miles held his position until ordered to return later in the day. On his way back, at 5.30 P.M., he was attacked by Mahone's Confederate brigade, which he handsomely repulsed, and the command rejoined the corps. General Gibbon had, in the meantime, been sent with his division to the support of the Fifth Corps, and took position facing the Po River, to the rear of the right flank of that corps.

The Ninth Corps moved from the Wilderness tavern by the way of and through Chancellorsville, commencing about 8 A.M. of the 8th and bivouacked on the night of the 8th on the road to Spottsylvania, the 3d Division being near Perry's house, some two miles from Chancellorsville.

May 9th.

On the morning of the 9th there were some indications of an advance by the enemy upon Birney's front along the Catharpin road. Gibbon was thereupon withdrawn from the rear of the Fifth Corps and moved one mile to the right, connecting with Birney, and Burton's brigade was

again ordered to Hancock. No attack being made, however, Birney's and Barlow's divisions moved down the Spottsylvania road to high, open ground overlooking the Po, and formed line on Gibbon's right, he having previously moved and taken up that position. Mott's division and Burton's heavy artillery were left to hold the position at Todd's tavern. At 6 P.M. Birney, Barlow, and Gibbon were ordered to force a passage of the river. Brooke's brigade, in the advance of Barlow's division, handsomely executed the order, but with extreme difficulty, on account of the depth of water and the thick undergrowth along the banks, in the face of two pieces of artillery and a detachment of Confederate cavalry. He pushed forward and took possession of the cross-roads between Gladly Run and the Po. Birney crossed the stream higher up, where he met quite a fierce resistance, the Confederates being posted behind a mill-race. Gibbon crossed below Barlow without resistance. The troops were pushed forward along the Block-house road, but night came on before they had proceeded far. Hancock's design was to push on to the bridge on the Block-house road, get possession of it, and recross the river without halting; but he found it impracticable to move his skirmish line through the dense woods in the darkness, and was compelled to halt until morning, but during the night caused bridges to be constructed where each division had crossed the river. Mott's division, in the meantime, had been withdrawn from Todd's tavern, and ordered into position on the left of the Sixth Corps.

But little change took place in the position of the Fifth Corps on the 9th. At daylight Mink's and

Richardson's batteries were posted, under General Griffin's orders, to the right of where Stewart's battery was the day before. These batteries were much annoyed during the day by the Confederate sharpshooters, and at 6.30 P.M. a Confederate battery opened on them from the left while their skirmish line advanced; but these were driven back and the battery silenced. Cooper's battery remained in position as placed the day before. Rittenhouse was also placed on the same knoll to the right of Cooper, and in the afternoon Phillips was posted about 400 yards in their rear, on commanding ground. The other batteries of the corps remained in reserve near the Alsop house until late in the afternoon, when Walcott relieved Cooper. The latter moved off about half a mile and fired some forty rounds at the Confederate line across the river. Breck's battery was sent to somewhat the same position in the afternoon.

The Sixth Corps was, in conjunction with the other two corps, employed on the 9th adjusting its lines, constructing breastworks, and developing the Confederate position, during which time the distinguished and much-loved General Sedgwick was killed. He had stood the fire of many battles and passed through the fiery furnace of all only to be sacrificed to the bullet of a Confederate sharpshooter at a period of almost inactivity. The command of the corps devolved on General H. G. Wright.

At 4 A.M. of the 9th, Willcox was ordered to move his division of the Ninth Corps to Gayle's house, on the Ny River, near Spottsylvania, where the road from that place to Fredericksburg crosses the river, with Stevenson's division in support. Meeting the

enemy in some force, Willcox drove him across the river, seized the bridge, over which he crossed Christ's brigade, with two batteries of artillery, and posted them on the rise about half a mile from the river. The demonstrations of the Confederates against Christ's brigade rendered it necessary for Willcox to cross his other brigades. Several attempts were made by the Confederates to dislodge him, but failed, and they finally retired, leaving their wounded and some fifty prisoners. At about noon, Stevenson's division arrived and a portion was thrown across the river. In the afternoon, Potter's division was moved to the neighborhood of Harris' house.

On this day, General Sheridan, with the cavalry corps, cut loose from the army, with orders to engage the enemy's cavalry, and, after cutting the Fredericksburg and the Central railroads, to threaten Richmond, and eventually communicate and draw supplies from the forces on the James River.

May 10th.

The crossing of the Po by General Hancock's command threatened to turn the Confederate left. This brought a part of Hill's corps out of their intrenchments. Unfortunately, however, it had been decided to reinforce the Fifth Corps with the Second for an assault on the Confederate works on Laurel Hill, which caused Hancock to recross the Po. Gibbon's and Birney's divisions recrossed at once, the former going into position on the right of the Fifth Corps, while the latter was massed in reserve in rear. Barlow was left to hold the ground on the south side of the Po. Shortly afterwards he was struck by Hill's

troops and a sharp engagement followed. General Meade, becoming aware of this, and not desiring to bring on a battle there, directed Barlow to be withdrawn to the north bank, which was subsequently accomplished, but not without some difficulty. Brooke's and Brown's brigades had been placed in position on a wooded crest in rear of the Block-house road while Miles and Smith retired to the south bank of the river, covering the bridges. The Confederates, discovering this movement, pressed forward on Brooke and Brown and soon occupied the breastworks; then advancing in line, supported by columns, they attacked with great vigor and determination; but they were met by a heavy and destructive fire and fell back in confusion. They rallied, however, and once more charged furiously, and with loud yells forced their way close up to the line; but the fire of the two brigades was so continuous and deadly that the Confederates found it impossible to stand it and broke again, retreating in the wildest disorder, leaving the ground strewn with their dead and wounded. During this contest, the woods on the right and rear of Brooke and Brown took fire, and the flames approached so close to the line that the position became untenable, and they commenced retiring. The Confederates, perceiving this, once more rallied and advanced, but were promptly checked by the Union troops, who fell back through the burning forest in admirable order, though in doing so many of them were killed and wounded—numbers of the latter perishing in the flames; Miles, with his brigade was left to cover the crossing of the other troops, and the Confederates endeavored to dislodge him, but were at once driven back. Miles then, under cover of the

Second Corps artillery, crossed in safety, taking up one bridge and destroying the others. This attack on Barlow was made by Heth's division, and had not Barlow been ordered to retire, it is more than probable that Heth would have been severely handled, two brigades of Barlow's having sustained the attack, holding their ground until driven away by the forest fire.

While Barlow was thus engaged on the south side of the Po, the Fifth Corps became more or less engaged with the enemy. At 11.30 A.M. the 22d Massachusetts and 4th Michigan were sent out to join the picket line and charge upon the Confederate position for a weak point. The line dashed forward, and drove the Confederates from their rifle-pits, which the Union troops immediately occupied. Two hundred men from the 32d Massachusetts, at 2 P.M., relieved the troops that had taken this advanced position. The 22d Massachusetts lost quite heavily in this action, mostly from a flank artillery fire.

At 2 P.M. the 4th Division was ordered to make an assault. Cutler advanced to attack the works, about 600 yards to the front. The attack failed. In the charge that was made by the 2d Brigade, General Rice was mortally wounded,¹ and Colonel Fowler succeeded to the command of the brigade.

In the meantime the Sixth Corps formed an assaulting column of twelve regiments in four lines—seven from the 1st Division and five from the 2d, under Colonel Emory Upton, and the formation being completed at 6 P.M., the column moved forward with great gallantry. The Confederate line of in-

¹ After having his leg amputated, General Rice was asked by the surgeon which way he desired to be turned that he might rest easier. He replied: "Turn me with my face to the enemy." These were his last words, and indicated the true character of the man, the soldier, and the patriot.

trenchments was carried and some 1200 prisoners captured. But the Confederates rallied, were reinforced, and in turn drove the Union troops from the intrenchments. The assaulting column was at once withdrawn to its former position.

Potter's division of the Ninth Corps was, during the day, ordered to Gayle's house, to support a reconnaissance which Burnside had been directed to make towards Spottsylvania Court-House. The division crossed the Ny River, and the reconnaissance was pushed that afternoon and evening, under a pretty heavy fire, close up to the enemy's lines, one portion of Potter's division being within a quarter of a mile of the court-house. Here the corps intrenched. In the meantime the Provisional Brigade, under Colonel Marshall, was ordered up to the Gayle house on the banks of the Ny. In this movement the Ninth Corps met with misfortune in the loss of General Stevenson, who was killed by a Confederate sharpshooter. "General Stevenson," says General Burnside, "commenced his services in the war with me in the expedition to North Carolina, and on all occasions proved himself a brave and efficient soldier."

Major-General Crittenden arrived, and was assigned to the command of the 1st Division of the Ninth Corps.

May 11th.

This day was spent in making preparations for a combined assault by the Union troops on the morning of the 12th. The Ninth Corps was ordered to withdraw from its position on the south side of the Ny to the north bank; the line was being formed in the new position when orders were received directing

Burnside to again cross the Ny and resume his position of the 10th, which was accomplished without much opposition on the part of the Confederates.

Wright was directed to extend the left of the Sixth Corps, concentrate on that wing, and be prepared for the assault. Hancock, with the Second Corps, moved, during the night, from the right of the army to the left of the Sixth Corps, and he was ordered to assault the "salient" at daylight. Warren was to make an assault with the Fifth Corps, to keep the enemy in his lines, while Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was ordered to assault on the extreme left. After these dispositions had been made, the position of the Army of the Potomac was as follows: The Fifth Corps was on the extreme right from near the Po River, extending past the front of the Alsop house, in an irregularly curved line; the Sixth Corps was on the left of the Fifth; the Second Corps, continuing the line to the left of the Sixth, was in front of the "salient"; while the Ninth Corps was on the extreme left, its left resting near Spottsylvania Court-House. The Fifth Corps batteries were either in position, or placed in time for the assault, as follows: Mink and Richardson retained their old positions; Cooper occupied his old works commanding the valley; Breck and Phillips were in position to the extreme left of the corps, to the left of the road which crosses the Po at Corbin's bridge; Stewart was moved to the left and front of Cooper, and Walcott was ordered to report to General Ayres, and was placed in the front line.

SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE.

May 12th.

Hancock's assaulting column was formed just in rear of his picket line, about 1200 yards from the Con-

federate works. The ground ascended sharply between the two lines and was thickly wooded, with the exception of a clearing of about 400 yards in width, extending up to the Confederate works in front of the Landrum house, curving to the right as it approached them. A small watercourse ran parallel to and in front of Hancock's line, which was formed as follows: Barlow, in two lines of masses, was placed on the cleared ground; Birney's division was formed in two deployed lines on Barlow's right; in front of him was a marsh and a dense wood of low pines; Mott's division formed in rear of Birney; Gibbon was in reserve. The assault was ordered at 4 A.M., but a heavy fog prevailing, Hancock decided to wait until it was sufficiently light to make sure of his points of assault. At 4.35 the order was given to advance. Barlow marched over the enemy's pickets without firing a shot, regardless of a sharp fire on his left flank from a Confederate picket reserve, while Birney's men, ploughing through the marsh and dense woods, kept well up with Barlow. The column continued half-way up the hill, when the men broke into a tremendous cheer, and spontaneously taking up "the charge," they rolled like an irresistible wave into the Confederate works, tearing away what *abatis* there was in front of the intrenchments, carrying the line at all points in a few moments, although it was desperately defended. Barlow's and Birney's divisions entered almost at the same moment, striking the enemy's lines at "the salient," in front of the Landrum house. A fierce and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets, and although short, the interior was literally covered with the dead and wounded, the affair resulting in the capture of 4000 prisoners of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps,

twenty pieces of artillery with horses, caissons, and material complete; several thousand stand of small-arms, and upwards of thirty colors. Among the prisoners were Major-General Edward Johnson and Brigadier-General George H. Stewart. Other portions of the Confederate army fled in disorder, and the fighting Second Corps could not be restrained from pursuit, which was continued until they encountered a second formidable line of earthworks, the existence of which was not previously known.

As the line was very much broken during this movement, a halt was made to adjust it, and Hancock's reserves were ordered up to occupy the captured works. By this time the Confederates had thrown heavy reinforcements in the second line, opposite Hancock's point of assault, and, while Barlow and Birney were re-forming, advanced against the halted line, which retired to the captured works, where it resisted all attempts of the Confederates to dislodge it.

As soon as General Hancock had carried the works, General Wright, with the Sixth Corps, moved up in support, the head of his column arriving about 6 A.M. Russell's division advanced at once into line on the right of Mott's division and the remainder of the corps occupied the line of intrenchments to the right of the salient, which is now known in history as "the Angle," and was the key to the whole position. The Confederates made attack after attack to regain it, but were repulsed with severe loss each time. In this affair General A. S. Webb, the former and much-loved inspector-general of the Fifth Corps, was severely wounded and compelled to leave the field.

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, had been

directed to assault the works in his front, keeping up, if possible, a connection with the Second Corps. At 4 A.M., Potter's division, supported by the 1st Division (Major-General Crittenden), advanced to the assault, while Willcox was held in reserve, Marshall's Provisional Brigade holding the line of intrenchments. Two lines of detached rifle-pits, occupied by the Confederates, were passed over and the assault was made, resulting in Potter's division carrying a portion of the line, capturing a battery of two guns with a large number of prisoners. No connection was had at this time with the Second Corps, and when Burnside's right became a little pressed, the troops abandoned that portion just captured. General Grant, at this time sent urgent orders to establish connection with the Second Corps at all hazards. Crittenden's and Potter's divisions were ordered forward to repeated attacks, but did not succeed in driving the Confederates from their main line. Willcox was finally directed to attack as soon as possible, in consequence of the expectation of a counterstroke by the Confederates. The dense woods through which the Ninth Corps charged became the scene of a terrible conflict. Crittenden and Potter pressed close up to the Confederate line, under a galling fire, and finally Potter succeeded in establishing the desired connection with the Second Corps.

In the meantime, Warren, with the Fifth Corps, had been employed in holding a portion of the intrenchments vacated by the assaulting columns; but in order to keep the Confederates in his front, as directed, made an assault with Cutler's division. This division was under arms at daylight and charged the Confederate line of intrenchments, but was unsuccessful in

carrying any portion of them, the division having no supports on its right or left owing to the long line of works which Warren was compelled to occupy. But the object for which the charge was made had been accomplished.

A general downpour of rain added to the discomfort of the battle-field. Men were drenched to the skin and those on the picket-line were compelled to remain standing waist-deep in water and mud in the rifle-pits from twenty-four to thirty-six hours. It would be impossible in a work of this character, to give in detail the movements of the various regiments and brigades of the corps during this campaign. They were shifted so often (at each time employed in constructing breastworks), were employed in so many minor assaults, and changed into and out of the rifle-pits so frequently, that one must look to the various regimental histories to form an exact idea of the work each did. So greatly had the corps been depleted during the 12th of May, that at one time Warren's whole line of intrenchments was held by Crawford's division, the Maryland brigade, and Kitching's brigade of heavy artillery.

May 13th-20th.

On the 13th it was ascertained by General Meade that the Confederates, failing to recover their lost ground, had retired to their inner and shorter line. This fact having been fully demonstrated by reconnaissances, dispositions were made to turn their right flank. During the night of the 13th, therefore, the Fifth, followed by the Sixth Corps, moved over to the Fredericksburg road, leading into Spottsylvania.

The Fifth Corps started at 9.30 P.M., leaving their pickets all in position, and marched all night through rain and mud ; forded the Ny River once and moved over routes unknown to any one of the corps. The night was intensely dark and many of the men gave out from exhaustion and weariness ; the column became disjointed and parts lost the way. The greatest pains had been taken to mark the route by posting mounted men ; but it was impossible, through the swamps and dense forests and pitchy darkness, to make connections. Warren, however, with about 1000 men, reached the appointed place at daylight. On this day Colonel J. Howard Kitching's brigade composed of the 6th New York and the 1st and 3d battalions of the 15th New York Heavy Artillery, was assigned to the 4th Division Fifth Corps.

The 14th of May was occupied in placing the Fifth and Sixth Corps in position, the Confederates being found to be very strongly posted across the Fredericksburg road in front of the court-house. During the day Upton's brigade of the Sixth Corps was violently attacked and compelled to retire from an advanced position it had taken ; but the ground was immediately re-taken by Ayres, with the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, of the Fifth Corps, in conjunction with supports from Neill's division of the Sixth Corps.

From this time until the 17th, the Union army was employed in constant reconnoitring and skirmishing, developing the Confederate position and learning the character of the country. On the 17th, Warren was directed to take up lines and intrench, so that he could hold his position alone while the remainder of the army was being used elsewhere. He selected an advantageous position, intrenched, and placed twenty-

six guns in position in his works. During the night of the 17th, Hancock's and Wright's corps were moved back again to the extreme right of the army for the purpose of making another grand assault.

On the morning of the 18th, the removal of the two corps so uncovered the left of Warren that Hart, Bigelow, and Wolcott's batteries were posted in the neighborhood of the Anderson house, to protect that flank. Before daylight Rittenhouse's battery was pushed forward on the pike to Warren's advanced works, about 1400 yards from the court-house, and was joined by Taft's battery of six 20-pounder Parrott guns, which had temporarily joined the Fifth Corps the night before, and Sheldon's battery, making fourteen guns, under Major Fitzhugh. At the same time, Captain Cooper, with his own, Breck's, and Phillips' batteries of twelve 3-inch guns, was posted on a sharp knoll to the front and some 400 yards to the left of Fitzhugh. At daylight, Warren commenced a cannonade as a diversion from the contemplated assault. This caused a brisk artillery duel with Hill's batteries. No serious attack was made on the right, however, as it was found that the Confederates had anticipated it and were fully prepared. The two corps then returned to the positions they had occupied on the 17th.

Up to this time General Grant, as he says in his *Memoirs*, had received no reinforcements except "about 6000 raw troops under Brigadier-General R. O. Tyler."¹

On the 19th, the Second and Ninth Corps were moved to the left—the former in reserve and the lat-

¹ The entire number of troops sent to General Grant up to June 15th (*Rec. Reb.*, serial No. 81, p. 49) amounted to 55,178—a few more than were placed *hors de combat* during the campaign.

ter taking post on the left of the Sixth Corps. In the afternoon, Ewell's corps of Confederates attempted to turn the right of the Union line, having found its front unoccupied by troops. This attempt was frustrated by the prompt action of Kitching's brigade, the Maryland brigade, and Tyler's division of new troops, Crawford's and Birney's divisions moving up in support, but not used. A portion of Ewell's forces, pushing to the rear on the Fredericksburg road, suddenly met some of Ferrero's outposts of cavalry, by whom they were firmly met and the Confederates repulsed.

List of Officers Killed or Mortally Wounded in the Battles about Spotsylvania Court-House, May 8-21, 1864.

Indiana.—Captain Hugh Jamieson, 7th.

Maine.—Major Archibald D. Leavitt and Lieutenant Nathaniel W. Coston, 16th ; Captain William W. Morrell, 20th.

Maryland.—Captain Charles Z. O'Neill, 4th.; Captain James Bride, 8th.

Massachusetts.— Lieutenants James O'Neil and Archibald Simpson, 9th ; Captain John S. Stoddard, Lieutenants Edward J. Kidder and William Robinson, 12th ; Lieutenant Charles W. Whitcomb, 13th ; Captain Benjamin Davis, 22d ; Captain Robert Hamilton, 32d ; Lieutenant Isaac D. Paull, 39th.

Michigan.—Captain Lewis C. Randall, 1st.

New York.—Lieutenant Michael J. Lee, 4th Heavy Artillery ; Lieutenants David Hamel and Horton R. Platt, 6th Heavy Artillery ; Major Leander Chamberger and Lieutenant William C. Mueller, 15th Heavy Artillery ; Captain John M. K. Connally and Lieutenant Charles M. Reynolds, 83d ; Major Milo M. Starks, 140th.

Pennsylvania.—Lieutenant Josiah White, 1st Reserves ; Captain John M. Guyer, 6th Reserves ; Lieutenant Josiah M. Anawalt, 8th Reserves ; Lieutenants Robert Maxwell, Daniel Blett, and Daniel

Orcutt, 13th Reserves; Major John B. Keenan and Lieutenant Enos S. Hall, 11th; Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Hull, and Lieutenants William H. Johnson and John E. Myers, 62d; Captain George Stowe and Lieutenant Alexander B. Langley, 83d; Lieutenant Jesse W. Super, 90th; Captain William W. Dorr, 121st; Lieutenant Charles H. Reilay, 143d; Lieutenant Sylvanus D. Hamler, 149th; Captain Edward E. Clapp, 155th.

United States Army.—Major Luther B. Bruen, 12th; Captain Hamilton W. Keyes and Lieutenant John K. Clay, 14th; Lieutenants John T. Dowling and Frank E. Stimpson, 17th.

Wisconsin.—Captain Robert Hughes, 2d; Lieutenants Oscar Graetz and Howard F. Pruyn, 6th.

Third Epoch.

On the 20th of May, General Lee having shown no sign of advancing from his intrenchments, General Grant gave orders to renew the left flank movement. Accordingly, during the night, the Second Corps, with a small force of cavalry under General Torbert, was pushed through Bowling Green to Milford. Torbert had a handsome affair with some Confederate infantry which disputed his passage of the bridge at Milford. He carried the bridge and drove the enemy, capturing over 100 prisoners. These were a part of Pickett's division, on the way from Richmond to reinforce Lee. Butler's army having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the Confederates were enabled at this time to bring the most of, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, probably not less than 15,000 men were obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge, from the western part of Virginia. General Grant accordingly, on the 22d, directed that

all available forces at Bermuda Hundred not necessary to secure the position be sent to him under the command of Major-General W. F. Smith.

NORTH ANNA RIVER.

May 21st-24th.

General Grant's further movement to the left was quickly perceived by General Lee, and, in consequence, Ewell's corps, then on the left of the Confederate line, moved with its artillery early on the 21st to the Telegraph road south of the Po, and then by that road towards Hanover Junction. Later the same day Hill's corps moved towards the same point, and in the afternoon Anderson's corps took up the line of march on the Telegraph road. By the afternoon of the 22d the entire Confederate army had reached the south bank of the North Anna River, near Hanover Junction,—Anderson occupying localities in the centre, near the Telegraph road bridge, Hill on his right down the river, and Ewell on Anderson's left, up the stream. At this time Breckinridge's division, which had just arrived from the Valley, with two batteries of artillery, remained in reserve at Hanover Junction.

At 10 A.M. of the 21st, the Fifth Corps' artillery commenced to move southward, followed by the infantry shortly after 1 P.M. Crossing the Mattaponi at the bridge near Guiney's Station, the corps bivouacked for the night on the south bank of the river. The march was resumed at noon the next day and the troops bivouacked near Bullock's church. On the 23d the corps moved at daylight, Griffin's division in the lead, and the head of the column arrived

near North Anna River, at the railroad bridge, at 11 A.M. This being the position that the Second Corps was to occupy, the Fifth Corps returned to Mount Carmel church, and passed to the right, striking the river again at Jericho Mills. Rittenhouse's battery was placed in position on the north bank, immediately on the left of the road leading to the ford, and soon afterwards Breck's battery took position about one third of a mile farther down, below the bend.

Griffin's division was at once pushed across the ford, followed by Crawford's and Cutler's divisions. The 22d Massachusetts took the lead. Upon gaining the opposite bank, Colonel Tilton was ordered to deploy the regiment as skirmishers and display them. Soon afterwards he was ordered to advance. The country which the troops were now to operate in was very different from any that the army had passed through since leaving the Rapidan. The roads were wide and good and fields well cultivated. It was all new to the army, and, singular to relate, the headquarters had no maps explanatory of it. It would seem, however, that a due precaution might have supplied these.

Colonel Tilton was ordered to advance and his skirmish line soon struck the South Carolina Rifles, who gave way before the Union line and permitted themselves to be chased through some woods into an open field on the left, about 400 yards, and thence to the railroad, 500 yards farther on, at Noel's Station. Tilton halted his skirmish line at a fence on the edge of the timber on the left of the road. He then obtained fifty men of the 32d Massachusetts, in order to extend his line, the Confederates making some demonstration in his front while they were hurrying off

both railroad and wagon trains from the station. Colonel Sweitzer, in the meantime had formed the remainder of the brigade and made a barricade. The entire 1st Division was then thrown forward on this line, and, as soon as a pontoon bridge was laid, the six 12-pounder batteries crossed. The 3d and 4th Divisions were, at 5 P.M., pushed across to the left and right of the 1st, respectively, to complete the chord across the bend of the river. The 3d Division succeeded in reaching its position on the left, near a house, and Hart's and Stewart's batteries were posted in rear, on good ground. Meanwhile, the 4th Division was going into position on the right. It was formed in echelon of regiments. Cutler moved up the 1st Brigade to connect with Griffin and the 3d Brigade joined the line on the right of the 1st. The 2d Brigade was ordered to support them, and Lyle's brigade was held in reserve. While Cutler was advancing to the front with Captain Mink, to examine a position for the battery, and before the 1st Brigade had assured its position, the Union line was furiously attacked by the Confederates, they making their appearance on Griffin's right, thinking, no doubt, that his division (or as they may have supposed a brigade) was making a reconaissance and they could take him in flank. The 1st Brigade was advancing toward an open ridge on the right of the woods where the Confederate line of battle arose from behind the ridge, fired a volley, and at once charged. The brigade gave way. Colonel Wainwright, chief of corps artillery, being present, directed Mink to take position with his battery and cover the right. Mink advanced beautifully in line and went into battery at canister range. Matthewson's and Wolcott's batteries were

also brought up at a gallop and formed on the right of Mink, and it is needless to say commenced an effective fire. The behavior of all these batteries was admirable. By the promptness with which they were placed and the efficiency with which they were handled, the attack was repulsed and the 4th Division, the other brigades of which had come promptly to the support of the 1st, was established in line. The engagement lasted till after dark, when the lines were intrenched.

While the Fifth Corps had been engaged in establishing itself on the south bank of the North Anna, the Second Corps had moved up from Milford, developing along the heights about one mile back from the river, Gibbon's division crossing the Richmond & Fredericksburg Railroad. Birney's division took position on the right of the Telegraph road which leads to the wooden bridge across the North Anna. Barlow's division was in the centre. The Confederates were found to be in some force in rifle-pits on the north bank, and Birney sent Egan's and Pierce's brigades to drive them out. Led by these gallant officers, the brigades charged with spirit from different points over an open field several hundred yards in breadth, carried the pits, and drove the Confederates pell-mell across the stream, with considerable loss to them. The corps then occupied the north bank during the night, and, by the vigilance of the pickets, prevented the Confederates from destroying the bridge, at which they made several attempts. The Confederates succeeded, however, in holding the railroad bridge during the night.

Meanwhile, the Sixth Corps moved *via* Guiney's Station and Pisgah church, and crossed Jericho Ford

at 11 P.M. of the 23d, going into bivouac on the south bank ; while the Ninth Corps moved by the way of Downer's Bridge on the Ta River, Smith's Mill on the Ny, and Guiney's Station, and bivouacked near Bethel church, to support the movements of the Second and Fifth Corps ; but, not being required, started across the fields for Jericho Ford on the morning of the 23d. Before reaching its destination orders were given for the corps to proceed to Ox Ford of the North Anna and relieve Mott's brigade with a division. This was accomplished just before sundown.

On the morning of the 24th, General Hancock, finding that the enemy had withdrawn his lines to such an extent as to leave nothing in front of the Second Corps, moved across the river and occupied the works which the Confederates had vacated. Potter's division of the Ninth Corps reported to Hancock, and it moved into position on the right of the Second Corps, the other two divisions remaining on the north bank of the river.

If the military reader will retain in his memory some of the salient points of this campaign, General Lee's strategic manœuvres will become very apparent, and he will observe : First—That after the first slight effort that officer made to turn the right of the Army of the Potomac on the evening of May 6th, which was evidently for the purpose of cutting off the Union army from the fords of the Rapidan, he never again attempted a movement against the right of that army ; but, as soon as he discovered that Grant had cut loose from his base, he threw his whole force against the left. Second—That Lee never lost the opportunity of offering advantages to Grant to attack

his (Lee's) left. He permitted Hancock to cross the Po to the left of his lines, and having received the information that a corps had crossed, sent two divisions to attack that corps (not knowing of Hancock's orders to recross the river), in the hope that this action would call the entire army across in support of those on that side of the river. In other words, he strengthened his right flank and retired his left. Heretofore, Grant had been moving by the left flank in order to preserve his base of supplies by water and rail at different points as he progressed. He had moved upon Lee's right and taken the chances of the Wilderness for the purpose. Now, however, Lee suddenly threw Grant on his left flank, which, if continued, would put Lee between the Army of the Potomac and its supplies; and, if the Confederate army continued to be as successful as it had been in repulsing Grant's attacks, the Army of the Potomac would have been pushed to the westward of Richmond instead of gaining a position to the eastward.

After Grant had thrown the Fifth and Sixth Corps without obstruction across the North Anna, opposite the left of Lee's line, Lee, holding strongly to Ox Ford, threw back his left until it rested on Little River, at or about New Market, thus forming almost an acute angle, with Ox Ford as the apex, the right extending along the North Anna and resting on an extensive swamp. This was the second bait thrown out to change the front of the Army of the Potomac. We had always been of the opinion that General Grant perceived this until after reading his reports in the *Rebellion Records*. In his letter to General Halleck of May 26, 1864, he does not in the slightest manner allude to this, but says :

"To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible, on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River, and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once and leaves us still where we can draw supplies."

Although General Grant gives a reason for not attacking Lee on his left flank, it is not the reason we imagined he would give. It is possible that, had it not been for the three rivers mentioned he would have attacked at the point Lee so cleverly offered. It may be that he thought Lee whipped and that he could select his choice of positions on the James River, as would seem from the following extract of the letter above mentioned :

. . . "Lee's army is really whipped. . . . A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. . . . I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. . . ."

General Grant did not at that time contemplate the pounding the Army of the Potomac would yet have to undergo before Lee's army was whipped. Feeling satisfied, however, that he was master of the situation, after having employed the Fifth and Sixth Corps in tearing up and destroying a great portion of the Central and the Fredericksburg railroads, he issued the following order :

"QUARLES MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

"Major-General MEADE,

"Commanding A. P. :

"Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river

to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage's bridge and Taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede the march. At the same time this division starts, commence withdrawing all of the Fifth and Sixth Corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the Ninth Corps not now with Hancock may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town, they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left to-morrow afternoon also.

“U. S. GRANT,
“Lieutenant-General.”

We have quoted this order in full, not only to show the movement intended, but that it may be seen how much General Grant entered into details, and how little he left for the exercise of judgment on the part of General Meade, the former having asserted (p. 118, *Memoirs*) that “I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command.”

Fourth Epoch.

TOTOPOTOMOY CREEK—BETHESDA CHURCH.

May 25th-31st.

On the 25th of May, the Cavalry Corps rejoined the army, General Sheridan having accomplished the object of the expedition for which he was detached, having destroyed 10 miles of the Central Railroad, 2 locomotives, 3 trains, about 1,500,000 rations, and overtaken and recaptured 400 Union soldiers who were being marched to Richmond as prisoners. Subsequently he captured Ashland Station. The depot, 6 miles of railroad, a train of cars, and a large quantity of stores were destroyed. At Yellow Tavern he attacked and drove the Confederates four miles, mortally wounding Generals Stuart and Gordon, capturing two pieces of artillery, and taking between 200 and 300 prisoners. He destroyed the railroad bridge across the Chickahominy; destroyed two bridges and some track near Hanover Court-House; and encountered and drove the Confederate cavalry across the Chickahominy. He then crossed the Pamunkey at White House, reaching the army as stated—all in seventeen days, three of which he spent at Haxall's Landing, on the James, refitting his command.

On the morning of the 26th, in obedience to the order above quoted, Wilson's division of cavalry was sent across the river at Jericho Mills, to make the desired feint, and on the night of the 26th, General Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, supported by Russell's division of the Sixth Corps, moved towards Hanover Town. The remaining division of the Sixth Corps recrossed during the night of the 26th and,

marching to the Pamunkey, encamped near Hanover Town. Early on the following day the command crossed the Pamunkey and, moving out about two and one half miles, threw up intrenchments.

At dark of the 26th, the Fifth Corps began to re-cross the North Anna at Quarles Mills. It had been raining most of the day and the roads were very heavy and slippery, and as the place of crossing was lower down the river than where the Sixth Corps crossed, the Fifth had to wait until 2 A.M. of the 26th, as the Sixth Corps had the right of way. The Fifth Corps, however, did not get away from the river until daylight, and with its trains following proceeded as far as Mangohick church. On the 28th, it marched to Hanover Town, crossed the river, and took position with the left resting on the Totopotomoy and the right at Mrs. Newton's. On the 29th the corps moved up as far as Norman's, and Griffin's division crossed the Totopotomoy and advanced towards Shady Grove, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, with some considerable skirmishing.

About 10 A.M. on the 27th, the Second Corps, having been massed on the north bank of the North Anna during the night previous, commenced its march, and about 12.30 P.M. of the 28th, crossed the Pamunkey above Hanover Town, taking position on the left of the Sixth Corps, the right near Pollard's house and the line prolonged towards Haw's store. Communication was established with the Fifth Corps during the afternoon, although the corps did not connect.

Early on the morning of the 29th, the Ninth Corps moved into the interval between the Second and Fifth, and the whole line was thrown forward in front of Haws' store.

In the meantime, General Lee, making no endeavor to obstruct the withdrawal of the troops in his front (although General Grant deemed it "a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna"), put his army in march even before Hancock moved away from the river on the 27th, and took position on the southwest bank of Totopotomoy Creek, Breckinridge, with his division and McLaughlin's battalion of artillery occupying the left and crossing the Hanover Town road; Anderson's corps, with artillery was in suitable position to the right of Breckinridge; the Second Corps, under General Early, with a sufficient number of guns, was still farther to the right, near and beyond Pole Green church; the Third Corps, with its artillery, encamped in reserve to support Breckinridge.

On the morning of the 30th, Warren was ordered to move forward, and Griffin was pushed out towards Shady Grove, driving Rodes' skirmishers in front of him. The Confederates, however, were threatening the left of the Union line from the road leading to Mechanicsville, and Crawford moved out to drive them away and gain the road. His skirmishers had just crossed it near Tinsley's house, when the Confederates charged and drove the division back nearly to the Shady Grove road. Richardson's battery immediately took position across the road by which Crawford fell back, and opened with solid shot, and afterwards with canister, when the Confederates made a determined charge upon this point; but Crawford had faced to the left under their fire, and, with the assistance of Richardson, met and repulsed the attack.

In the meantime Griffin directed Sweitzer to feel

the Confederate line, and it advanced on each side of the Shady Grove road, with the 22d Massachusetts deployed as skirmishers and the 4th Michigan in support. The brigade steadily drove in the Confederate skirmishers until it came to a clearing in front of its left wing. Here were found two lines of breastworks at right angles, from which was delivered a cross-fire upon the advancing line. Tilton deployed some of his reserve and extended his line to the left so as to enfilade that portion of the line delivering the cross-fire, and after a little while started the Confederates again. Following up, he found them posted on the edge of another clearing, from which he drove them, and then the 32d Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania formed line of battle, while the 22d Massachusetts assembled in rear of the brigade.

It will be remembered that after the battle of the Wilderness, the 2d Division had been broken up, and the Maryland brigade had remained independent, under the orders of the corps commander. The division was now re-organized, with Brigadier-General Lockwood in command, and the Maryland brigade became the 2d Brigade. When Crawford was temporarily thrown back, the Maryland brigade was ordered forward in support, and, advancing on Crawford's left, engaged the enemy with him and drove the Confederates from the ground they had gained, and on the following morning advanced with the 2d Division and took position southeast of Bethesda Church, to which line the entire corps advanced and intrenched. Mink's battery was posted on the north side of the Shady Grove road, immediately in front of the Bowles house, and Breck's was brought up on

the left of Richardson's. At the same time, Rittenhouse, Walcott, and Bigelow were posted on the extreme left of the line, near the Armstrong house. Later in the day these three batteries were pushed forward about 800 yards, across a small run, to a ridge, from which they could command the Mechanicsville road at and to the east of Bethesda Church.

The movements of the day found the Fifth Corps line extended to the left. The Ninth Corps, with some pretty sharp skirmishing, had crossed the Totopotomoy and was now on the right of the Fifth. General Wright had endeavored to place his corps on the enemy's left flank, but a swamp and tangle of the worst character at the head of Crump's Creek delayed the movement until it was too late to effect anything.

While the Fifth and Ninth Corps had been gaining their positions on the south bank of the Totopotomoy, Hancock made a reconnaissance with a division of infantry, accompanied by artillery, supported by the remainder of the Second Corps, on the road from Haws' store to Hanover Junction. Barlow's division moved at 12 noon, meeting with no opposition until it arrived at the crossing of Totopotomoy. Here the Confederates were found in force, intrenched on the opposite bank, and a brisk skirmish ensued, Barlow attempting to dislodge him. Birney and Gibbon were ordered up, Birney's division being placed on Barlow's right and Gibbon's on his left, and on the left of the road. The enemy's skirmish line was strongly intrenched in front of Gibbon, but it was handsomely carried without much

loss by the skilful manœuvring of Colonel Brooke, with his brigade, assisted by Owen's brigade, most of the Confederates in the intrenchments being captured. At this point operations ceased for the night.

May 31st.

On the morning of the 31st of May, Lee was holding a line from Atlee's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, south and east to the vicinity of Cold Harbor. While Warren was moving into position the day before, Early (now in command of Ewell's corps) had moved out by the flank on the Old Church road to attack him, and Anderson moved up into the position vacated by Early. Warren had driven Early back till the latter had formed the right of Anderson's line. Early extended his line to the left, so as to place one division west of Beaver Dam Creek; Anderson was moved to the right of Early, Kershaw's division being placed near Beulah church, about a mile north of Cold Harbor; Pickett's division on Kershaw's left, extending in the direction of the Walnut Grove Church road, and Field still farther to the left, his left flank resting on the Mechanicsville pike. Hoke, who had come up with his division during the night, was placed on the extreme right of the Confederate line, near Cold Harbor. This extension of the lines was at once partially intrenched. From Early's left the command of Breckinridge and Hill's corps extended the lines along the Totopotomoy to the vicinity of Atlee's Station.

The position of the Army of the Potomac was as follows: The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady Grove road, extending to the Mechanicsville pike,

and about three miles south of the Totopotomoy; Burnside to his right, then Hancock and Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court-House, six miles southeast of it. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, on the right of the army, had been sent to the Virginia Central Railroad, to destroy it as far back as possible. Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, was confronting Hoke at Cold Harbor. Smith, with his command of about 12,500 men from the Army of the James, was moving up from White House, on the York River, where he landed, but a portion (about one division) was left at the White House temporarily on guard. Of the situation on the 31st, General Humphreys, in his *Virginia Campaign*, says:

"The infantry corps were pressed up against the enemy as close as practicable without assaulting, but the position was so strong naturally, and so well intrenched, and the intrenchments so strongly held, that an assault was not attempted; the skirmish lines, however, were kept up against the enemy's, and an attack threatened. . . . An attack on the enemy's position on the Totopotomoy, and covering the Shady Grove Church road and Mechanicsville pike, giving no promise of success, it was determined to send two infantry corps to maintain possession of Cold Harbor, and attack the enemy there before they and the troops sent to their support could intrench. . . . The presence of General Hoke near Cold Harbor was known to General Meade from Sheridan's reports, but it was not known that Kershaw was near him, or that Anderson's (Longstreet's) corps was on the right of Early, between Bethesda Church and Cold Harbor."

June 1st.

Wright's corps was, therefore, ordered to march early in the evening of the 31st directly to Cold Harbor, passing by Haws' store and across to the road from Old Church to Cold Harbor, a march of

more than fifteen miles, and to be there by daylight of June 1st, or before. But the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was 9 o'clock in the morning before it reached its destination, and 2 P.M. before it was all up. Before its arrival the Confederates had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed. After Wright's arrival there was no further attack made at that point. General Smith, with his command, had been ordered directly to Cold Harbor, but by some blunder the order which reached him directed him to Newcastle. He did not, therefore, arrive at Cold Harbor until 3 P.M.

Upon the arrival of the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor, Kershaw at once closed in on Hoke, Pickett on Kershaw, and Field on Pickett. This movement seems to have created an erroneous impression on General Grant's mind, for he supposed Anderson was moving from Lee's left across Warren's front, when the fact is that Anderson never was on the left, but—barring Hoke at Cold Harbor—was on the extreme right and intrenched on the 31st. General Grant, in his *Memoirs*, says :

“Soon after light on the 1st of June, Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy, but lost so much time in making ready, that the enemy got by, and at 3 o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides, his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front.”

The truth of the matter is that Warren himself discovered the closing in to the right of the Confed-

erate troops, which was not that of any corps moving in column from any part of the line, but the closing together of the troops holding the intrenchments, who could have faced to the left at any moment, and in one second's time been in line of battle. When Warren reported this movement he received orders to attack, and not only opened with his artillery, but immediately advanced two divisions of his corps. His troops, however, could not force their way across intervening swamps before the movement, which occupied in all about an hour, had ceased, and the Confederates were ready to receive them from behind intrenchments already decided by his superiors in command to be too formidable to be attacked with promise of success.

Early on the night of the 1st, in obedience to orders, Hancock withdrew the Second Corps from the right of the line of the Totopotomoy and moved to Cold Harbor, reaching there at 6.30 A.M., June 2d, and was placed in position on the left of the Sixth Corps, Gibbon crossing the Mechanicsville road, with Barlow on his left. Birney had been left to aid General Smith in front of the Woody house, but at 2 P.M. was returned to Hancock.

*List of Officers Killed or Mortally Wounded in the Battles about
North Anna River, Totopotomy River, and Pamunkey River,
May 22—June 1, 1864.*

Delaware.—Lieut. Jno. M. Dunn, 3d.

Indiana.—Lieut. David B. Gageby, 7th.

Massachusetts.—Lieut. David B. Burrell, 12th ; Lieut. George W. Bibby, 32d.

Michigan.—Major Robert T. Elliott, 16th.

New York.—Lieut. Franz Braunstein, 15th Heavy Artillery ;
Capt. Henry W. Davis, Battery E, 1st Light Artillery.

Pennsylvania.—Lieut. Benjamin F. Young, 56th ; Lieut. Wm. J. Gleason, 83d ; Lieut. John Jungerich, 121st ; Lieut. Christian S. Zimmerman, 149th.

United States Army.—Lieut. James P. Pratt, 11th.

Wisconsin.—Lieut. Burns Newman, 7th.

June 2d.

Perceiving the withdrawal of Hancock, General Lee, on the morning of the 2d, sent Breckinridge and Hill, with Wilcox's and Mahone's divisions, to his right at Cold Harbor, leaving Early on the left with his own corps and Heth's division.

Warren had been directed to extend the left of the Fifth Corps so as to unite with Smith at Woody's, and to contract his right to such an extent as to make one half his force available for attack. Cutler, Lockwood, and Crawford therefore were compelled to hold the long line (about 3 miles) from Bethesda Church to Smith's right, while Griffin's division was massed at Bethesda Church.

Burnside was directed to withdraw his force and mass it in rear of Warren's right, to protect that flank and support Warren ; while Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was ordered to cover the right of the army from the vicinity of Bethesda Church to the Pamunkey, the main body of the Confederate cavalry being on Lee's left, with Fitz-Lee's division on his right.

In the afternoon of the 2d, General Lee, feeling perfectly secure in his dispositions with the reinforcements he had received, and no longer desirous of having the Army of the Potomac change its front, determined to take the offensive, and directed Early to move on the right flank of the Union army and drive down in front of the Confederate line. Rodes

moved out to the Shady Grove road, Gordon swung around to form line with Rodes, and Heth took position on the left.

Bartlett's brigade held the extreme right of the Fifth Corps, and on their right were the skirmishers of the Ninth Corps, with whom they were supposed to unite, but between them was a deep thickly-wooded ravine, which effectually concealed one from the other. A desultory fire was kept up during the day until about 3 P.M., when it was interrupted by a severe thunder storm. As soon as the shower ceased Rodes advanced on the flank of Burnside's skirmishers and they fell back. Bartlett's skirmishers were not looking for an enemy from that quarter and a greater part of them were captured, supposing that the advancing columns were Union troops. Rodes, who had cleared off everything that had interposed, now made a desperate charge along the whole line, but Griffin, as soon as Early's movement was discovered, formed in line, Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the centre, and Sweitzer on the right, and moved forward, under musketry and artillery fire, to the attack. They had their enemy in the open now, and were ready to test their strength where everything seemed equal. With a dash that bespoke their willingness to take some exercise after being cooped up in intrenchments, they threw themselves upon Rodes and forced him back to the road.

General Early's movement found Burnside's withdrawal unfinished, and when Rodes advanced his skirmish line was driven in and some captured, and in this way Rodes' troops got in rear of the Fifth Corps' skirmish line. In the withdrawal of the Ninth Corps, Crittenden's division was in rear and

was attacked with some vigor, but held Heth in check until Willcox and Potter got into position and stopped the farther advance of those two Confederate divisions. It was now nearly dark and no further demonstrations were made, Early's troops remaining on the Shady Grove road and intrenching during the night, Ramseur's division holding the intrenchments on Anderson's left.

This occasion furnished the opportunity for General Humphreys to comment upon what the historian of this work has noticed before in other cases, the apparent lack of disposition or knowledge of our commanders as to the giving of a counterstroke. General Grant says :

"The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I *directed* Meade to give orders to his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manœuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover."

General Grant takes occasion to state in connection with this affair (p. 266, *Memoirs*) :

"While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting than Warren *when the enemy forced him to it.*"

While Warren and Burnside were engaged on the right of the line, Smith and Wright made an attack on the Confederate position at Cold Harbor at 5 P.M. This resulted in the capture of the first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps and in front of General Smith, together with 700 or 800 prisoners.

During the night the Confederates made several demonstrations with a view of regaining that of which they had been dispossessed, but without effecting their object.

June 3d-12th.

General Grant had intended to make a general assault at Cold Harbor on the 2d, but it was postponed for various reasons until the next day. At 4.30 A.M., therefore, on the 3d, Hancock, Wright, and Smith assaulted the Confederate position. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward with Birney as a reserve. Barlow succeeded in driving the enemy from a sunken road and followed him into his works, capturing between 200 and 300 prisoners, 1 color, and 3 pieces of artillery. No assistance being at hand, Barlow intrenched under fire, turned the guns he had captured against the Confederates, and continued to hold his place. Gibbon found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines and a morass difficult to cross. Although not succeeding in carrying the works in his front, he gained ground much nearer the Confederate works, intrenched and held fast. Wright captured the rifle-pits in his front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the Confederate rifle-pits. The ground over which this corps moved was the most exposed of any over which the charges were made, and it was subjected to a cross-fire, which occasioned severe loss. The fighting was substantially over by 7.30 A.M.

In the meantime Burnside had, as directed, attacked the Confederate position near Bethesda Church,

assisted by a portion of the Fifth Corps, to create a diversion, and carried an advanced line which, in the afternoon, the Confederates attacked, but were repulsed with considerable loss.

During the night of the 3d the Confederates abandoned the line in front of the Ninth Corps, and in consequence, on the morning of the 4th it was withdrawn and posted between Warren and Smith. On the 6th, Warren was withdrawn from the right of the line and massed in rear of the centre.

General Grant had visited all the corps commanders after the assault of the 3d, and from that interview decided to abandon offensive operations at that point, stating, in his *Memoirs* :

“I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. . . . No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.”

On the 7th of June, the Second Corps line being extended to the Chickahominy River, two divisions of the Fifth were sent to extend still farther to Dispatch Station on the York River Railroad, while Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, was sent to Gordonsville to destroy more effectually the Central Railroad. The army rested in this position until June 12th. General Grant states, in his report of this campaign, as follows :

“I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley ; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except by canal.”

The movement to the James River commenced after dark on the 12th. The Fifth Corps, preceded by Wilson's cavalry, seized the crossing of the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and early on the 13th took position on the Long Bridge road, covering the crossing of White Oak swamp. At this point the cavalry and Crawford's division repulsed all attempts of the Confederates to advance on that road. The Second Corps followed the Fifth, withdrawing from Cold Harbor on the night of the 12th, crossing at Long Bridge, and reaching the James at Charles City Court-House on the evening of the 13th. The Second Corps having passed, the Fifth was withdrawn to the James, and Wilson covered the White Oak Swamp road. The Sixth and Ninth Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Jones' Bridge, and the trains by a bridge at Cole's ferry. The troops under General Smith were relieved and moved on the night of the 12th to the White House, whence they embarked for City Point.

The Army of the Potomac, after *forty-three days* of almost continuous fighting, had arrived at the James; but at what a sacrifice! *Fifty-four thousand nine hundred and twenty-six men* was the price! The country between the Rapidan and the James had proved a mausoleum for over 7000 Union men—some unburied, some hastily put away, and others sacrificed in the holocaust of the terrible fires of the forests during the battles, many of whom are simply reported as "missing." The Fifth Corps alone lost 12,027 officers and men in killed and wounded.

During this campaign the valuable services of the Engineer Corps were tested to their fullest extent, and great credit is due to the corps for the ability ex-

exercised and the patience with which the officers and men performed their duties under the most trying circumstances. No less than *thirty-eight* bridges were built, the aggregate length of them being 6458 feet.

In his report on this campaign General Grant states :

“During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight without materially changing the vantage ground of either. . . . The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive.”

List of Officers Killed or Mortally Wounded in the Battles of Bethesda Church and Cold Harbor, June 1-15, 1864.

Delaware.—Lieut. Purnell J. Pettijohn, 3d ; Lieut. Richard H. Webb, 4th.

Massachusetts.—Capt. Charles F. Pray, 18th.

Michigan.—Lieut. James W. Vesey, 4th.

New York.—Lieut. Charles DeMott, Battery D, 1st Light Artillery ; Lieut.-Col. Cleveland Winslow, Capt. Lawrence Murphy, and Lieut. Constantine Weinberg, 5th ; Lieut. John Koch, 97th ; Lieut. Hugh Chalmers, 146th.

Pennsylvania.—Lieut. Richard Waters, 21st Cavalry ; Lieut. John P. Straw, 11th ; Lieuts. Samuel M. Adams, Jefferson Truitt, and Wm. Phillips, 62d ; Capt. George B. Rhoades, 88th ; Lieut. David L. Ware, 118th.

United States Army.—Lieut. August Eggemeyer, 12th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS DURING THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS, MAY 5-7, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN, PROVOST GUARD : 12th New York Battalion. ¹							
FIRST DIVISION : Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN. FIRST BRIGADE : Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES. Staff.....						1	1
140th New York.....	1	22	5	113	5	109	255
146th New York.....	3	17	5	62	6	219	312
91st Pennsylvania.....				9		2	11
155th Pennsylvania.....		7	2	40		6	55
2d United States.....			1				1
11th United States.....	2	9	2	33		19	65
12th United States.....		15	4	47	1	43	110
14th United States.....		4	5	74	1	34	118
17th United States.....		1	1	6			8
Total First Brigade.....	6	75	25	384	14	432	936
SECOND BRIGADE : Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER. 9th Massachusetts.....	3	23	9	99		3	137
22d Massachusetts ²		5	1	33		3	42
32d Massachusetts.....				16		3	19
4th Michigan.....		5	4	29		4	42
62d Pennsylvania.....		8		47	1	5	61
Total Second Brigade.....	3	41	14	224	1	18	301
THIRD BRIGADE : Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT. 20th Maine.....	1	12	2	80		16	111
18th Massachusetts.....		8	3	24		29	64
1st Michigan.....	1	4	3	44		12	64
16th Michigan ³		3		37			40
44th New York.....	1	3	1	61		1	67
83d Pennsylvania.....		15	2	59		4	100
115th Pennsylvania.....		2	1	37		25	65
Total Third Brigade.....	3	47	12	342		107	511
Total First Division.....	12	163	51	950	15	557	1748

¹ Loss if any, not of record.
² 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.
³ Brady's Co. Sharpshooters attached.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General JOHN C. ROBINSON.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel SAMUEL H. LEONARD.							
Colonel PETER LYLE. ¹							
16th Maine ²			19	1	20		40
13th Massachusetts.....		2	8		1		11
39th Massachusetts.....	5		12				17
104th New York.....		2					2
Total First Brigade.....	5	2	41	1	21		70
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER. ³							
Colonel RICHARD COULTER.							
Staff.....			1		1		2
12th Massachusetts.....	1	13	1	47		8	70
83d New York (9th Militia).....	1	17	1	81	1	14	115
97th New York.....	1	14	4	67		13	99
11th Pennsylvania.....		6	8	128	1	12	155
88th Pennsylvania.....				1			1
90th Pennsylvania ⁴		5	3	70		16	94
Total Second Brigade.....	3	55	18	394	3	63	536
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel ANDREW W. DENISON.							
1st Maryland.....	1	4		11		9	25
4th Maryland.....	1	4		8	1	4	18
7th Maryland.....		7	3	49		22	81
8th Maryland.....		5	2	46		9	62
Total Third Brigade.....	2	20	5	114	1	44	186
Total Second Division.....	5	80	25	549	5	128	792

¹ Assigned May 6th.² Including five men captured or missing from small detachment of 107th Pennsylvania attached.³ Wounded May 6th.⁴ Assigned to 1st Brigade.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. McCANDLESS.							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....						1	1
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	1	2	3	3	3	10
6th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	5	2	23		5	5	35
7th Pennsylvania Reserves.....				20	28	3	303
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	3	3	34	4	54	99
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles)....		3		31		3	37
Total First Brigade.....	1	12	6	90	27	349	485
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER.							
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	3	1	9		2	16
8th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		5	4	36		2	47
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		3	1	14		4	22
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....				3			3
Total Third Brigade.....	1	11	6	62		8	88
Total Third Division.....	2	23	12	152	27	357	573
FOURTH DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General JAMES S. WADSWORTH. ¹							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.							
Staff.....			1				1
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.							
Colonel WM. W. ROBINSON.							
7th Indiana.....	1	15	3	89	4	50	162
19th Indiana.....	1	13	2	76	1	10	103
24th Michigan.....	2	12	3	45	1	41	104
1st New York Battalion Sharpshooters.....		1		27		7	35
2d Wisconsin.....	2	4	2	14	1	17	40
6th Wisconsin.....	3	5	1	39	1	14	63
7th Wisconsin.....	3	24	7	148		35	217
Total First Brigade.....	12	74	18	438	8	174	724

¹ Mortally wounded May 6th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JAMES C. RICE.							
76th New York	1	26	2	67	12	74	282
84th New York (14th Militia).....					2		3
95th New York	2	6		63	6	86	174
147th New York		15	4	93	2	57	171
56th Pennsylvania	2	8	4	18		10	42
Total Second Brigade.....	5	66	11	241	22	327	672
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel ROY STONE.							
Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
121st Pennsylvania.....		1		19		9	29
142d Pennsylvania	1	2	2	34		16	55
143d Pennsylvania	2	21	4	132	3	58	220
149th Pennsylvania.....		11	3	106	1	94	215
150th Pennsylvania.....	1	6	3	58		24	92
Total Third Brigade.....	4	41	12	349	4	201	611
Total Fourth Division.....	21	181	42	1028	34	702	2008
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) ¹							
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E) ¹							
1st New York Light, Battery D.....			1	4	1	2	8
1st New York Light, Batteries E and L ¹							
1st New York Light, Battery H ¹							
4th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion.....				2			2
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.....				1			1
4th United States, Battery B ¹							
5th United States, Battery D ¹							
Total Artillery Brigade...			1	7	1	2	11
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	40	447	131	2686	82	1746	5132

¹ Loss, if any, not of record.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN
AND ABOUT SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, MAY 8-21, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.							
Staff.....			1				1
PROVOST GUARD :							
12th New York Battalion ¹							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
140th New York.....	2	10	3	45			60
146th New York.....		3	1	12			16
91st Pennsylvania.....		9	3	60			72
155th Pennsylvania.....	1	7		51		2	61
2d United States.....		12	4	30		3	48
11th United States.....		17	1	100		10	129
12th United States.....		3	5	32		25	65
14th United States.....		12	3	83			98
17th United States.....		13	5	58		4	80
Total First Brigade.....	3	86	25	471		44	629
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.							
9th Massachusetts.....	2	23	3	68		9	105
22d Massachusetts ²	1	17		52		9	79
32d Massachusetts.....		23	5	96		5	120
4th Michigan.....		5	1	28		4	38
62d Pennsylvania.....	1	13	5	107		18	144
Total Second Brigade.....	4	81	14	351		45	495
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.							
20th Maine.....	1	7	3	18		2	31
18th Massachusetts.....		1		14		1	16
1st Michigan.....	1	2	1	18			22
16th Michigan ³		7		38		3	48
44th New York.....		8	3	52		9	72
83d Pennsylvania.....	2	19	4	115		24	164
118th Pennsylvania.....		9	2	29		2	42
Total Third Brigade.....	4	53	13	284		41	395
Total First Division.....	11	220	52	1106		130	1519

¹ Loss, if any, not of record.
² 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.
³ Brady's Co. Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General JOHN C. ROBINSON, ¹							
Colonel RICHARD COULTER.							
Staff.....			1				1
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel PETER LYLE.							
16th Maine.....		13	9	110		11	143
13th Massachusetts.....	1	1	1	23	1	18	45
39th Massachusetts.....	1	18	6	115		28	168
104th New York.....		5	1	36		4	46
90th Pennsylvania.....	1	6	2	42		3	54
107th Pennsylvania ²				1	1		2
Total First Brigade.....	3	43	19	327	2	64	458
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel RICHARD COULTER. ³							
Colonel JAMES L. BATES.							
12th Massachusetts.....	2	14	3	29		1	49
83d New York (9th Militia).....	2	27	6	88		5	128
97th New York.....		6	2	65		2	75
11th Pennsylvania.....	1	9	2	97		3	112
88th Pennsylvania.....		14	3	62		2	81
Total Second Brigade.....	5	70	16	341		13	445
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel ANDREW W. DENISON. ⁴							
Colonel CHARLES E. PHELPS. ⁵							
Colonel RICHARD N. BOWERMAN.							
1st Maryland.....		10	6	58		20	94
4th Maryland.....	1	2	2	40		7	52
7th Maryland.....		6	2	41	2	10	61
8th Maryland.....	1	5	3	35		6	50
Total Third Brigade.....	2	23	13	174	2	43	257
Total Second Division.....	10	136	49	842	4	120	1161

¹ Wounded May 8th. On May 9th the division was temporarily disbanded, the 1st Brigade being attached to the 4th Division and the 2d to the 3d Division; the 3d Brigade served as an independent command under direct orders of the corps commander. This arrangement continued until May 30th.

² Joined May 16th.

³ Coulter assumed command of the division and Bates of the brigade May 8th. The former returned to the brigade May 9th, and being wounded May 18th was again succeeded by Bates.

⁴ Wounded May 8th.

⁵ Wounded and captured May 8th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. McCANDLESS. ¹							
Colonel WM. C. TALLEY. ²							
Colonel WELLINGTON H. ENT.							
Colonel SAMUEL M. JACKSON.							
Colonel MARTIN D. HARDIN. ³							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....	6	2	73	2	13	96	
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	3	20	...	1	27	
6th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	9	38	1	4	54	
7th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	2	2	
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	...	7	...	1	9	
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles)....	1	14	5	59	...	2	81
Total First Brigade.....	2	33	11	199	3	21	269
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER.							
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	9	2	17	1	2	31	
8th Pennsylvania Reserves ⁴	1	6	4	49	5	65	
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	9	...	24	...	12	45	
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	7	...	16	...	2	25	
Total Third Brigade.....	1	31	6	106	1	21	166
Total Third Division.....	3	64	17	305	4	42	435
FOURTH DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. W. ROBINSON.							
7th Indiana.....	1	8	3	35	...	47	
19th Indiana.....	...	6	2	31	...	36	
24th Michigan.....	...	20	2	37	1	60	
2d Wisconsin ⁵	1	1	...	2	...	6	
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters.....	1	2	11	14	
6th Wisconsin.....	2	8	3	65	5	83	
7th Wisconsin.....	...	19	1	57	3	80	
Total First Brigade.....	4	63	13	238	...	11	329

¹ Wounded May 8th.
² Captured May 8th.
³ Assumed command May 18th.
⁴ Left army May 15th.
⁵ Provost Guard of division from May 11th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JAMES C. RICE. ¹							
Colonel EDWARD B. FOWLER. ²							
Colonel J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
Staff.....	1						1
76th New York.....		7	1	41		3	52
84th New York (14th Militia).....	1	12	6	99		5	123
95th New York.....		6	2	49		8	65
147th New York.....		8	2	30		3	43
56th Pennsylvania.....		6	1	28		1	36
Total Second Brigade.....	2	39	12	247		20	320
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
121st Pennsylvania.....	1	6		16			23
142d Pennsylvania.....		4		19		8	31
143d Pennsylvania.....	1	15	2	52		3	73
149th Pennsylvania.....	1	11	3	81		3	99
150th Pennsylvania.....		7	2	41		1	51
Total Third Brigade.....	3	43	7	209		15	277
Total Fourth Division.....	9	145	32	694		46	926
HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE :³							
Colonel J. HOWARD KITCHING.							
6th New York.....		18	6	125		12	161
15th New York (1st and 3d Battalions).....		18	1	131	1	5	156
Total Heavy Artillery Brigade.....		36	7	256	1	17	317
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C).....			1	6			7
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E).....		2		3			5
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery ⁴							
1st New York Light, Battery B ⁴							
1st New York Light, Battery C ⁴							
1st New York Light, Battery D.....				4			4
1st New York Light, Batteries E and L.....		2		2			4
1st New York Light, Battery H.....			1	6			7
New York Light, 5th Battery ⁴		3		1		3	7
New York Light, 15th Battery ⁴						1	1
4th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion.....		12	2	55		7	76
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.....				2			2
4th United States, Battery B.....		3	1	6			10
5th United States, Battery D.....		1		2			3
Total Artillery Brigade.....		23	5	87		11	126
Total 5th Army Corps.....	33	624	163	3285	9	366	4480

¹ Killed May 10th.² Relieved May 21st.³ Transferred from the Artillery Reserve May 13th.⁴ Transferred from the Artillery Reserve May 16th. The 5th New York Battery was sent to Washington May 19th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS
DURING THE BATTLES AT NORTH ANNA, PAMUNKEY,
AND TOTOPOTOMOY, MAY 22 TO JUNE 1, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
Staff			1				1
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
140th New York				2		7	9
146th New York		1		9			10
91st Pennsylvania		3		13			16
155th Pennsylvania		2		15			17
11th United States	1		1	4			6
12th United States		1		14			15
14th United States				5		3	8
17th United States		1		11		3	15
Total First Brigade.....	1	8	1	73		13	96
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.							
9th Massachusetts		2	1	7			10
22d Massachusetts		6	1	22		3	32
32d Massachusetts	1	3	1	24		6	35
4th Michigan		1		8		3	12
62d Pennsylvania		1		13		1	15
Total Second Brigade.....	1	13	3	74		13	104
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.							
20th Maine		2	1	3			6
18th Massachusetts		1	1	10			12
29th Massachusetts ¹			1	12		3	16
1st Michigan			1	7			8
16th Michigan ²	1	2	4	14			21
44th New York		1	2	7			10
83d Pennsylvania		3	1	15		2	21
118th Pennsylvania		2		9			11
Total Third Brigade.....	1	11	11	77		5	105
Total First Division.....	3	32	16	224		31	306

¹ 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.

² Joined army May 29th.

³ Brady's Co. Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND DIVISION ¹ :							
Brigadier-General HENRY H. LOCKWOOD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel PETER LYLE :							
16th Maine.....		2		3			5
13th Massachusetts.....		1		7			8
30th Massachusetts.....		1		5		2	8
94th New York ²		1		2			3
104th New York.....		1		1		1	3
90th Pennsylvania.....				8		1	9
107th Pennsylvania.....		3		4		1	8
Total First Brigade.....		8		30		4	43
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel JAMES L. BATES.							
12th Massachusetts.....	1	1		5	1		8
83d New York (9th Militia).....		1		4			5
97th New York.....				6			6
11th Pennsylvania.....		1	1	8			10
88th Pennsylvania.....				6		5	11
Total Second Brigade.....	1	3	1	29	1	5	40
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel RICHARD N. BOWERMAN.							
Colonel NATHAN T. DRISBANE. ³							
1st Maryland.....		1		7	1		9
4th Maryland.....		1		1		3	5
7th Maryland.....		1		2			3
8th Maryland.....		2		3			5
Purnell Legion, Maryland ⁴				2			2
Total Third Brigade.....		5		15	1	3	24
Total Second Division.....	1	16	1	74	3	12	107

¹ Reorganized May 30th.² Joined Army May 26th.³ Assumed command May 23d.⁴ Joined Army May 29th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel MARTIN D. HARDIN.							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....	5	13			9		27
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....					1		1
6th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	2	6		13		24
7th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1		1		11		14
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	6	2		14		25
13th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	2			2		5
Total First Brigade.....	13	2	28		4	49	96
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER.							
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		1	2		2		5
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....			5		1		6
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....			1				1
Total Third Brigade.....		1	8		3		12
Total Third Division.....	13	3	36		4	52	108
FOURTH DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. W. ROBINSON.							
7th Indiana.....	1	7	1	30	4		43
19th Indiana.....		3		9	4		16
24th Michigan.....		3		16	5		24
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters.....		1	1	6	1		9
6th Wisconsin.....		2	1	9			12
7th Wisconsin.....	1	2		22	3		28
Total First Brigade.....	2	18	3	92	17		132

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
3d Delaware ¹	1			5		1	7
46th New York ¹		1		2		1	4
76th New York				9		3	12
95th New York		1		6		1	8
147th New York		3		17			20
56th Pennsylvania	1	3	2	17			23
Total Second Brigade	2	8	2	56		6	74
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
121st Pennsylvania		2	1	13			16
142d Pennsylvania		2		9		2	13
143d Pennsylvania		4		16	1	5	26
149th Pennsylvania	1	6		23	1	25	56
150th Pennsylvania		1		6			7
Total Third Brigade	1	15	1	67	2	32	118
Total Fourth Division	5	41	6	215	2	55	324
HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE ² :							
Colonel J. HOWARD KITCHING.							
6th New York	17		1	98		17	133
15th New York (1st and 3d Battalions)	5		2	57		4	68
Total Heavy Artillery Brigade	22		3	155		21	201
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C)			1	2			3
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E)			1				1
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery		1					1
1st New York Light, Battery B			1	2			3
1st New York Light, Battery C				1			1
1st New York Light, Battery D				5			5
1st New York Light, Batteries E. and L.			2	2		1	5
1st New York Light, Battery H				3			3
New York Light, 15th Battery				5			5
4th United States, Battery B				1			1
5th United States, Battery D		1					1
Total Artillery Brigade	2	5	5	21		1	29
Total Fifth Army Corps	9	126	34	725	9	172	1075

¹ Joined Army May 30th.² Assigned to 3d Division May 30th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS IN THE
BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR, BETHESDA
CHURCH, ETC., JUNE 2-15, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.							
FIRST DIVISION : Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE : ¹ Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG. Colonel JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN. ²							
121st Pennsylvania.....		2		2		1	5
142d Pennsylvania.....				3			3
143d Pennsylvania.....		1	1	8		1	11
149th Pennsylvania.....				9		6	15
150th Pennsylvania.....				5			5
187th Pennsylvania ³				2			2
Total First Brigade.....		3	1	29		8	41
SECOND BRIGADE : Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.							
9th Massachusetts ⁴		1		22			23
22d Massachusetts ⁵		1	7	20			28
32d Massachusetts.....		10	2	42			54
4th Michigan.....		1	4	19			24
62d Pennsylvania.....		2	3	1	24		30
21st Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted) ⁶ ..		1	7	4	43		55
Total Second Brigade.....		5	32	9	170		216

¹ Was the 3d Brigade, 4th Division, up to June 6th.

² Assigned June 6th.

³ Joined June 6th.

⁴ Ordered home for muster out June 9th.

⁵ 2d Company Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.

⁶ Joined June 1st.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.							
Staff					1		1
20th Maine		2	3	21		1	27
18th Massachusetts	1	2	1	16			20
1st Michigan		1	1	6			8
16th Michigan ¹		1		34			35
44th New York		4	2	17			23
83d Pennsylvania		2		9		1	12
118th Pennsylvania			1	6	2	89	98
Total Third Brigade	1	12	8	109	3	91	224
Total First Division	6	47		308	3	99	481
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General HENRY H. LOCKWOOD.							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD. ²							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES. ³							
FIRST BRIGADE⁴ :							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
Colonel EDGAR M. GREGORY.							
5th New York	2	6	2	48		29	87
140th New York				12		48	60
146th New York		3	2	3		47	55
91st Pennsylvania			2	1			3
155th Pennsylvania			1	10		1	12
4th United States ⁵				4		4	9
10th United States ⁶				2			3
11th United States				6		43	50
12th United States	1			5		36	53
14th United States			1	2		17	20
17th United States		1	1	4		24	30
Total First Brigade	3	10	3	107		249	382

¹ Brady's Company Michigan Sharpshooters attached.² Assigned June 2d.³ Assigned June 6th.⁴ Was 1st Brigade, 1st Division, up to June 6th.⁵ Transferred from the Ninth Corps June 10th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND BRIGADE¹:							
Colonel NATHAN T. DUSHANE.							
1st Maryland	5	13	2	20			
4th Maryland	1	3	1	5			
7th Maryland		9		9			
8th Maryland		1		1			
Purnell Legion, Maryland.	8	23	6	37			
Total Second Brigade.	13	49	9	72			
THIRD BRIGADE²:							
Colonel J. HOWARD KITCHING.							
6th New York Heavy Artillery.	2	14		16			
15th New York Heavy Artillery (1st and 3d Batteries).		3		3			
Total Third Brigade.	2	17		19			
Total Second Division.	3	25	14	173	258	473	
THIRD DIVISION:							
Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD. ³							
FIRST BRIGADE⁴:							
Colonel PETER LYLE.							
16th Maine	3	5	23	31			
13th Massachusetts	2	5	2	10			
39th Massachusetts		3	3	6			
104th New York		1	1	2			
90th Pennsylvania	2	3		5			
107th Pennsylvania		3	1	4			
Total First Brigade.	7	20	30	58			

¹ Was 3d Brigade, 2d Division, up to June 6th.
² Transferred from the 3d Division June 2d.
³ Assigned June 6th.
⁴ Was 1st Brigade, 2d Division, up to June 6th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND BRIGADE ¹:							
Colonel JAMES L. BATES.							
12th Massachusetts.....		4		17			21
83d New York (9th Militia).....				1			1
94th New York ²		2		17	1	29	49
97th New York.....	1	4		16		1	22
11th Pennsylvania.....	1	5		13			19
88th Pennsylvania.....	1			4			5
Total Second Brigade.....	3	15		68	1	30	117
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Major WM. B. HARTSHORNE.							
Colonel JAMES CARLE. ³							
190th Pennsylvania (1st Veteran Reserves).....				6	1	5	12
191st Pennsylvania (2d Veteran Reserves).....		2		4		1	7
Total Third Brigade.....		2		10	1	6	19
Total Third Division.....	3	24	1	98	2	66	194
FOURTH DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. W. ROBINSON.							
Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG. ⁴							
7th Indiana.....		2	1			2	10
19th Indiana.....		2		4		1	7
24th Michigan.....		3		7			10
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters.....		1		5			6
6th Wisconsin.....		1		6		1	8
7th Wisconsin.....		1	2	2			5
Total First Brigade.....		10	3	29		4	46

¹ Was 2d Brigade, 2d Division, up to June 6th.² Ordered home June 7th.³ Assigned June 6th.⁴ Assumed command June 7th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel J. WILLIAM HOFMANN,							
3d Delaware.....	1	3	8	2	14
4th Delaware ¹	1	12	21	2	36
76th New York.....	2	2	7	2	13
95th New York.....	1	11	12
147th New York.....	10	1	11
56th Pennsylvania.....	1	5	6
157th Pennsylvania ²	1	16	2	19
Total Second Brigade.....	2	18	4	78	9	111
Total Fourth Division.....	2	28	7	107	13	157
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C).....	1	2	3
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E).....	5	3	8
1st New York Light, Battery B.....	1	1
1st New York Light, Battery D.....	1	2	3	6
1st New York Light, Batteries E and L.....	1	1
New York Light, 15th Battery.....	1	1	2
4th United States, Battery B.....	1	10	11
5th United States, Battery D.....	3	3
Total Artillery Brigade.....	1	10	23	1	35
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	15	134	40	709	5	437	1340
RECAPITULATION :							
Wilderness.....	40	447	131	2686	82	1746	5132
Spottsylvania Court-House.....	33	624	163	3285	9	360	4480
North Anna, Pamunkey, and Totopotomoy	9	126	34	725	9	172	1075
Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, etc.....	15	134	40	709	5	437	1340
Grand Total of Loss during the Campaign.....	97	1331	368	7405	105	2721	12027

¹ Joined June 6th.

² Joined June 2d.

CHAPTER XI.

THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG—BATTLES OF THE WELDON RAILROAD, PEEBLES' FARM, AND HATCH- ER'S RUN—RAID TO MEHERRIN RIVER.

How calmly and serenely rolled the majestic James River as the army stood in the midst of growing fields of grain, or lounged upon the greensward of its banks, or gathered beneath the foliage of great trees and watched the rippling of the waters. No frowning battlements there to storm ; no marshalled hosts in battle array stood ready to dispute its passage ; no roar of guns to tell of deadly fray ; no gleam of bayonets glinting in the sunlight on the fatal charge. All was peace and harmony. Animals luxuriated in the verdant pastures. Men swam, bathed, or dabbled in the flowing waters. A day of rest had come, and tents were pitched as if the day of fighting was over. But it was not for long. Many weary days of marching, intrenching, and fighting were yet before the Army of the Potomac. All thoughts of this were thrown aside for the moment, and each enjoyed in his own way this halcyon time. One sad thought, however, crept into the minds of many, and that was the remembrance of the brave comrades they had left lying on the bloody fields all the way from the Rapidan to the James.

The Eighteenth Corps, under General Smith, having arrived at Bermuda Hundred, via the James River, on the 14th of June, 1864, General Grant proceeded by steamer to that point, and there gave verbal orders to General Butler to send Smith that night, with all the available troops he could furnish him, without sacrificing his position, to capture Petersburg. It has been stated that Wise's brigade, some 2400 militia, and Dearing's cavalry, 2000, were the only Confederate troops holding the intrenchments at the time.

General Smith moved as expected, and confronted the Confederate pickets near Petersburg before daylight of the 15th ; but for some reason, never satisfactorily explained to the Lieutenant-General, did not assault until late in the evening of that day—then only with part of his command. He carried the lines northeast of Petersburg, from the Appomattox River for a distance of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, capturing 15 pieces of artillery and 300 prisoners. This was about 7 P.M., of a long summer day. Between the line thus captured and the city of Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the line had been reinforced by a single brigade from any source. The night was clear, the moon shining brightly, and, as General Grant says, "favorable to further operations." At 6 P.M. of the 15th General Lee did not know where the Army of the Potomac was.

On the 10th of June, Breckinridge's division of Confederates had been placed *en route* for the Shenandoah Valley, and on the 13th Early's corps (Second), together with Nelson's and Braxton's batteries, was sent to confront the Union forces under General Hunter. Hoke's division, with Read's battalion, marched on

the 13th from Cold Harbor directly towards Petersburg, "then threatened by the enemy," as General Lee reports. Hoke arrived at Petersburg during the afternoon of the 15th. The other two corps (Anderson's and Hill's), during the 14th and 15th, remained on the north side of the James. By the morning of the 16th, however, Lee became aware of Grant's movement and the Confederate army was put in motion. Huger, Haskell, and Gibb's batteries of artillery crossed the James River on the pontoon bridge near Drewry's bluff, accompanying Pickett's and Fields' divisions, and on the 17th occupied the line previously held by Beauregard, which he had evacuated to go to the relief of Petersburg. Anderson reached the city on the 18th, followed soon afterwards by Hill, and they were ordered into the intrenchments. Besides the artillery, Beauregard had probably about 14,000 effective force of infantry, and he received no further reinforcements until Anderson's arrival. From the afternoon of the 16th, therefore, until the 18th, three corps (Smith, Hancock, and Burnside's) were only confronted by Beauregard's comparatively small force.

General Hancock, with the Second Corps, had been ferried across the river at Wilcox's Landing, and proceeding at once, reached General Smith with two divisions, just after dark of the 15th. Waiving his rank, thinking that Smith knew more about the position than he (Hancock) did, he placed his divisions at Smith's disposal. The latter, instead of making use of these troops to push his success, requested Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works. A golden opportunity was thus lost, for Lee could not be convinced, or at least did not know, that the Army of the Potomac was operating on the south

side of the James until it was nearly all across the river.

A pontoon bridge having been laid across the James River at old Fort Powhatan, which was unoccupied at the time of the arrival of the army at the James, but now bristling with Union guns, the Ninth Corps crossed on the night of the 15th, and continuing the march that night and the next day, arrived in the early afternoon of the 16th, and taking position on the left of the Second Corps, the three corps assaulted the works in their front at 6 P.M., and carried the advance and some of the main works in front of the Ninth Corps, capturing several pieces of artillery and over four hundred prisoners.

In the meantime, at 4 A.M. on the 16th, the 1st and 4th divisions of the Fifth Corps were ferried across the James from Wilcox's Landing to the upper landing, and the 2d and 3d divisions from the same place to Wind-mill point; then moving up to Petersburg, took position on the left of the Ninth Corps on the 17th, one division being placed in line of battle, while the others were held to meet any attack on the left flank.

During the afternoon of the 17th, Ledlie's division of the Ninth Corps assaulted and carried another interior line of intrenchments, which the prisoners taken in it said was the last they had in front of Petersburg. This line, however, was retaken by a charge of the Confederates just before dark. An order was then given by General Meade for an assault at 4 A.M. on the 18th by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. General Cutler, with his division of the Fifth Corps, was sent to the extreme left, with intrenching tools; Crawford's division was formed in line on the left of Burnside, and Ayres and Griffin were held in reserve.

On the evening of the 17th, Wright was sent with two divisions of the Sixth Corps to reinforce General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and Neill's division relieved the Eighteenth Corps in its line of intrenchments.

On the morning of the 18th, when the three corps advanced for the assault, it was found that the Confederates had retired to an interior line about one mile from Petersburg. The lines of the Second Corps being closer to the enemy at this time than the other corps, Hancock, on emerging through a piece of woods by which his movement had been concealed, found himself within three hundred yards of the new line of Confederate intrenchments at the Hare house. The Ninth Corps on the left of the Second had a mile to go, when it came abruptly on a Confederate force occupying the Norfolk Railroad cut and a ravine some four or five hundred yards in advance of and nearly parallel with their main line. The Fifth Corps had still a greater distance to advance over—broken by deep ravines and the Norfolk Railroad cut, which was at this time deep and difficult to cross, and was held by the enemy at its northern end. Finding that serious delays were occurring, General Meade then directed strong columns of assault at 12 noon. Birney, who was temporarily in command of the Second Corps, owing to General Hancock's wounds, carried out this order about midday, making two assaults with Gibbon's division, both of which were repulsed with severe loss.

Burnside was in the meanwhile occupied in endeavoring to drive the enemy out of the railroad cut, while Warren was similarly engaged. General Meade again ordered assaults by all the corps with their whole force

at all hazards. All assaulted late in the afternoon, very nearly at the same time. Birney was again repulsed with considerable loss. Burnside drove the enemy out of the railroad cut and established his corps within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line.

Notwithstanding the fact that the ground over which the Fifth Corps had to pass was intricate and difficult to cross, and being chiefly open ground, was exposed to the Confederate artillery fire for a long distance, Warren's assault was well made, and each obstacle passed over seemed to give fresh impetus to his charging troops. The main work seemed to fall on the 1st and 2d brigades of Griffin's division, some of his men being killed within twenty feet of the enemy's works. But at this time Beauregard had been reinforced by Lee's army, Anderson and Hill having both arrived and secured position before the final assault was made.

Colonel Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, who was commanding Griffin's 1st Brigade, was desperately wounded leading this charge. He had previously been recommended for promotion, as he had fully earned it in his glorious fight on the left of Little Round Top at Gettysburg. In consequence of his conspicuous gallantry on many fields, which up to this time had not been acknowledged at Washington, General Grant promoted him on the field—the only case of the kind on record during the war. General Grant thus refers to it in his *Memoirs*:

“Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th. He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. He had several times been rec-

commended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well."

As has been stated, General Cutler, with the 4th Division of the Fifth Corps, was sent to the extreme left on the evening of the 17th, and on the morning of the 18th he advanced, securing the redoubt in his front, which had been evacuated by the Confederates, and swinging round his left to conform to the general line of the corps, continued his advance. At 5.40 he struck the Confederate skirmishers. Continuing for about two miles, he was confronted with a new line of intrenchments, which, when the final assault was ordered, was not carried, but the corps held all the ground it had gained.

The three days' operations resulted in the taking of two lines of intrenchments, four guns, four colors and about five hundred prisoners.

General Meade then reported to the Lieutenant-General that all had been done in this particular matter that could be done, to which he received the following reply :

" CITY POINT, VA., June 18, 1864, 10 P.M.

" Major-General MEADE :

" I am perfectly satisfied that all has been done that could be done, and that the assaults to-day were called for by all the appearances and information that could be obtained. Now we will rest the men and use the spade for their protection until a new vein can be struck. . . .

" U. S. GRANT,
" Lieutenant-General."

And then began the long and tedious work of enveloping the city of Petersburg. Under the supervision of the engineers frowning redoubts, long lines of breastworks, mortar batteries, and field works of all kinds were constructed. The sortie, the bombproof, the mine, the countermine, the covered ways—were all now to be added to the experience of those who had not participated in the siege of Yorktown.

To encircle Petersburg as closely as a siege demanded required that the two railroads, the Weldon and the Lynchburg should be covered. The Sixth Corps was sent to accomplish this purpose, and the Second Corps, connecting its right with the left of the Fifth Corps at the Jerusalem Plank road, was ordered to swing round its left and close in on the Confederates. At first these corps were ordered to keep up connections, but these instructions were subsequently withdrawn and a gap opened between the Sixth and Second Corps. A. P. Hill, who was sent to look after Wright in his operations, discovered this gap and leaving Cadmus Wilcox to perform that duty; passed through the opening with Mahone, and getting on the flank of the Second Corps, drove back Barlow's and Mott's divisions in some confusion, struck Gibbon's left, and broke his second line. For a while some excitement was created ; but, rallying, the entire corps line was subsequently recovered and intrenched.

The Sixth Corps failing in its attempt on the Weldon Railroad, its left was refused and intrenchments were made facing the railroad, but at some distance from it. The corps' pickets, however, were advanced to the road.

In this general position the army remained some time, the Fifth and Ninth Corps being pushed up

close to the Confederate works, to the eastward of and on the direct Petersburg front. Now ensued a period of comparative inactivity. Not only was there much fraternizing of the Confederate and Union pickets, but considerable trading was carried on in the way of small articles, the Confederates always having tobacco, which they were willing to trade for anything—coffee, sugar, needles, thread, or anything that was for their own personal use. Many changes took place at this time in the personnel of the Fifth Corps, and hence we give, prior to an account of further operations, the organization as it stood June 30, 1864.

Commander.

Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

First Division.

Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.

First Brigade.

Colonel WM. S. TILTON.

121st Pennsylvania, Captain Nathaniel Lang.
 142d Pennsylvania, Major Horatio N. Warren.
 143d Pennsylvania, Major James Glenn.
 149th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. John Irvin.
 150th Pennsylvania, Major George W. Jones.
 187th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Joseph F. Ramsey.

Second Brigade.

Colonel JACOB B. SWEITZER.

22d Massachusetts,¹ Major Mason W. Burt.
 32d Massachusetts, Major J. Cushing Edmands.
 4th Michigan, Captain Cornelius B. Van Valer.
 62d Pennsylvania, Captain Matthew M. Felker.

¹ 2d Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached.

THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

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91st Pennsylvania, Colonel Edgar M. Gregory.
155th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Alfred L. Pearson.
21st Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted), Major Oliver B. Knowles.

Third Brigade.

Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.

20th Maine, Major Ellis Spear.
18th Massachusetts, Major Thomas Weston.
1st Michigan, Lieut.-Col. Wm. A. Throop.
16th Michigan,¹ Colonel Norval E. Welch.
44th New York, Captain Campbell Allen.
83d Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. DeWitt C. McCoy.
118th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Charles P. Herring.

Second Division.

Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General JOSEPH HAYES.

5th New York, Capt. George L. Guthrie.
140th New York, Lieut.-Col. Elwell S. Otis.
146th New York, Major James Grindlay.
10th United States, Lieut. Adolph Lunning.
11th United States, Capt. Francis M. Cooley.
12th United States, Capt. Matthew M. Blunt.
14th United States, Capt. Horace K. Thatcher.
17th United States, Capt. Joseph D. Carney.

Second Brigade.

Colonel NATHAN T. DUSHANE.

1st Maryland, Lieut.-Col. John W. Wilson.
4th Maryland, Col. Richard N. Bowerman.
7th Maryland, Capt. John Makeehney.
8th Maryland, Lieut.-Col. John G. Johannes.
Purnell (Maryland) Legion, Col. Samuel A. Graham.

¹ Brady's Co. Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

*HISTORY OF**Third Brigade.*

Colonel J. HOWARD KITCHING.

6th New York Heavy Artillery, Major Edward Jones.
 15th New York Heavy Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Michael Wiedrich.

Third Division.

Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.

First Brigade.

Colonel PETER LYLE.

16th Maine, Col. Charles W. Tilden.
 13th Massachusetts, Major Elliot C. Pierce.
 39th Massachusetts, Col. Phineas S. Davis.
 104th New York, Col. Gilbert G. Prey.
 90th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Wm. A. Leach.
 107th Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas F. McCloy.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER.

94th New York, Lieut.-Col. Samuel A. Moffett.
 97th New York, Col. Charles Wheelock.
 11th Pennsylvania, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines.
 88th Pennsylvania, Capt. Jacob Houder.

Third Brigade.

Colonel JAMES CABLE.

190th Pennsylvania, Major John A. Wolff.
 191st Pennsylvania, Major Milton Weidler.

Fourth Division.

Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER.

Provost Guard.

Independent Battalion Wisconsin Infantry (2 cos.),
 Lieut. Henry Naegely.

First Brigade.

Colonel EDWARD S. BRAGG.

7th Indiana, Major Merit C. Welsh.
19th Indiana, Major John M. Lindley.
24th Michigan, Major Albert M. Edwards.
6th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Rufus R. Dawes.
7th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Mark Finnicum.
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters, Lieut. John
B. McDonald.

Second Brigade.

Colonel J. WM. HOFMANN.

3d Delaware, Capt. Wm. J. McKaig.
4th Delaware, Lieut.-Col. Charles E. LaMotte.
76th New York, Lieut.-Col. John E. Cook.
95th New York, Major Robert W. Bard.
147th New York, Lieut.-Col. George Harney.
56th Pennsylvania, Major John T. Jack.
157th Pennsylvania, Capt. Aldus F. Hawthorn.

Artillery Brigade.

Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.

Massachusetts Light, Third Battery (C), Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott.
Massachusetts Light, Fifth Battery (E), Lieut. Joseph E. Spear.
Massachusetts Light, Ninth Battery, Capt. John Bigelow.
1st New York Light, Battery B, Lieut. Robert E. Rogers.
1st New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Almont Barnes.
1st New York Light, Battery D, Lieut. David F. Ritchie.
1st New York Light, Battery E, Lieut. James B. Hazelton.
1st New York Light, Battery H, Capt. Charles E. Mink.
1st New York Light, Battery L, Lieut. George Breck.
New York Light, Fifteenth Battery, Lieut. Andrew R. McMahon.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Capt. James H. Cooper.
4th United States, Battery B, Lieut. James Stewart.
5th United States, Battery D, Lieut. Wm. E. Van Reed.

While the investment of Petersburg was in progress, Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania, a regiment of the Ninth Corps, conceived the idea of undermining one of the Confederate forts on Burnside's front—the redoubt at Elliott's salient. His men were from the mining regions of Pennsylvania. After obtaining permission, he proceeded to carry out his plan. He encountered many difficulties, but succeeded in completing it, and July 30th was designated as the day for the explosion of the mine, to be followed by a general assault.¹ This affair belonged peculiarly to the Ninth Corps, but Ayres' and Cutler's divisions of the Fifth Corps were massed to support Burnside, and Griffin's division, temporarily under the command of General Bartlett (Griffin being absent sick), held the whole front of the corps intrenchments. Bartlett was ordered to keep up a severe and continuous musketry fire, and to advance at any intimation of a break in the Confederate lines. No advance was made however, as there was no break sufficient to warrant it.

The explosion was to have taken place at break of day, but owing to the fuse becoming wet at the depression where the gallery ran under the bed of a small creek, it did not take place until some half-hour after daylight. The explosion was very successful, as it threw guns, men, material, and great masses of earth in the air, and opened a hole in the ground about 150 feet long, 60 wide, and 25 deep. The lines of the two armies were so close at this point that the debris from the explosion, as it descended, had all the appearance of falling within the

¹ For a full description of this affair see "Mine Explosion" or "The Crater," by the historian of this work, in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.

Union lines. The men of Ledlie's division (Ninth Corps), who were in waiting to lead the assault, broke and ran some distance to the rear. It took about twenty minutes to re-form them. During this time the Confederates had somewhat recovered from the surprise occasioned by the explosion. Many of the men in the breastworks to the right and left of the crater fled when the explosion occurred ; but, finding that no advance was made, returned to their places. The order for the assaulting column was to pass through the opening in the lines made by the explosion, seize the crest of the hill in rear, which commanded the city of Petersburg, and hold it while the entire army advanced. An error was made at the outset, even after the assaulting party was re-formed. The troops advanced by brigade, in deployed regimental front, which carried them into the crater, instead of around it, as could have been done in a column of fours. By this time the Confederates had planted a battery which swept the edge of the crater with canister, and notwithstanding the fact that numerous Union batteries opened fire on this particular battery, they could not silence it, for it continued its fire as long as the Union troops held the crater. The troops having once gotten inside, became subject to this canister fire, and could not be gotten to go forward. Orders and threats were of no avail. Brigade after brigade was pushed into the crater until the larger part of four divisions had been swallowed up by the hole in the ground.

The result, as might be expected, from this condition of things, was a failure, and the Confederates, subsequently making an assault in turn, recovered their line and captured several hundred prisoners,

among them General Bartlett of Massachusetts and Colonel E. G. Marshall, 14th New York Heavy Artillery.

General Ayres made a special request, during the occupation of the crater by the Ninth Corps, to take his division forward and secure the desired point, but General Grant declined to let him go, saying "It is too late." All the troops that had been summoned to support this assault were then returned to their respective positions in the intrenchments, and routine life was resumed.

On the 9th of July the Sixth Corps was sent to overcome Early's demonstration against Washington City, and subsequently followed that General, under Sheridan, into the Shenandoah Valley.

BATTLE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

A month and a half of trench life, with the hot rays of a July and August sun pouring down upon the heads of the men, was sufficient to cause them to feel that a little exercise in the freedom of a comparatively open country would not only be beneficial, but agreeable, and so when General Burnside received orders to relieve the Fifth Corps from its intrenchments the news was hailed with joy, because they knew there was work on hand. According to instructions, on the night of the 14th of August, the Ninth Corps extended its line and occupied the Fifth Corps intrenchments. Relief in this case did not mean succor. It was the precursor to hard work. Warren was ordered to take and hold the Weldon Railroad. The weather was tropical in its character. An oppressive, warm rain fell, and it was almost impossible to move the wheeled

vehicles through the mud of the roads and fields, but the corps, with Griffin's division in the advance, started at 4 o'clock A.M. on the 18th. Arriving at Dr. Gurley's house at 7 A.M. the Confederate cavalry pickets were encountered. Griffin immediately formed line of battle by brigade, with skirmishers deployed. At 8 A.M., the line advanced rapidly. By the aid of the cavalry picket belonging to the 3d New York Cavalry, the Confederate pickets were soon disposed of and several were captured.

Pushing ahead, Griffin reached and crossed the railroad at Globe tavern without opposition, at 9 A.M. His division was immediately disposed so as to cover the position toward the south and west. The distance from this point back to the Jerusalem Plank road is about three miles. To the northward of the line of march dense timber covered almost the entire distance from the Plank road to the railway. The Halifax road runs parallel to the railroad. Beyond it, a mile to the west, is the Vaughan road. This road enters the Halifax road to the north, towards Petersburg, about one and a half miles from Globe tavern. The country in the vicinity of Dr. Gurley's was heavily timbered; from there to the railroad it was more or less open. The railroad ran north and south. The march had been directed well to the southward, in order to conceal the movement from the Confederates.

Griffin threw out a strong picket line in his front, which was facing the west, and began to secure himself in his position, while Ayres' was moved to the north along the line of railroad; in other words he was faced about at the extreme point at the south

where the railroad had been struck, and then moved up that road towards Petersburg. This direction could not be pursued long without encountering the enemy. Dearing had lost no time in communicating the fact of the appearance of Warren's command, and General Heth, with Davis' and Walker's brigades of Confederates, were sent to confront the Union force. Near the intersection of the Vaughan and Halifax roads Ayres came upon the Confederates in line of battle, with artillery, and as they showed a firm disposition to contest a farther advance, Warren ordered Crawford's division up on the right of Ayres to outflank the enemy. Ayres had formed his line of battle with the 1st and 2d brigades in line near the Blick house, the 15th New York Heavy Artillery in support. It was then advanced about 1000 yards, when it struck the enemy. The division advanced about 100 yards into a dense woods. Soon after reaching the front edge of the woods, Ayres struck Heth's division, which had moved out the Vaughan road about 2 P.M., and the former found himself outflanked. It has been stated that the brigade commanders gave orders for their brigades to fall back, which they did for about 100 yards. Ayres then threw forward the 15th New York, and the two brigades were formed on it. The 2d was in some confusion on arriving upon this new line, but was rallied and soon engaged the enemy. During the engagement Ayres requested reinforcements, and Hofmann's brigade of Cutler's division was sent for the purpose. The Confederates, after persistent efforts, were repulsed, leaving their dead behind them. The 15th New York Heavy Artillery, as General Ayres says: "was steady and

cool," and "Hofmann's brigade moved as on drill." During the night rifle-pits were constructed with the 1st Brigade on the right of the railroad; on the left, the 15th New York; then Hofmann's brigade; the Maryland brigade being on the extreme left, curving to the rear.

In the meantime Crawford had been pushing forward his right through the dense woods until dark. Lyle's brigade, however, came in for a share of this attack. General Warren, in his report, says: "General Ayres showed great bravery in fighting his troops under difficult circumstances. The 15th New York Heavy Artillery acted very handsomely, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wiedrich, commanding, was wounded. General Hayes and Colonel Winthrop also acted with gallantry."

At 4 A.M. on the 19th, Warren sent Bragg's brigade to the right, to support General Crawford and establish a connection on the shortest line, with skirmishers, between his right and the Jerusalem Plank road. This order, General Warren says, "General Bragg did not execute as directed, but took up another line a mile or more to the rear. I at once directed General Bragg to correct his line and sent the best officers of my staff to assist."

Before Bragg had obtained his position, General Mahone, with Weisiger, Colquitt, and Clingman's brigades passed through the gap at fifteen minutes past 4 P.M., in column of fours, left in front; then facing to the right swept rapidly down towards the left in rear of General Crawford's line. Two regiments of the Pennsylvania Veteran Reserves of Crawford's division were on the skirmish line, and

the Confederates passed entirely in their rear. Colonel Wheelock's brigade stood up manfully to its work ; but so much confusion was produced by the men falling back, and masking the fire of those in line, that all of Crawford's troops were compelled to fall back, as well as the right of Ayres' division. The 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, and 17th regiments of regulars, which were posted in the front line of works on the right of the railroad, were rapidly enveloped, and many of the regiments, especially the 12th and 14th, were forced to fight their way through, losing by this means heavily in prisoners. General Hayes and Lieutenant Brady, 14th Infantry, his assistant adjutant-general, were captured at this time while endeavoring to reach the position held by the 12th and 14th. The remainder of the 1st Brigade, under orders, fell back and formed about 700 yards to the rear, and the command then devolved upon Colonel Frederick Winthrop. As soon as circumstances rendered it proper, Ayres moved forward rapidly and retook the old line, capturing some Confederate wounded and releasing some of his own men who had been taken prisoners. About ten minutes after this the Confederates attacked Ayres again, but were repulsed ; they shortly after, about dark, attacked once more and were again repulsed. After the first of these two attacks had progressed for a time, Ayres asked for 500 men to reinforce the right of his front, and Griffin threw forward the 187th Pennsylvania, of Tilton's brigade. Moving forward rapidly it performed its duty handsomely. But deeming it judicious to secure further reinforcement, the remainder of Tilton's brigade was furnished and Griffin and Ayres, with their division flags side by side,

led them to the front in time to assist in the repulse of the last attack.¹

At one time Crawford's command was quite surrounded by the enemy, but Willcox's division of the Ninth Corps, about 1200 strong, was ordered up to attack, and the lines of Ayres and Crawford being, in the meantime, re-formed, moved forward simultaneously, driving back the enemy, regaining the ground lost, and capturing prisoners. Crawford's division captured a battle-flag.² Hofmann's brigade also captured one.³ About the same time, the troops under General White, of the Ninth Corps, about 1000 strong, on the right of Warren, were formed facing to the right to oppose any further flanking, and engaged Colquitt's brigade, driving it back and capturing about 40 prisoners. The Confederates, in great confusion, rapidly fell back to their intrenchments, carrying with them the disorganized parts of Warren's command, which had become so by the attack from the rear in the woods, as well as a large portion of those on picket. General Warren says :

"An instance of brutality occurred on the part of a rebel officer which deserves execration. Finding he was too closely pressed to carry off Captain Newberry, 12th U. S. Infantry, a prisoner, he deliberately put a pistol to his [Newberry's] breast and shot him. This is the testimony of the dying man himself."

¹ Colonel Winthrop, in his report, says : "While awarding great praise to all and every one of my regimental commanders, I cannot but mention the name of Captain J. S. Fletcher, commanding the 11th Infantry, for the skill and calmness with which he manœuvred his regiment, although for a long time the only officer remaining with it. I beg also to call the attention of the brigadier-general commanding to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Thieman, of the 12th Infantry, in the engagements of the 18th and 19th, more especially that of the 19th. Surrounded on all sides by the enemy, Lieutenant Thieman succeeded in cutting his way through, bearing away with him the colors of his regiment, and eliciting by his heroic conduct the admiration and praise of every member of the command."

² Taken by G. W. Reed.

³ Taken by J. T. Jennings.

Referring to General Bragg's failure to establish his connections properly in the morning, General Humphreys, in his *Virginia Campaign*, says :

"The line was probably imperfectly formed, but at best would constitute a very imperfect guard against an active enemy, acquainted in detail with the woods, which, at the distance of twenty paces, effectually screened everything from sight."

Be this as it may, had Bragg been in position, it is more than probable that this intrepid commander and his gallant brigade would have made such a fight as would have given Crawford and Ayres but little time to prepare to meet the emergencies of the occasion.

On the 20th, General Warren, having become satisfied that his position was one which the Confederates would use every means to drive him from, posted his lines in places favorable for artillery defense, which gave him a considerable infantry reserve, and then awaited an attack.¹

Warren was not an executive officer ; he was, in every sense of the word, a commander and a strategist. When he had the opportunity of testing his strategic ability, he was never found wanting. While there never was in his composition an element of insubordination, or lack of desire to carry out all orders

¹ Referring to General Humphreys again, on this subject, he says : "General Warren was directed toward night on the 18th, if his contingent objects could not be accomplished that night, to intrench as close up to the enemy's works as he could get ; he was informed that he would be reinforced by the Ninth Corps the next day ; on the 19th he was instructed to maintain his hold on the railroad, at all hazards, and if practicable, extend to connect with the Ninth Corps ; he was also to push the enemy back nearer their own lines. These were too many conditions to impose upon him on ground of the character he was operating in. Informed of the general object he was to accomplish, everything else, as far as possible, should have been left to his judgment."

given him, yet when detailed instructions were imposed, they seemed to rob him of all his individuality. Left alone, he rose above the minor surroundings, grasped the situation with a giant hand, and never had a failure. His quick conception of the strategic points at Gettysburg; his gallant fight at Bristoe, and the skill he developed at the Weldon Railroad are sufficient occasions to justify what we assert. His forcing of troops to the crest of Little Round Top saved the day at Gettysburg, and his fight at the Weldon Railroad secured almost incalculable advantage in the final overthrow of the Confederacy, for the ground won by Warren on the 18th of August, 1864, was never recovered by the Confederate army.

On the morning of the 21st, as Warren anticipated when establishing his lines of defense, the Confederates made a desperate attempt to dislodge him. A. P. Hill, with his own corps, part of Hoke's division, and Lee's cavalry, at 9 A.M., drove in Warren's pickets on the north and west, and opened fire with about thirty pieces of artillery, crossing the fire at right angles over Warren's position. The timber, however, prevented the Confederate artillerymen from having any good view of Warren's lines. At 10 A.M., Hill made an assault all along the north and west of Warren's position, but was everywhere repulsed.¹

¹ Mr. J. I. Smith, in his *History of the 118th Pennsylvania*, serving in the Fifth Corps, says of this affair: "Lines of gray, three and four deep, emerged from them [the woods] and with flaunting battle-flags bore down on the pickets. Batteries were run out on commanding eminences, and thundered away effectively with an oblique fire. The pickets that were not captured fell back slowly, fighting. The attack fell heavily upon the Maryland brigade, . . . The Confederates came up through the standing corn in four lines of battle. The Maryland brigade lay down so that they could not be seen, and when the Confederates were within fifty yards, they rose up and delivered a withering fire. Six times the flag of the first line of Confederates fell, and six times a color

The corps' artillery did excellent execution and broke the Confederate line in places before coming within good musketry range. Warren immediately advanced his skirmish line and 517 men and officers were taken prisoners, among whom were Colonel E. C. Council, 16th Mississippi, and Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Thomas, 12th Mississippi. Hagood's Confederate brigade struck a part of Warren's line where the troops were in echelon, and they found themselves almost surrounded, and every one, thinking they had surrendered, ceased firing. Troops immediately advanced to bring them in, when their officers commenced firing, and Captain Dailey, provost marshal of the 4th Division, was shot, it is asserted, by General Hagood himself.¹ In the mixed

corporal picked it up and was killed. After that it lay on the ground until it was captured. The corn-stalks were cut off by bullets as if with a knife. These assaults were renewed, but without effect."

¹ Extracts from General Hagood's *Memoirs* (from p. 592, vol. ii., *Military Operations*, General Beauregard):

"In a few minutes the brigade was formed, and the report coming at the same time from the skirmishers that the enemy was but a short distance ahead of them, and only in rifle pits, thus confirming General Mahone's statement, Hagood cautioned his men to move slowly only at a quick step till he himself gave the order to charge, and marched his brigade forward. He had dismounted, and, placing himself in front of the centre, to steady his men and repress excitement, moved backward in front of the line for a short distance as if on drill. Himself halting before reaching the crest of the hill, the line passed on, and he followed with his staff, behind the right of the 21st Regiment. The 25th was on the left of the 21st and the other three regiments on its right. As soon as the brigade became visible ascending the hill, a rapid fire was opened upon it, to which in reply not a shot was fired; but moving forward steadily at quick time, with arms at a 'right shoulder shift,' as we approached the line of the enemy's pits they broke from them and fled. With one accord a battle-yell rang out along our line, and the men, as if by command, broke into double quick in pursuit. At the same moment General Hagood discovered that the line in front of us had only been an intrenched skirmish line, though so heavy as to have deceived his skirmishers into the notion that it was a line of battle, and that two hundred and fifty yards beyond was a strongly intrenched line, crowded with men and artillery, extending right and left as far as he could see, and the five attacking brigades of which General Mahone had spoken nowhere visible. It also appeared to him that he was moving upon a

condition at this time of the Union and Confederate troops Warren's line could not fire and many of them escaped. Six battle-flags were captured. On Gen-

re-entering angle of the enemy's line. In this however he was partially mistaken. An examination of the field, after the war, showed the enemy's line crossing the railroad from the east at this time bent immediately southward and followed its course in a comparatively straight line at some forty yards on its western front. Later in the siege their line extended farther west. Then, re-crossing the road at a point below where we struck it, their line only bit out a piece sufficient, if we could hold and permanently intrench, to prevent its further use by us. Immediately on the right of where we struck their line a small bastioned work for field artillery was thrust forward, and our line of advance was oblique to the enemy's general line and towards its junction with the flank of this work.

"Thus, in fact we were going into a re-entering^g made more by the vicious direction of our advance than by the actual construction of the enemy's works. The flank fire from the bastioned work we could not have avoided, but from our oblique attack we had also more or less of a flank fire from the straight line, which was an infantry parapet of fully five feet with an exterior ditch eight or ten feet wide and artillery at intervals. Perceiving at a glance the hopelessness of assault under such circumstances, General Hagood, stopping himself, shouted again and again to the command to halt; but the crash and rattle of twelve or fifteen pieces of artillery and probably twenty-five hundred rifles, which had now opened upon us at close range, drowned his voice and the fury of battle was upon his men. Moving forward with the steady tramp of the double quick, and dressing upon their colors, these devoted men, intent only on carrying the position before them, neither broke their alignment until it was broken by the irregular impact upon the enemy's works, nor stopped to fire their guns until their rush to obtain the parapet was repelled.

"When General Hagood saw his men rushing upon certain destruction, and his efforts to stop them unavailing, he felt that if they were to perish he would share their fate; and with Molony and Martin and orderly Stoney, who were of his staff that were with him (Moffatt and Mazych were farther back, in discharge of their several duties as inspector and ordnance officers), followed the advancing line. In fifty yards Lieutenant Martin fell, shot in the knee; and a few steps farther on Captain Molony fell, shot through the head, and Hagood and Stoney alone reached the works—the latter shot in the shoulder, but not disabled. The 25th and 21st Regiments being on the left, from the oblique direction of the advance, first struck the works; and while they staggered to get in the other three regiments swept on; when they reached the ditch there was seventy-five to a hundred yards' interval between the two divisions into which the brigade was broken.

"General Hagood was with Major Wilds, commanding the 21st, who was cheering on his men to renewed assault (success being now their only hope of safety) when, looking to the right, he saw a mounted Federal officer, among the men on the left of the portion of the brigade to the right, with the regimental

eral Griffin's advance, the battle-flag of the 27th South Carolina was captured¹ by the 18th Massachusetts. In Cutler's advance the 76th New York took one²;

color in his hands and a confusion and parleying immediately around him that betokened approaching surrender.

"The fight was still raging to Hagood's right and left; there was no cessation on our part except in the squad just around this officer, and none whatever was perceptible on the part of the enemy they had pushed out from their right and left line to cut off our retreat, and this officer (Captain Daily of General Cutler's staff) galloped out of a sally port, seized a color from the hands of its bearer, and demanded a surrender. Some officers and men surrendered, but were not carried in; others refused, but just around him ceased fighting. General Hagood called to the men to shoot him and fall back in retreat. They did not hear him, or were bewildered by the surrender of part of this number, failed to obey. It was a critical moment and demanded instant and decided action. In a few minutes the disposition to surrender would have spread, and the whole brigade would have been lost. Making his way across the intervening space as speedily as he could, exposed to a regular fire by file from the enemy's line scarce thirty yards off, and calling to his men to fall back, which they did not do, General Hagood approached the officer and demanded the colors, and that he should go back within his own lines, telling him he was free to do so. He commenced arguing the hopelessness of further struggle, and pointed out the line in our rear. Hagood cut him short and demanded a categorical reply, yes or no. Daily was a man of fine presence, with a long flowing beard, and sat with loosened rein upon a noble-looking bay that stood with head and tail erect, and flashing eye and distended nostrils, quivering in every limb with excitement, but not moving in his tracks. In reply to this abrupt demand the rider raised his head proudly, and decisively answered No! Upon the word General Hagood shot him through the body, and as he reeled from the saddle upon one side sprang into it from the other, orderly Stoney seizing the flag from his falling hands. There was no thought of surrender now; the yell from the brigade following the act and ringing out above the noise of battle told to their commander that they were once more in hand and would go now wherever ordered—whether to the front or rear. Shouting to them to face about, Hagood led them at a run against the line in his rear, Stoney holding aloft in their front the recaptured flag which he had torn from the staff. This line melted away before our charge; but the fire was terrific, after breaking through it, until the shelter of the valley of the branch was reached. Upon its margin a fragment from a schrapnel shell tore open the loin of the horse upon which he rode; and struggling as he fell he kicked Lieut. W. Taylor of the 7th Battalion, upon the head, rendering him for the time so confused that he had to be led from the field by one of his men. This gallant young officer had a few days before rejoined his command with an unhealed wound previously received."

¹ Taken by F. C. Anderson, 18th Massachusetts.

² Taken by Capt. J. C. Hatch, 76th New York.

the 3d Delaware captured two from South Carolina regiments¹; the 7th Wisconsin took the flag of the 16th Mississippi²; and the 7th Indiana captured one.³

General Cutler received a wound on the face from a shell. Colonel Dushane, commanding the Maryland brigade, was killed.

We are unfortunately not able to give the positions of the various batteries brought into action during this engagement, as no reports could be found that would give this information, but General Warren states that "the service of all our batteries was most efficient." He further says:

"During these four days' operations, men and officers performed their duties as well as any ever did under the circumstances. The heat of the first day was excessive and on the march many fell out; . . . about fifty were completely prostrated by sunstroke. The men were kept working night and day, and were, every day and night, wet through with the rains."

List of Officers Killed or Mortally Wounded at the Battle of the Weldon Railroad, August 18-21, 1864.

Maryland.—Col. Nathan T. Dushane, Major Josiah B. Coloney, and Lieut. Alfred D. Reynolds, 1st; Lieut. Thomas A. Mills, 4th; Lieut. Robert H. Hergesheimer, 7th; Lieut. James Fay, 8th; Capt. Alexander S. Williamson, Purnell Legion.

Massachusetts.—Lieut. Robert F. Bourne, 22d; Lieut. Wm. T. Spear, 39th.

New York.—Lieut. Robert Mueller, 15th Heavy Artillery; Capt. Wm. S. Woods and Lieut. George Osborne, 5th; Lieut. Barnard Phenix and Lieut. Thomas F. Weldon, 76th; Lieut. Henry P. Fitzpatrick, 97th; Lieut. Arthur V. Coan, 146th.

¹ Taken by Lieut. M. Eyre, Adj., 3d Delaware, and Sergt. J. Shilling, 3d Delaware.

² Taken by Corp. H. A. Ellis, 7th Wisconsin.

³ Taken by Private Norton, 7th Indiana.

Pennsylvania.—Lieut. J. Spear Orr, 21st Cavalry; Capt. Jacob Houder, 88th; Lieut. James S. Bonsall, 90th.

United States Army.—Capt. Samuel S. Newberry, 12th; Lieut. Frederick E. Crosman, 17th.

Wisconsin.—Capt. Wm. W. Hutchins, Capt. Charles P. Hyatt and Lieut. John Timmons, 6th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS, CONNECTED
WITH THE BATTLE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD,
AUGUST 18-21, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN. ¹							
ESCORT :							
Lieutenant JOHN C. PAUL.							
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (detachment).....							
PROVOST GUARD :							
Major HENRY W. RIDER.							
5th New York (battalion).....							
AMBULANCE TRAIN :							
Captain WM. F. DRUM.....		2		6		19	27
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. S. TILTON.							
121st Pennsylvania				2			2
142d Pennsylvania.....				1		2	3
143d Pennsylvania.....				2	1	16	19
149th Pennsylvania.....		2		5		21	28
150th Pennsylvania.....			1	3			4
187th Pennsylvania.....		3		6		6	15
Total First Brigade.....		5	1	19	1	45	71

¹ In command of all troops engaged.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel EDGAR M. GREGORY.							
Staff.....			1				1
32d Massachusetts.....	2		6		3		11
21st Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted).....	2	1	10				13
91st Pennsylvania.....	1						1
155th Pennsylvania.....							
Total Second Brigade.....	5	2	16		3		26
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel JAMES GWYN.							
20th Maine.....							
18th Massachusetts.....							
1st Michigan.....			3		4		7
6th Michigan.....			2		11		13
44th New York.....					4		4
83d Pennsylvania.....					1		1
118th Pennsylvania.....	1		1		20		22
Total Third Brigade.....	1		6		40		47
Total First Division.....	11	3	41	1	88		144
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
Staff.....			1				1
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH HAYES. ¹							
Colonel FREDERICK WINTHROP.							
Staff.....					1		1
5th New York.....	2	12	7	42	1	55	119
140th New York.....	4	1	18			51	74
146th New York.....	2	1	6	1		36	46
10th United States (3 Companies).....	6	1	9	1		16	33
11th United States.....	6		32			51	89
12th United States.....	1	5	15	2		173	196
14th United States.....	6	5	20	1		79	111
17th United States.....	1	8	1	24	1	16	51
Total First Brigade.....	4	49	16	166	8	477	720

¹ Brady's and Jardine's Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

² Captured August 19th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND BRIGADE : Colonel NATHAN T. DUSHANE, ¹ Colonel SAMUEL A. GRAHAM.							
1st Maryland.....	2	3	7	62	1	5	80
4th Maryland.....	3	3	4	20	8	35
7th Maryland.....	1	9	1	20	10	41
8th Maryland.....	3	3	1	16	5	25
Purnell (Maryland) Legion.....	1	16	3	62	2	54	138
Total Second Brigade.....	4	34	16	180	3	82	319
THIRD BRIGADE : Lieutenant-Colonel MICHAEL WIEDRICH.							
15th New York Heavy Artillery.....	13	9	66	5	93
Total Second Division.....	8	96	42	412	11	564	1133
THIRD DIVISION : Brigadier-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
Staff.....	1	1
FIRST BRIGADE : Colonel PETER LYLE.							
Staff.....	1	1
16th Maine.....	1	28	6	116	151
39th Massachusetts.....	1	9	5	30	8	238	291
104th New York.....	8	12	126	146
90th Pennsylvania.....	1	1	14	3	93	112
107th Pennsylvania.....	2	3	6	145	156
Total First Brigade.....	2	13	5	83	36	718	857
SECOND BRIGADE : Colonel RICHARD COULTER, ² Colonel CHARLES WHEELOCK.							
94th New York.....	1	1	6	6	164	178
97th New York.....	1	4	3	10	6	87	111
11th Pennsylvania.....	2	10	1	71	84
88th Pennsylvania.....	1	3	28	32
Total Second Brigade.....	2	7	4	29	13	350	405

¹ Killed August 21st.² Sick from August 18th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel WM. R. HARTSHORNE.							
190th Pennsylvania (1st Veteran Reserves).....	3	1	7	14	302	327	
191st Pennsylvania (2d Veteran Reserves).....	1	1	10	16	292	320	
Total Third Brigade.....	4	2	17	30	594	647	
Total Third Division.....	5	24	11	129	1162	1910	
FOURTH DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER. ¹							
Staff.....			1				1
PROVOST GUARD :							
Independent (Wisconsin) Battalion.....			2	4			6
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
Staff.....					1		1
7th Indiana.....	1		3	2	74	80	
19th Indiana.....			1		8	9	
24th Michigan.....	2		4	1	19	26	
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters.....				3	50	53	
6th Wisconsin.....	2	7	3	23	10	45	
7th Wisconsin.....			1	2		3	
Total First Brigade.....	2	10	4	33	7	161	217
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
Staff.....				1			1
3d Delaware.....	1	1	15		8	25	
4th Delaware.....	3		10		7	20	
76th New York.....	2		7			10	
95th New York.....	6	1	19		52	78	
147th New York.....	4	2	10			16	
56th Pennsylvania.....	5	1	18			24	
157th Pennsylvania (battalion).....	3	2	15		1	21	
Total Second Brigade.....	2	22	8	95	68	195	
Total Fourth Division.....	4	32	15	132	7	229	419

¹ Wounded August 21st.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C).....		1		4			5
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E).....				2			2
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery.....				1			1
1st New York Light, Battery B.....		1		1			2
1st New York Light, Battery C.....				2			2
1st New York Light, Battery D.....							
1st New York Light, Battery H.....		1	1				2
1st New York Light, Battery L.....		1		2			3
New York Light, 15th Battery.....		2		9			12
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.....				2			2
5th United States, Battery D.....			2	4			6
Total Artillery Brigade.....		6	3	27			36
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	17	171	74	747	98	2562	3669

The Second Corps, it will be remembered, had been operating on the north side of the James River. Mott's division recrossed on the 18th of August, and relieved a portion of the troops holding the intrenched line in front of Petersburg. The other two divisions remained on the north side until after dark of the 20th, when they recrossed the James and returned to their old camp near the Deserted house, where they arrived about 6.30 A.M., on the 21st, and they rested there just long enough to cook breakfast, when they were ordered to be massed at the Gurley house, in rear of the Fifth Corps. The extension of the left of the Union line to Globe tavern, while interrupting traffic by rail into Petersburg, did not prevent the Confederates from using that road as a line of supply up to a point within a day's hauling by wagon. By

destroying the road as far as Rowanty Creek, about thirteen miles beyond Warren's left, they would be obliged to haul by wagon from Stony Creek depot to Dinwiddie Court-House, and thence by the Boydton Plank road to Petersburg, a distance of thirty miles at least. This destruction of the railroad was the duty assigned to General Hancock, and on the 22d he destroyed about two miles of it. The following day the destruction was carried to Ream's Station, General Gregg's division of cavalry and two regiments of the same arm under Colonel Spear, being in the meanwhile engaged with the Confederate cavalry on the roads leading to Dinwiddie Court-House. On the 24th the work had progressed about three miles south of Ream's Station, when it was ascertained that a large force of Confederates (from eight to ten thousand) was approaching from the direction of Dinwiddie. General A. P. Hill, with McGowan, Lane, and Scale's brigades of Wilcox's division, Anderson's brigade of Field's division, Cook's and McRae's brigades of Heth's division, and two brigades of Mahone's division, attacked Hancock the next day and the engagement ended somewhat disastrously for the Second Corps; and, as General Hancock says, "would have ended still more disastrously but for the steadiness of a part of the 1st Division and the fine conduct of its commander, General Miles."

As it was essential either to withdraw, or retake the lost works, in order to protect the only communication open to the rear, and as no reinforcements had arrived by dark, the troops were ordered to withdraw, the Confederates making no attempt to follow up their advantage. Both commands then returned

to their intrenchments. Hill reported his captures to be 12 colors, 9 guns, 10 caissons, 3100 small-arms, and 2150 prisoners.

During the month of September, 1864, the construction of redoubts and intrenchments was carried on to cover the new ground that had been gained by the Fifth Corps. On the 15th General Baxter made a reconnaissance with his own brigade of infantry and about 800 cavalry, for the purpose of determining the position of the right of the Confederate line, or rather with a view of extending the left of the Union line. He moved towards the Vaughan road and encountered a Confederate cavalry picket where the Poplar Spring Church road joins the Vaughan road. The cavalry drove in the pickets of the enemy, and after some lively skirmishing a line of infantry was developed in some rifle-pits running east and west directly across the Squirrel Level road. The enemy showed no desire to leave the works to make an attack. Orders were received at 11 A.M. to retire, and the withdrawal was effected without pursuit. The loss in this reconnaissance was 2 killed and 8 wounded.

On the 23d, the whole army was cheered by the information of Sheridan's grand success in the Shenandoah Valley. Its publication by circular to the troops was the occasion of unusual and demonstrative excitement.

General Grant now determined to strike a blow at the Confederate capital by way of the north bank of the James, and on the 28th of September General Ord, commanding the Eighteenth, and General Birney the Tenth Corps, were directed to cross the James in the night and advance upon Richmond, the former by

the Varina road, near the river, and the latter by the Newmarket and Darby roads. This expedition resulted in the capture of Fort Harrison, with 16 guns and a number of prisoners, together with the intrenchments on the right and left of the fort, including two lunettes, 600 yards apart, with 6 guns.

In co-operation with this movement, General Meade, under instructions from General Grant, made such semi-concealed changes of position of part of his troops on the 28th as to give the impression to the enemy that he, Meade, was concentrating on his left in order to delay Lee in reinforcing the real point of attack. In addition, the Army of the Potomac was got under arms at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, Generals Warren and Parke, each with two divisions of his corps, ready to move. All the corps commanders made dispositions to withdraw from the intrenchments, leaving garrisons in the redoubts and enclosed batteries. General Gregg was sent to the crossing of Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road and the Squirrel Level road to the vicinity of the Peebles and Pegram farms. At the former point the Confederates had a redoubt at the termination of the intrenchments they had constructed and were still going on with. This intrenchment was nearly parallel with the Weldon Railroad and joined the Petersburg intrenchments. Peebles' farm was two miles west of the Union intrenchments on the railroad. It was not deemed advisable by General Grant that Meade should move on the 29th, nor until 8 o'clock A.M. of the 30th, and the object in view was to secure the junction of the Squirrel Level and Poplar Spring Church roads, coming from the southwest. The redoubt at the junction of these roads

was known as Fort McRae, and was flanked by intrenchments and protected by *abatis*.

General Warren, with Griffin's and Ayres' divisions, and Hofmann's brigade of Crawford's division, accompanied by Batteries B, D, and H, 1st New York Light Artillery, was directed against Fort McRae, while General Parke was to follow with Willcox's and Potter's divisions. At 7 o'clock A.M. of the 30th, therefore, Griffin and Ayres moved out of their intrenchments at Globe tavern, with Bartlett's brigade, temporarily under the command of Colonel Gwyn, in the lead. Through a thick growth of woods and scrubby pine the command cautiously pursued its way for about two and one half miles, when skirmishers were thrown out under the personal direction of General Griffin. They had not proceeded far, when the Confederate pickets were encountered behind light works thrown up along the road in front of Poplar Grove Church. The pickets were driven in and under a sharp fire from the works the line advanced. Under the crest of a small hill it halted to prepare for the assault. In a few moments the troops left the cover and were greeted with a heavy fire of grape and canister from a four-gun battery, and a furious discharge of musketry. After passing over about 500 yards of open ground, the 16th Michigan and 118th Pennsylvania, being in the lead, encountered some *abatis*. A passage was speedily cut wide enough for eight men, and through this the 16th went by fours by the left flank, and the 118th by the right flank. The two commanders, Colonel Welch and Captain Wilson, led their regiments. Both climbed the parapet together and Welch fell dead from a carbine bullet. Dearing's dismounted cavalry brigade, with infantry,

was holding this point. As the troops crossed the works the Confederates fled. The 20th Maine had, as usual, pressed forward gallantly and lent its aid in the capture. Colonel Gwyn's horse fell on him as he mounted the works, and for a time he was severely disabled. This work had been well done, but more was to come. Griffin went into position some 200 yards beyond the captured works. General Ayres had in the meantime pressed forward with his division and gallantly carried the redoubt on the right of Griffin. This gave Warren the whole line of intrenchment.

General Parke advanced Potter's division to support Griffin on his left, and as soon as Willcox got up, moved forward with his two divisions through the Pegram farm, in a northwest direction toward the Boydton Plank road, Willcox on Potter's left in support, as General Parke expected Griffin's division to support his right. To meet this advance of the Union troops, General Hill threw out Heth's and Wilcox's divisions of Confederates as far as the Jones house. Potter, passing through a wood, found himself within 800 yards of the main line of the Confederate intrenchments, and quite near Heth's and Wilcox's troops, which he advanced to attack. He was met by an advance on their part, and he attacked vigorously, but his right was outflanked and his division driven back in some confusion, as well as one of Willcox's brigades. Griffin's line at once advanced, and some troops were met retreating on the run. The forward movement was soon changed to the left flank, and it had scarcely begun when it was quickly faced about and ordered to move by the right flank. The Confederates were pressing their advantage. Griffin seized a crest facing a wood through which ran a

roadway and down which the Confederates moved with ease. This alone averted the fate which befell Potter. Here the line was established just in time to hold the Confederates to the timber, they having become somewhat disorganized by their pursuit. Potter had by this time re-formed, but the belief that some of his command still lingered on the same ground over which they had fought, and the sight of men here and there dressed partly in blue, created the impression that some Union troops were still in front. Officers in all directions called loudly not to fire; but the men knew better, and, notwithstanding the command, the fire opened just in time to save a disaster. For full thirty minutes Griffin's men stood in the open receiving the fire of the Confederates, who were sheltered by the woods. There were no supports in view. Ammunition was taken from the dead to fight with by men whose supply became exhausted. There was much wavering hesitancy and doubt; but Griffin came along with his resolute, heroic bearing and gave assuring words and the lines stiffened. He had ordered up Mink, the one-armed artilleryman of intrepid valor, and had instructed him to push right up to the front. "The front" meant the skirmish line for Mink. Requesting the commanding officer of the 118th to throw back three companies, to permit the placing of a section of his battery, he rolled out his commands, "Double shot with canister, and fire by sections," and poured in such an effective fire that nothing could withstand it, and the woods were soon cleared of the enemy. This was just about the close of the day, and the fight necessarily ceased as darkness enveloped the troops.

A new line was now established, occupied by Ayres on the right, Griffin on the left of Ayres, Potter next on the left of Griffin, and Willcox on Potter's left. Mott's division of the Second Corps arrived on Parke's left in the afternoon of the 1st of October, and on the 2d of October Parke advanced and established a line of intrenchments about one mile from the enemy's, connecting on the right with the line held by the Fifth Corps. This was connected with the Weldon Railroad works, having its proper number of redoubts and batteries.

On the evening of the 1st of October, however, the Confederates made a feeble attempt to assault the position held by the Fifth Corps, but it was easily repulsed. Lieutenant-Colonel Otis was severely wounded.

On the 2d of October the Maryland brigade was pushed forward about one mile on a reconnaissance, supported by the 5th and 140th New York. They remained a few hours, and were withdrawn.

The following-named officers were either killed or mortally wounded in the battle of Poplar Spring Church (or Peebles' and Pegram's farms), September 30th, 1864 :

Maine.—Captain Weston H. Keene, 20th.

Michigan.—Captain James A. Wheaton, 1st ; Colonel Norval E. Welch, 16th.

Pennsylvania.—Captain Charles M. Young and Lieutenant John Conahey, 118th.

United States Army.—Lieutenant Thomas D. Urmston, 12th.

LIST OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS AT THE
BATTLE OF POPLAR SPRING CHURCH (PEEBLES'
AND PEGRAM'S FARMS) SEPTEMBER 30, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOVERNEUR K. WARREN.							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brig.-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel HORATIO G. SICKEL.							
21st Pennsylvania Cavalry (dismounted)		1		9		1	11
198th Pennsylvania		1		9			10
Total 1st Brigade		2		18		1	21
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel EDGAR M. GREGORY.							
32d Massachusetts		2	1	14		19	36
91st Pennsylvania		1		2		8	11
155th Pennsylvania		5	1	14		3	23
Total 2d Brigade		8	2	30		30	70
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel JAMES GWYN.							
20th Maine	1	5	3	49			58
18th Massachusetts (2 companies)				3		10	13
1st Michigan	1	2		20		4	27
16th Michigan ¹	1	6	4	37			48
44th New York		1	1	21		4	27
83d Pennsylvania		6	1	27			34
118th Pennsylvania	2	7	4	33		3	49
Total 3d Brigade	5	27	13	190		21	256
Total 1st Division	5	37	15	238		52	347
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brig.-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Lieut.-Colonel ELWELL S. OTIS. ²							
Major JAMES GRINDLAY.							
5th New York		3		5			8
15th New York Heavy Artillery		2		5			7
140th New York			1	4		7	12
146th New York				3			3
10th United States		3	1	5		18	27
11th United States		5	1	11			17
12th United States	1	2				1	4
14th United States		2		3			5
17th United States				7	2	14	23
Total 1st Brigade	1	17	3	43	2	40	106

¹ Brady's and Jardine's Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

² Wounded October 1st.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel SAMUEL A. GRAHAM.							
1st Maryland.....		3		9			12
4th Maryland.....				1			1
7th Maryland.....							
8th Maryland.....				3			3
Purnell (Maryland) Legion.....							
Total Second Brigade.....		3		13			16
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel ARTHUR H. GRIMSHAW.							
3d Delaware.....		2		2			4
4th Delaware.....		1	1	3			5
157th Pennsylvania.....		2		10			12
190th Pennsylvania.....		2	1	2		1	6
191st Pennsylvania.....						1	1
Total Third Brigade.....		7	2	17		2	28
Total Second Division.....	1	27	5	73	2	42	150
THIRD DIVISION :							
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel J. WM. HOFMANN.							
76th New York.....			1	2		24	27
95th New York.....		1		1		30	32
147th New York.....						11	11
56th Pennsylvania.....						6	6
121st Pennsylvania.....					8	37	45
142d Pennsylvania.....				1			1
Total Third Brigade.....		1	1	4	8	108	122
ARTILLERY :							
1st New York Light, Battery B.....							
1st New York Light, Battery D.....			1	3			4
1st New York Light, Battery H.....				4			4
Total Artillery.....			1	7			8
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	6	65	22	322	10	202	626

BATTLE OF BOYDTON PLANK ROAD, OR HATCHER'S RUN.

General Grant sent General Meade the following letter on the 24th of October :

“ Make your preparations to march out at an early hour on the 27th to gain possession of the Southside Railroad, and to hold it, and fortify back to your present left. In commencing your advance, move in three columns, exactly as proposed by yourself in our conversation of last evening, and with the same force you proposed to take. Parke, who starts out nearest to the enemy, should be instructed that, if he finds the enemy intrenched, and their works well manned, he is not to attack, but confront him and be prepared to advance promptly when he finds that by the movement of the other two columns to the right and rear of them they begin to give way.”

General Humphreys (*Virginia Campaign*, p. 294) says :

“ According to the information we had, the Petersburg intrenchments had been extended to Hatcher's Run at a point two miles above the Vaughan-road crossing of that stream, and about a mile above Armstrong's Mill, but were in a very incomplete condition. They did not cross or extend up the run. At Burgess' Mill, where the Boydton Plank road crossed Hatcher's Run there were emplacements for artillery and some infantry parapets, but no line of intrenchments, nor were there any further up the run.

“ The Confederate Petersburg lines from the Appomattox to Battery 31 (west of the Jerusalem Plank road) were held by Johnson's division. General Hill held the remainder of the line—Heth on the right, Wilcox on the left, Mahone in reserve. Hampton's two divisions of cavalry (Lee's and Butler's) with Dearing's brigade were on the right flank.

“ The general plan of the contemplated movement was to leave sufficient force in the redoubts to hold them, and with from 30,000 to 35,000 effective force of infantry, a due proportion of artillery, and Gregg's division of cavalry, about 3,000 strong, to move to our left. Hancock, with Gregg on his left, to cross Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road, move to the Boydton Plank road past Dabney's Mill, thence by the White Oak road to its in-

tersection with the Claiborne road, recross Hatcher's Run near there (two miles above Burgess' Mill), and then march to the South Side Railroad, striking it at a point about three miles east of Sutherland Station. General Parke, with the Ninth Corps, was first to endeavor to surprise the incomplete intrenchments near Hatcher's Run at daylight (it was thought they were thinly held), but failing in that, to remain confronting them while the Second and Fifth Corps moved to turn their right.

"General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was to move to the vicinity of Armstrong's Mill, support General Parke, and if his attack was successful, to follow it up, moving on the left of the Ninth Corps. If General Parke did not break the enemy's line, General Warren was to cross Hatcher's Run and endeavor to turn the enemy's right by recrossing the run above the Boydton-Plank-road bridge (Burgess'-Mill bridge), keeping on the right of Hancock, and, being over the stream, to open the Burgess'-Mill bridge."

Such were the general instructions.

On the morning of October 25, 1864, Gibbon's division (under the command of General Egan) and Mott's division of the Second Corps were withdrawn from their intrenchments and massed in a concealed position in rear of the lines, leaving Miles, with his division, to hold the entire line from Redoubt Converse, on the Appomattox, to Battery 24 on the left. Hancock's orders were to move down the Vaughan road, cross Hatcher's Run and thence as directed in the general instructions. Gregg's division of cavalry was placed under Hancock's orders, and was to move on his left flank, via Rowanty post-office and the Quaker road.

General Parke, with the Ninth Corps, was to move at such an hour in the morning of the 27th as would enable him to attack the Confederate right between Hatcher's Run and their new works at the dawn of day.

General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was directed, if practicable, to move simultaneously with the Ninth Corps and proceed to the crossing of Hatcher's Run and thence according to the general instructions above mentioned.

At 3.30 A.M. of the 27th, General Gregg moved out with his cavalry by the Halifax road, while Hancock moved across fields to the Vaughan road, where the enemy's videttes were first encountered. Egan reached Hatcher's Run soon after daylight, forced a small body of Confederates in some rifle-pits on the opposite bank, and crossed the stream, moving by the nearest road to Dabney's Mill. Mott's division followed the Vaughan road for about a mile and then struck over to the mill by a cross-road. As soon as Mott reached Dabney's Mill, Egan moved on toward the Boydton Plank road. At this time the sound of Gregg's guns became distinct, but nothing was heard from the Ninth Corps, which was expected to make a demonstration at daylight.

General Parke had also moved out at 3.30 A.M., taking a road to the right of Fort Cummings. When his leading division approached the Watkins house, a Confederate skirmish line was met and driven into their works, which stretched from Hatcher's Run north for about a mile, covering the Boydton road, and in front of the junction of that road and the route followed by the Ninth Corps. General Parke then halted his command, and made connection with the right of the Fifth Corps.

General Warren had issued his orders for the Fifth Corps to march at 5.30 A.M., but the commanding general changed it to 4 A.M. The corps started as directed. It consisted of the 1st Division, commanded

by General Griffin, 4707 strong, of which 1247 were ignorant of the manual, and 2803 had never fired a musket ; 2d Division, commanded by General Ayres, 4704 strong, of which 104 were ignorant of the manual, and 812 had never fired a musket ; two brigades of the 3d Division, commanded by General Crawford, of which 298 were ignorant of the manual, and 298 had never fired a musket. The artillery brigade was composed of three batteries of light 12-pounders (14 guns) and two batteries of 3-inch rifled (10) guns. The men carried sixty rounds of ammunition and four days' rations. Half the ambulances and the intrenching tools accompanied the expedition. The ammunition wagons, with reserve supplies, remained in camp, which was defended in the Fifth Corps front by Baxter's brigade, about 2500 strong, and 8 batteries of 34 guns. All the transportation and baggage was sent to City Point.

It began to rain lightly about 4.45, and it was very dark from the clouded state of the sky. Owing to this darkness, part of the command soon became mixed and connections between parts of brigades were lost throughout the corps. It became light enough to see about 5.30, and the head of the column began to move into the woods beyond the intrenchments. Keeping to the left of the Ninth Corps flankers, the column moved southwesterly to R. Thompson's house. Finding that he was getting too far south, Warren cut a road through the woods in a due westerly direction for half a mile, which led him into the so-called Duncan road, just south of the Clements house. Here he struck a road leading west, along which he advanced, striking the Confederate skirmishers at 9 A.M. Griffin immediately formed Gregory's brigade

and advanced through the woods, driving the enemy into a line of breastworks with *abatis* and slashing, before which Parke had halted his corps.

About 9.30 A.M., General Warren received word from General Meade that it was important that a portion of his command should cross Hatcher's Run and communicate with General Hancock as soon as possible. Ordering Ayres and Crawford to mass their divisions near to the front, General Warren sent Major Roebing with his escort to reconnoitre to his left for the end of the enemy's line, and Captain Gentry, of his staff, to communicate with Hancock, while Warren in person made a reconnaissance of his front to ascertain the practicability of forcing the Confederate position. On his return, about 10.30 A.M., he found Generals Grant and Meade at his headquarters. Major Roebing, who returned about the same time, reported Griffin's skirmish line as extending to Hatcher's Run on the left. Captain Gentry, returning, reported the rear of Hancock's corps as having moved up towards the Plank road past Armstrong's Mill. Warren was then directed to send a division across Hatcher's Run, place its right flank on the run, and then move up, supporting Hancock, and upon arriving at the enemy's right of the line in front of Griffin, to attack it in flank. Warren ordered the most convenient division at the time of receiving his instructions, which was Crawford's. Moving out promptly, Crawford crossed the run at Armstrong's Mill, strengthened by a brigade from Ayres.

In the meantime Hancock had emerged into the clearing on the Plank road when the Confederates opened fire on him from near Burgess' tavern and from the left by a section of a battery at each place,

but the one by the tavern was soon silenced by Beck's battery. Soon after Hancock's arrival at the Boydton road, Gregg came in by the Quaker road, and preparations were at once made to resume the march by the White Oak road. Egan moved down the Boydton road toward the bridge, for the purpose of driving the enemy across the run. Mott's division was put in motion for the White Oak road and a brigade of cavalry was sent down to relieve Egan in order that he might follow Mott.

At this juncture (1 P.M.) General Hancock received orders to halt at the Plank road. Mott formed one brigade in line, looking toward the upper bridge, while Egan continued to press the Confederate dismounted cavalry, which were finally driven over the run by a charge from a part of Smyth's brigade. Very soon after the order was received to halt, Generals Grant and Meade arrived on the field and Hancock was informed of Crawford's movement. The former was directed to extend his line to the right to form connection with the latter. Major Bingham was sent to find Crawford, and on his return and reporting Crawford's whereabouts, Generals Grant and Meade left the field, giving Hancock verbal orders to hold his position until the following morning. General Hancock now prepared to assault the enemy's position over the bridge, assisted by Beck's battery and supported by McAllister's brigade of Mott's division. De Trobriand's and Kerwin's brigades were in line to the left of the Plank road, facing northwesterly some distance below the White Oak road. Pierce's brigade was formed on the right of the Plank road, near the dense woods, part facing towards the run and part in the woods facing east, at almost right

angles to the first part, with a section of Beck's battery on the edge of the timber. Gregg was on the Plank road below the junction of the Quaker road, engaged with some Confederate cavalry.

Egan was just about to begin his assault, when a force of Confederate infantry appeared coming through the woods on his right and rear. Pierce was soon forced from his position. Beck's section was captured after it had changed front and fired some shots, and the Confederates were rapidly closing in on Egan's rear, even getting possession of the Plank road. Seeing the trouble at a glance, Egan faced his command about, swept down upon the Confederate flank, while De Trobriand and Kerwin changed front and moved over to the right of the Plank road, and Beck turned the remainder of his guns loose on the assailants. Egan was irresistible, the Confederates were swept from the field with a loss of two colors and several hundred prisoners, and Beck's two guns were recovered.

While this was going on Warren had advanced with Crawford's command, which crossed Hatcher's Run at 11.45 A.M. His line was formed with Bragg's brigade in line of battle, his right resting on the creek. Colonel Hofmann's brigade covered the left, and the Maryland brigade was in reserve. The density of the woods and the crookedness of the run caused great delays in the movement. Finding there could be no guide to Crawford's movements, Warren directed Griffin, at 1 P.M., to open on the Confederates with his skirmish line, to show where it was. Crawford continued his movement, losing a little time by mistaking the branch which comes in near the Crow house for the main stream, and subsequently having

much difficulty in crossing it on account of the slashed timber, felled by the Confederates. After crossing this branch, Crawford's line began to skirmish with the enemy, driving him to the north and west. About 4 P.M., his line was on the right flank of the Confederate position fronting Griffin, and the firing was quite lively. As his line of march had led him to quite a different position from what had been expected, and as he was in a dense forest of great extent, where it was difficult to find him, and as his men were getting lost in great numbers—in fact whole regiments losing all idea of where to find the rest of the division, Warren ordered him to halt his line and get it in good order, and then press the enemy with his skirmishers, while he (Warren) went to consult with General Meade, who was at Armstrong's Mill. Soon after arriving there news was brought of Hancock's affair, and Meade directed Warren to send Crawford to Hancock's support; but, Ayres being more available, his division was started at once. Night was so near at hand by this time that Ayres was halted at Armstrong's Mill. General Warren says, in his report of this affair:

“The attack on General Hancock must have occurred while I was near General Crawford and yet in the woods—the sound of musketry did not reach us. There was, besides, no road known to us leading directly to General Hancock, and that same woods, for two or three miles, was certain to prevent him arriving for any contemplated emergency. What would have added still greater delay to communicating with General Crawford supervened by the rebels getting in on the road by which we communicated, between him and myself. The enemy became so bewildered in these woods that upward of 200 of them strayed into General Crawford's line and were captured. These men, before being taken, captured three of our ambulances a mile in

rear of Crawford. Six Confederates captured Captain Cope, of my staff, but finding themselves in our lines, gave up to him, and he brought them in. Major Bingham, of General Hancock's staff, on his way to General Crawford, was also captured, but made his escape, and three officers of my staff, in attempting to avoid the road thus infested by the enemy, became lost in coming from General Crawford to me, and had to stay out all night in the woods."

The Fifth Corps remained in position all night in a heavy rain ; but General Hancock, seeing no advantage in retaining his position, after receiving information that the enemy was massing on his left, and his ammunition being almost entirely exhausted without being able to get any during the night, decided to fall back, which he commenced to do at 10 P.M. Warren ordered Crawford, therefore, to withdraw at daybreak to the north side of Hatcher's Run. At 10 A.M., of the 28th, all the wagons, wounded, and prisoners had gone back and the road was clear. Egan and Crawford were then ordered to retire. At 10.30 these divisions were out of sight. Ayres with his two brigades had, in the meantime, been ordered to report to General Parke. At 11 A.M., Griffin's division was withdrawn simultaneously with the Ninth Corps, and all returned to their former positions. The Confederate cavalry drove in Warren's small mounted force on withdrawal, but Bartlett formed his brigade to check this advance and the Confederates did no more than fire a few shots at long range.

In this engagement the Fifth Corps lost 279 in killed and wounded, and secured 269 prisoners. No officers were killed or mortally wounded.

THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

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RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS AT THE BATTLE OF BOYDTON PLANK ROAD (OR HATCHER'S RUN), VA., OCTOBER 27-28, 1864.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN. <i>Escort.</i> Captain NAPOLEON J. HORRELL. 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (detachment).....		1					1
<i>Provost Guard.</i>							
Captain PAUL A. OLIVER. 5th New York (battalion)..... Ambulance Train (Captain Wm. F. DRUM).....						4	4
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel HORATIO G. SICKEL.							
185th New York.....				5			5
198th Pennsylvania.....				1		2	3
Total 1st Brigade.....				6		2	8
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel EDGAR M. GREGORY.							
187th New York (6 cos.).....	8			51		18	77
188th New York.....	6	1		45		2	54
91st Pennsylvania.....	6	2		43		2	53
155th Pennsylvania.....	1			16		1	18
Total 2d Brigade.....	21	3		155		23	202
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.							
20th Maine.....	1			2			3
32d Massachusetts.....				1		2	3
1st Michigan.....				1			1
16th Michigan ¹				1			1
83d Pennsylvania.....				1			1
118th Pennsylvania.....				2			2
Total 3d Brigade.....	1			8		2	11
Total 1st Division.....	22	3		169		27	221

¹ Brady's and Jardine's Cos. Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brigadier-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
<i>Provost Guard.</i>							
Captain JOSHUA S. FLETCHER, Jr.							
2d United States, Company C.....							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel FREDERICK WINTHROP.							
5th New York.....			1				1
15th New York Heavy Artillery.....							
140th New York.....							
146th New York.....							
8th United States.....							
11th United States.....							
12th United States.....							
14th United States.....							
Total 1st Brigade.....			1				1
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel ANDREW W. DENISON.							
1st Maryland.....					1		1
4th Maryland.....			1		2		3
7th Maryland.....			1				1
8th Maryland.....							
Total 2d Brigade.....			2		3		5
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Colonel ARTHUR H. GRIMSHAW.							
3d Delaware.....							
4th Delaware.....							
157th Pennsylvania (four companies).....							
190th Pennsylvania (1st Veteran Reserves).....							
191st Pennsylvania (2d Veteran Reserves).....							
210th Pennsylvania.....							
Total 3d Brigade.....							
Total 2d Division.....			3		3		6


COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brig.-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE							
Brig.-General EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
24th Michigan		1					1
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters.....							
143d Pennsylvania.....				1		3	4
149th Pennsylvania						1	1
150th Pennsylvania				4	1	2	7
6th Wisconsin.....						1	1
7th Wisconsin.....						1	1
Independent (Wisconsin) Battalion				4			4
Total 1st Brigade.....		1		9	1	8	19
THIRD BRIGADE¹ :							
Colonel J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
76th New York (six companies)							
95th New York				1		7	8
147th New York					1	5	6
56th Pennsylvania.....				1		1	2
121st Pennsylvania.....				2		2	4
142d Pennsylvania.....		1		1		6	8
Total 3d Brigade.....		1		5	1	21	28
Total 3d Division		2		14	2	29	47
ARTILLERY BRIGADE :							
Colonel CHARLES L. WAINWRIGHT.							
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E).....							
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery.....							
1st New York Light, Battery B							
1st New York Light, Battery H.....							
4th United States, Battery B.....							
Total Fifth Army Corps.....		25	3	186	2	63	279

¹ The 3d Brigade remained in the trenches.

On the 31st of October, General Grant directed that the organizations of regular infantry serving in the Fifth Army Corps at once proceed as regiments and battalions to the city of New York and report for further orders to Major-General Dix. They accordingly left the Fifth Corps November 1, 1864. One regiment, however, remained on duty in the field, the 4th U. S. Infantry (General Grant's old regiment), at the Headquarters of the Armies of the United States. Subsequently the 1st Battalion of the 11th and the 2d Battalion of the 14th were returned to the Army of the Potomac, and were employed as part of the Provost Guard at General Meade's headquarters. These battalions, together with the 4th Infantry, served during the campaign of 1865, and were present at the surrender of General Lee's army at Appomattox Court-House, Va., April 9, 1865.

RAID TO THE MEHERRIN RIVER.

A month had passed in comparative rest, barring work on the intrenchments. In the meantime, as the nights began to be quite cool, the men all along the line, wherever it was practicable, had either constructed bomb-proofs or burrowed into the ground, like gophers, in order to shelter themselves from the night-air and from the shells of the enemy, which were directed so constantly against the redoubt constructed at the then left of the line (Fort Sedgwick) as to win it the sobriquet of "Fort Hell"; and by this name it was known better throughout the siege than by its proper title. The Sixth Corps had just returned to the Army of the Potomac, after its highly successful trip to the Shenandoah Valley, and it was directed to



occupy the lines held by the Fifth Corps, the latter being ordered to mass near the Gurley house, which indicated more work for Warren.

At 6 A.M., on the 7th of December, therefore, a command, consisting of Gregg's division of cavalry, three divisions of the Fifth Corps, Mott's division of the Second Corps, four batteries of artillery, and a canvas pontoon bridge, 250 feet long, all under the command of General Warren, started on its famous mission of railway destruction, to Hicksford, on the Meherrin River, forty miles to the southward of Petersburg, well down towards the North Carolina line. General Gregg took the road east of the Jerusalem Plank road, turning out of it at Temple's and joining it again about one mile and a half below Warwick swamp. The infantry, with Crawford leading, then Griffin, followed by Ayres and Mott, moved on the Jerusalem Plank road. The men had four days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition on their persons and two days' rations and forty rounds of ammunition per man in the wagons. At the crossing of the Warwick swamp by the Plank road, the bridge was found to have been destroyed. A passage was made for infantry alongside of it in about fifteen minutes, but a bridge with a crib-work pier about forty feet long had to be made before the train could cross.

It commenced raining about 8.30 A.M., and continued through most of the day, clearing after dark, but clouding up again at midnight. Gregg's cavalry forded the Nottaway River, and then proceeded to Sussex Court-House, bivouacking for the night, as Warren had directed. A pontoon bridge, 140 feet long, was constructed, and at 4.50 P.M. Crawford's

division moved across and bivouacked at Sussex. Griffin and Ayres remained on the north bank of the river until two o'clock the next morning. Mott and the trains all crossed after Crawford and bivouacked south of the river.

Gregg led off for Jarratt's Station at 4 A.M. on the 8th, followed by Crawford. Griffin began to cross the Nottaway at 2.30 A.M., in a heavy rain, and was followed by Ayres. All were over by 4.30 A.M., and the bridge was up and away by daylight, about which time it ceased raining. Gregg destroyed the railroad trestle bridge over the Nottaway, about 160 feet in length, driving away a few Confederate cavalymen. About 10 A.M., a regiment of Confederate cavalry crossed the Nottaway at a ford and got in between Gregg and Crawford, but Gregg soon made them wish they had remained on the other side of the river, across which he speedily drove them. The cavalry continued to work on the railroad, partially destroying it down to Jarratt's.

General Warren, thinking it possible that he might meet a Confederate force near the railroad, delayed setting the men to work until near sunset, by which time the whole command was up and the trains parked. At 6 P.M., after the men had refreshed themselves with a good cooked dinner, Crawford, Ayres, and Griffin went on the railroad and completed its destruction by moonlight, from the Nottaway down to below Jarratt's Station. The work of destruction was renewed early on the morning of the 9th, by forming a line of battle on the railroad, each division destroying all on its front, and then moving to the left alternately. Gregg had cleared the enemy out of the way southward and picketed the country

north and east. He met with a force of Confederates, with artillery, at Three Creeks, and found the wagon-road bridge destroyed and the railroad bridge on fire. He drove the enemy away and put out the fire on the railroad bridge so as to cross some of his men over it dismounted. The stream was about fifty feet wide, and had been made unfordable by raising the gates of the mill-dam above; but these were quickly shut down, and the cavalry forded the stream, across which the pontoon bridge was soon laid. General Gregg followed up the enemy, and by 4 P.M. had possession of Belfield, on the north bank of the Meherrin River, opposite Hicksford, having driven the Confederates across that stream.

At Hicksford the Confederates had three forts, armed with artillery, connected by rifle-pits, and manned by a considerable force, and as an attempt to turn that position would take longer than the command had rations for, General Warren determined to return, having completed the destruction of the railroad for seventeen or eighteen miles. All the ties were burned, the rails heated and twisted, and the railroad bridges destroyed, except the one over the Meherrin River, which could not be accomplished, being covered by the works at Hicksford.

A storm of sleet began about 8 P.M., and lasted throughout the night, much to the discomfort of the men, and the animals suffered a great deal from its effects. A small force of cavalry harassed Gregg, who moved on the Halifax road, but could not get at the infantry, Gregg moving on the left flank. The head of the column reached Sussex Court-House at dark, after a nasty day's march, and a mist continued to fall and keep the men wet and cold all night, so

that they got little sleep or rest. The next day the command reached the Nottaway at Freeman's Ford. The weather had cleared during the night and was very cold. The mud in the morning was frozen stiff and the men suffered much from their feet, which were sore and blistered. Numbers walked barefoot over the frozen ground.

Upon reaching the Nottoway, General Potter's division was met, it having been sent to Warren's support, information having been received at army headquarters that General A. P. Hill, with a large Confederate force, would intercept Warren's command on its return. But this force was not encountered and the troops all returned to their intrenchments. The entire distance travelled, besides the labor performed, was about one hundred miles in the six days. General Warren says :

"The men marched and behaved most praiseworthy during this tiring expedition in most disagreeable weather—weather which almost precluded rest and sleep. . . . The country enabled us to forage our animals to some extent. Scarcely a man was to be found. Many houses were deserted or contained only helpless women and children. We had evidences, however, of the men lurking about in the woods, for on our return, it is reported some of our men were found dead along the route—in one instance, with his throat cut. Whether this is true or not, all the men in the command believed it, and in retaliation, almost every house was set on fire. Great effort was made by the officers to stop this incendiarism (which most likely punished only the innocent), with only partial success."

This expedition closed the operations of the Fifth Corps for 1864. Indeed, the weather was of such unusual severity that it precluded the possibility of attempting any movements on a large scale. At

times the Potomac River was closed to navigation on account of the ice ; but neither the weather, the temperature, nor the proximity to the enemy in any way interfered with the means and measures heretofore resorted to for comforts, conveniences, and entertainment during lengthened seasons of inactivity.

CHAPTER XII.

THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN—BATTLES OF HATCHER'S RUN.

ALTHOUGH General Lee's troops suffered much from their threadbare, insufficient clothing and meagre food—chiefly cornbread made of coarse meal, no coffee, tea, or sugar except in the hospitals, and very little meat—they were kept hard at work strengthening and lengthening their intrenchments. These, General Humphreys says, when completed, in the spring of 1865—

—“ were thirty-seven miles in length, from the White Oak swamp, on their left, to the Claiborne-road crossing of Hatcher's Run, on their right. This length is not measured along the irregularities of the general line of intrenchments, much less along those of the parapet line. Eight miles of these intrenchments were north of the James River, five were on the Bermuda Hundred front, and sixteen on the Petersburg line. The space along James River between Chapin's bluff and Bermuda Hundred, which was held by heavy artillery, was four miles in length. The space along the Appomattox River from the Bermuda Hundred intrenchments to the left of their Petersburg intrenchments, was also four miles in length.”

It was reported that supplies were carried to Petersburg by wagon-trains from Hicksford, the point to which General Warren had torn up the Weldon Rail-

road, the route of the trains being up the Meherrin River to the Boydton Plank road, and thence through Dinwiddie Court-House to Petersburg. General Grant, therefore, determined to break up this route of supply. In order to do this another expedition of some magnitude was planned.

General Gregg, with his division of cavalry, was directed to march at 3 A.M. of February 5, 1865, by way of Ream's Station, to Dinwiddie Court-House, move up and down the road, and endeavor to intercept trains.

General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was directed to cross Hatcher's Run below the Vaughan road, and take position on that road half-way between that run and the cavalry. Prior to this movement all the regular regiments, being reduced to mere skeletons, had been relieved from duty with the Fifth Corps.

General Humphreys, now commanding the Second Corps by assignment, was directed to take his two reserve divisions to the crossing of the Vaughan road over Hatcher's Run, and to Armstrong's Mill, hold those two points, keep up communication with General Warren (four miles distant) and support him, and also keep up communication with the intrenchments, between three and four miles distant.

General Gregg moved as directed, and General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, at 7 o'clock on the fifth, moved down the Halifax road to Rowanty post-office, and thence about a mile above Malone's Bridge, half-way between the creek and Dinwiddie Court-House, where he was within easy communication with General Gregg. Ayres' division led, Griffin's followed, and Crawford's brought up the rear. Following Griffin, and in front of Crawford, were twelve field pieces,

with eight horses to each piece and caisson. The trains, consisting of half the ambulances of the corps, fifty wagons of infantry ammunition, and fifty-six wagons loaded with forage and ammunition for the cavalry, followed Crawford. The column had an advance-guard of three squadrons of the 6th Ohio cavalry, commanded by Captain Sexton.

Hatcher's Run loses its name at the confluence with Gravelly Run, and from thence is known as Rowanty Creek. From the camps to the creek the country was fairly open for that region. What timber there was mostly skirted but one side of the road at a time. A halt was made where the Vaughan road comes in from the northeast and continues on to Dinwiddie Court-House. Arthur's swamp borders the run to the north of its confluence with Gravelly Run.

The head of the Fifth-Corps column reached the crossing at W. Perkins', at 10 A.M. which was found to be defended by a company or two of infantry. The cavalry being unable to keep down the fire, General Gwyn's brigade was ordered up and soon silenced it. A crossing of the swamp was effected by swimming and wading, and a few passed over on the ice, capturing about 25 prisoners. The stream, which was about 60 feet wide, could not be forded by men or horses. Trees were soon felled for the men to make a passage, and by 1 P.M. a bridge was finished. At 3.45 P.M. all the troops had passed over. The command was then pushed forward to the Vaughan road, of which it took possession without opposition.

In the meantime, General Gregg had pushed the cavalry into Dinwiddie Court-House and captured some wagons and prisoners on the Boydton road ;



but, finding the road but little used, returned in the evening to Malone's Bridge over Rowanty Creek.

General Humphreys, with his two divisions of the Second Corps, upon arriving at the crossing of the run by the Vaughan road, had found the run dammed and obstructed by fallen trees and defended by a few Confederate infantry. These were immediately dispersed, and Mott's division was put in position on the south side of the run. Smyth's division was established on the north side of the run at Armstrong's Mill. Both these divisions intrenched, and communication was opened with Warren.

General Lee, advised of the movement of the Union forces, had concentrated parts of Hill's and Gordon's corps to meet it. Opposite Smyth's centre the new intrenchments of the Confederates were in full view, about one thousand yards distant.

Anticipating a flank attack, General Humphreys moved McAllister's brigade and put it along the edge of a wood on Smyth's right, sending to General Miles in the intrenchments for another brigade, which arrived in due time, and McAllister intrenched the whole line.

A little after 5 P.M., the Confederate artillery opened on Smyth, and their infantry, moving along the edge of a wood on Smyth's right, made a determined attack. At the same time, another column appeared, but the dispositions made by General Humphreys caused a heavy and unexpected fire from McAllister, and the Confederates were repulsed.

Expecting a concentration, which this attack indicated, Warren, at 9 P.M. of the 5th, was ordered up to join Humphreys, and Gregg to connect with Warren on the left. Griffin's division was ordered to

move first, but the relieving of the pickets caused so much delay that it was nearly midnight before it was fairly on the way. The trains followed Griffin, then Ayres' division, and the artillery. Crawford moved last. Gregg united with Warren at 4 A.M., bringing up the rear, and skirmishing with the enemy all the way. The troops had but little rest and no sleep. The night was very cold and no fires were allowed—the roads being frozen hard before morning. At 6 A.M. of the 6th, the command crossed the run at the Vaughan-road crossing.

In the meanwhile, General Meade, becoming informed of the concentration of the Confederates in front of General Humphreys, ordered Hartranft's division of the Ninth, and Wheaton's division of the Sixth Corps, to join General Humphreys, and when they arrived in the night Humphreys established them on his right.

At 12.15 P.M. of the 6th, General Warren received orders to make a reconnaissance to the south and west of Hatcher's Run, to ascertain the whereabouts of the Confederate force, a similar reconnaissance on the north of the run having developed the fact that the Confederates were not out of their intrenchments at that point. General Crawford was sent south on the Vaughan road to where the Dabney's Mills road enters it and then westerly on that road, with instructions to drive the Confederates back and ascertain the position of their intrenched lines. Ayres followed Crawford on his left, and Griffin was in reserve; General Gregg, with his cavalry, was sent down the Vaughan road to the crossing of Gravelly Run, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant. Dabney's Mills was about one mile from the Vaughan road.

General Lee was not content that these movements, which meant disaster to him, should go on without resistance, and sent out part of Pegram's division to look after affairs on the Vaughan road, while the other part, with Evans' and Mahone's divisions were to operate in the neighborhood of the mill. General Gregg ran into one and Crawford the other.

Wheaton's division, about 4500 strong, and De Trobriand's brigade, about 2500, were located at the Cummings house, just east of the run, ready for effective service.

General Crawford had not proceeded far before he encountered the Confederate intrenched picket line, which was handsomely carried by Bragg's brigade. He drove the enemy to and beyond Dabney's Mills. Rallying there, the Confederates forced back his left, and Ayres was sent forward with two of his brigades on that flank. Morrow's brigade had been formed in line of battle some 300 yards in rear and overlapping Bragg's left, his right and left being slightly re-fused. Baxter's brigade was subsequently formed on Morrow's left. When Bragg became actively engaged, Morrow moved up his line to within 100 yards of the front line, and Bragg's left being driven back, uncovered Morrow's entire front, when the latter ordered his line at once into action. Moving forward in handsome style, in double time, the Confederates were driven back for a considerable distance into a wood beyond a small cleared field. The fighting was now heavy and continuous, and the ammunition was soon exhausted. General Morrow was wounded at this time and the command of the 3d Brigade fell upon Colonel McCoy, of the 107th Pennsylvania.

Ayres had pushed rapidly forward, marching in two lines by the flank, through the thick underbrush, ascending a ridge, when a number of cavalymen, riding rapidly, came suddenly on his ranks, and a portion of his command became demoralized. Without stopping to re-form, he pushed on with what he had, and soon engaged the enemy. General Pearson was then ordered to furnish immediate assistance to General Ayres. Taking the 32d Massachusetts and the 155th New York, Pearson moved by the left flank to the front in double time, and placed them on the left of a brigade of the 2d Division, near Dabney's Mills, General Ayres having gallantly assailed the Confederates in his advance with his small force, swept over the Confederate intrenchments, and retaken the mill. Pearson's command becoming at once fiercely engaged, he, by order of General Ayres, directed the 16th Michigan to move up, and placed it on the right of the brigade of the 2d Division, with orders to hold the position as long as possible.

In the meantime Mahone's Confederate division had been pushed out from the intrenchments, and, arriving upon the field, formed between Evans and Pegram, and the whole line advanced to the attack. Their advancing columns approached and poured a destructive fire into Crawford's and Ayres' divisions. The battle-lines swayed to and fro again and again. The ammunition gave out in the Union line, and there was none to replenish the cartridge-boxes. The Confederates had artillery and were using it effectively, while Warren had no artillery in the engagement. It being nearly night and no possibility of succor, Crawford's men fell back. This uncovered the right of Ayres, and his position becoming unten-

able, he also retired. The Confederates followed up their success, but Wheaton's troops came upon the scene at this time, and, some of the commands forming with them, checked the enemy's advance: Night now coming on, all the commands were re-formed and the troops lay on their arms in line of battle.

When Ayres moved forward at first to support the left of the 3d Division, he supposed that General Gwyn, the most of whose brigade was disorganized by the cavalry, would rejoin as soon as he got his men together; but in going forward Gwyn lost the direction and went to the left. His command engaged the enemy for about two hours, but as his brigade was entirely alone, without any troops to the right or left, and the firing on his flanks increasing, he considered his position untenable and retired to the crest of the hill.

During the engagement General Gregg became somewhat pressed on the Vaughan road and Winthrop's brigade from Griffin's division was sent to his support. The brigade moved to the point designated at 1 P.M., and relieved the cavalry pickets with the 146th New York. Winthrop deployed the 5th and 140th New York on the right-hand side of the Vaughan road and the 15th New York Heavy Artillery on the left-hand side, in a large open field. These dispositions had hardly been made before the cavalry advanced to the attack. They soon became actively engaged with the Confederate infantry, and, getting rather roughly handled, retired in some confusion, the enemy closely following. Winthrop moved forward his line in double time and, after delivering several volleys, succeeded in checking the Confederate advance, and forced it to retire to the shelter of

the woods. Again the Confederates attempted to advance over the open field, but were again repulsed. About 5 P.M., Winthrop's brigade, being entirely out of ammunition, was relieved by the 1st Brigade of Griffin's division. After replenishing cartridge-boxes, the brigade was ordered out on picket covering the road leading to Dabney's Mills, where it remained until the afternoon of the 7th.

General Chamberlain, with his brigade of the 1st Division, Fifth Corps, had occupied several positions under orders until about 3 P.M., when he was ordered to the Warren house, to report to Major-General Mott. Arriving there, he was directed by General Humphreys to proceed straight to the front. He moved by the flank along a narrow road, through the slashing, and was halted by General Humphreys, in a thin belt of timber in front of which General Mott's line was formed, and in position to overlook the line. About dusk there was a strong and vigorous advance made on Mott's front. The skirmishers were driven back in confusion and the Confederates were close upon the main line, when Chamberlain, fearing that they might follow up their attack with sufficient force to break through, sent Sickel, with the 198th Pennsylvania, to occupy the edge of the woods close in rear of Mott's line; and, on the request of General Humphreys to strengthen Mott's right, sent Colonel Sniper, with the 185th New York, to occupy the front line and fill the space between General Mott's and General Miles' divisions, his centre being nearly in front of the Watkins house. Simultaneously with these movements the troops of General Mott opened a vigorous fire on the advancing Confederate line, followed by a gallant charge of the entire division and

supports, in which the Confederates were completely repulsed, Chamberlain's troops capturing 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 sergeant, and 8 privates from the Confederates. At 9 P.M., General Chamberlain's brigade was withdrawn and reported to General Griffin.

During the night it rained, and the water froze as it fell, rendering the night one of discomfort, as no large fires could be permitted.

On the morning of the 7th, General Warren threw forward the Pennsylvania Veteran Reserve regiments as a reconnoissance, meeting but few Confederates, the force having retired during the night, leaving only a thin picket line. The line of Union intrenchments was now extended to Hatcher's Run, at the Vaughan-road crossing; and the Second Corps held the intrenchments on the extreme left, the Sixth occupying the line at Fort Fisher and the signal tower, while the Fifth Corps was massed in rear of the Second, near the left.

During this engagement the corps lost many valuable officers. The following were killed or mortally wounded:

Delaware.—Major James E. Bailey, 3d.

Maryland.—Colonel John W. Wilson, Lieut. Lewis Armacost and Lieut. Robert A. Wilson, 1st; Lieut. Jacob L. Troxell, 8th,

New York.—Lieut. Adolph Rieman, 15th Heavy Artillery; Captain Charles S. Montgomery, 5th; Lieut. Lansing Bristol, 147th.

Pennsylvania.—Captain Benj. A. Smith, 83d; Lieut. John Edgar, 91st; Captain Jno. Scott, 118th; Captain Asher Gaylord, 143d; Lieut. Albert B. Cole, 149th; Lieut. Charles W. Frazier, 198th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH CORPS AT THE
BATTLE OF HATCHER'S RUN, VA., FEBRUARY 5-7, 1865.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.							
<i>Escort.</i>							
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Co. C.).....				1			1
<i>Provost Guard.</i>							
104th New York						3	3
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General CHARLES GRIF- FIN.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General HORATIO B. SICKEL. ¹							
185th New York		2	1	9	1	3	16
198th Pennsylvania	1	2	2	15		1	21
Total First Brigade.....	1	4	3	24	1	4	37
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel ALLEN L. BURR.							
187th New York (battalion).....			1	6		1	8
188th New York (battalion)		7		21		3	31
189th New York		2		13			15
Total Second Brigade.....		9	1	40		4	54
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General ALFRED L. PEARSON.							
20th Maine.....		1	1	15		7	24
32d Massachusetts.....		2	2	32		10	46
1st Michigan		3	1	6		4	14
16th Michigan		2	2	20		6	30
83d Pennsylvania (six companies).....		1	1	9		2	13
91st Pennsylvania		1	1	2		3	7
118th Pennsylvania.....		1		2		4	7
155th Pennsylvania.....		4		30		3	37
Total Third Brigade.....	3	14	10	119		32	178
Total First Division	4	27	14	183	1	40	269

¹ Wounded February 6th.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General FREDERICK WINTHROP.							
5th New York (Veteran).....	1	1	1	11			14
15th New York Heavy Artillery.....		4	1	25			30
140th New York.....		3		20			23
146th New York.....							
Total First Brigade.....	1	8	2	56			67
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Colonel RICHARD N. BOWERMAN.							
1st Maryland.....	2	3	2	45		5	57
4th Maryland.....		1		17		2	20
7th Maryland.....		3		13		4	20
8th Maryland.....	1	1	1	11			14
Total Second Brigade.....	3	8	3	86		11	111
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General JAMES GWYN.							
3d Delaware.....	1	3		8		5	17
4th Delaware.....	1	2		6			9
157th Pennsylvania.....				2		1	3
190th Pennsylvania.....				5			5
191st Pennsylvania.....				4			4
210th Pennsylvania.....		2	3	21		7	33
Total Third Brigade.....		4	8	46		13	71
Total Second Division.....	4	20	13	188		24	249
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General EDWARD S. BRAGG.							
24th Michigan.....		4	2	15		1	22
143d Pennsylvania.....	1	6	2	27			36
149th Pennsylvania.....	1		1	13		3	18
156th Pennsylvania.....		2	1	5			8
6th Wisconsin.....		11	4	74		14	103
7th Wisconsin.....		3	3	17		3	26
Total First Brigade.....	2	26	13	151		21	213

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER.							
Staff			1				1
16th Maine		3	1	58		11	73
39th Massachusetts		3	1	26		3	33
97th New York		3	3	26		2	34
11th Pennsylvania		9	2	68		9	88
88th Pennsylvania		5	1	23		7	36
Total Second Brigade		23	9	201		32	265
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brig.-Gen. HENRY A. MORROW.							
94th New York		4		36			40
95th New York		2	1	32		2	37
147th New York		1	2	28	1	13	48
56th Pennsylvania		2		6			8
107th Pennsylvania ¹		6	2	52		21	81
121st Pennsylvania		5	1	11			17
142d Pennsylvania		3		25		1	29
Total Third Brigade	1	24	7	190	1	37	260
Total Third Division	3	73	29	542	1	90	738
Total Fifth Army Corps	11	120	56	944	2	157	1260

THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

Although no man could tell what the next two months would bring forth, yet it was evident that the end was near for the capture of Petersburg. The continued extension of the Union lines to the left was very threatening to the only remaining railroad line of communication of the Confederate army directly with the South, and General Grant feared, from indications, that General Lee would abandon his Petersburg and Richmond intrenchments and endeavor to unite with Johnston's army, then in front of Sherman,

¹ Temporarily detached.

before he (Grant) was quite ready for the pursuit, Sheridan still being in the Shenandoah Valley. In preparing, therefore, for a contemplated pursuit, General Sheridan was summoned to Petersburg with his command. He moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, 1865, with two divisions of cavalry, up the valley to Staunton; thence to Charlottesville, destroying the railroads between those towns, and from Charlottesville towards Gordonsville, and to within a short distance of Lynchburg. He destroyed the James River Canal from New Market nearly to Goochland Court-House, and on the 27th of March formed a junction with the Armies of the Potomac and the James. This was what General Grant had waited for.

Anticipating his arrival, General Grant, on the 24th of March, issued an order for a movement to the left on the 29th, with a view to the destruction of the Danville and the South-Side (Lynchburg) railroads, turn Lee's right, and force him to abandon his intrenchments. Previous to the execution of this order, however, General Lee determined on a bold stroke to relieve the pressure on his lines.

A SORTIE—FORT STEDMAN.

In a conference between General Lee and the President of the Confederacy early in March, it had been determined that, as soon as the roads would admit of a movement, the intrenchments about Petersburg and Richmond should be given up, and Lee should unite with Johnston and suddenly fall on Sherman's army. General Lee, however, determined on a sortie before he gave up. For this purpose General Gordon, in addition to his own corps, was given a portion

of General Hill's and General Longstreet's corps, together with a detachment of cavalry—in all about one half the Army of Northern Virginia. The point of attack was Fort Stedman, where the opposing lines were only about 150 yards apart, and the pickets only 50 yards. General Humphreys (*Va. Camp.*, p. 317) says :

“The attack was well arranged ; picked men preceded the storming party to cut away the fraise and *abatis* in front of the intrenchments ; the storming party was followed by three columns, which were to push through the gap made by the capture of Fort Stedman and seize three forts on the high ground that commanded Fort Stedman and the lines on the right and left of it. These forts were supposed to be open at the gorge. But, in point of fact, there were no such forts. The redoubts that had a commanding fire on Fort Stedman and the lines and open batteries on its right and left were on the main line. In front of them was the line of intrenchments erected by our troops on the 18th of June, which probably led to the misapprehension of General Gordon.

“A division of infantry, moving by its left flank, was to follow the three detachments, and when halted and fronted was to move down our intrenchments to the left, being joined by the other troops as their fronts were cleared. Next were the cavalry, who were to cut our telegraph lines and destroy the pontoon bridges over the Appomattox. Next, all the remaining force was to unite in the attack.

“The Ninth Corps was on our right, holding, from the Appomattox to Fort Howard, a line about seven miles in length. . . . Taking advantage, General Parke says, of the order allowing deserters to bring their arms with them, the enemy at half-past four in the morning of the 25th quietly gained possession of several picket-posts ; the storming party instantly followed, and with a rush overpowered the trench guard, broke the main line between Batteries 9 and 10, turned to the right and left, gained Battery 10, overpowered the garrison of Fort Stedman after a spirited resistance, capturing the greatest part of it, and then turned its artillery (four 12-pounders and two guns of Battery 10)

against Willcox's troops, but not until they had been effectively used by the garrison. Batteries 11 and 12, open works, were also captured. It was so dark, General Parke says, that friends could not be distinguished from foes, and artillery, therefore, could not at first be used ; but Brigadier-General McLaughlin, whose brigade occupied this part of the line, opened a mortar fire on Battery 11 and recaptured it with the bayonet ; but while entering Fort Stedman, in ignorance of its capture, was himself taken prisoner."

General Willcox was now ordered to recapture the works, General Hartranft to concentrate and support him, and Tidball to post his artillery on high ground and open fire at once. Hartranft executed his orders promptly, and while doing so, with one of his own regiments and some of Willcox's troops, attacked the detachments of the enemy that were moving in the direction of City Point, being already at the military railroad and telegraph lines, and drove them back to their own troops. By 8 A.M. the entire line was recaptured, together with 1949 prisoners, including 71 officers and 9 stands of colors. The Union loss was 494 killed and wounded and 523 missing.

Generals Meade and Grant did not learn of this affair until the works had been retaken. They were both at City Point, and telegraphic communication with that place had been severed by the detachments which Hartranft had struck. General Parke, who was the senior in command, having been informed of this fact, ordered Wright to send him a division, and directed Warren (who had the Fifth Corps all under arms ready to move to the support of General Parke) to move up at once.

General Humphreys had also prepared the Second Corps for a movement, directed his division commanders to make strong reconnaissances to ascertain

the condition of the enemy's lines in their front, and to attack their intrenched picket line, with the view of assaulting their main works if the force holding them had been weakened. This was approved of by General Meade, and the intrenched picket line of the enemy was captured, and the Union line advanced close to the main Confederate works, which proved to be held by a force sufficient to maintain them against assault. Under cover of their artillery and musketry, the Confederates moved out repeatedly with strong force at several points to recapture their picket intrenchments, but were driven back each time.

General Wright also attacked and carried the Confederate intrenched picket line in his front, losing about 400 in the encounter, but secured 547 prisoners.

Organization of the Fifth Army Corps in the Appomattox Campaign.

Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

Brevet Major-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.¹

Escort.—4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Co. C), Captain Napoleon J. Horrell.

Provost Guard.—104th New York, Captain Wm. W. Graham.

First Division.

Brevet Major-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.

Brevet Major-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.¹

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN.

185th New York, Colonel Gustavus Sniper.

198th Pennsylvania, Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Horatio B. Sickel²; Major Edwin A. Glenn³; Capt. John Stanton.

¹ In command from evening of April 1st.

² Wounded March 29th.

³ Mortally wounded April 1st.

Second Brigade.

Brevet Brigadier-General EDGAR M. GREGORY.

187th New York, Lt.-Col. Daniel Myers.

188th New York, Lt.-Col. Isaac Doolittle.

189th New York, Lt.-Col. Joseph G. Townsend.

Third Brigade.

Brevet Major-General JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.

Brevet Brigadier-General ALFRED L. PEARSON.¹

1st Maine Sharpshooters, Capt. George R. Abbott.

20th Maine, Lt.-Col. Walter G. Morrill.

32d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. James A. Cunningham.

1st Michigan, Lt.-Col. George Lockley.

16th Michigan,² Bvt. Col. Benjamin F. Partridge.

83d Pennsylvania, Col. Chauncey P. Rogers.

91st Pennsylvania, Lt.-Col. Eli G. Sellers.

118th Pennsylvania, Bvt. Lt.-Col. Henry O'Neill.

155th Pennsylvania, Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Alfred L. Pearson; Major John A. Cline.

Second Division.

Brevet Major-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.

First Brigade.

Brevet Brigadier-General FREDERICK WINTHROP.³

Colonel JAMES GRINDLAY.

Brigadier-General JOSEPH HAYES.⁴

5th New York (Veteran), Capt. Henry Shickhart; Lt.-Col. Wm. F. Drum.⁵

15th New York Heavy Artillery, Lt.-Col. Michael Wiedrich⁶; Major Louis Eiche.

140th New York, Lt.-Col. Wm. S. Grantsynn.

146th New York, Col. James Grindley; Lieut. Henry Loomis; Col. James Grindlay.

¹ In command from April 1st.

² Brady's and Jardine's Companies Michigan Sharpshooters attached.

³ Mortally wounded April 1st.

⁴ In command from April 3d.

⁵ In command from April 1st.

⁶ Wounded April 1st.

*HISTORY OF**Second Brigade.*

Brevet Brigadier-General **ANDREW W. DENISON**.¹
 Colonel **RICHARD N. BOWERMAN**.²
 Colonel **DAVID L. STANTON**.

1st Maryland, Col. David L. Stanton ; Maj. Robert Neeley.
 4th Maryland, Col. Richard N. Bowerman ; Maj. **Harrison**
 Andreon.
 7th Maryland, Lt.-Col. David T. Bennett³ ; Maj. **Edward M.**
 Mobley.
 8th Maryland, Lt.-Col. Ernest F. M. Faeltz.

Third Brigade.

Brevet Brigadier-General **JAMES GWYN**.

3d Delaware, Capt. John H. Cade.
 4th Delaware, Capt. Wm. H. McClary,⁴ Bvt. Lt.-Col. **Moses B.**
 Gist.
 8th Delaware (3 cos.), Capt. John N. Richards.
 157th Pennsylvania (4 cos.), }
 190th Pennsylvania, } Bvt. Col. Joseph B. Pattee.
 191st Pennsylvania, }
 210th Pennsylvania, Col. Wm. Sergeant,⁵ Lt.-Col. **Edward L.**
 Witman.

Third Division.

Brevet Major-General **SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD**.

First Brigade.

Colonel **JOHN A. KELLOGG**.

91st New York, Col. Jonathan Tarbell.
 6th Wisconsin, Lt.-Col. Thomas Kerr,⁶ Capt. **Edward A. Whaley**,
 Capt. Lewis A. Kent.
 7th Wisconsin, Lt.-Col. Hollon Richardson.⁷

¹ Wounded March 31st.

² Wounded April 1st.

³ Wounded March 31st.

⁴ Killed April 1st.

⁵ Mortally wounded March 31st.

⁶ Wounded March 31st.

⁷ Wounded April 1st.

⁸ Wounded April 2d.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER.

- 16th Maine, Col. Charles W. Tilden.
 39th Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Henry M. Tremlett,¹ Capt. Jos. J. Cooper.
 97th New York, Lt.-Col. Rouse S. Eggleston.²
 11th Pennsylvania, Maj. John B. Overmyer.
 107th Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas F. McCoy.

Third Brigade.

Brevet Brigadier-General RICHARD COULTER.

- 94th New York, Maj. Henry H. Fish,³ Capt. Albert T. Morgan.⁴
 95th New York, Capt. George D. Knight.
 147th New York, Maj. Dennis B. Dailey,⁵ Capt. James A. McKinley.
 56th Pennsylvania, } Maj. Henry A. Laycock.
 88th Pennsylvania, }
 121st Pennsylvania,⁶ Maj. West Funk.
 142d Pennsylvania,⁷ Lt.-Col. Horatio N. Warren.⁸

Unattached.

- 1st Battalion, New York Sharpshooters, Capt. Clinton Perry.

Artillery Brigade.

Brevet Brigadier-General CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.

- 1st New York Light, Battery B, Capt. Robert E. Rogers.
 1st New York Light, Battery D, Lt. Deloss M. Johnson.
 1st New York Light, Battery H, Bvt. Maj. Charles E. Mink.
 15th New York Heavy, Co. M, Capt. Wm. D. Dickey.
 4th U. S., Battery B, Lt. John Mitchell,⁹ Lt. Wm. P. Vose.
 5th U. S., Batteries D and G, Lt. Jacob B. Rawles.

¹ Wounded March 31st.² Mortally wounded March 31st.³ Wounded March 31st and killed April 1st.⁴ In command from April 3d.⁵ Wounded March 31st.⁶ Consolidated April 1st and commanded by Major Funk.⁷ Wounded March 29th.⁸ Wounded March 29th.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN.

General Grant having issued his orders on the 24th, as we have stated, for a movement on the 29th of March, 1865, General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, was directed to join the Army of the Potomac. On the night of the 27th, therefore, he took with him General Gibbon, with two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, Birney's colored division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, and Mc Kenzie's cavalry, and made a secret march of thirty-six miles to the left of the Army of the Potomac. His command was massed in rear of the Second Corps by the evening of the 28th. This was managed so well that the Confederates knew nothing of it until April 2d.

On the 28th, General Grant instructed Sheridan to move with his cavalry (about 13,000) at an early hour on the morning of the 29th, cross Hatcher's Run below where it would be crossed by the Fifth Corps (at Monk's Neck Bridge), pass near to or through Dinwiddie Court-House, and reach the right and rear of the Confederate line as soon as practicable. He was informed that the Second and Fifth Corps would be in position on the Vaughan road, south of Hatcher's Run, extending to or near Dinwiddie Court-House. It was not intended to attack the enemy in his intrenchments, but to force him to quit them. Should he remain, Sheridan was to cut loose and push for the Danville road. If practicable, he was to cross the South Side Railroad between Petersburg and Burkesville, destroy the road as much as possible without interfering with the complete destruction of the Danville Railroad, which he was to strike as near the Appomattox River as possible. Having accomplished the destruction of these two roads, he was to

return to General Grant or join General Sherman, who was at Goldsboro', N. C., at the commencement of the movement.

General Humphreys, with the Second Corps, was ordered to cross Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road on the morning of the 29th, as soon as General Ord's troops occupied the intrenchments held by the Second Corps, and take position with his right near Hatcher's Run, and his left in communication or connection with the Fifth Corps, and advance towards the enemy's position.

General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was directed to cross Hatcher's Run at Monk's Neck bridge early on the morning of the 29th, but not to proceed beyond the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker roads until the Second Corps was in position, when he would advance toward the enemy by the Boydton road, his right connecting with the Second Corps; but at mid-day on the 29th he was directed to move up the Quaker road.

General Wright was ordered to hold the Sixth Corps in readiness to be withdrawn from its intrenchments, and General Parke to remain in the intrenchments held by the Ninth Corps and be prepared to take up the return works from his left, at Fort Sedgwick, if the Sixth Corps should be withdrawn.

General Sheridan marched to Dinwiddie Court-House on the 29th by way of Malone's crossing of Rowanty Creek, encountering only small cavalry pickets. Learning that a strong force of Confederate cavalry (W. H. F. Lee's and Rosser's divisions) was on the south side of Stony Creek, near the railroad depot, Custer's division was directed to remain near Malone's crossing to protect the trains.

The Fifth Corps moved from its camp in the vicinity of the Vaughan-road crossing of Hatcher's Run at 3 A.M. of the 29th, Ayres' division leading, Griffin's following, and Crawford in rear. The route east of the run lay through Arthur's swamp to Monk's Neck Bridge at the crossing of the Rowanty; thence by the Old Stage and Vaughan roads until the Chapple house was reached, about two miles from Dinwiddie Court-House. At 8 A.M., the head of the column had arrived at its destination, having encountered a few pickets at Rowanty Creek.

As the question of the character of that particular part of the country will come into consideration to a greater or less extent, we quote General Warren's description of it:

"It was of the forest kind common to Virginia, being well watered by swampy streams. The surface is level and the soil clayey and, where these mix together, like quicksand. The soil, after the frosts of winter first leave it, is very light and soft, and hoofs and wheels find but little support."

The point at the Chapple house had been secured without opposition, and at noon Warren was directed to return by the Vaughan road to the Quaker road, and thence by it towards the Boydton road, to connect with the left of the Second Corps. Chamberlain's brigade led the column, and about a mile and a half from the junction of the Quaker road with the Boydton road, in the vicinity of the steam saw-mill, came in contact with Wise's and Wallace's brigades, of Anderson's command. Immediately after crossing Gravelly Run Chamberlain struck the Confederate skirmishers, drove them steadily to the Lewis house, where, after a spirited engagement of about two hours, with his usual skill and resistless

energy, he drove the Confederates from the field. At one time he was sorely pressed, when the 1st and 16th Michigan and the 155th Pennsylvania, all of the famous old 3d Brigade of the 1st Division, were pushed up to his assistance, and, entering the fight with spirit, the Confederate line was forced back into its intrenchments on the White Oak road, losing some 200 prisoners, besides the wounded left on the field. The loss in General Griffin's division in this encounter was 367 killed and wounded, General Sickel among the latter.

When General Grant's movement on the 29th was perceived by General Lee, the latter sent General Anderson, with Bushrod Johnson's division and Wise's brigade to the extreme right of his intrenchments along the White Oak road. It was part of this force that Griffin encountered. Pickett's division was likewise transferred to the extreme right by General Lee, reaching there about daybreak on the 30th.

When, on the 28th, General Sheridan was sent to the left of the Union line, General Fitz Lee's division of Confederate cavalry was north of the James River, on the extreme left of General Lee's lines. Surmising that Sheridan's presence opposite his right indicated an attack on the South Side Railroad and his right rear, General Lee directed Fitz Lee to move at once to Five Forks, assume command of the Confederate cavalry, and, with the infantry supports which were to be sent to him, attack Sheridan. Fitz Lee arrived at Sutherland Station with his division on the night of the 29th, and Hill extended his line the same night—McGowan's and McRae's brigades moving into the intrenchments on the White

Oak road on Johnson's left, Scales' and Cook's brigades into the intrenchments in front of Burgess' Mill and along the south side of Hatcher's Run. Heth commanded the troops south of the run—Wilcox north of it.

A heavy rainstorm came on and continued all night of the 29th and during the 30th, making the roads impassable for artillery and wagons. The country was flat and covered generally with dense forests and tangled undergrowth, with numerous small swampy streams.

On the 30th, General Humphreys drove the enemy inside of his intrenchments along Hatcher's Run from the Crow house to the Boydton road, pressing close up against them, but not assaulting.

Early on the morning of the 30th, General Warren directed Griffin to feel the enemy in his front, to see whether he had changed his position. General Bartlett, whose skirmishers were out, had anticipated such work, for at 7.30 A.M. General Griffin sent in Bartlett's report showing that he had been watching his front. A heavy fog prevailed early in the morning, and as soon as it lifted, Bartlett found the right of his skirmish line within 150 yards of a complete line of rifle-pits. He had made a demonstration with his skirmish line, which was in an open field, that satisfied him the position would be hotly contested.

The Second Corps skirmish line having advanced during the morning, caused the Confederate line in front of Bartlett to retire, and he accordingly, about noon, pushed up his skirmishers. Finding that the line of battle could be advanced to a good position, Giffin now moved it forward some half a mile across

the open field to the point where the road from Dabney's enters the Plank road, when the Confederates opened with artillery from intrenchments at Burgess' Mill. A reconnaissance was then made, which located the battery at the junction of the White Oak road with the Plank road. The former road was the shortest route to Five Forks, and it was desirable to secure it, as that would eventually force an abandonment of the Petersburg intrenchments by the Confederates.

While General Griffin was operating in front of Burgess' Mill, Ayres had, under orders, moved out to a position where he could see the White Oak road, in the vicinity of the point where the Confederate intrenchments turned north to cover the Claiborne road, and a picket line was established there, supported by a part of his division, the other part remaining on Griffin's left, in advance of the Boydton road. About 4 P.M. Wilcox's Confederate division made a demonstration against Griffin's front, but was easily repulsed, a few prisoners falling into Griffin's hands.

General Sheridan had directed General Merritt to gain possession of Five Forks with Devin's division, supported by Davies' brigade, leaving Crook's brigade to guard the Boydton-road crossing of Stony Creek. Merritt advanced to the forks of the road near J. Boisseau's, from which point reconnaissances were sent on the left-hand or Five Forks road leading to the White Oak road. Devin halted for the night at the forks mentioned.

In the meantime General Lee had not been inactive. Fitz Lee marched to Five Forks early on the morning of the 30th, and advancing toward Dinwid-

die Court-House, encountered Devin's skirmishers, and some sharp firing ensued. At dark, W. H. F. Lee and Rosser, with their divisions, joined Fitz Lee. General Pickett, with three brigades of his own division and two brigades of Johnson's division, arrived at Five Forks by sunset, by way of the White Oak road. Sheridan soon became informed of Pickett's arrival and reported it to General Grant. General Pickett assumed command of the troops engaged in the operations against General Sheridan, while Hill's and Anderson's troops were to be used in conjunction with Pickett's attack in an attempt to turn the left of the Fifth Corps.

As it was presumed that the Confederate intrenchments were thinly held, owing to the increased extension of General Lee's lines, Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke were, on the 30th, ordered to make an assault, to ascertain the possibility of carrying them. General Warren, in reporting the result of Ayres' reconnoissance on the afternoon of the 30th, suggested that a division of the Second Corps should take Griffin's place during the night and that the Fifth Corps should capture the White Oak road early the next morning, thus cutting Lee's direct communication with Five Forks. In consequence of this, General Miles' division relieved General Griffin before daylight of the 31st, and Warren was directed to place Griffin and Crawford within supporting distance of Ayres, the latter being ordered by Warren to reinforce his advance by daylight of the 31st with his whole division. Crawford was directed to hold his command ready to follow Ayres and Griffin to take up the position Ayres had held at Mrs. Butler's as soon as relieved by the Second Corps. Ayres' posi-

tion at this time was in open ground, on the south side of the White Oak road, near W. Dabney's and about 600 yards from the road. Crawford took position at the Holliday house, about 500 yards in rear of Ayres, and Griffin massed his men on the south or east side of a branch of Gravelly Run, about 1000 yards to the rear of Crawford.

At 8 o'clock A.M. Ayres was informed of Pickett's presence at Five Forks, about four miles from his left flank, and, in order to meet an attack from any direction, formed Winthrop's brigade looking north, fronting the White Oak road; Dennison's Maryland brigade was placed along a ravine on Winthrop's left, facing the west; the 3d Brigade was located somewhat to Winthrop's right; and a brigade which Crawford had sent him was located in rear of his centre.

An order for the suspension of hostilities, on account of the previous rain and terrible condition of the roads, was sent out from General Grant's headquarters about 8.30 A.M. of the 31st, but General Warren thought that his position was such that he would be forced into active operations should he remain inactive. At 9.40, therefore, he sent word to Ayres to try to drive off the enemy's pickets and develop the force holding the White Oak road. This fact he telegraphed to General Meade, and the latter replied that if his reconnoissance should show that he could get possession of and hold the White Oak road he was to do so, notwithstanding the order to suspend operations during the day.

General Griffin's men, probably understanding there was to be no offensive movement that day, and being some distance from the advanced line, had put

out their blankets, clothing, etc., to dry under the influence of the warm sun, and at once set to work to get a morning meal ; but in an instant, as it were, a terrible roar of artillery and musketry, almost upon them, came near throwing them into a state of confusion.

General Lee, in preparing his plan of attack for the 31st, had directed McGowan to take his own brigade and that of Gracie, and move out of the intrenchments by the White Oak road, and, passing through the thick timber, attack the flank of the Fifth Corps. McGowan had not completed his movement when Winthrop's brigade of the Fifth Corps advanced, supported by Gwyn's brigade. This about 10.30 A.M. The Confederates did not attempt a forward movement until Winthrop arrived within fifty yards of them, and then Hunton's Confederate brigade rushed forward from the woods on the north side of the road, to meet Winthrop in front, while McGowan and Gracie, although not having gotten well in rear of Ayres' line, as intended, struck Winthrop diagonally on the front and left flank. Winthrop, seeing what he had to encounter, marched back across the field in good order, the Confederates pressing their advantage. Repeated attempts were made to check the enemy, but the attack on the flank had, to a certain extent, demoralized some of Ayres' supports. Ayres endeavored twice to form line of battle, but could not do so, and everything fell back to the position occupied the day before, behind a branch of Gravelly Run. And there stood Griffin's division, like a rock. At the first rush of the tide to the rear, he had promptly formed his men, and as the fugitives pressed to the rear, Griffin advanced his line to a rise of ground

overlooking the run. The Confederates were moving over the swale in the little valley, evidently with the intention of crossing the run, sweeping before them hordes of Ayres' and Crawford's men, who masked the fire of Griffin's line to such an extent that Griffin cried out: "For God's sake, let them through, or they will break our line."

The gallant Mink was on hand with his battery, and his guns thundered forth their deadly charges, while Griffin's men poured into the Confederate ranks volley upon volley of musketry, and the lines of Ayres' and Crawford's divisions being re-formed in Griffin's rear, joined in the fight. At this juncture, Warren and Griffin rode to Chamberlain, who with his brigade and the artillery was holding the left, where an attack had been expected, and asked him if, suffering as he was from his wounds, he felt able to try a counterstroke on the Confederates. Chamberlain, ever ready, though in much pain, instantly threw his brigade across the branch, fording the stream nearly waist deep, and pressing an advantage which had been gained by some of the skirmishers, pushed the enemy steadily before him. Ayres' division supported Chamberlain on the left in echelon by brigade, the skirmishers of the 1st Division, in charge of General Pearson, in their front. Chamberlain advanced in this way a mile or more into the edge of the field it was desired to retake. A heavy fire from the enemy was here met, and a line of battle could be plainly seen in the opposite edge of the woods and in a line of breastworks in the open field. Here Warren ordered Chamberlain to halt; but the latter did not believe in standing and taking blows without delivering some in return. He obtained permission from

General Griffin to attack. General Gregory coming up at this time with his brigade, Chamberlain requested him to move rapidly into the woods on his right by battalion in echelon by the left so as to break any flank attack and possibly turn the enemy's left, while he, Chamberlain, charged in front. The movement was handsomely executed and the result was completely successful. The woods and the works were carried and nearly the entire 56th Virginia regiment, with its colors, was captured. The line was then advanced some 300 yards across the White Oak road.

General Warren then thought it was possible for him to carry the enemy's breastworks, but after a personal examination, during which a heavy fire was drawn upon the troops, he concluded that it would be useless to sacrifice the men in an assault. Thus far his actions had been independent of General Sheridan. When Warren's men were first seen coming to the rear, General Humphreys at once ordered General Miles to go forward quickly with two of his brigades and attack the enemy's left flank. This was done in a prompt and spirited manner. The other two brigades of his division followed soon after. Mott was also ordered to attack in his front and Hays the Crow-house intrenchments.

Wise's Confederate brigade had advanced on the left of Hunton's, and being struck in front and flank by Miles, fell back rapidly to its intrenchments, with a severe loss in killed and wounded and over 300 prisoners. Mott endeavored to carry the redoubts and intrenchments covering the Boydton-road crossing of Hatcher's Run, but without success. Hays also failed to carry the works at the Crow house ; but the

combination of these attacks kept the Confederates in front of Warren from being reinforced, so that when Chamberlain moved forward, the Confederates were not prepared for the brilliant counterstroke and lost the White Oak road.

In order to pursue the course of events pertaining to the Fifth Corps, we must now turn attention to General Sheridan's operations :

On the morning of the 31st General Fitz Lee moved with his Confederate cavalry towards Dinwiddie Court-House on the direct road from Five Forks, encountering Devin's cavalry division, which was advancing towards Five Forks. Pickett's infantry had not moved at that time. Leaving Munford (Lee's division) in contact with Devin near the fork of the Gravelly Run Church road, Pickett moved with his infantry, and Fitz Lee with W. H. F. Lee's and Rosser's cavalry, by way of Little Five Forks, intending to cross Chamberlain Creek at Fitzgerald's. This was held by Crook with Smith's brigade, and Dause's crossing—a mile above—with Davies' brigade, while Gregg's brigade was held in reserve. Dinwiddie Court-House was two and a half miles by road from Fitzgerald's crossing. Lee at first made a crossing at this point, but was driven back with severe loss. At first the Confederates failed at Dause's crossing, but at 1 P.M. Pickett's infantry succeeded in making it. Gregg then attacked and held them there for some time. Munford, in the meanwhile, had forced Devin back and Pickett, driving Davies upon Devin's left, passed between Devin and Crook. Being unable to withdraw to Dinwiddie by direct road, Devin and Davies retired, fighting towards the Boydton road. Gibbs withdrew

his brigade towards Dinwiddie and joined Crook. Fitz Lee, having forced the crossing mentioned, moved up and united with Pickett, forming on his right and Munford on the left. Crook's two brigades had been forced to fall back.

General Pickett, having exposed the rear of his column in following Devin and Davies toward the Boydton road, was attacked by Gibbs, Gregg, Pennington, and Capehart. This attack relieved Devin and Davies and forced Pickett to face about and meet Sheridan's line of battle in front of Dinwiddie. An obstinate fight continued until dark. Devin and Davies being relieved from molestation, moved by the Boydton road to the Court-House, but not in time to take part in the closing action of the day. The two contending lines of battle lay very close to each other that night, Pickett's infantry lying across the road leading from Dinwiddie to Five Forks, with cavalry on each flank. Custer, supported by Devin, held Sheridan's front.

We now desire to call particular attention to the actions of General Warren, in view of what took place the following day.

About 5 P.M. of the 31st, Warren, then at W. Dabney's, on the White Oak road, heard the sound of Sheridan's engagement, coming from a southwest direction, and it appearing to him to recede, and still to be receding, conveying the impression that the enemy was driving the cavalry, directed General Griffin to send Bartlett with his brigade, directly across the country, so as to attack the Confederates on the flank, and sent Major Cope (of Warren's staff) with Bartlett. The sound of firing in Sheridan's direction created the impression at

army headquarters that it was approaching, instead of receding, and shortly after Bartlett had moved off General Warren received orders from General Meade to "push a brigade down the White Oak road, to open it for General Sheridan and support the same if necessary."

Before this order could be executed, however, an officer and a sergeant of Sheridan's command, who had been cut off by Fitz Lee's attack, reported to General Warren that General Sheridan's forces had been attacked about noon by cavalry and infantry and rapidly driven back. This information Warren sent to headquarters at 5.50 P.M., stating at the same time the action he had previously taken with regard to Bartlett's brigade. This was the first information conveyed to army headquarters of General Sheridan's status, for at 6.30 P.M. General Warren received the following from General Webb, chief of staff:

"A staff officer of General Merritt has made a report that the enemy has penetrated between Sheridan's main command and your position. This is a portion of Pickett's division. Let the force ordered to move out the White Oak road move down the Boydton Plank road as promptly as possible."

General Bartlett's command had been gone an hour when this dispatch was received, and it would have taken two hours to have recalled it to the Boydton road. All the corps artillery had been left on that road on account of the mud, and Griffin had protected it with three regiments of Bartlett's brigade, under Brevet Brigadier-General Pearson. Knowing that Pearson's command could reach Dinwiddie Court-House many hours before Bartlett could do so, Warren directed the former to proceed at once toward that point, and notified General Meade of his action,

and the reason therefor. By this time it was nearly dark, and Warren gave orders to secure the position he had gained by intrenching; after which he returned to the Boydton road in order to be in more direct and closer communication with General Meade, as from that point he could send telegrams. Meade's headquarters were at this time four and a half miles distant, near where the Vaughan road crosses Hatcher's Run; General Grant was at Dabney's Mills, about four miles off; General Sheridan was at Dinwiddie Court-House, about five and a half miles.

At 8 P.M. General Warren was advised by General Meade that Sheridan had been forced back to Dinwiddie [just what Warren had supposed when he sent Bartlett away] by a strong force of cavalry, supported by infantry, and as this left the rear of the Second and Fifth Corps open on the Boydton road, it would require great vigilance on the part of the commanders of those corps; that if Warren had sent the brigade down the Boydton road it should not go farther than Gravelly Run. General Pearson, in the meantime, had been compelled to stop at Gravelly Run on account of the bridge having been burned by the Confederates, and the stream was so much swollen by the recent rains as to render fording impossible.

At 8.20 P.M. General Warren wrote to General Webb, chief of staff, as follows:

"I sent General Bartlett out on the road running from the White Oak road and left him there. He is nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy communicating by that road to-night. I have about two regiments and the artillery to hold the Plank road toward Dinwiddie Court-House. It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and Dinwiddie Court-House, if Sheridan keeps fighting them, and I believe they will have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I

have to move to-night, I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. Does General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie Court-House?"

At 8.40 P.M. General Warren received the following from General Webb, marked "confidential," written at 8.30 P.M. :

"The probability is that we will have to contract our lines to-night. You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton Plank road, and to Gravelly Run. Humphreys and Ord along the run. Be prepared to do this at short notice."

This foreshadowing of events caused much regret in General Warren's mind, for he feared it would have the morale of giving a failure to the whole movement. He, therefore, at 8.40 sent the following by telegraph to General Webb :

"The line along the Plank road is very strong. One division with my artillery, I think, can hold it, if we are not threatened south of Gravelly Run, east of the Plank road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, and *let me move down and attack the enemy* at Dinwiddie Court-House on one side, and Sheridan on the other. On account of Bartlett's position they (the enemy) will have to make a considerable detour to reinforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless General Sheridan has been too badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of."

This offer of Warren's to go to Sheridan's assistance can be here noted, he having received no orders whatever up to this time to do so. His appeal, however, was in vain, for at 9.17 P.M. he was directed to draw back at once to his position within the Boydton Plank road and to send Griffin's division down the Plank road to Dinwiddie Court-House, to report to General Sheridan. This order General Warren proceeded to comply with at once, and as Griffin's troops

were picketing the front, and some time would elapse before Bartlett could be recalled, Ayres, who was nearest the Plank road, was directed to move first, then Crawford; and Griffin was ordered to draw in his pickets as soon as Bartlett joined, then retire to the Plank road, thence to Dinwiddie, and report to Sheridan.

At 9.50 P.M. General Warren received a telegram stating that the division to be sent to Sheridan must start at once. To this Warren replied that it would take so much time to get Griffin's command together that he had withdrawn the other divisions first, they being unengaged, stating that this would not retard Griffin as the bridge on the Plank road was broken, and he did not know how long it would take to repair it; that he had sent Captain Benyaurd of the engineers to examine it as soon as the first order was received, and that that officer reported it unfordable and a span of forty feet would be required to complete the bridge. "Nevertheless," said General Warren, "I will use everything I can get to make it passable by the time General Griffin's division reaches it."

Warren's command had no pontoons with it, and in order to facilitate the repair of the bridge over Gravelly Run, he directed a house to be torn down to supply materials necessary. At 10.15 P.M. the following telegram was received by General Warren, written at 9.40 P.M. :

"Since your dispatch of 8.20 P.M., the general commanding finds it impossible for Bartlett to join Griffin in time to move with any promptitude down the Boydton Plank road. He therefore directs that you send another good brigade to join Griffin in the place of Bartlett's, in this movement.

"Sheridan was attacked by five brigades from Gordon's Corps—three from Pickett's, possibly by two from Gordon's, one of them being Hoke's old brigade."

It was evident from the tenor of the above dispatch that Warren's previous message concerning the bridge at Gravelly Run had not at that time been received by the commanding general; but, deeming that it would show when it was that Bartlett could join Griffin before the bridge could be rendered passable, he made no change in his previous orders.

At 9.45 P.M. General Meade had submitted to General Grant Warren's proposition to take his corps and attack the Confederates in rear, without, however, stating that it was Warren's proposition. As a result of this, General Grant replied: "Let Warren move in the way you propose and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was at first directed." General Meade thereupon dispatched to Warren at 10.15 P.M., which was received at 10.50 P.M., to send Griffin by the Plank road, and to move the remainder of the corps by the road Bartlett was on, and strike the enemy in rear. Warren was at the same time informed that Sheridan was north of Dinwiddie Court-House near Dr. Smith's, and that the Confederates held the cross-roads at that point. Directions were given him to be very prompt in this movement and get the forks of the Brooks cross-roads, so as to open communication by it with the Boydton road.

This dispatch again showed that Warren's dispatch about the Gravelly Run bridge had not been received, and also exhibited complete ignorance of the position of the enemy along the road Bartlett was on, for

the Confederates not only held this road (as Warren knew from the report of Major Cope, who had accompanied Bartlett) on the south side of Gravelly Run, but also held a point on the road Bartlett was on where it joins the White Oak road, as had been ascertained by Major Gentry (of Warren's staff) while endeavoring to communicate with General Bartlett. The Major lost his orderly by capture while he narrowly escaped himself. But an hour and a half had passed since Warren had sent his order withdrawing his divisions to the Plank road, which had to be done by a single forest road with only one bridge across the branch of Gravelly Run.

Upon receiving General Meade's order at 10.50, General Warren ordered Ayres, instead of Griffin, to proceed to Dinwiddie, because, in retiring the corps to the Boydton road, Ayres' division would be the first to reach it, and hence less delay. At the same time Warren gave preliminary orders for the movements of Griffin's and Crawford's divisions; which when reached were found not to have yet taken up the line of march. The delay was principally caused by their proximity to the enemy. They could not be roused by drums and bugles and loud commands, as such was not permissible, but each order had to be communicated by each commander to his subordinate—from the general until it reached the non-commissioned officers, which latter could only arouse each man by shaking him. The obstacles to overcome in carrying out the numerous orders and changes of orders in the darkness of a stormy, starless night can only be surmised by those who have not had the experience.

Having made his dispositions, and sent off all his

staff officers in various directions to deliver his orders, General Warren telegraphed General Meade what he had done, and proceeded to make the necessary arrangements to move with his two divisions as soon as he could. The movement had to be made without artillery, or ambulances, or ammunition wagons, and instructions had to be given in the two latter cases for special provisions. Relations had to be established between General Humphreys, whose troops were required to take Warren's place, and the chief of the Fifth Corps artillery, whose batteries were to remain on the Plank road, and many other minor matters of detail had to be attended to.

At 1 A.M., April 1st, Warren received reports from the officers who had returned from carrying his orders of 11 P.M., and then learned the positions of Griffin and Crawford. At this time he received the reply to his message about the bridge at Gravelly Run, written by General Meade at 11.45 P.M., as follows :

“ A dispatch, partially transmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly Run is destroyed, and time will be required to rebuild it. If this is the case, would not time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker road? Time is of the utmost importance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without reinforcements, and guns are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get troops to him as soon as possible. If necessary, send troops by both roads and give up the rear attack. If Sheridan is not reinforced and compelled to fall back, he will retire by the Vaughan road.”

This dispatch created great anxiety on the part of General Warren, as the question as to what was best to do was left for him to determine. The night was far advanced ; the distance to Dinwiddie Court-House from Warren's troops was over ten miles by the Quaker road, and it was impossible for them to reach

the designated point before 8 A.M. By that time they would be of no use for the purpose of holding Dinwiddie. The most direct route for the rear attack was down the Plank road, where Ayres was marching. If Sheridan had to retire by the Vaughan road, General Warren knew that the rear of Humphreys' position would be exposed, and to send the division around by the Quaker road would break his command into three detachments, to say nothing of the fact that the men thus sent would be too much exhausted by their previous day's fight and night march to go upon the battle-field with anything like enthusiasm. General Warren, for these reasons, and to give the men as much rest as possible (this being their fourth night of almost continual deprivation of it), determined to abide by what had been done and keep Crawford and Griffin where they were until he had information that the bridge over the run had been repaired. In less than an hour after the reception of this dispatch (2.05 A.M.), Captain Benyaurd reported the bridge as practicable for infantry, and Ayres was crossing and advancing toward Dinwiddie. At 4.30 A.M. Warren received information that Ayres had communicated with Sheridan. Before daybreak his division was massed along the Brooke's road inside of Sheridan's lines.

Upon receiving the message announcing Ayres' juncture with Sheridan, Warren was preparing to join Griffin and Crawford and proceed across the country to J. Boisseau's, when he received the following dispatch from General Sheridan, written at 3 A.M. :

" I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court-House, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three-fourths of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying

so as to cover the road just this side of the Adams house, which leads across Chamberlain's Run or bed. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, have this division attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyway, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams' house, and if I do you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains I shall fight at daylight."

General Meade's dispatch to General Grant dated 6 A.M., April 1, 1865 (*Record*, p. 1254), concludes with the words, "Warren will be at or near Dinwiddie soon, with his whole corps, and will require further orders." The following dispatch (*Record*, p. 1288) was received by General Warren *about* 9 A.M. April 1st :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

" April 1, 6 A.M., 1865.

" Major-General WARREN :

" Gen'l Meade directs that in the movements *following your junction* with Gen'l Sheridan you will be under his orders, and will report to him. Please send a report of progress.

" ALEX. S. WEBB,

" B. M. G., C. O. S."

In the absence of *evidence* to the contrary, these dispatches certainly indicate that General Warren—*held under direct orders from General Meade up to 6 A.M. April 1st*—had met the intentions and expectations of his commanding officer, and had even exceeded, or anticipated them when his whole corps had joined and reported to General Sheridan before 7 A.M.—two hours before the receipt of the 6 A.M. order sent by General Webb.

The state of affairs mentioned in General Sheridan's dispatch promised brilliant results, if they had been correct ; but they were not. The Confederates occupied the position at J. Boisseau's, and instead of having a division *at that point* Bartlett's brigade comprised the force in its neighborhood and that was north of Gravelly Run, while the Confederates guarded the crossing of that stream. Even this force was withdrawn at 9.35 by order of General Meade. However, as this message from Sheridan was delivered at *twenty minutes* to 5 A.M., April 1st, Warren set Griffin in motion towards J. Boisseau's promptly at 5 o'clock, and as it was within an hour of daylight he remained behind with Crawford in anticipation that the Confederates would attack him upon withdrawal from their front.

In the meantime General Fitz Lee had been disturbed at the report that Union troops were at Gravelly Run, in rear of his position. Bartlett had driven the Confederate skirmishers across Gravelly Run and established his picket line by dark of the 31st, and Fitzhugh Lee, being made aware of this fact at 10 P.M. (a little after Bartlett's withdrawal) and supposing it was the advance of the Fifth Corps, commenced withdrawing from Sheridan's front, and by daylight all but his rear-guard was at Five Forks. Had Griffin and Crawford arrived at Gravelly Run at 12 midnight, or any hour after that, they could not have had a battle in the dark, for it was Sheridan's express orders to attack at daylight. At daylight there was no enemy to attack.

Warren had reinforced Sheridan according to orders. If the Confederates intended to fight, Ayres was there with his division to hold Pickett, and Sher-

idan was more than able to take care of the Confederate cavalry. To insure success in his rear attack, Warren did not desire, even if it had been possible, to be on the ground too soon. That would have defeated the object he had in making the rear attack, as we have already seen that the arrival of Bartlett's brigade at Gravelly Run alone, caused the Confederates to retire, as Warren had believed they would do, from General Sheridan's front. No one can dispute the soundness of the principle that the time to strike a blow at the flank or rear of an enemy is when that enemy has become thoroughly engaged in his front and withdrawal impossible. General Warren was accused of being slow on the night of March 31st. Let us see what he did: He moved three divisions from direct contact with the enemy, through a dense woods, over a single road without disaster; he tore down a house and built a forty-foot span of a bridge in the middle of a night so black you could not distinguish a friend from one end of a piece of timber to the other, and reinforced General Sheridan with a division of troops; he, without orders and governed by his soldierly instincts, sent a brigade to strike the rear of a partially successful enemy, and thus caused that enemy to retire from General Sheridan's front; under orders he subsequently withdrew that brigade between 10 P.M. and 12 midnight; then, before daylight, he gathered up his two remaining divisions and moved to the point whence he had been ordered to withdraw his brigade, arriving and reporting to General Sheridan at 7 A.M., April 1st. Surely he had done all that one man could do as a commander.

As we have stated before, General Warren started

his command at 5 A.M. April 1st, and moved across the country to Crump's, and thence to the forks of the road at J. Boisseau's. Here, at 7 A.M., the head of the column met Devin's division of cavalry. General Chamberlain was in the lead, and meeting General Sheridan, the latter asked where Warren was. To this Chamberlain replied that he thought Warren was at the rear of the column. "That's just where I should expect him to be!" said General Sheridan. We have noted before the reason for Warren being in rear while withdrawing his divisions in front of the enemy. The imputation cast on Warren's valor by this remark to one of Warren's subordinates could not be productive of good discipline, even if there had been a shadow of truth in it. As the writer well knows, personally—having seen him in action on many a battle-field—Warren was never the one to be in the rear when there was a fight going on. When any one wanted to find him during a battle, they had to go to the front line to do it.

Upon Warren reporting to General Sheridan, the latter directed him to halt his command at J. Boisseau's, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front when required. Crawford's division was at J. Boisseau's, near where the Gravelly Run church road joins the road to Dinwiddie Court-House; Griffin was across the road, half a mile south of Crawford; and Ayres was still about three fourths of a mile south of Griffin, at J. M. Brooks', at the junction of the road which leads from the Boydton Plank road to the main road from the Court-House to Five Forks. From Crawford's position to Five Forks was about four miles. General Mackenzie, who had reported

with his cavalry, was directed to rest at Dinwiddie Court-House until further orders.

THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS, VA.

General Merritt moved on the Confederate rear-guard at daylight on the 1st of April with the 1st and 3d divisions of cavalry. Custer's division was dismounted on the left, not being able to move through the timber with horses. Devin was on the right and Crook in reserve.

General Pickett, having moved his Confederate infantry back to Five Forks about midnight, proceeded at once to intrench himself along the White Oak road, extending about a mile west of Five Forks and about three-fourths of a mile east of it, with a short return about one hundred yards long to the left of it. W. H. F. Lee's division was on his right, along the west line of the Gilliam field, then followed in succession Corse's brigade, whose line lay along the north edge of the Gilliam field, Terry, Stuart, Ransom and Wallace's brigades, with Pegram's battalion of artillery on the line—three guns on Corse's right and three at the Five Forks, with McGregor's battery of four guns on the left. Munford's cavalry division (dismounted) was posted on the left, so as to cover the ground between Wallace's left and Hatcher's Run. It connected with Roberts' brigade, which picketed toward their main line of intrenchments. Rosser guarded the trains on the north side of Hatcher's Run, near the Ford road.


General Sheridan's plan of attack was to manœuvre as if to turn the enemy's right flank with his cavalry,

and assault the left with the Fifth Corps; General Merritt was to attack the intrenchments in his front as soon as the infantry became engaged. At 1 P.M. Warren was directed to bring up the Fifth Corps and form it on Devin's right, 600 or 800 yards south of the White Oak road. Captain Gillespie, engineer officer on General Sheridan's staff, had examined the ground where the Fifth Corps was formed. General Mackenzie had been sent from Dinwiddie Court-House to get possession of the White Oak road at a point about three miles east of Five Forks. He succeeded after a brisk skirmish with some Confederate cavalry, and moved down to the right of the Fifth Corps, having been ordered to move in conjunction with that corps, on its right, and gain the flank and rear of the enemy, and then to hold the Ford-road crossing of Gravelly Run, to cut off the retreat.

General Sheridan, in addition to informing Warren of the general plan of the battle, instructed him that the enemy was in line of battle along the White Oak road, his left resting not far from the crossing of Gravelly Run church road; that he (Warren) was to form his line so that he could strike with his right centre on the angle of the works and let his left engage the front; that he was to place one division behind his right to support the attack on the angle, and to give his line such a direction that its obliquity to the road would correspond with the supposed position of the Confederate works. The matter was talked over at length, and General Warren drew a diagram of the supposed plan, and wrote upon it the instructions he had received for the assault.

" April 1, 3 P.M.

" The following is the movement now about to be executed :



GENERAL WARREN'S DIAGRAM OF APRIL 1, 1865.

" The line will move forward as formed till it reaches the White Oak road, where it will swing round to the left perpendicular to the White Oak road. General Merritt's and General Custer's cavalry will charge the enemy's line as soon as the infantry get engaged. The cavalry is on the left of the infantry, except Mackenzie's, which is moving up the White Oak road from the right."

General Sheridan's order was to form the whole corps before advancing, so that all of it should move simultaneously. The number of lines and consequent extent of front he left Warren to decide, and he determined on an equivalent of three lines of battle for each of the front divisions, arranged so that each division was to place two brigades in front, each brigade in two lines of battle, and the 3d Brigade in two lines of battle behind the centre of the two front lines; the 3d Division to be posted in column of battalions in mass behind the right.

General Crawford's division arrived first upon the

ground, and was followed by General Griffin's—General Ayres arriving last. Crawford's division was placed on the right of the Gravelly Run church road, obliquely to that road, so that his centre would strike where it was supposed the angle was located, and be the first to reach the works. Griffin's division was placed in rear of Crawford's. Ayres' division, the smallest, was formed on the left of the road, and was to engage the enemy's front and prevent support being sent to the angle when Crawford should become engaged at that point. A copy of General Warren's diagram, with the instructions noted on it, was given to each division commander, and the plan explained to them verbally in addition. The line was to move forward, as formed, till it reached the White Oak road, when it was to swing around to the left until perpendicular to that road.

It must be remembered that the point where the corps formed was on rough wooded ground, cut up by numerous ravines, and out of sight of the Confederate works, so that the direction of advance ordered depended solely upon the roadways and the *supposed* location of the intrenchments along the White Oak road. It was about 2 P.M. when General Griffin received the order to move to Five Forks; he had to march four miles, which could not be done in less than one and a quarter hours; his division as well as the others were in position to advance by 4 P.M.; in other words, the entire corps was taken from the roadway and its lines of battle formed in three quarters of an hour. During the formation General Sheridan expressed to Warren the apprehension that the cavalry, which continued to fire on the enemy, would use up all their ammunition before the Fifth Corps would

be ready. Warren told him that they could not get in position before 4 P.M., but that he was ready to move forward at once with whatever of his troops were at hand and let the rest follow. This seems to have caused General Sheridan to make the statement that his impression was that Warren wanted the sun to go down. Warren's whole life is simply a refutation of this charge.

The order to advance was given at 4 P.M., as soon as Ayres' division was formed. A few minutes brought Warren's line of battle to the White Oak road, where it met the advance of Mackenzie's cavalry, and no intrenchments in sight. General Ayres' right crossed the road in the open field, and his division commenced changing front at once, so as to bring his line on the right flank of the enemy's position. The rapid change of front by General Ayres caused his right flank at first to get in advance of General Crawford's, owing to the greater distance the latter had to move. Finding that the enemy's fire came from the left, Ayres changed front by facing Dennison's brigade to the left and filing it to the left. In order not to lose time, he threw Winthrop's brigade, which was in support, into the front line on the left of Dennison. Gwyn's brigade, soon after engaging the enemy, found its flank in the air, and portions of it were very unsteady, but they subsequently moved up and bore their part in the action in a handsome manner. After this change of front, Ayres pushed forward and soon came upon the left flank of the Confederate position, which was thrown back at right angles with his main line and covered by a strong breastwork, screened by a dense undergrowth of pines, and about 100 yards in length. The angle

of this return was at least 700 or 800 yards west of Gravelly Run church road, instead of in the near vicinity of that road. Undaunted by the appearance of this position of the Confederate line, the charge with the bayonet was ordered by Ayres; the return of the works was captured, and with it 1000 prisoners and several battle-flags. Here General Sheridan halted him a short time.

Notwithstanding the diagram with instructions given him to swing around to the left on reaching the White Oak road, General Crawford bulged ahead in the direction in which he started, although he knew that he had passed the road several hundred yards. Warren at once sent word to Crawford to change direction to the left at right angles to the line he was following. General Sheridan, who was with Ayres' division through the greater part of the battle, also sent orders to Generals Griffin and Crawford to come in on Ayres' right. But a large part of both these divisions had entered the thick woods north of the White Oak road.

Anxious to have this turning movement executed as quickly as possible, not only to insure success in the movement, but to prevent Ayres' division from becoming isolated and hence in danger, General Warren rode off to find Crawford. Coming upon Colonel Kellogg, commanding Crawford's left, Warren directed him to halt and form his brigade at right angles to its original direction, for the division to align upon; and he then directed Colonel Coulter, who was following in reserve, to form on Colonel Kellogg. Searching through the dense woods for General Crawford, and sending repeated orders for him to change direction to the left and keep closed on Kellogg, so as to ad-

vance against the rear of the enemy, General Warren, returning to Colonel Kellogg's position to govern the movement, found that officer had been removed by one of General Sheridan's aides.

All of Warren's staff had now been sent to bring Griffin and Crawford to attack the enemy in rear, and many of General Sheridan's staff had been dispatched for the same purpose; and in spite of the tangled woods, Warren found Griffin (who had, with his usual soldierly instinct, halted his command as soon as he heard the heavy firing of Ayres), and directed him to attack Ransom's Confederate brigade, which, with part of Wallace's brigade, had formed a new line slightly intrenched, connected with and at right angles to their main line.¹ He then rode to General Ayres, and finding that he had carried the return, and was reforming his troops to face the new line taken up by the enemy, he started to find General Crawford, who had by this time passed through the Sydnor field, driving Munford's dismounted calvary westward before him.

In the meantime, Chamberlain had drawn his brigade into the open field by the left flank, and formed them facing towards where the firing was going on. Bartlett moved up with three regiments of the 3d Brigade immediately on Chamberlain's right, and Griffin's line of battle was soon changed

¹In a foot-note to his *Virginia Campaign*, p. 349, General Humphreys says: "A singular circumstance connected with this battle is the fact that General Pickett was all this time, and until near the close of the action, on the north side of Hatcher's Run, where he had heard no sound of the engagement, nor had he received any information concerning it. There was no Confederate commander on the field, otherwise Terry's (Mayo's) brigade would probably have been brought into action with Ransom's and Wallace's brigades when General Ransom formed his new line, or earlier still, when Ayres was moving to attack the return."

to the proper direction. While this was being done, however, Warren followed Crawford's track, now easily marked by his dead and wounded, and overtook him in the Young-Boisseau farm, with his command facing west and in good order, Colonel Kellogg's brigade having joined the division. First sending Colonel Spear to hold the Ford-road crossing of Hatcher's Run, Warren changed the direction of the division to the south.

General Sheridan had directed General Mackenzie to swing around on the right of the infantry, and gain the Ford road, so as to cut off the enemy's escape that way. As General Mackenzie did not succeed in getting there till after the infantry had gained the road, Warren asked him the nature of his operations. He informed Warren that in attempting to execute his order he found himself north of Hatcher's Run, and moving directly away from the battle, which seemed heavy. He therefore (as General Griffin had done) moved back towards the White Oak road, so as to take part in the action. Warren at once directed Mackenzie to swing round so as to face southward, and join in the movement against the enemy; after which he led Crawford along the Ford road toward the rear of the enemy's lines, meeting, however, at the edge of the woods on the south side of the farm, a sharp fire from a line which General Pickett, who had but just reached the field, had formed across the Ford road with Mayo's Confederate brigade, some of Ransom's troops (just driven from the southwest corner of the Sydnor field by Griffin in his advance), and McGregor's four guns, which had been drawn back from the return on the left. The resistance here was brief, and the Ford-road intrenchments were carried with the capture of the guns.

General Griffin had in the meanwhile advanced in a southwesterly direction from the point where he had halted, and, joining the right of Ayres, both divisions pushed along in rear of the line of intrenchments, stubbornly confronted with Ransom's and Wallace's brigades; but when Crawford had gained his success, everything began to give way behind the Confederate lines, and as they fell back from the Young-Boisseau fields, Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade of Union cavalry charged the works in front and carried the lines, capturing 3 guns, 2 battle-flags, and over 1000 prisoners, Ayres and Griffin meeting the cavalry as the Five Forks were gained possession of.

General Custer's division of cavalry, on the left, in the assault, had but one brigade dismounted. With that he had kept up a constant fire upon the Confederate lines. With his other two mounted brigades he charged W. H. F. Lee's right, and a spirited encounter took place; but Lee held his position. Devin's division had advanced upon the enemy's front when the Fifth Corps moved to the attack, and had kept up a constant fire. Immediately after the forks had been gained, Warren directed Crawford to change front again to the right, and march toward the sound of the firing so as again to take the enemy in flank and rear, and this he at once did. He also directed a cavalry brigade, which had been kept mounted, and came rapidly along the Ford road toward him, not to move along it farther, but to file to their left and proceed in the direction Crawford had taken. Warren then passed down the Ford road, reached the forks, and turned to the right along the White Oak road. Arriving at the point marked *E* on the diagram, he found that the advance there was stayed by the enemy.

to General Pickett, having seen that the line on the
h^ord road could not be maintained, gave directions
e to General Corse to form a line along the west of the
t Gilliam field at right angles to the main intrench-
ments, and extending into the woods to the north.
This was the last stand. Though the orders had
been not to halt, and many officers were then urging
their men forward, the disordered troops, not feeling
the influence of their commanders, continued to fire
without advancing. Accompanied by Captain Ben-
yaurd, of the engineers and others of his staff, General
Warren rode out to the front and called to those near
him to follow. This was immediately responded to.
Everywhere along the front the color-bearers and
officers sprang out, and without more firing the men
advanced, capturing all the Confederates remaining.
In this last charge Warren's horse was fatally shot
within a few paces of the line where the Confederates
made the last stand, an orderly by his side was killed,
and Colonel Richardson, of the 7th Wisconsin, who
sprang between Warren and the enemy, was severely
wounded. Warren was now afoot, and had the bullet
which pierced his noble horse pierced the heart of the
man, it would have been a trifle to the missile which
pierced his brain an hour later.

At this point and without General Warren's knowl-
edge, General Sheridan in person directed General
Griffin to take command of the Fifth Corps and push
the enemy down the White Oak road. Griffin at
once directed his division commanders to pursue the
fleeing enemy, and the pursuit was kept up until after
dark, when the command was halted, the cavalry hav-
ing gone ahead in the pursuit, and when the corps
was halted were out of sight and hearing.

After the last of the enemy had been captured, Warren sent Bankhead, his inspector, to report the result to General Sheridan, and receive instructions. He returned with the reply that his instructions had been sent. At 7 P.M. they reached Warren, and were as follows :

“Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps, is relieved from duty, and will report at once for orders to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the United States.”

If a thunderbolt had descended from a cerulean sky, the effect could not have produced a greater sensation. Little dreaming that his relief from the command of his old corps had ever been thought of before this, he went to General Sheridan and asked him to reconsider his action. What was the reply he obtained ?

“Reconsider ? H——! I don't reconsider my determination.”

With the flush of victory on his brow, with the end of the struggle so near, with the faint rays of the dawn of peace already gleaming in the sanguinary sky, this noble warrior was brushed aside like a fly from a map and sent into what was an undeniable, if not apparently dishonorable, seclusion.

The Fifth Corps alone in this battle captured 3244 men, with their arms, 11 regimental colors, 4 guns with their caissons, and lost in killed and wounded 634 men, of which 300 were in General Crawford's division, 205 in General Ayres' division, and 125 in General Griffin's division. The Confederate loss, exclusive of the dead, was about 4500 prisoners, as well as 13 colors and 7 guns.

Brevet Brigadier-General Frederick Winthrop, Colonel of the 5th New York Vols. (Captain 12th U. S. Inf.) was mortally wounded at the head of his command, while making the successful assault on the left of the Confederate line. General Warren says : " His conduct had always been distinguished for gallantry of action and coolness of thought, and no one carried with him more of the confidence and inspiration that sustains a command in trying scenes."

At 7 P.M. April 1st, Captain Sawyer, with two companies of the 1st Maine Sharpshooters, was sent to report to Major Ellis Spear, who accompanied him to a creek nearly two miles in rear of the line of the regiment, with instructions to take possession of and hold a bridge, if possible. Captain Howes' company was deployed as skirmishers and advanced to the bank of the creek, when it received a volley from some earthworks on the opposite bank, about twenty-five yards distant. Skirmishing was kept up for nearly an hour, about which time General Mackenzie rode up and said they were shooting our own men, and advised Sawyer to send one company across, which Sawyer refused to do, having seen the enemy himself. General Mackenzie then advised Captain Howes to send some men across, the enemy having acknowledged some halloos and saying they were the "9th New York Cavalry." Sawyer again refused to send men across, feeling sure the force were those of the enemy. In the meantime two sergeants (unknown to him at the time) went across and were captured by Rosser's cavalry. The detachment was relieved about 10 P.M. by General Mackenzie and joined the regiment.

GENERAL WARREN'S REMOVAL.

That the removal of General Warren from his command caused great surprise to the army at large there can be no doubt, and the question as to why he was removed ever remained unanswered.

In the *History of the Second Army Corps* the author, General Francis A. Walker, referring to the removal, remarks :

“What is infinitely to be regretted is, that the brilliant and fortunate successor of Grant and Sherman did not, when the heat of action had passed, when the passions of the moment had cooled, himself seize the opportunity which his own power and fame afforded him, to take the initiative in vindicating the reputation of one of the bravest, brightest, and most spirited of the youthful commanders of the Union armies. It would not have diminished the renown which Sheridan won at Yellow Tavern, Cedar Creek, and Five Forks, had he welcomed an early occasion to repair the terrible injury which one hasty word, in the heat of battle, had done to the position, the fame, and the hopes of the man who snatched Little Round Top from the hands of the exulting Confederates.”

Neither General Adam Badeau, sixteen years after the battle of Five Forks, nor General Grant five years later, nor General Sheridan two years later still, seem to have been able to comprehend the fact stated by General Walker ; and yet General Badeau, unquestionably speaking for and of his principles, with due rhetorical introduction, announces that “*no one but a hero is fit to command armies.*”

Imaginings of Deity take many an awkward and grotesque shape, while worship advances from fetichism to enlightened adoration, and between the denial of the valet and the verdict of history there are

many varying and often contradictory applications of the title "hero." In the quotation just made, General Walker has suggested one line of thought connecting generalship with heroism. General Badeau, more in accord with so-called practical conceptions, somewhat limits his ideal by the dogma, "in military matters nothing which is successful is wrong." The words of the late Mr. Charles Gibbons, of Philadelphia, are suggestive. He says :

"Heroism is not an uncommon virtue. There are others more rare and no less essential in forming the character of a great soldier. All American soldiers, North and South, have proved themselves heroes, but we cannot expect to find in every one a Thomas, a Washington, or a Meade. Such men are not common in any country. They seem to be set for special occasions and as examples. They do not thrust themselves into notice. They do not come swaggering into the history of the times. They are not vainglorious nor envious. They 'bear their faculties' meekly and are guided by a better cynosure than their own personal renown."

It is purposed to glance briefly at the account given by General Sheridan of the part taken by General Warren with the Fifth Army Corps in the battle of Five Forks. In his account of the operations of March 30, 1865, his first reference to General Warren (vol. ii., p. 146, *Personal Memoirs*) mentions the hasty call he made at the headquarters of that officer in the afternoon, after his visit to General Grant's headquarters, and states that he found General Warren "speaking rather despondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by the depressing weather." The remark is worthy of note only because it is the first of a series of statements. Considering the condition of affairs at General Grant's

headquarters, as described by General Sheridan, there is not much to occasion surprise or comment in the statement. General Sheridan continues: "From Warren's headquarters I returned by the Boydton road to Dinwiddie Court-House, *fording Gravelly Run with ease.*" The brevity and, in connection with succeeding assertions, the evident intent of this statement call to mind certain portions of the evidence given before the court of inquiry ultimately convened as one of the results of the operations under consideration. On pages 1034-5 of the Proceedings of the Warren Court of Inquiry, the following is recorded in the testimony of General Grant:

"Cross-examination by Mr. Stickney, counsel for the applicant:

"Q. When you say 'previous conduct,' you mean, of course, your understanding of his previous conduct? A. Certainly; of course, always my understanding.

"Q. You would admit quite as readily as any other man in the world that you might have made a mistake in your judgment on those past matters? A. *I am not ready to admit that; no, sir.*

"Q. What you claim is not that you cannot make a mistake, but that you did not make a mistake? A. I have no doubt I have made many mistakes, *but not in that particular.*

"Q. In this particular you do not think you did make one? A. No."

On page 57 of the same record, General Sheridan being under examination by Mr. Stickney, we find:

"Q. What papers have you referred to in making up this statement which was read before the court? A. I have taken copies from the original papers in the War Department.

"Q. Have you had or used any other papers than these copies now in your possession in preparing your present statement? A.

None that I know of, except an extract from the report of General Pickett.

"Q. Did you have a pamphlet of General Warren, among other things? A. *Yes, sir ; I did not consult it ; I never read it.*

"Q. You did not use that then? A. *No, sir.*"

The insinuation in the manner of General Sheridan's statement that he forded Gravelly Run with ease late in the afternoon of March 30th might mislead many who are not particular in noticing dates. It was indelibly in evidence before the court of inquiry (*Record*, pp. 155-7) that *on the night of March 31st*, Gravelly Run, at the crossing of the Boydton road, had been swollen by rain till it was flowing bank-full and was not fordable for infantry, but that the necessary bridging was pushed with such energy that the march of General Ayres' division was in no way retarded thereby. Of this fact General Sheridan could not plead ignorance.

After a characteristic account of the action between his cavalry command and the forces under General Pickett on March 31st, General Sheridan (vol. ii., p. 154, *Personal Memoirs*) continues :

"By following¹ me to Dinwiddie, the enemy's infantry had completely isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a rare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired, and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the first report of my situation. General Meade appreciated it too from the information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army headquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to General Grant :

¹ General Meade's dispatch to Warren says: "Dispatch from General Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie. . . . *This leaves your rear and that of the Second Corps on the Boydton Plank road open, and will require great vigilance on your part.*"

“ ‘ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“ ‘ March 31, 1865—9.45 P.M.

“ ‘ Lieutenant-General GRANT :

“ ‘ Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line of the Boydton Plank road and the refusal along with it. Bartlett’s brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau’s, running north, where it crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road. Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening Sheridan in rear at Dinwiddie and move on the enemy’s rear with the other two.

“ ‘ G. G. MEADE, Major-General.’

“ ‘ An hour later General Grant replied in these words :

“ ‘ HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ ‘ DABNEY’S MILLS, March 31, 1865—10.15 P.M.

“ ‘ Major-General MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac :

“ ‘ Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first directed.

“ ‘ U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.’

“ ‘ These two dispatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me. . . .”

In explanation of General Grant’s reference to General Griffin, General Sheridan adds, in a foot-note :
 “ ‘ Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the Boydton road to protect his rear.”

This shows a very imperfect rendering of General Meade’s dispatch of 9.45 P.M.

About 5 P.M. of March 31st, General Warren received from General Meade’s headquarters a dispatch, dated 4.30 P.M., in which he was directed to secure his position on the White Oak road ; informed that it was “ ‘ believed that Sheridan is pushing up ” ; and authorized, if he thought it worth while, to push a small

force down the White Oak road, to "try to communicate with Sheridan; but they must take care not to fire into his advance." Before this dispatch was received, the attention of General Warren, and of his command, had been attracted by the sound of General Sheridan's engagement; and, as the firing was heavy, and evidently receding in the direction of Dinwiddie Court-House, General Warren, not in consequence of the dispatch, but, to use his own expression, in consequence of his duty as a soldier to send reinforcements, if he could, in the direction of a portion of our army that was evidently hard-pressed, *on his own responsibility ordered General Bartlett to march at once toward the firing, and attack the enemy in the rear.* (*Record*, pp. 232, 720, 768, 1175.) General Bartlett obeyed this order promptly.

At 5.45 P.M., General Warren received another dispatch from General Meade's headquarters, dated 5.15 P.M., directing him to "push a brigade down the White Oak road *to open it for General Sheridan*, and support the same if necessary."

General Warren answered by the following report :

" 5:50 P.M., March 31.

" General WEBB :

" I have just seen an officer and a sergeant from General Sheridan, who were cut off in an attack by the enemy and escaped. From what they say, our cavalry was attacked about noon by cavalry and infantry and rapidly driven back, two divisions, Crook's and Devin's, being engaged. The firing seems to recede from me toward Dinwiddie. I have sent General Bartlett and my escort in that direction, but I think they cannot be in time.

" *I hear cannonading that I think is from near Dinwiddie C. H.*

" Resp'y,

" G. K. WARREN, Maj.-Gen."

This was received at General Meade's headquarters probably about 6.20 P.M., and was undoubtedly the subject of General Meade's missing dispatch of 6.35 P.M. to General Grant, the receipt of which is acknowledged in General Grant's telegram of 8.45 P.M. to General Meade. Captain M. V. Sheridan (*Record*, p. 212) testified that he reached General Meade's headquarters, en route to General Grant with General Sheridan's message, about 7.30 P.M., and this agrees with General Meade's dispatch to General Grant, dated 7.40 P.M. March 31st. It is evident, therefore, that General Warren, at 5.50 P.M., sent to the headquarters of the armies the first information of General Sheridan's discomfiture, and, *at the same time, gave assurance of aid promptly attempted in the most effectual manner.*

About 6.30 P.M., General Bartlett having been gone more than an hour, General Warren received from General Webb a dispatch saying :

"A staff officer of General Merritt has made a report that the enemy has penetrated between Sheridan's main command and your position. This is a portion of Pickett's division. Let the force ordered to move out the White Oak road move down the Boynton Plank road as promptly as possible."

To this General Warren at once replied :

"I have ordered General Pearson, with three regiments that are now on the Plank road, right down toward Dinwiddie C. H. *I will let Bartlett work and report result, as it is too late to stop him.*"

At 8 P.M., General Warren received the following order from General Meade :

"Dispatch from General Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie C. H. by strong force of cavalry, supported by in-

fantry. *This leaves your rear and that of the Second Corps in the Boydton Plank road open, and will require great vigilance on your part. If you have sent the brigade down the Boydton Plank it should not go farther than Gravelly Run, as I don't think it will render any service but to protect your rear.*"

At 8.20 P.M., General Warren replied as follows :

"I sent General Bartlett out on the road running from the White Oak road and left him there ; he is nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy communicating by that road to-night. I have about two regiments and the artillery to hold the Plank road toward Dinwiddie C. H.

"It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and Dinwiddie if Sheridan keeps fighting them, and I believe they will have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I have to move to-night I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. Does General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie C. H.?"

At 8.40 P.M., General Warren received the following "confidential" dispatch :

"The probability is that we will have to contract our line to-night. You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton Plank road and to Gravelly Run. Humphreys and Ord along the run. Be prepared to do this on short notice."

In answer General Warren sent the following :

"8.40 P.M., March 31, 1865.

"General WEBB, Chief of Staff :

"The line along the Plank road is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I think, can hold it. If we are not threatened south of Gravelly Run, east of the Plank road, General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely and *let me move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie on one side and Sheridan the other.* From Bartlett's position they will have to make a considerable detour to reinforce their troops at that point from the north.

"Unless Sheridan has been too badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of.

"Respectfully,

"G. K. WARREN, M. G."

At 8.50 P.M., General Meade received instructions from General Grant to draw the Fifth Corps back to its position on the Boydton road, and send at once a division of the corps down that road to the relief of General Sheridan. At 9.17 P.M., General Warren received his orders from General Meade for drawing back and instructions to send General Griffin's division to General Sheridan. At 9.35 P.M., the orders were issued to the divisions of the corps. At 9.50 P.M., General Warren was notified that the division intended for General Sheridan's relief should start at once. At 10 P.M., he reported to General Meade the conditions of the withdrawal of his command from the White Oak road, and that, *in order to save time*, General Ayres' division would be sent to Dinwiddie Court-House in place of General Griffin's. About 10.15 P.M., General Meade confirmed this substitution of Ayres for Griffin, having, in the meantime, sent the 9.45 P.M., dispatch to General Grant, suggesting the movement indicated without reference to General Warren's dispatch of 8.40 P.M.

On p. 69, vol. ii., *Personal Memoirs*, General Sheridan, again referring to his repulse on this same March 31st, states:

"The turn of events finally brought me the Fifth, *after my cavalry, under the most trying difficulties, had drawn the enemy from his works.* . . ."

But in his sworn statement, submitted in writing to the Warren Court of Inquiry (*Record*, p. 51) he expresses it:

"During the 31st of March, *my cavalry had been driven back from Five Forks* to within a short distance of Dinwiddie Court-House."

We find further, in General Sheridan's testimony relating to the battle of Five Forks (*Record*, pp. 100, 101) the following :

"Q. And what do you claim was Warren's sin of omission or commission in relation to that going off to the right? A. If there was anybody in the wide world that should have made an effort to prevent that, General Warren was the man.

"Q. Undoubtedly. *Now do you know whether he made any effort or not?* A. *I don't know; I did not realize any.*

"Q. Did you ask him what he had done? A. *I could not find him.*

"Q. *Did you ask him afterwards when you did find him?* A. *No, sir.*

"Q. Did you ask *any one* at the time you relieved him? A. *No, sir.*

"Did you try to get any information of any one at the time you relieved him? A. *No, sir; I had all I wanted.*"

For the sake of brevity, we quote the words of Mr. Stickney (*Record*, pp. 1404-6) addressed to the court :

"Now, the most singular feature of this whole case, the most remarkable point in it, is the fact that a witness comes here and says : 'Although I was in command of the United States forces in the field on that day, I saw only the attack of General Ayres on that earthwork at the end; I know nothing of Griffin's movements; I know nothing of Crawford's movements; I do not know that Crawford became engaged with Munford, or that he had any fighting at any point in the woods; *I do not know anything of what the commander of the Fifth Corps did during the operations of that day;* and I cannot give,'—for those are his words—'*I cannot give any account of my own personal movements after Ayres' assault.* Yet I have had the glory of that day for sixteen years; and I still claim it. . . .' If ever a soldier in military history has taken such a position before, it is beyond my knowledge. If any enemy of General Sheridan should tell such a story against him, no one would credit it; but, it is the statement of the man himself as to his own movements, made before a military court. And there we must leave him."

After repeated applications, with as many failures, for a court of inquiry, it was not until November 18, 1879, that General Warren again urged his request through the Hon. George W. McCreary, Secretary of War. This application was endorsed as follows :

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 2, 1879.

“ The Hon. Secretary of War having asked my opinion of the enclosed appeal, I must say that the long-endured imputations on the fair fame of Gen. Warren warrants the court of inquiry he has repeatedly asked for, and which has thus far been denied him.

“ W. T. SHERMAN,

“ General.”

On December 9, 1879, the order convening the court was issued by the Adjutant-General.

The opinions of that court, as finally laid before the President of the United States, are as follows :

“ Report.

“ The First Imputation is found in an extract from General Grant's report, on page 1137 of the report of the Honorable Secretary of War to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, as follows (see also *Record*, page 48):

“ ‘ On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it in turn forced back upon the third division ; when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained.’

"Opinion.

"There seems to be *no evidence that General Warren, on the morning of March 31st, or at any other time, reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road except in his dispatch (V.) of 4 P.M. March 30th, already referred to, and the movement suggested in that was practically set aside by General Grant's dispatch (VIII.) of March 30th, heretofore quoted. General Warren's report, in his dispatch (LXXXIV.) of 9.40 A.M. March 31st, quoted above, that he had given orders to drive the enemy's pickets off the White Oak road or develop what force of the enemy held it, could not be fairly construed as being able to take possession of it.*

"With regard to that portion of the imputation contained in the statement that General Warren *was directed to take possession* of the White Oak road, the following dispatch from General Meade is the only one that can bear that construction :

"LXXXV.

' U. S. M. T.

' HDQRS. ARMIES, U. S.

' 10:30 A.M., March 31, 1865.

'Nunan.

'To. Maj.-Gen. G. K. WARREN :

'Your dispatch giving Ayres' position is received. General Meade directs that *should you determine by your reconnaissance that you can get possession of and hold the White Oak road, you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations to-day.*

'ALEX. S. WEBB,

'Bv't. M. G., C. of S.'

"And the evidence before the court shows that this order was not received by General Warren till *after* the fighting that resulted from the attempted reconnaissance had begun.

"It is in evidence by Ayres' and Crawford's testimony that General Warren had in his advance *two divisions*, though the testimony does not clearly show how long before the attack of the enemy upon Ayres the division of Crawford reached him.

"Griffin's division was held *in reserve* along the branch of Gravelly Run nearest to and northwest from the Boydton Plank road, and *it may have been so held to carry out the intentions of the following dispatch from General Meade's headquarters :*

“ ‘ LXXIX.

‘ U. S. M. T.

‘ Nunan, 8.30 A.M.

‘ HDQRS. A. OF P., 8.25, March 31, 1865.

‘ To Maj.-Gen. WARREN :

‘ There is firing along Humphreys’ front. The Maj.-Gen’l com’d’g desires you be ready to send your reserve, if it should be called for, to support Humphreys.

‘ There will be no movement of troops to-day.

‘ A. S. WEBB,

‘ B. M. G.’

‘ Rec. 8.40 A.M.—G. K. W.’

“ The court is further of the opinion that, considering the Fifth Corps constituted the extreme left wing of the armies operating against Richmond, and that the corps was in a delicate position and liable to be attacked at any moment, of which liability General Warren had been repeatedly warned, he should have been with his advanced divisions, guiding and directing them, and that he should have started earlier to the front than he did, and not have waited at the telegraph office to keep in communication with General Meade’s headquarters, unless he had direct orders that morning so to do, which, however, does not appear in the evidence.”

“ *Second Imputation.*

“ The Second Imputation is found in the following extract from General Sheridan’s report of May 15, 1865 (See *Record*, pp. 21 and 48), as follows :

“ ‘ . . . Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy’s infantry in front of the Dinwiddie Court-House.’

“ *Opinion.*

“ It is supposed ‘ that the expectations of the lieutenant-general,’ referred to in the imputation, are those expressed in his dispatch to General Sheridan of 10.45 P.M. of March 31, 1865, as follows :

‘ CLXXIX.

‘ DABNEY'S MILLS,

‘ March 31, 1865, 10.45 P.M.

‘ Major-General SHERIDAN :

‘ The Fifth Corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent Mackenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road. All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.

‘ You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you and use it to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day.

‘ U. S. GRANT,

‘ Lieutenant-General.’

In which he says, ‘ All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.’ If this supposition be correct, the court is of opinion, considering the condition of the roads and of the surrounding country, over part of which the troops had to march, the darkness of the night, the distance to be travelled, and the hour at which the order for the march reached General Warren, 10.50 P.M., that *it was not practicable for the Fifth Corps to have reached General Sheridan at 12 o'clock on the night of March 31st.*

“ Notwithstanding that dispositions suitable for the contingency of Sheridan's falling back from Dinwiddie might well have occupied and perplexed General Warren's mind during the night, the court is of the opinion that he should have moved the two divisions by the Crump road in obedience to the orders and expectations of his commander, upon whom alone rested the responsibility of the consequences.

“ It appears from the dispatches and General Warren's testimony, that neither Generals Meade, Sheridan, nor Warren expressed an intention of having this column attack before daylight.

“ The court is further of the opinion that General Warren should have started with two divisions, as directed by General Meade's dispatch (CIV., heretofore quoted), as early after its receipt, at 10.50 P.M., as he could be assured of the prospect of Ayres' departure down the Boydton Plank road, and should have advanced on the Crump road as far as directed in that dispatch, or as far as might be practicable or necessary to fulfil General

Meade's intention ; whereas the evidence shows that he did not start until between five and six o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April, and did not reach J. Boisseau's with the head of the column till about seven o'clock in the morning.

"The dispatches show that Generals Meade and Warren anticipated a withdrawal during the night of the enemy's forces fronting General Sheridan, which was rendered highly probable from the known position in their rear of a portion of the Fifth Corps (Bartlett's brigade) at J. Boisseau's, and the event justified the anticipation."

"Third Imputation.

"The Third Imputation is found in an extract from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 (see *Record*, pp. 21 and 48), as follows :

"' . . . General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed.'

"On the afternoon of April 1st, the Fifth Corps was massed as follows : Crawford's and Griffin's divisions at the forks of the Crump road and the main road from Dinwiddie Court-House to Five Forks, and Ayres' division on the Brooke's road, about one fourth of a mile east from the forks of that road and the road to Five Forks.

"The distance from the position of Griffin and Crawford to the place of formation of the Fifth Corps, near Gravelly Run church, was about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and the length of the corps when spread out in column of route would be about $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles. The last file of the column required as much time to reach the place of formation as it would have taken to march about five miles.

"General Warren received his orders near Gravelly Run church to move up his corps at 1 P.M., and it took some time to communicate those orders to the divisions and for the movement to begin.

"The route to the place of formation was along a narrow road, very muddy and slippery, somewhat encumbered with wagons and led horses of the cavalry corps, and the men were fatigued. The testimony of brigade and division commanders is to the effect that the corps in line of march was well closed up, and that no unnecessary delay was incurred.

"The corps reached its destination, and was formed ready to advance against the enemy about 4 P.M.

"It is in evidence that General Warren remained near Gravelly Run church, directing the formation, explaining the mode of attack to the division and brigade commanders, with sketches prepared for the purpose.

"General Warren also repeatedly sent out staff officers to the division commanders in order to expedite the march.

"Opinion.

"The court is of the opinion that *there was no unnecessary delay in this march of the Fifth Corps*, and that General Warren took the usual methods of a corps commander to prevent delay.

"The question regarding General Warren's manner appears to be too intangible and the evidence on it too contradictory for the court to decide, separate from the context, that he appeared to wish 'the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack would be completed'; *but his actions, as shown by the evidence, do not appear to have corresponded with such wish, if ever he entertained it.*"

"Fourth Imputation.

"The Fourth Imputation is found in an extract from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 (see *Record*, pp. 22 and 48), as follows :

"During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire.'

"When the Fifth Corps moved up to the attack, General Sheridan said to General Ayres: 'I will ride with you.' General Warren was on the left of Crawford's division, between Crawford and Ayres.

"When General Ayres' command struck the White Oak road it received a fire in flank from the enemy's 'return' nearly at right angles to the road. He changed front immediately at right angles and faced the 'return,' his right receiving a fire from Munford's Confederate division of dismounted cavalry dis-

tributed along the edge of the woods to the north of the White Oak road. There was some confusion, which was immediately checked by the exertions of General Sheridan, General Ayres, and other officers.

“The evidence shows that General Warren was observant of Ayres, because he sent orders to Winthrop’s reserve brigade to form on the left of Ayres’ new line.

“This necessary change of front of Ayres increased the interval between him and Crawford on his right; the latter was marching without change of direction until, as he expressed it, he would clear the right of Ayres, when he was also to change front to the left.

“At this moment, Warren, who saw that Crawford, with Griffin following, was disappearing in the woods to the north of the White Oak road, sent a staff officer to Griffin to come as quickly as he could to sustain Ayres; went himself to the left brigade of Crawford, and caused a line to be marked out facing to the west, directing the brigade commander to form on it; then went into the woods and gave orders to the right brigade of Crawford to form on the same line. When he returned to the open ground the brigade he had directed to change front had disappeared, as appears by the evidence, in consequence of orders given by an officer of General Sheridan’s staff. General Warren sent repeated orders by staff-officers to both Griffin and Crawford to change direction, and *went himself to both*, and finally by these means corrected, as far as was possible under the circumstances, the divergence of these two divisions.

“It appears from evidence that these two divisions were operating in the woods and over a difficult country, and received a fire in their front from the dismounted cavalry of Munford, posted in the woods to the north of the White Oak road, which led to the belief, for some time, that the enemy had a line of battle in front; and this may furnish one reason why it was so difficult at first to change their direction to the proper one.

“*Opinion.*”

“General Warren’s attention appears to have been drawn, almost immediately after Ayres received the flank fire from the ‘return’ and his consequent change of front, to the probability

of Crawford with Griffin diverging too much from and being separated from Ayres, and *by continuous exertions of himself and staff substantially remedied matters*; and the court thinks that this was *for him the essential point to be attended to, which also exacted his whole efforts to accomplish.*"

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EVACUATION OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG—
THE PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY—THE
SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX, VA.—DISBANDMENT
OF FIFTH CORPS.

WHEN the last gun was fired at Five Forks it sounded the death-knell of the Confederacy!

As soon as General Grant learned definitely of the great success over the Confederates at Five Forks, he directed Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke, commanding the Twenty-fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps, respectively, to assault the Confederate works at 4 A.M. April 2d. Upon carrying the works they were to move towards Petersburg. The Second Corps was to be thrown forward in the same direction. General Sheridan was to start at daylight and sweep along the White Oak road and all north of it to Petersburg.

General Wright attacked with the Sixth Corps at 4 A.M., as directed, carrying everything before him, taking possession of the enemy's strong line of works and capturing many guns and prisoners. After carrying the line in his front, and reaching the Boydton road, Wright turned to his left and swept down the Confederate intrenchments until near Hatcher's Run

where, meeting the head of the Twenty-fourth Corps, he retraced his steps and advanced on the Boydton road towards Petersburg, encountering the Confederates in an inner line of works immediately around the city.

General Parke's attack was also successful, carrying the enemy's lines and capturing guns and prisoners; but the position of the Ninth Corps, confronting that portion of the Confederate line the longest held and most strongly fortified, was such that it could not advance far without coming upon the second and inner line, which it was found impossible to carry.

As soon as Wright's success was reported, General Humphreys was ordered to advance with all the Second Corps, except Miles' division, which had been sent to report to General Sheridan. Hays advanced in front of the Crow house, capturing a redoubt with 1 gun and 100 prisoners. About 7.30 Mott captured the intrenched picket line at the Burgess' Mill works, and by 8.30 the Confederates were moving rapidly out of the intrenchments by the flank, when Mott sharply attacked them. Mott and Hayes were then ordered to advance on the Boydton road towards Petersburg and connect on the right with the Sixth Corps. Overtaking Miles' division near Sutherland Station, General Humphreys found that it had just come up with the Confederate brigades under General Heth, which were forced to halt and give battle. After two unsuccessful attacks, in which he was repulsed by the Confederates, Miles finally, at 3 P.M., charged the enemy again, this time with complete success, sweeping down inside his intrenchments, capturing 600 prisoners, 1 battle-flag, and 2 guns, the Confederates retreating toward the Appomattox River.

At his own request, General Gibbon, after the Sixth Corps had swept the outer line of works to Hatcher's Run, was permitted to pass the Sixth with his corps (Twenty-fourth), and he advanced to the front of the Confederate lines, closing on the Appomattox River, near the Whitworth house, while the Sixth pressed forward on Gibbon's right. General Wright's troops were so exhausted by this time, having been eighteen hours under arms, that it was considered unadvisable to attack until the next morning.

The main line of intrenchments closing upon the Appomattox west of Petersburg ran along the east bank of Old Town or Indian Town Creek. In front of this line on the opposite side of the creek, about 1000 yards distant, were some advanced works, the most important of which were Forts Gregg and Whitworth, the former enclosed at the rear with a ditch eight or ten feet deep, of about the same width, and the parapet of corresponding height and thickness. Whitworth was of the same dimensions, but open at the gorge.

As soon as Ord's and Wright's commands arrived before these works, Foster's division of Gibbon's corps was ordered to charge them. Notwithstanding the difficulties attending an assault of works of this character, particularly under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, Foster gallantly carried both works, capturing 2 guns, several colors, and about 300 prisoners.

The Fifth Corps, in the meantime, had remained on the battle-field of Five Forks until the afternoon of the 2d, engaged in caring for the wounded, burying the dead, and destroying the old arms, etc., cap-

tured with the prisoners. General Griffin then received orders to move it by the Church road toward Petersburg. Bartlett's (formerly Griffin's) division led the column, with Chamberlain's brigade in advance. Skirmishers and flankers were thrown out and soon came upon the enemy. Colonel Sniper, who was in command of the skirmish line, attacked with vigor and soon dislodged the Confederates. At Church-road crossing on the South Side Railroad, Chamberlain captured a train of cars which happened to be passing. Crossing the railroad he was then directed to push out if possible to the Cox road, which crossed the direction of the corps at nearly right angles. The Confederates here displayed some opposition with about 500 dismounted cavalymen, but Chamberlain formed two battalions of the 198th Pennsylvania in line and threw forward Townsend's regiment of Gregory's brigade (which had reported to him for duty) into a piece of woods to protect his right, and in this order pushed rapidly forward. The Confederates fell back, and with the loss of only three men the road was secured and Chamberlain was ordered to make dispositions to hold it. At 3.30 p.m., however, orders were received for the corps to resume its march, and proceeding up the Cox road and the railroad some distance bivouacked for the night on the Namozine road, near Sutherland Station, General Crawford's division being sent forward to General Merritt, at the crossing of Namozine Creek.

While the events were taking place about Petersburg which we have described, let us glance for a moment into Richmond. Mr. E. A. Pollard, in his volume entitled *The Lost Cause*, thus presents us with a picture of what was taking place there :

"A small slip of paper, sent up from the War Department to President Davis, as he was seated in his pew in St. Paul's Church, contained the news of the most momentous event of the war.

"It is a most remarkable circumstance that the people of Richmond had remained in profound ignorance of the fighting which had been taking place for three days on General Lee's lines. There was not a rumor of it in the air. Not a newspaper office in the city had any inkling of what was going on. Indeed, for the past few days there had been visible reassurance in the Confederate capital; there were rumors that Johnston was moving to Lee's lines, and a general idea that the combined force would take the offensive against the enemy. But a day before Grant had commenced his heavy movement a curious excitement had taken place in Richmond. The morning train had brought from Petersburg the wonderful rumor that General Lee had made a night attack, in which he had crushed the enemy along the whole line. John M. Daniel, the editor of the Richmond *Examiner*, died the same day under the delusion that such a victory had been won; and John Mitchell, who wrote his obituary in the morning papers, expressed the regret that the great Virginian had passed away just as a decisive victory was likely to give the turning-point to the success of the Southern Confederacy. The circumstance shows how little prepared the people of Richmond were, on the bright Sabbath morning of the 2d of April, for the news that fell upon them like a thunder-clap from clear skies and smote the ear of the community as a knell of death.

"The report of a great misfortune soon traverses a city without the aid of printed bulletins. But that of the evacuation of Richmond fell upon many incredulous ears. One could see the quiet streets stretching away, unmolested by one single sign of war; across the James the landscape glistened in the sun; everything which met the eye spoke of peace and made it impossible to picture in imagination the scene which was to ensue. There were but few people in the streets; no vehicles disturbed the quiet of the sabbath; the sound of the church-bells rose into the cloudless sky and floated on the blue tide of the beautiful day. . . .

"As the day wore on, clatter and bustle in the streets denoted the progress of the evacuation and convinced those who had been incredulous of its reality. The disorder increased each hour. The streets were thronged with fugitives making their way to the

railroad depots ; pale women and little shoeless children struggled in the crowd ; oaths and blasphemous shouts smote the ear. Wagons were being hastily loaded at the departments with boxes, trunks, etc., and driven to the Danville depot. In the afternoon a special train carried from Richmond President Davis and some of his Cabinet. At the departments all was confusion ; there was no system ; there was no answer to inquiries ; important officers were invisible, and every one felt like taking care of himself. Outside the mass of hurrying fugitives, there were collected here and there mean-visaged crowds, generally around the commissary depots ; they had already scented prey ; they were of that brutal and riotous element that revenges itself on all communities in a time of great public misfortune. . . .

“ The only convocation, the only scene of council that marked the fall of Richmond, took place in a dingy room in a corner of the upper story of the Capitol building. In this obscure chamber assembled the city council of Richmond, to consult on the emergency and to take measures to secure what of order was possible in the scenes about to ensue.

“ There had been but little sleep for the people of Richmond in the night which preceded their great misfortune. It was an extraordinary night ; disorder, pillage, shouts, mad revelry of confusion. In the now dimly lighted city could be seen black masses of people, crowded around some object of excitement, besieging the commissary stores, destroying liquor, intent perhaps on pillage, and swaying to and fro in whatever momentary passion possessed them. The gutters ran with a liquor freshet and the fumes filled the air. Some of the straggling soldiers passing through the city, easily managed to get hold of quantities of the liquor. Confusion became worse confounded ; the sidewalks were encumbered with broken glass ; stores were entered at pleasure and stripped from top to bottom ; yells of drunken men, shouts of roving pillagers, wild cries of distress filled the air and made night hideous.

“ But a new horror was to appear upon the scene and take possession of the community. To the rear-guard of the Confederate force on the north side of the James River, under General Ewell, had been left the duty of blowing up the iron-clad vessels in the James and destroying the bridges across that river. The *Richmond, Virginia*, and an iron ram were blown to the winds ; the little shipping at the wharves was fired ; and the

three bridges that spanned the river were wrapped in flames as soon as the last troops had traversed them. The work of destruction might well have ended here ; but General Ewell, obeying the letter of his instructions, had issued orders to fire the four principal tobacco warehouses of the city—one of them the Shockoe warehouse—situated near the centre of the city, side by side with the Gallego flour mills, just in a position and circumstances from which a conflagration might extend to the whole business portion of Richmond. The warehouses were fired ; the flames seized the neighboring buildings and soon involved a wide and widening area ; the conflagration passed rapidly beyond control ; and in this mad fire, this wild unnecessary destruction of their property, the citizens of Richmond had a fitting *souvenir* of the imprudence and recklessness of the departing administration.

“Morning broke on a scene never to be forgotten. It was a strange picture—impossible to describe—the smoke and glare of fire mingled with the golden beams of the rising sun. The great warehouse on the basin was wrapped in flames ; the fire was reaching to whole blocks of buildings ; and as the sun rose majestically above the horizon, it burnished the fringe of smoke with lurid and golden glory. Curious crowds watched the fire. Its roar sounded in the ears ; it leaped from street to street ; pillagers were busy at their vocation, and in the hot breath of the fire were figures as of demons contending for prey.

“The sun was an hour or more above the horizon when suddenly there ran up the whole length of Main Street the cry of ‘Yankees!’ ‘Yankees!’ . . .”

The troops of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, occupying the intrenchments in front of Richmond, discovered, before daylight on the 3d, that the city was being evacuated, and made preparations to advance at once, preceded by skirmishers. Lines of Confederate works were passed in double time until the spires of the city came in view. All the colors were unfurled, bands struck up “Rally round the Flag,” and cheer upon cheer from the soldiers rent the air, as Richmond was entered in triumph by the national army about 8.30 A.M. The rear-guard of the

Confederates passed up Main Street just ahead of the advance of the troops that entered the city at that point.

But our story is more directly connected with the lines about Petersburg, and we must return to that locality. At 3 A.M. of the 3d, Generals Parke and Wright reported that there was no enemy in their front, and on advancing it was soon ascertained that Petersburg had been evacuated. The entire army, except Willcox's division of the Ninth Corps (which was ordered to occupy the town), was immediately moved up the river to the vicinity of Sutherland station, where the Fifth Corps had bivouacked during the night of the 2d.

General Grant had been expecting this withdrawal of the Confederates for some time, and his impressions were that General Lee would endeavor to reach Danville, if possible, or Lynchburg as a last resort. He therefore gave directions for the march of the armies so as to intercept Lee's movement. General Sheridan, with the cavalry and the Fifth Corps, was to move in a westerly direction, south of and near to the Appomattox River, so as to feel Lee's army constantly, and at the same time to strike the Danville Railroad between its crossing of the Appomattox and its crossing of the Lynchburg Railroad at Burke's Junction. General Meade, with the Second and Sixth Corps, was to follow Sheridan, moving westward in the general direction of Amelia Court-House. General Ord, with Gibbon's Twenty-fourth Corps and Birney's colored troops, followed by the Ninth Corps, was to move along the South Side Railroad to Burke's Junction.

On the morning of the 3d, the cavalry commenced

the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia, Custer's command leading. Colonel Welles' brigade overtook Fitz Lee's rear-guard and captured a number of prisoners. The Confederate infantry were encountered at Deep Creek, where a severe fight took place. The Fifth Corps followed up the cavalry rapidly, picking up many prisoners and five pieces of abandoned artillery, together with a number of wagons. The corps, with Crook's division of cavalry, encamped on the night of the 3d on the Namozine road, near Deep Creek.

On the morning of the 4th, Crook was ordered to strike the Danville Railroad, between Jetersville and Burke's station, and then move up towards Jetersville. The Fifth Corps moved directly and rapidly to the latter point, General Sheridan becoming convinced that Lee's army was collecting at Amelia Court-House, about eight miles northeast from Jetersville. The Fifth Corps upon arriving at the last-named place was ordered to intrench itself, with a view to holding Jetersville until the main army could come up. The Second and Sixth Corps had followed the Fifth closely until about 11 A.M. of the 4th of April, when Merritt's cavalry, coming in from the right, and having precedence, necessarily delayed the progress of the infantry, so that it was night by the time the two corps reached Deep Creek. It will thus be seen that the Fifth Corps was occupying an isolated position. General Sheridan says, in his report :

“ It seems to me that this was the only chance the Army of Northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to him, and pursued his march to Burkeville Junction. . . . So soon as I found that the entire

army of the enemy was concentrated at Amelia Court-House, I forwarded promptly all the information I obtained to General Meade and the Lieutenant-General."

Lee's army was not concentrated at Amelia Court-House by the night of the 4th, but Longstreet's command was there on the afternoon of the 4th; Gordon's was not more than four or five miles distant; Mahone's division was near Goode's Bridge, ten or twelve miles off; Ewell's command did not arrive at the Court-House until noon of the 5th; Anderson's command, the rear brought up by Fitz Lee's cavalry, arrived on the morning of the 5th.

The Fifth Corps, with the cavalry, therefore held Jetersville from the afternoon of the 4th until the afternoon of the 5th of April in the face of the whole of Lee's army, as the Second Corps did not begin to arrive at Jetersville until 2.30 P.M. of the 5th, followed by the Sixth Corps, the former going into position on the left and the latter on the right of the Fifth.

During the morning of the 5th of April, and before the arrival of the Second and Sixth Corps at Jetersville, Sheridan sent Davies' brigade of cavalry on a reconnoissance to Paineville, about five miles north of Amelia Springs, to ascertain if the Confederates were making a movement towards that flank. At Paineville, Davies found a wagon-train, which was said to have contained General Lee's headquarters papers and records, as well as Fitz Lee's headquarters wagons, guarded by Gary's brigade of Confederate cavalry. Davies attacked at once, drove off or captured the escort, burned the wagons, and captured five pieces of artillery. Upon hearing of this, Fitz Lee, with Munford's and Rosser's divisions of cav-

alry, followed Davies very closely and attacked him at Amelia Springs, about sunset; but Crook, with Gregg's and Smith's brigades, had been sent to Davies' support, joining him at Flat Creek, from which point the command returned to Jetersville with their captures, without further molestation. During this movement Chamberlain's and Gregory's brigades of the Fifth Corps moved out of their intrenchments about 1.30 P.M., to the support of the cavalry, but they had proceeded only a short distance up the railroad, when it was found that their services would not be required and they returned to their former positions.

In the meantime, General Ord, with his command, had made a march of fifty-two miles since the morning of the 3d and arrived at Burke's Junction late at night on the 5th, Birney's colored troops being left at Black's and White's station. Before arriving at Burke's Junction, General Ord had received directions from General Grant to destroy High Bridge and the other bridges in Lee's front; but he sent what proved to be an entirely inadequate force for the purpose. The command (two small regiments of infantry and about eighty cavalrymen) encountered Rosser, with his own and Munford's divisions of cavalry. After a gallant fight, in which General Read and Colonel Washburn of the Union forces, and General Dearing, Colonel Boston, and Major Thompson of the Confederates were killed, the Union troops were compelled to surrender within two miles of High Bridge.

Early on the morning of April 6th, General Crook was ordered to move with his division to the left, to Deatonsville, in consequence of the march of Lee's

army having been continued westward through the night of the 5th. Crook was followed by Merritt.

Moving on the Pride's Church road, Crook ascertained that the Confederates were passing through Deatonsville, their trains on the Jamestown road. About two and a half miles beyond Deatonsville the road forks, near Hott's house, one branch turning abruptly to the right and running down Sailor's Creek, at about one mile distant from it; the other branch of the fork is the road to Rice's Station. The ground at this fork is high, declining in an even slope of the ground to Sailor's Creek.

General Crook, about midday, endeavored to cut off these trains at the forks of the road, but found them strongly guarded by Anderson's command. The head of Ewell's troops was about a mile in the rear of Anderson at this time, coming up, and took part in repulsing a second attempt of Crook, aided by Merritt. Crook's instructions had been to attack the trains, and if the enemy was too strong, one of the divisions would pass ahead, while the other held fast and pressed the enemy, and attack farther on, and so on, alternating, in order to finally strike some weak point.

At the same time that the cavalry proceeded in its movement, General Meade began to advance with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps towards Amelia Court-House, to give battle to Lee; but at 8.30 A.M., when about four miles out, General Humphreys discovered a strong column of Confederate infantry on the north bank of Flat Creek, moving westward. Directing Mott to send a brigade across the creek to develop the force, he halted the remainder of the command and communicated the information to General Meade. From this and other information given by the signal

officers, General Meade became satisfied that Lee's army had been passing the left of the Union army during the night of the 5th, and that the force in front of Humphreys was the rear-guard. He at once faced his command about, directed the Second Corps to move on Deatonsville, the Fifth Corps through Paineville on the right of the Second, and the Sixth Corps through Jetersville to report to Sheridan.¹

The Second Corps at once began crossing Flat Creek, some of the troops wading across with the water up to their armpits, while some bridges were constructed in an incredibly short space of time. A sharp running fight commenced at once with Gordon's corps, and was continued over a distance of fourteen miles, through a broken country, consisting of woods with dense undergrowth and swamps, alternating with open fields.

General Pickett, in the meantime, had crossed Sailor's Creek, and when the head of Gordon's corps, closely followed by the Second Corps, began to arrive at the forks of the road, Anderson crossed the creek with Johnson's division, and, with Pickett, formed across the road to Rice's Station, on high ground, where they made some temporary breastworks. Ewell followed Anderson across the creek, halting upon it. Generals Merritt and Crook moved parallel with the enemy's line of march on its left flank, carrying out their

¹ General Sheridan, in his report says: "The Fifth Corps had been returned to the command of General Meade at his request. *I afterward regretted giving up the corps.*" It will be remembered that when General Grant offered the Fifth Corps to General Sheridan, at the commencement of the Appomattox campaign, the latter did not desire it and preferred the Sixth Corps, but was forced to take it on account of its position. In less than ten days afterwards he expressed the regret that he gave up the corps when he did. Surely, this must be taken as very complimentary, particularly so when prejudices had to be overcome.

instructions, leaving Colonel Stagg with the Michigan brigade at or near the forks of the road. General Custer, when south of Sailor's Creek, succeeded in striking the column at a weak point, capturing 16 pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners and destroying about 400 wagons.

After the main trains of Lee's army had passed the forks of the road at Hott's house, Gordon took the right-hand fork covering them. His delay at this point had given Humphreys time to come up with the Second Corps, and Wright with the Sixth. Humphreys at once continued his pursuit of Gordon's corps, which had turned down the creek on the right-hand fork, keeping up a running contest for three miles farther, the road being strewn with tents, camp equipage, etc. Gordon attempted to make a last stand at Perkinson's mill on Sailor's Creek, but the contest was short and sharp, and 13 flags, 4 guns, and 1700 prisoners were captured by the Second Corps, together with a large part of the main trains of Lee's army, which had become huddled together in a confused mass at the crossing of the creek. Gordon attempted to form on the high ground on the opposite side of the creek, but fell back quickly as the Second Corps crossed. Night now put a stop to the pursuit, as the country and roads were unknown. Gordon, however, moved on and reached High Bridge that night.

In the meantime General Crook, moving to the left, found Anderson posted across the Rice's Station road, behind temporary breastworks. He thereupon, sent Gregg, dismounted, to take possession of and form across the road, to prevent retreat in that direction. Smith, with his brigade dismounted, formed on

Gregg's right; Davies, mounted, in front of Anderson's works; while Merritt formed Devin and Custer on the right of Crook. Ewell had established his Confederate line in a good position on a crest back from the creek, and when he learned from Anderson that the cavalry held the road in his front, he proposed that they should strike through the woods to the right, and reach a road farther west that led to Farmville, or unite and attack the cavalry in Anderson's front, but before they could arrange for either attempt, Wheaton and Seymour of the Sixth Corps charged Ewell, while the cavalry, supported by Getty's division, assaulted Anderson, who was broken to pieces, and the whole of Ewell's command was either killed, wounded, or captured, except 250 of Kershaw's division.¹

The Fifth Corps followed the route designated, and, without becoming engaged, bivouacked on Sailor's Creek during the night of the 6th. The march had been very rapid and tiresome, the Corps having moved a distance of thirty-two miles to Ligintown Ferry. In passing through Paineville, Chamberlain's brigade, being in the advance, captured about 150 prisoners and several teams, and the pioneers destroyed, by order of the corps commander, a large number of army wagons, gun carriages, and caissons, which had been captured by the cavalry, or abandoned by the Confederates.

¹ General Humphreys (*Va. Camp.*, p. 383) says: "According to the most reliable information I have been able to obtain, General Ewell had about 3600 men, General Anderson about 6300, making a total force of 10,000. General Ewell lost about 3400, General Anderson about 2600, making a total loss of both commands about 6000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Among the prisoners were Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Custis Lee, and Dubose of Ewell's command, and Generals Hunton and Corse of Pickett's division. The total loss to Lee's army to-day in its actions with the cavalry and Sixth Corps, and with the Second Corps, was not less than 8000."

No army in the world could stand such losses as Lee was meeting with every day, and no troops could long endure the strain and fatigue of marching all night and fighting by day, as Lee's men were now enduring. They were by this time deprived of everything, even food, and those captured presented a pitiable condition.

As soon as the night of the 6th set in Longstreet, with his command, marched for Farmville, crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox there, and on the morning of the 7th began to move out on the road passing through Appomattox Court-House to Lynchburg. Fitz Lee, with all his cavalry, followed Longstreet, crossing the river by a ford above the bridges, leaving some force there in the vicinity of Farmville. General Gordon crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox at High Bridge (railroad), where there is also a wagon-road bridge. Mahone's division followed Gordon's troops early on the morning of the 7th.

Finding that Longstreet had moved in the night toward Farmville, General Ord moved with his command soon after daylight of the 7th to that town. Birney's colored division had now joined him. General Sheridan sent two divisions of Merritt's cavalry towards Prince Edward Court-House, to intercept any movement of the Confederates towards Danville, and dispatched Crook with his division to Farmville. General Meade directed Griffin to move with the Fifth Corps to Prince Edward Court-House, and Humphreys and Wright to continue the direct pursuit with their corps as long as it promised success.

Crook continued the direct pursuit and encountered the main body of the Confederates at Farmville and

on the north side of the Appomattox River, where their trains were attacked by Gregg, a sharp fight ensuing with Confederate infantry, during which General Gregg was captured.

The Second Corps resumed the pursuit at 5.30 on the 7th and came upon High Bridge just as the Confederates had blown up the redoubt that formed the bridge-head and had fired the wagon-road bridge ; but General Barlow, whose division was in advance, promptly sent his leading men in double time to secure the latter—a matter of exceeding importance, since the river was not fordable for infantry. Indeed, it was of so much importance to the Union army that Mahone, realizing the fact as soon as his men had been driven off, sent a cloud of skirmishers to drive away the men of the Second Corps ; but they failed to effect their purpose, and Humphreys at once began crossing his command. Mahone was occupying the high ground on the north bank, apparently to oppose the crossing, but soon moved off in a northwesterly direction, Gordon's corps moving up the river, along the railroad bed, in the direction of Farmville. Barlow was sent to follow Gordon, and overtaking a part of his command, attacked at once and cut off a large number of wagons. General Humphreys in the meantime had moved with Miles and De Trobriand by a cross-road towards the old Lynchburg stage-road. Coming in contact with the Confederates near the latter road about 1 P.M., he was opened upon by Prague's artillery. It was now discovered that the majority of Lee's army had concentrated, and Humphreys so informed General Meade. Barlow was at once sent for to join the corps, and General Meade directed Gibbon with the Twenty-fourth Corps, and

Wright with the Sixth Corps, to cross the river at Farmville and attack jointly with the Second Corps. It was not known, however, by Meade or Humphreys that the river at Farmville was impassable, nor that it would be night before the Sixth Corps, which had arrived at Farmville at 2 P.M., could get across. Barlow's division did not rejoin until sunset, and it was dark before it could be put in position; and although Miles had made an attack on the Confederates while awaiting Barlow, it was without other result than detaining Lee, which proved to be an unfortunate detention for him and his army.

In the meantime the Fifth Corps had marched from Ligintown Ferry and occupied Prince Edward Court-House, crossing the Lynchburg Railroad at Rice's station.

General Grant, feeling that the end was near, and that the sacrifice of more lives partook only of inhumanity, addressed the following letter to General Lee :

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

It was about 8.30 P.M. of the 7th, when General Seth Williams, Adjutant-General, arrived at General Humphreys' headquarters with the above note. It was sent at once through the picket line, and the following reply was returned within an hour :

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE,

"General.

"Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

No further communication could pass during the night, in consequence of General Williams having to return with this communication to General Grant, by the roundabout way of High Bridge.

As was expected General Lee moved off with his command during the night of the 7th, Fitz Lee, with the rear-guard leaving about midnight.

At 5.30 A.M. of the 8th, the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth, resumed the pursuit on the road to Lynchburg. During the morning, while on the march, General Williams arrived at General Humphreys' headquarters with the following letter:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified from taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

This letter was sent through Fitz Lee's cavalry rear-guard, close in General Humphreys' front.

Notwithstanding the passage of these letters General Humphreys was informed that active pursuit must be kept up, and that they were in no way to interfere with the movements of the Union forces.

General Merritt, with his cavalry, marched from Spring Creek, near Prince Edward Court-House, early on the 8th, towards Appomattox Station, arriving there early in the evening of the same day, capturing Walker's train of artillery and wagons, and three trains of cars with subsistence for the Confederates. He then moved up to the vicinity of Appomattox Court-House and formed across the road the Confederates were moving on. General Crook, with Mackenzie following him, reached Appomattox Station in the evening of the 8th, having burned subsistence trains at Pamplin's Station on the way. From the station he sent Smith's brigade to the Court-House to hold the road from that place to Lynchburg.

About dusk of the 8th the following letter was received by General Humphreys, who had halted his command for a two or three hours' rest in the neighborhood of New Store :

“April 8, 1865.

“GENERAL : I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I

should be pleased to meet you at 10 A.M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

“ R. E. LEE,
“General.

“ Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT.”

This communication had to be sent back to General Grant, who was at Curdsville, ten miles from New Store. Consequently no other communication passed during the night of the 8th.

While the above matters were taking place, General Griffin, with the Fifth Corps, had moved from Prince Edward Court-House early on the morning of the 8th, struck the Lynchburgh road at Prospect Station about noon, and thence followed the Twenty-fourth Corps towards Appomattox Court-House, bivouacking the next morning about 2 A.M. within about two miles of the above place, having marched a distance of twenty-nine miles. General Griffin says :

“ The march from Prospect Station was very slow and tedious, the road being obstructed by the repeated and long halts of the Twenty-fourth Corps.”

But once again that ever-familiar bugle-call of “ Dan—Dan—Dan—Butterfield—Butterfield,” rang out on the fresh morning air, and though some of the wearied men substituted “ Damn ” for “ Dan,” they pulled themselves together with spirit as soon as they got an inkling of what was in prospect, and without rations the day before, or breakfast on this memorable day, at 4 A.M. of the 9th of April the Fifth Corps moved from its bivouac, and reached General Sheridan’s headquarters, near Appomattox Court-House, about 6 A.M. Very soon afterwards it was reported

that the cavalry were heavily engaged and hard pressed. The Twenty-fourth Corps was moving out when General Ayres, with the 2d Division of the Fifth Corps, moved on a parallel line rapidly toward the firing. At this time a message was received from General Sheridan, through his aide, Captain Martin, that the enemy was pressing back the cavalry. Ayres immediately pushed forward his division at double time, and deployed the 190th and 191st Pennsylvania, under Colonel Pattee, as skirmishers (they being armed with the Spencer rifle), and the rest of the division in two lines of battle. Bartlett, with the 1st Division, came up promptly on Ayres' right and formed two lines of battle, with the 195th Pennsylvania, a portion of the 198th Pennsylvania, and the 185th New York as a skirmish line. All immediately moved forward and attacked the enemy, pushing him back and driving both his infantry and artillery from the hills westward through the town, taking a number of prisoners, several wagons, caissons, and limbers. A portion of the skirmish line had entered the town, being strongly supported by the lines of battle, when a message was received from General Sheridan that hostilities would be suspended, as General Lee was about to surrender. Lieutenant Hiram Clark, of the 185th New York, of Chamberlain's brigade, was instantly killed by a cannon-shot, fired from a Confederate battery in the town, just as the flag of truce came in.

General Griffin, in his report, says :

“ Although a battle was expected at this point, and orders had been carefully given by staff officers for the divisions to keep well closed up, through some unaccountable mistake or neglect on the part of the commander of the 3d Division it failed to follow the

column, and did not move until an officer had been specially dispatched for it to move up, and did not reach its proper position until after hostilities for the day had ceased."

On the morning of the 9th General Humphreys received from General Grant his third letter to General Lee, which he sent forward by Colonel Whittier, who was conducted directly to General Lee, as follows :

" April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.

"By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.

"Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT,

" *Lieutenant-General.*

"General R. E. LEE."

General Lee at once dictated the following letter to General Grant, Colonel Marshall writing it, and delivered it to Colonel Whittier about 9 A.M. :

" April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL : I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday, with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

" R. E. LEE,

" *General.*

" Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

Colonel Whittier delivered this letter to General Meade about 10 A.M., and it was forwarded to General Grant by the hands of Lieutenant Pease, who, after a ride of about twelve miles, delivered it to General Grant about eight miles from Appomattox, on or near the roads followed by Generals Sheridan and Ord, he having crossed over to this point from the route followed by the Second and Sixth Corps.

General Grant at once sent the following to General Lee :

" April 9, 1865.

" General R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A. :

" Your note of this date is but this moment, 11.50 A.M., received. In consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am, at this writing, about four miles west of Walker's church, and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you.

" Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me.

" Very respectfully your obedient servant.

" U. S. GRANT,

" *Lieutenant-General.*"

THE CLOSING IN ON THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

The following is an account of the scene as described by Mr. J. L. Smith, the historian of the 118th Pennsylvania, on the Fifth Corps' front. Says Mr. Smith :

" At maddening gait a single horseman dashed up the lane towards the Union lines, and struck them immediately in front of the 118th [Pennsylvania]. As he rode he swung violently above his head an article white in color, longer than it was wide. As he drew nearer a red border was plainly seen around the edges of his flag. It was, in fact, a towel, improvised into a flag, for the occasion, and the two great armies that for four years

had so fiercely contended for the mastery were at last, in this quiet Virginia vale, brought to terms by this most innocent and essential of all domestic articles. The horseman approached the left of the regiment, which stood across the lane, and quickly asked, 'Where is your commanding officer, General Sheridan?' We pointed to our right, saying, 'Over there,' and the truce-bearer was seen dashing away in that direction at breakneck speed."

" ' Copy.

" ' CHARLESTON, S. C., May 22, 1866.

" ' MR. J. L. SMITH :

" ' DEAR SIR.—Your letter of May 1st, inquiring as to the detail of carrying the flag of truce at Appomattox, has remained unanswered longer than I intended from pressure of business, sickness in my family, and general reluctance to write on this subject and disinclination to write at all on any matter or subject.

" ' The flag was a new and clean white crash towel, one of a lot for which I had paid \$20 or \$40 a piece in Richmond a few days before we left there. I rode alone up a lane (I believe there was only a fence on my right intact), passing by the pickets or sharpshooters of Gary's (Confederate) cavalry brigade, stationed along the fence, enclosing the lane on my right as I passed. A wood was in front of me, occupied by Federals, unmounted cavalry, I think. I did not exhibit the flag until near your line, consequently was fired upon until I got to or very near your people. I went at a full gallop. I met a party of soldiers . . . and near them two or three officers. One was Lieutenant-Colonel Whitaker, now in Washington, and the other a major. I said to them : "Where is your commanding Officer, General Sheridan? I have a message for him." They replied : "He is not near here, but General Custer is, and you had better see him."—"Can you take me to him?"—"Yes." They mounted and we rode up the road that I came but a short distance when we struck Custer's division of cavalry, passing at full gallop along a road crossing our road and going to my left. We galloped down this road to the head of the column, where we met General Custer. He asked : "Who are you, and what do you wish?" I replied : "I am of General Longstreet's staff, but am the bearer of a message from General Gordon to General Sheridan, asking for a suspension of hostilities until General Lee can be heard from,

who has gone down the road to meet General Grant to have a conference." General Custer replied: "We will listen to no terms but that of unconditional surrender. We are behind your army now and it is at our mercy." I replied: "You will allow me to carry this message back?" He said: "Yes."—"Do you wish to send an officer with me?" Hesitating a little, he said, "Yes," and directed the two officers who came with me, Lieutenant-Colonel Whitaker and the major, whose name I don't know, to go with me. We rode back to Gordon in almost a straight line. Somewhere on the route a Major Brown, of General Gordon's (Con.) staff, joined me, I think after I had left Custer.

"On our way back to Gordon two incidents occurred. Colonel Whitaker asked me if I would give him the towel to preserve that I had used as a flag. I replied: "I will see you in hell first; it is sufficiently humiliating to have had to carry it and exhibit it, and I shall not let you preserve it as a monument of our defeat." I was naturally irritated and provoked at our prospective defeat, and Colonel Whitaker at once apologized, saying he appreciated my feelings and did not intend to offend. Passing some artillery crossing a small stream, he asked me to stop this artillery, saying: "If we are to have a suspension of hostilities, everything should remain *in statu quo*." I replied: "In the first place I have no authority to stop this artillery; and secondly, if I had, I should not do so, because General Custer distinctly stated that we were to have no suspension of hostilities until an unconditional surrender was asked for. I presume this means continuing the fight. I am sure General Longstreet will construe it so."

"When I reached General Gordon, he asked me to go in another direction, almost opposite to the one I had been, and take the flag to stop the firing. I replied that I could not so go, as I must go to General Longstreet; besides, some of his (Gordon's) staff were now with him. He directed Major Brown to go. Major Brown came to me and asked me to loan him the towel. I took him off to a private place and told him I would let him have the towel on condition that he would not let the Federal officer get possession of it, and that I would call in the afternoon for it. He took the towel, and in going into your lines (as he reported to me that afternoon) Colonel Whitaker asked for the towel to display to keep his own people from firing on him, and, as soon as he got

into the lines, he mixed up with the others and disappeared with the towel.

“ I learned a few years ago that Mrs. General Custer has the towel. When I reached General Longstreet, after leaving General Gordon, I found General Custer and he talking together at a short distance from the position occupied by the staff. Custer said he would proceed to attack at once, and Longstreet replied : “ As soon as you please ” ; but he did not attack. Just after I left Custer he came in sight of our lines. He halted his troops, and taking a handkerchief from his orderly, displayed it as a flag, and rode into our lines. He was surrounded by some of our people, and was being handled a little roughly, when an old classmate of his recognized him and rescued him.

“ Upon frequent applications from General Gordon to General Longstreet for reinforcements, he (Longstreet) sent me to say to General Gordon that General Lee had rode down the road to meet General Grant, and that if he thought proper he could send a message to General Sheridan, who was in command in his front, asking him for a suspension of hostilities until General Lee could be heard from. I found General Gordon without a staff officer near him, and he begged me to take the flag, which I did. Major Brown, of his staff, joined me somewhere on the route, I think as I was returning from General Custer.

“ Pardon the hurried manner in which this is written. Let me hear from you again. What part were you in this surrender ?

“ R. M. SIMS,

“ late Captain C. S. A. ”

What took place on the Second and Sixth Corps' front General Humphreys describes as follows :

“ About half-past ten the troops of the Second Corps, closely followed by the Sixth Corps, began to overtake General Longstreet's, when General Humphreys received two earnest verbal requests from General Lee by a staff officer (Colonel Marshall or Colonel Taylor) with a flag of truce, not to press forward upon him, but to halt, as negotiations were going on for a surrender. General Humphreys did not feel himself authorized to comply with these requests, since he had not received such information and authority from General Meade or General Grant as

would sanction it, and so replied to General Lee, and continued to press forward.

“When the request by General Lee’s staff officer was made the last time (the Second Corps was then close on General Longstreet), he was very urgent—so urgent that General Humphreys had to send him word twice that the request could not be complied with, and that he must withdraw from the ground at once. He was in full sight on the road, not a hundred yards distant from the head of the Second Corps.

“About half a mile beyond this, at eleven o’clock, the Second Corps had come up with Longstreet’s command, intrenched in the vicinity of Appomattox Court-House. It was at once formed for attack, the Sixth Corps formed on the right, which, at the moment when it was about to begin, was suspended by the arrival of General Meade, who sent a written communication to General Lee granting a truce on his (Meade’s) line for an hour, in view of the negotiations for a surrender.”

We now turn to the scene on the cavalry front, as graphically described by General Sheridan, in an article published in the *North American Review*, as follows :

“I remember well the little frame house just south of the station where the headquarters of the cavalry rested, or rather remained, for there was no rest the night of the 8th. Dispatches were going back to our honored chief, General Grant, and Ord was requested to push on the wearied infantry. To-morrow was to end our troubles in all reasonable probability, but it was thought necessary that the infantry should arrive, in order to doubly insure the result. Merritt, Crook, and Custer were, at times, there. Happiness was in every heart. Our long and varied labors were about to cease ; our dangers soon to end. There was no sleep ; there had been but little for the previous eight or nine days. Before sunrise, General Ord came in reporting the near approach of his command. After a hasty consultation about positions to be taken up by the incoming troops, we were in the saddle and off for the front, in the vicinity of Appomattox Court-House. As we were approaching the village a heavy line of Confederate infantry was

seen advancing, and rapid firing commenced. Riding to a slight elevation, where I could get a view of the advancing enemy, I immediately sent directions to General Merritt for Custer's and Devin's divisions to slowly fall back, and as they did so to withdraw to our right flank, thus unmasking Ord's and Gibbon's infantry. Crook and Mackenzie, on the extreme left, were ordered to hold fast. I then hastily galloped back to give General Ord the benefit of my information. No sooner had the enemy's line of battle reached the elevation from which my reconnaissance had been made, and from whence could be distinctly seen Ord's troops in the distance, than he called a sudden halt, and a retrograde movement began to a ridge about a mile to his rear. Shortly afterward I returned from General Ord to the front, making for General Merritt's battle-flag on the right flank of the line. On reaching it, the order to advance was given, and every guidon was bent to the front, and as we swept by to the left of the enemy's line of battle he opened a heavy fire from artillery. No heed was paid to the deadly missiles, and, with the wildest yells, we soon reached a point some distance to his right and nearly opposite Appomattox Court-House. Beyond us, in a low valley, lay Lee and the remnant of his army. There did not appear to be much organization, except in the advanced troops under General Gordon, whom we had been fighting, and a rear guard under General Longstreet, still farther up the valley. Formations were immediately commenced, to make a bold and sweeping charge down the grassy slope, when an aide-de-camp from Custer, filled with excitement, hat in hand, dashed up to me with the message from his chief: 'Lee has surrendered! Do not charge; the white flag is up!' Orders were given to complete the formation, but not to charge.

"Looking to the left, to Appomattox Court-House, a large group was seen near to the lines of Confederate troops that had fallen back to that point. General Custer had not come back, and, supposing that he was with the group at the Court-House, I moved on a gallop down the narrow ridge, followed by my staff. The Court-House was, perhaps, three-fourths of a mile distant. We had not gone far before a heavy fire was opened on us from a skirt of timber to our right, and distant not much over three hundred yards. I halted for a moment, and, taking off my hat, called out that the flag was being violated, but could not stop the firing, which now caused us all to take shelter in a ravine running paral-

led to the ridge we were on, and down which we then travelled. As we approached the Court-House, a gentle ascent had to be made. I was in advance, followed by a sergeant carrying my battle-flag. Within 100 to 150 yards off from the Court-House and Confederate lines, some of the men in their ranks brought down their guns to an aim on us, and great effort was made by their officers to keep them from firing. I halted, and hearing some noise behind turned in the saddle, and saw a Confederate soldier attempting to take my battle-flag from the color-bearer. This the sergeant had no idea of submitting to, and had drawn his sabre to cut the man down. A word from me caused him to return his sabre and take the flag back to the staff officers who were some little distance behind. I remained stationary a moment after these events ; then, calling a staff officer, directed him to go over to the group of Confederate officers and demand what such conduct meant. Kind apologies were made and we advanced. The superior officers met were General J. B. Gordon and General Cadmus M. Wilcox, the latter an old army officer. As soon as the first greeting was over a furious firing commenced in front of our own cavalry, from whom we had only a few minutes before separated. General Gordon seemed to be somewhat disconcerted by it. I remarked to him : ' General Gordon, your men fired on me as I was coming over here, and undoubtedly they have done the same to Merritt's and Custer's commands. We might just as well let them fight it out.' To this proposition General Gordon did not accede. I then asked : ' Why not send a staff officer and have your people cease firing ? They are violating the flag ! ' He said : ' I have no staff officer to send.' I replied, ' I will let you have one of mine,' and calling for Lieutenant Vanderbilt Allen, he was directed to report to General Gordon and carry his orders. The orders were to go to General Geary, who was in command of a small brigade of South Carolina cavalry, and ask him to discontinue the firing. Lieutenant Allen dashed off with the message, but, on delivering it to General Geary, was taken prisoner, with the remark from that officer that he did not care for white flags ; that South Carolinians never surrendered.

" It was about this time that Merritt, getting impatient at the supposed treacherous firing, ordered a charge of a portion of his command. While Generals Gordon and Wilcox were engaged in conversation with me, a cloud of dust, a wild hurrah, a flashing of sabres, indicated a charge, and the ejaculations of my staff

officers were heard: 'Look! Merritt has ordered a charge!' The flight of Geary's brigade followed; Lieutenant Allen was thus released. The last gun had been fired, and the last charge made in the Virginia campaign.

"While the scenes thus related were taking place, the conversation I now speak of was occurring between General Gordon and myself. After the first salutation, General Gordon remarked: 'General Lee asks for a suspension of hostilities pending the negotiations which he has been having for the last day and night with General Grant.' I rejoined: 'I have been constantly informed of the progress of the negotiations, and think it singular that while such negotiations are going on General Lee should have continued his march and attempted to break through my lines this morning with the view of escaping. I can entertain no terms except the condition that General Lee will surrender to General Grant on his arrival here. I have sent for him. If these terms are not accepted we will renew hostilities.' General Gordon replied: 'General Lee's army is exhausted. There is no doubt of his surrender to General Grant on his arrival.'

"General Wilcox, whom I knew quite well, he having been captain of the company to which I was attached as a cadet at the military academy, then stepped to his horse, and taking hold of the saddle-bags, said in a jocular way: 'Here, Sheridan, take these saddle-bags; they have one soiled shirt and a pair of drawers. You have burned everything else I had in the world, and I think you are entitled to these also.' He was alluding, of course, to the destruction of baggage-trains, which had been going on for some days.

"When the terms above referred to were settled, each army agreed to remain *in statu quo* until the arrival of General Grant, whom Colonel Newhall, my adjutant-general, had gone for. Generals Gordon and Wilcox then returned to see General Lee, and promised to come back in about thirty minutes, and during that time General Ord joined me at the Court-House. At the end of thirty or forty minutes General Gordon returned in company with General Longstreet. The latter, who commanded Lee's rear-guard back on the Farmville road, seemed somewhat alarmed lest General Meade, who was following up from Farmville, might attack, not knowing the condition of affairs at the front. To prevent this, I proposed to send my chief of staff, Gen. J. W. Forsyth, accompanied by a Confederate officer, back through the

Confederate army and inform General Meade of the existing state of affairs. He at once started, accompanied by Colonel Fairfax, of General Longstreet's staff, met the advance of the Army of the Potomac, and communicated the conditions.

"In the meantime General Lee came over to McLean's house in the village of Appomattox Court-House. I am not certain whether General Babcock, of General Grant's staff, who had arrived in advance of the general, had gone over to see him or not. We had waited some hours and, I think, about 12 or 1 o'clock General Grant arrived. General Ord, myself, and many officers were in the main road leading through the town, at a point where Lee's army was visible. General Grant rode up and greeted me with, 'Sheridan, how are you?' I replied, 'I am very well, thank you.' He then said, 'Where is Lee?' I replied: 'There is his army down in that valley; he is over in that house (pointing out McLean's), waiting to surrender to you.' General Grant, still without dismounting, said, 'Come, let us go over.' He then made the same request to General Ord, and we all went to McLean's house. Those who entered with General Grant were, as near as I can recollect, Ord, Rawlins, Seth Williams, Ingalls, Babcock, Parker, and myself; the staff officers, or those who accompanied, remaining outside on the porch steps and in the yard. On entering the parlor we found General Lee standing in company with Colonel Marshall, his aide-de-camp. The first greeting was to Gen. Seth Williams, who had been Lee's adjutant when he was superintendent of the military academy. General Lee was then presented to General Grant, and all present were introduced. General Lee was dressed in a new gray uniform, evidently put on for the occasion, and wore a handsome sword. He had on his face the expression of relief from a heavy burden. General Grant's uniform was soiled with mud and service, and he wore no sword. After a few words had been spoken by those who knew General Lee, all the officers retired, except, perhaps, one staff officer of General Grant's and the one who was with Lee. We had not been absent from the room longer than about five minutes when General Babcock came to the door and said: 'The surrender has taken place—you can come in again.'

"When we re-entered, General Grant was writing on a little wooden, elliptical-shaped table (purchased by me from Mr. McLean and presented to Mrs. G. A. Custer) the conditions of the surrender. General Lee was sitting, his hands resting on the

hilt of his sword, to the left of General Grant, with his back to a small marble-topped table, on which many books were piled. While General Grant was writing, friendly conversation was engaged in by General Lee and his aide with the officers present, and took from his breast-pocket two dispatches, which had been sent to him by me during the forenoon, notifying him that some of his cavalry, in front of Crook, were violating the agreement entered into by withdrawing. I had not had time to make copies when they were sent, and had made a request to have them returned. He handed them to me with the remark: 'I am sorry. It is possible my cavalry at that point of the line did not fully understand the agreement.'

"About one hour was occupied in drawing up and signing the terms, when General Lee retired from the house with a cordial shake of the hand with General Grant, mounted his chunky, gray horse, and, lifting his hat, passed through the gate and rode over the crest of the hill to his army. On his arrival there we heard wild cheering, which seemed to be taken up progressively by his troops, either for him or because of satisfaction with his last official act as a soldier."

As it has been erroneously supposed that both General Grant and General Lee signed the terms of surrender, we furnish here a copy of the only papers which passed between the two officers—General Grant's proposition and General Lee's acceptance, as follows:

“ APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., April 9, 1865.

“ Gen. R. E. LEE,

“ Comd'g. C. S. A. :

“ GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their

property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkeville. General Lee left Generals Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton to confer with the Union generals in order to facilitate the work.

On the morning of the 12th of April, 1865, the anniversary of the day upon which the first gun of the Confederacy was fired at Fort Sumter, much activity was observed in the camp of Bartlett's (1st) division. To this division was delegated the honor of receiving the surrender, and about 9 A.M. it was drawn up in line, with its left resting near the fence which enclosed the grounds of the now celebrated McLean house, where the agreements had been signed. General Joshua L. Chamberlain, commanding the 1st Brigade of Bartlett's division, had been designated to command the parade. In remembrance of its valuable services on many a bloody field, and at Gettysburg in particular, Chamberlain asked for the famous old 3d Brigade of the 1st Division, Fifth Corps, with which he had been identified constantly until he was detached to command the 1st Brigade at Petersburg. Appreciative of his sentiment in this matter, these were the troops which he found in line of battle on the morning of the 12th to take the last view of Lee's (once magnificent) army. The 1st Brigade (Chamberlain's) and the 2d Brigade (Gregory's) were also present, but not in the same line. They occupied a position close by.

It was not long before a column of gray was seen marching down the valley, which sent a thrill of excitement through every individual present. The Union troops were brought to "attention." Evans' brigade of Gordon's corps led the advance of the Confederates. As its head reached the extreme right

of Chamberlain's line it was wheeled into company line first and subsequently into general line confronting the Union troops. Then each regiment stacked arms, unslung cartridge-boxes and hung them on the stacks, and finally laid down their colors. It was a trying scene. And then, disarmed and colorless, they again broke into column and marched off, disappearing forever as soldiers of the Southern Confederacy.

What more need we tell? The gallant old corps, which had alone withstood the shock of Lee's splendid army at Gaines' Mill, which had given the blow that saved Round Top and caused the turning-point in the affairs of the war, now stood, the last to look upon the disintegrated remnants of the Army of Northern Virginia, whose folded colors had been laid at its feet.

List of Officers Killed or Mortally Wounded during the Appomattox Campaign March 29-April 9, 1865.

Delaware.—Lieut. Lorenzo D. Wilson, 3d; Capt. Wm. H. McClary and Lieut. Alpheus Wilson, 4th.

Maine.—Lieut. Alvin A. Messer, 1st.

Massachusetts.—Capt. Willard C. Kinsley, 39th.

New York.—Major Emil Duysing, 15th Heavy Artillery; Brevet Brig.-Gen. Frederick Winthrop, 5th; Capt. Joseph Turkington, 5th; Major Henry H. Fish and Capt. George French, 94th; Capt. Thos. A. Wilson, 146th; Lieut. Ephraim F. Bander, Lieut. Hiram Clark, and Lieut. Daniel Minier, 185th; Lieut. Wm. Meehan, 188th.

Pennsylvania.—Capt. Lemuel Shaw, 56th; Capt. Thomas J. Koch and Lieut. Daniel J. Lehman, 88th; Lieut. Thomas B. Dunn and Lieut. James Strong, 155th; Major Edwin A. Glenn, Major Charles I. Maceuen, Capt. George W. Mulfrey, Capt. Isaac Schroeder, and Lieut. Andrew A. Pomeroy, 198th; Col. Wm. Sergeant, Capt. John N. Hughes, and Lieut. Morris Schlesinger, 210th.

Wisconsin.—Lieut. Augustus M. Hubbard, 7th.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS
DURING THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN,
MARCH 29-APRIL 9, 1865.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Major-General GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN. Brevet Major-General CHARLES GRIFFIN.							
ESCORT :							
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Co. C.)				4		1	5
PROVOST GUARD :							
104th New York							
FIRST DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General CHARLES GRIFFIN. Brevet Major-General JOS. J. BARTLETT.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN.							
Staff			1				1
185th New York	2	30	9	162		6	209
198th Pennsylvania	3	34	10	168		22	237
Total First Brigade	5	64	20	330		28	447
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General EDGAR M. GREGORY.							
187th New York				5			5
188th New York		4	3	37			44
189th New York		3	2	18			23
Total Second Brigade		7	5	60			72

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Major-General JOS. J. BARTLETT.							
Brevet Brigadier-General ALFRED L. PEARSON.							
Staff.....			1				1
1st Maine Sharpshooters.....	4	1	28		5		38
20th Maine.....	7	2	47		1		57
32d Massachusetts.....	2		21		2		25
1st Michigan.....	1	1	19		1		22
16th Michigan.....	2	1	7				10
83d Pennsylvania.....	3		8				11
91st Pennsylvania.....	1		15				16
118th Pennsylvania.....	1	2	16				19
155th Pennsylvania.....	2	9	40				51
Total Third Brigade.....	2	30	9	201		9	251
Total First Division.....	7	101	34	591		37	770
SECOND DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General ROMEYN B. AYRES.							
FIRST BRIGADE							
Brevet Brigadier-General FREDERICK WINTHROP.							
Colonel JAMES GRINDLEY.							
Brigadier-General JOSEPH HAYES.							
5th New York.....	1	8	1	28		30	68
15th New York Heavy Artillery.....	12	14	84		132		243
140th New York.....	6		21		30		57
146th New York.....	5	4	34		22		65
Total First Brigade.....	1	31	19	167		214	432
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General ANDREW W. DENISON. ¹							
Colonel RICHARD N. BOWERMAN. ²							
Colonel DAVID L. STANTON.							
1st Maryland.....	9	6	42		24		81
4th Maryland.....	1	1	3		4		9
7th Maryland.....	7	4	32		30		73
8th Maryland.....		2	4		7		13
Total Second Brigade.....	17	13	81		65		176

¹ Mortally wounded April 1st.² Wounded March 31st.³ Wounded April 1st.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier-General JAMES GWYNN.							
3d Delaware.....	1	2	13	8	24		
4th Delaware.....	2	7	1	27	2	9	48
8th Delaware (3 cos.).....	2	1	12	8	23		
157th Pennsylvania (4 cos.).....	1	7	7	7	15		
190th Pennsylvania.....	3	11	4	18			
191st Pennsylvania.....	2	15	9	26			
210th Pennsylvania.....	7	5	7	1	27		117
Total Third Brigade.....	2	23	9	162	3	72	271
Total Second Division.....	3	71	41	410	3	351	879
THIRD DIVISION :							
Brevet Major-General SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
FIRST BRIGADE :							
Colonel JOHN A. KELLOGG.							
91st New York.....	33	6	170	21	230		
6th Wisconsin.....	8	5	74	1	31		119
7th Wisconsin.....	11	4	55	11	81		
Total First Brigade.....	52	15	299	1	63		430
SECOND BRIGADE :							
Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER.							
16th Maine.....	2	1	16	2	24		45
39th Massachusetts.....	2	4	27	5	38		
97th New York.....	2	2	18	7	29		
11th Pennsylvania.....	3	3	48	5	59		
107th Pennsylvania.....			11	2	13		
Total Second Brigade.....	9	10	120	2	43		184
THIRD BRIGADE :							
Brevet Brigadier - General RICHARD COLTHER.							
94th New York.....	2	10	4	45	24		85
95th New York.....	4	2	61	9	76		
147th New York.....	2	1	28	2	33		
56th Pennsylvania.....	1	2	22	25			
88th Pennsylvania.....	1	3	22	1	35		
121st Pennsylvania.....	1	1	6	1	9		
142d Pennsylvania.....		4	8	4	16		
Total Third Brigade.....	3	18	16	192	1	49	279
1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters (un-attached).....			1				1
Total Third Division.....	3	79	41	612	4	155	894

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted en.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARTILLERY BRIGADE:							
Brevet Brigadier-General CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT.							
1st New York Light, Battery B.....				3			3
1st New York Light, Battery D.....				3			3
1st New York Light, Battery H.....	1						1
15th New York Heavy, Co. M.....				3			3
4th United States, Battery B.....	1	1					2
5th United States, Batteries D and G.....	1		1				2
Total Artillery Brigade.....	3	1	9				13
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	13	254	117	1626	7	544	2561

GRAND SUMMARY OF LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS DURING THE WAR OF THE REBELLION, 1861-5.

CAMPAIGN OR BATTLE.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Seven Days' Battles before Richmond, 1862.....	56	939	194	3611	101	2700	7601
Second Bull Run Campaign, 1862.....	30	301	68	1294	8	450	2151
Maryland Campaign, 1862.....	4	84	8	243	3	130	472
Rappahannock Campaign, 1862....	21	185	125	1544	300	2175
Chancellorsville Campaign, 1863....	6	63	19	453	5	154	700
Gettysburg Campaign, 1863.....	28	337	129	1482	1	210	2187
The Wilderness, 1864 (May 5-7)....	40	447	131	2686	82	1746	5132
Spottsylvania C. H., 1864 (May 8-21)	33	624	163	3285	9	366	4480
North Anna, Pamunkey, etc., 1864 (May 22-June 1).....	9	126	34	725	9	172	1075
Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, etc., 1864 (June 2-15).....	15	134	40	709	5	437	1340
Weldon Railroad, 1864 (August 18-21).....	17	171	74	747	98	2562	3669
Poplar Spring Church, 1864 (Sept. 30).....	6	65	22	322	10	202	626
Boydton Plank Road, 1864 (Oct. 27-28).....	25	3	186	2	63	279
Hatcher's Run, 1865 (Feb. 5-7)....	11	120	56	914	2	157	1260
Appomattox Campaign, 1865 (March 29-April 9).....	13	254	117	1626	7	544	2561
Grand total.....	289	3875	1183	19,827	342	10,193	35,708

CONCLUSION.

Although the last of Lee's men had departed from the valley of the Appomattox, the work of the Fifth Corps was not yet finished. It has been stated that, of the troops who surrendered, only 8000 had arms. This is not surprising, for many of the men threw away their arms on learning of the surrender. This was verified in the few days that the corps remained at Appomattox Court-House. The men were employed during this time in gathering up all abandoned stores and munitions of war. In the woods where the Confederates had encamped, muskets were scattered upon the ground in every direction. Whole battalions had stacked arms and left for home apparently without waiting to sign their paroles. These arms and equipments were, as a rule, of no value to the Government, and were of course destroyed.

The number of officers and enlisted men of Lee's army paroled on the 9th of April was as follows :

	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.
General Lee and Staff.....	15	15
Longstreet's Corps.....	1,521	13,312	14,833
Gordon's Corps.....	695	6,505	7,200
Ewell's Corps.....	19	268	287
Total Infantry.....	2,250	20,085	22,335
Cavalry Corps.....	132	1,654	1,786
Artillery Corps.....	192	2,394	2,586
Detachments.....	288	1,361	1,649
Grand Total.....	2,862	25,494	28,356

Notwithstanding the fact that the surrender was the occasion of great rejoicing, the discomforts arising

from this sojourn at Appomattox Court-House were sufficient to dampen the ardor of any body of men. The railroad bridges had been destroyed, so that trains could not reach them, while the condition of the wagon roads was terrible. The men were, for some unaccountable reason, without regular food for two days. This should not have been. Foraging expeditions were sent out, with poor results, and on the 14th the rain poured down in torrents. Without tents and without rations, a miserable day and night was passed.

On the 15th of April, about noon, the corps commenced its return march, the men floundering through mud, and moving with less of display than they had marched from many a field of defeat. It was expected that they would reach a point where rations could be drawn that night; but alas, for the hopes that vanish! Some time after dark, the order was given to stack arms and break ranks for the night, during which it rained incessantly. The next day was cold and raw. At noon the corps crossed the Appomattox River on a temporary bridge, and soon reached the village of Farmville, where, at 4 P.M., a dispatch was received announcing the assassination of President Lincoln. Additional gloom was thus cast upon a sullen and dispirited body of men; but, out of respect to their much-loved and honored President, the color-bearers resorted to all kinds of devices for draping their colors in mourning, even to that of dipping white handkerchiefs or other articles in ink.

On Monday, the 17th, the corps resumed its march by the way of Burkeville, and on Sunday, April 23d, stacked arms at Sutherland Station, near Petersburg,

where the corps went into camp. Two days afterwards the announcement was made of the surrender of General Johnston's army in North Carolina. Here the corps remained until May 5th, when it marched through the long lines of intrenchments about Petersburg, and, moving on the broad pike towards Richmond, united with the other corps of the Army of the Potomac. On the 6th of May the James River was crossed, and the army was reviewed by General Halleck as it passed through the principal streets of Richmond. Continuing the march, the white dome of the Capitol at Washington was sighted in the afternoon of the 12th, and with hearts full of gratitude cheer upon cheer was sent up all along the column. The corps went into camp for the last time about one mile from Falls Station, on the Alexandria Railroad, and here, for the first time, was seen General Sherman's great army, which had arrived and encamped on the heights above Alexandria.

Preparations were now made for a grand review of these two magnificent armies. Amidst the most elaborate of decorations, and the wildest enthusiasm of the inhabitants of the National Capital, the entire force paraded the streets on the 24th of May, 1865, and was reviewed by the President and Cabinet, by all the representatives of foreign governments, and by hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom had come from distant cities to witness the imposing pageant. Little children and tender, thoughtful women pressed flowers into the hands of these hardy veterans, while kindly smiles and sweet words of welcome greeted them on every hand. Comrades, can you remember the pride that swelled your hearts on that day?

The corps recrossed the Potomac to its camp the same evening, and the next day commenced the preparation of the rolls for discharge.

By June 1, 1865, the Fifth Army Corps existed only in name !

ADDENDA.

Col. Fred. T. Locke, A. A. G. of the Fifth Corps, was severely wounded in the face by a musket ball at Spottsylvania, Va., on May 8, 1864. This wound was the indirect cause of his death more than twenty years subsequently.

The following letter explains itself :

“ HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
“ WASHINGTON, July 22, 1865.

“ Corporal JACOB R. TUCKER,

“ Co. G, 4th Regiment Maryland Vol. Infantry :

“ The sum of \$460.00 was sent to me by patriotic citizens to be presented as a reward for gallantry to the soldier who should first raise our flag over Richmond. As Richmond was not taken by assault, I have concluded that the donors' wishes will be best carried out by dividing the sum between three soldiers most conspicuous for gallantry in the final and successful assault on Petersburg.

“ You have been selected by Major-General Charles Griffin, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, as entitled to this honor on behalf of that command, and I herewith present to you \$153.33, as one third of the original sum.

“ It affords me great satisfaction to receive from your commanding general such unqualified testimony of your gallantry and heroism in battle, and to be the medium of transmitting to you this recognition of the worth of your services in defense of our common country.

U. S. GRANT,

“ *Lieutenant-General.*”

Medals of Honor Awarded Men of the Fifth Army Corps for Distinguished Services under Resolution of Congress Approved July 12, 1863, and Section 6 of Act of Congress Approved March 3, 1863.

Chamberlain, Joshua L., Brig.-Gen. and Bvt. Maj.-Gen., for personal gallantry at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.

Delavie, Hiram A., Sergeant Co. I, 11th Penna. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Edwards, David, Private Co. H, 146th N. Y. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Everson, Adelbert, Private Co. D, 185th N. Y. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Fernald, Albert E., 1st Lieut. 20th Maine Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Funk, West, Major 121st Penna. Inf., April 9, 1865, for capture of flag of the 46th Va., at Appomattox, C. H., Va.

Gardner, Charles N., Private Co. E, 32d Mass. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Grindlay, James, Colonel 146th N. Y. Inf., April 1, 1865, for conspicuous bravery in the battle of Five Forks, Va.

Kauss, Augustus, Corporal Co. H, 15th N. Y. Heavy Art., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a battle-flag at Five Forks, Va.

Koogle, Jacob, 1st Lieut. Co. G, 7th Md. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a battle-flag at Five Forks, Va.

Murphy, Thomas F., 1st Sergt. Co. G, 146th N. Y. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Scott, John Wallace, Captain Co. D, 157th Penna. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Shiple, Robert F., Sergeant Co. A, 140th N. Y. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Shopp, George F., Private Co. E, 191st Penna. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Stewart, Joseph, Private Co. G, 1st Md. Inf., April 1, 1865, for the capture of a flag at Five Forks, Va.

Tucker, Jacob R., Corporal Co. G, 4th Md. Inf., April 2, 1865, for gallantry in the final and successful assault on Petersburg, Va.

Names of Corps, Division, and Brigade Commanders.¹

Corps.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Maj.-Gen. Fitz-John Porter | 4. Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade |
| 2. Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker | 5. Maj.-Gen. George Sykes |
| 3. Maj.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield | 6. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren |
| 7. Maj.-Gen. Charles Griffin. | |

¹ The troops which these officers commanded will be found in the organization of the corps, preceding campaigns, or in the return of casualties, following campaigns.

Division.

Ayres, Romeyn B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.	Humphreys, Andrew A., Brig.-Gen.
Barnes, James, Brig.-Gen.	Lockwood, Henry H., Brig.-Gen.
Bartlett, Joseph J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.	McCall, George A., Brig.-Gen.
Chamberlain, Joshua L., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.	McCandless, Wm., Col.
Crawford, Sam'l W., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.	Morrell, George W., Maj.-Gen.
Cutler, Lysander, Brig.-Gen.	Robinson, John C., Brig.-Gen.
Griffin, Charles, Bvt. Maj.-Gen.	Seymour, Truman, Brig.-Gen.
	Sykes, George, Brig.-Gen.
	Wadsworth, James S., Brig.-Gen.

Brigade.

Allabach, P. H., Col.	Griffin, Charles, Brig.-Gen.
Andrews, George L., Maj.	Grimshaw, A. H., Col.
Ayres, Romeyn B., Brig.-Gen.	Grindlay, James, Col.
Barnes, James, Brig.-Gen.	Gwyn, James, Bvt. Brig.-Gen.
Bartlett, Joseph J., Brig.-Gen.	Hardin, Martin, D., Col.
Bates, James L., Col.	Hartshorne, Wm. R., Col.
Baxter, Henry, Brig.-Gen.	Hayes, Joseph, Brig.-Gen.
Bowerman, Richard N., Col.	Hofmann, J. William, Col.
Bragg, Edward S., Brig.-Gen.	Jackson, C. Feger, Col.
Buchanan, Robt. C., Lt.-Col.	Kellogg, John A., Col.
Burbank, Sidney, Col.	Kitching, J. Howard, Col.
Butterfield, Daniel, Brig.-Gen.	Lansing, Henry S., Col.
Chapman, Wm., Lt.-Col.	Leonard, Samuel H., Col.
Coulter, Richard, Bvt. Brig.-Gen.	Lovell, Charles S., Maj.
Cutler, Lysander, Brig.-Gen.	Lyle, Peter, Col.
Day, Hannibal, Col.	Magilton, A. L., Col.
Denison, Andrew W., Bvt. Brig.-Gen.	Martin, A. P., Capt.
Dushane, Nathan T., Col.	Martindale, John H. Brig.-Gen.
Fisher, Joseph W., Col.	McCandless, William, Col.
Garrard, Kenner, Col.	McQuade, James, Col.
Graham, Samuel A., Col.	Meade, George G., Brig.-Gen.
Gregory Edgar M., Bvt.-Brig.-Gen.	Otis, Elwell S., Lt.-Col.
	O'Rorke, P. H., Col.
	Pearson, A. L., Bvt. Brig.-Gen.
	Reynolds Jno. F., Brig.-Gen.

Rice, James C., Brig.-Gen.	Tilton, Wm. S., Col.
Roberts, Chas. W., Col.	Tyler, Erastus B., Brig.-Gen.
Roberts, R. Biddle, Col.	Vincent, Strong, Col.
Robinson, Wm. W., Col.	Wainwright, Charles S., Col.
Seymour, Truman, Brig.-Gen.	Warren, G. K., Col.
Sickel, Horatio G., Col.	Weed, Stephen H., Brig.-Gen.
Simmons, Seneca G., Col.	Weeks, Henry A., Col.
Stanton, David L., Col.	Wheelock, Charles, Col.
Stockton, T. B. W., Col.	Wiedrich, M., Lt.-Col.
Stone, Roy, Col.	Winthrop, Fred'k, Bvt. Brig.-Gen.
Sweitzer, Jacob B., Col.	Gen.
Talley, Wm. C., Col.	

Battles, Sieges, etc., in which the Fifth Corps Participated during the War of the Rebellion.

1862.

Yorktown, Va., April 5 to May 3.
 Hanover Court-House, Va., May 27.
 Mechanicsville, Va., June 26.
 Gaines' Mill, Va., June 27.
 New Market Road, Va., June 29.
 White Oak Swamp, Va., June 30.
 Malvern Hill, Va., July 1.
 Bull Run (2d), Va., August 30.
 Antietam, Md., September 17.
 Blackford's Ford, Shepherdstown, Va., September 20.
 Snicker's Gap, Va., November 2.
 Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15.

1863.

Burnside's Mud March, January 20-4.
 Chancellorsville, Va., May 1-4.
 Upperville, Va., June 21.
 Gettysburg, Pa., July 1-3.
 Manassas Gap, Va., July 25.
 Draft Riots, N. Y. City, August 18-September 21.
 Rapidan, Va., October 10.
 Rappahannock Station, Va., November 7.
 Mine Run, Va., November 26-8.

1864.

Wilderness, Va., May 5-7.
Spottsylvania Court-House, Va., May 8-21.¹
North Anna River, Va., May 22-June 1.²
Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, etc., June 2-15.
Petersburg, Va., June 17-19.
Petersburg, Va. (Siege of), June 17-April 2, 1865.
Weldon Railroad, Va., June 22-23.
Mine Explosion, Va., July 30.
Poplar Springs Church (Peebles' Farm), September 30-October 1.
Boydton Plank Road, Va., October 27.
Weldon Railroad Expedition, December 7-11.

1865.

Dabney's Mill, Hatcher's Run, Va., February 5-7.
Quaker Road, Gravelly Run, Va., March 29.
Boydton and White Oak Roads, Va., March 31.
Five Forks, Va., April 1.
Fall of Petersburg, Va., April 2.
Namozine Church Road, April 2.
Appomattox Court-House, Va., April 9.
Surrender of Lee's Army, April 9.

¹ Under this general designation there is included the series of combats in which the corps was engaged, variously known as "Alsop's Farm," "Laurel Hill," "Po River," and "The Salient."

² This includes "Jericho Ford," "Hanover Junction," "Totopotomoy River," "Shady Grove," and "Bethesda Church."



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